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Foreword
i he International Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the NavalWar College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises, and articles that con-
tribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the sev-
enty-eighth volume of the historic series, contains the proceedings from a
scholarly colloquium entitled Legal and Ethical Lessons ofNATO's Kosovo Cam-
paign, which was hosted here at the Naval War College on 8-10 August 2001.
The colloquium's mission was to examine the international legal and ethi-
cal lessons to be learned from NATO's Kosovo conflict from the standpoint of
the jus in bello, that is, issues relating to the conduct of hostilities, rather than
the jus ad bellum questions regarding the legal justification for NATO's initia-
tion of the air operation in Kosovo. Renowned international scholars and
practitioners, both military and civilian, representing government and aca-
demic institutions, participated. The colloquium and this Blue Book were
co-sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; the
Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law;
the Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law;
and the International Law Department (then the Oceans Law and Policy
Department) of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, United States Naval
War College.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief ofNaval Operations, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I thank the co-sponsors and partici-
pants for their invaluable contributions to this project and to the future un-
derstanding of the laws of war.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Introduction
A fter every clash of arms, it is important to review the actual applicationof the laws of armed conflict, especially the jus in hello. The NATO
campaign in Kosovo is no exception and, as allied forces were accused of hav-
ing committed various violations of the law of armed conflict, examining what
happened in Kosovo is particularly valuable. While the Prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia conducted a prelim-
inary inquiry into NATO's actions and concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to conduct a formal investigation, there remained significant con-
cerns in the international community over the lawfulness ofNATO's actions.
Moreover, even if NATO did comply with the laws of armed conflict, are
those laws properly suited for today's high-technology battlefield and do they
encourage the maintenance of international peace and security? These issues
warranted examination by scholars in the fields of both ethics and interna-
tional law.
For over one hundred years, the United States Naval War College has com-
mitted itself to combining a scholarly understanding of the laws of war with an
appreciation for and insight into the perspective of the warfighter—the one
who must apply those laws to the battlefield. As such, the Naval War College
was uniquely suited to convene an array of scholars and practitioners to exam-
ine the legal and ethical lessons of NATO's Kosovo campaign. We are in-
debted to Lieutenant Andru Wall of the International Law Department
faculty for the energy and enthusiasm he displayed in organizing our confer-
ence and in editing this volume of the International Law Studies (Blue Book)
series. Well done!
Special thanks also are due to Yoram Dinstein and the Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights, Joel Rosenthal and the Carnegie Council on Ethics & Interna-
tional Affairs, John Norton Moore and Bob Turner and the Center for Na-
tional Security Law at the University of Virginia, and Scott Silliman and the
Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at the Duke University School
Introduction
of Law. Without their co-sponsorship and invaluable assistance the collo-
quium and this Blue Book would not have been possible.
Funding for this book and the colloquium was also provided by Dean
Alberto R. Coll, Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College.
His leadership and support are key to the Blue Book series. Invaluable contri-
butions were also made by Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, USN (Ret.), who
volunteered many hours of his personal time in reviewing manuscripts and of-
fering advice. Further assistance was provided by the rest of the faculty and
staff of the International Law Department and our associated reserve unit.
Volume 78 will serve as a standard reference work of case studies in this
area, continuing the solid, scholarly tradition of the "Blue Books." The series
is published by the Naval War College and distributed throughout the world
to academic institutions, libraries, and both U.S. and foreign military
commands.
DENNIS MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
International Law Department
xn
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W:hen an international group of military officers, judges, political sci-entists, philosophers, historians and lawyers gathered at the United
States Naval War College in early August 2001 to discuss the legal and ethical
lessons to be learned from NATO's Kosovo campaign, no one could have
imagined the horrific attacks that would take place in the United States just
one month later. Much of the discussion centered on whether Operation
Allied Force represented a new kind of war—what many term humanitarian
intervention—or simply an aberration with limited lessons for the future. Some
suggested that Kosovo was nothing like the battlefields of the future would be,
and so the lessons to be gleaned would be of limited use.
There is no question that the global war on terrorism that the United States
and its allies throughout the world are actively engaged in at the time of this
writing is dramatically different from Operation Allied Force. Most signifi-
cantly, the war on terrorism is a conflict fought primarily against non-State
actors and the States that aid, harbor, or support them, while the war over
Kosovo was more traditionally fought against a sovereign State. Some scholars
mused over whether humanitarian intervention wasn't really war at all, yet it
was, classically stated, a matter of politics by another means. A group of sover-
eign States (NATO) used military force in order to impose their political will
(the cessation of the oppression of Kosovar Albanians) on another sovereign
State (Serbia).
The goal of the colloquium was to examine how the law of armed conflict
should be applied in modern warfare—focusing not just on the law, but also
the crucial operational perspective of the warfighter. As Judge James E. Baker
pointed out during his keynote luncheon address, the law of armed conflict is
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not for the specialist, it is not for the lawyer; it must be capable of application
at the tactical level by the most junior of military personnel. 1 As Professor
Dolzer's wisely cautions: "We are living through a period of fundamental
changes in the laws of armed conflict, and it is important that the implication
of all these changes are thought through in a broad debate where the require-
ments of criminal law are discussed, where the realities of military conduct are
taken into account and where not only the noble humanitarian aspirations in
an isolated sense are highlighted." 2
The theme of the colloquium and, thus, this volume, is simply that while
the politics and the modalities of force employed in Kosovo may have been
unique, the legal and ethical lessons to be learned are applicable to any inter-
national armed conflict. So what are the jus in hello lessons to be learned from
Operation Allied Force? First, the law of armed conflict applies to any clash of
arms between two or more States. Secondly, only military objectives may be
lawfully targeted and they are defined within the temporal context of the
given conflict. Thirdly, the principle of proportionality prohibits excessive col-
lateral damage, yet the law does not impose absolute rules regarding imple-
mentation of weapons and tactics. Fourthly, despite the proliferation of
treaties on the law of armed conflict, customary international law will con-
tinue to define major elements and interpretations of the law of armed con-
flict. Thus, it is essential that the development and determination of
customary international law be properly understood and the continuing rele-
vance of state practice be fully appreciated.
The Applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict
1. The existence of an international armed conflict
While there was some debate contemporaneous with the Kosovo campaign
over whether "humanitarian intervention" triggered the applicability of the
law of armed conflict, Professor Christopher Greenwood abruptly answers the
question without qualification: while there is no definition of international
armed conflict in any law of armed conflict treaty, it is agreed to be a factual
determination based on the existence of actual hostilities between two or
more States. 3 This is irrespective of a declaration of war and of the justifica-
tion for the hostilities. An international armed conflict "exists from the first
1. Baker, infra, at 9.
2. Dolzer, infra, at 358.
3. Greenwood, infra, at 39.
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moment after an exchange of fire" between two States.4 Opinio juris supports
this, as NATO certainly believed the law of armed conflict was fully applica-
ble and defined and incorporated the legal limits on the use of force within
the NATO rules of engagement. 5
2. The internationalization of an internal armed conflict
The more challenging question is whether intervention by outside States
(e.g., NATO) on behalf of an organized armed group within a State (e.g., the
Kosovo Liberation Army) "internationalizes" the conflict between that group
and the State it is in conflict with (e.g., Serbia). Professor Greenwood argues
that it does "only if there is a clear relationship between the non-governmental
party to the conflict and one of the States party to the international conflict."6
In the present case, there was not a sufficient link between the KLA and
NATO to internationalize the conflict between the KLA and Serbia. 7 As
such, the members of the KLA were not entitled to combatant immunity nor
were they entitled to prisoner of war status if captured.
3. The interdiction of maritime shipping
The issue of whether NATO could lawfully intercept and divert neutral
vessels carrying strategic commodities was a political question more than a le-
gal one. The "customary law of armed conflict still permits a State engaged in
an international armed conflict to prevent strategic commodities such as oil
from reaching its opponent by sea, even if carried by neutral flagged vessels."8
The law of neutrality was not abolished by the UN Charter, but belligerent
rights still permit warring States to interdict shipping—even that from neutral
States. 9 While not disputing the continuing viability of customary belligerent
rights, Professors Greenwood and Bring urge caution in applying them in the
post-UN Charter era. 10 NATO chose not to interdict shipping bound for Ser-
bia, not because doing so would have been illegal, but because certain political
4. Shearer, infra, at 76.
5. Miller, infra, at 109.
6. Greenwood, infra, at 45.
7. Greenwood, infra, at 44-6; Ronzitti, infra, at 1 14.
8. Greenwood, infra, at 56. See also Walker, infra, at 92 and discussion comments by Professor
Wolff H. Von Heinegg at 127-8.
9. Ronzitti, infra, at 117-8.
10. See Discussion, infra, at 127-30.
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leaders within the alliance were "trying to damp down expectations of the
level of violence" that would be applied. 11
4. Is it the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law?
Professor Stein acknowledges the confusion created by "re-naming the
'laws of war' or 'law of armed conflict' as 'international humanitarian law' thus
blurring the distinction between 'humanitarian' and 'human rights' law." 12 For
Colonel Graham this "renaming" indicates that some people think that ele-
ments of human rights law are included in the law of armed conflict—a trou-
bling proposition for those who have to advise military commanders on their
legal obligations given that human rights law is much less well-defined than
the law of armed conflict. 13 The US military prefers the term "law of armed
conflict" as its obligations are better understood and because, as a matter of
policy, the US military applies the law of armed conflict to all military opera-
tions regardless of their characterization.
Professors Bothe and Green, among others, engaged in a lively debate over
whether humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict, is lex specialis vis-a-vis
human rights law. 14 A lex specialis implies the existence of a lex generalis. How-
ever, because many human rights treaties do not apply during armed conflicts,
it is incorrect to label human rights law a lex generalis and the law of armed
conflict a lex specialis. They are two separate bodies of international law with,
at times and depending on the treaties a State is party to, overlapping
jurisdiction.
The drafters of Protocol I and other more recent law of armed conflict treaties
did draw from the realm ofhuman rights law and incorporated certain human
rights concepts into the law of armed conflict. What must remain clear is that
these concepts are then implemented from the standpoint of the law of armed
conflict. Where there is overlapping jurisdiction and the actions of a military
commander are subject to review under both human rights law and the law of
armed conflict, then the greater specificity of the latter must be determinative.
5. Is there a link between the jits ad bellum and the jits in bellol
It is a well-established maxim that the law of armed conflict applies equally
to both sides of a conflict, although some have argued that there may be a rela-
tionship between the degree of force that may be used and the "purpose for
1 1. See the comments by Professor Greenwood, infra, at 127.
12. Stein, infra, at 319.
13. Graham, infra, at 381.
14. See Discussion, infra, at 392-6.
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which force is permitted under the jus ad bellum." 15 Professor Bothe agrees that
the "jus ad bellum and jus in hello have to be kept separate" because the equality
of the parties is an essential precondition to the objective application of the law
of armed conflict, however, he proffers the caveat that "[m]ilitary advan-
tage ... is a contextual notion." 16 This, to Professor Von Heinegg, amounts to
simply paying "lip service" to the principle that the two bodies of law are sepa-
rate. 17 He counters that "the overall aim that led one of the parties to an armed
conflict to resort to the use of armed force is irrelevant when it comes to the
question whether certain objects effectively contribute to military action of the
adversary or whether their neutralization offers a definite military advantage." 18
Professor Greenwood emphatically rejects the "heresy" that NATO's hu-
manitarian motives entitled it to greater latitude in choosing targets and the
"rival heresy" that "because the campaign was fought for a humanitarian ob-
jective, international humanitarian law has to be interpreted as imposing
upon NATO more extensive restrictions than would otherwise have been the
case."
19 Both these "heretical" views "involve an unjustified muddling ofjus ad
bellum and jus in bello issues in a way which is contrary to principle and unsup-
ported by authority."20
"The law of armed conflict does not ask for motives, political aims, or the
legality of the first use of force," Professor Von Heinegg states: "[i]t takes as a
fact that the jus ad bellum has failed to function properly." 21 Any time consid-
eration of the jus ad bellum plays a role in the jus in bello, the latter is weak-
ened. 22 Even if violations of the jus in bello can justify intervention as some
have argued, that remains a matter of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello re-
mains equally binding on both parties in any resulting hostilities. 23
Nevertheless, Professor Bothe identifies this as the "fundamental issue:
how far does the context of the military operation have an impact on the no-
tion of military advantage?" 24 In this regard, Professor Miillerson points out
15. Greenwood, infra, at 52.
16. Bothe, infra, at 186.
17. Von Heinegg, infra, at 205.
18. Id.
19. Greenwood, infra, at 48-9.
20 Greenwood, infra, at 53.
21. Von Heinegg, infra, at 206.
22. See comments by Professor Von Heinegg, infra, at 221.
23. See Robertson, infra, at 457; see also, Roberts, infra, at 409-13. Professor Roberts states:
"Quite simply, massive violations of jus in bello by a belligerent can help to legitimize certain
threats and uses of force by outside powers intervening to stop the violations." Id. at 410.
24. See Discussion, infra, at 216.
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that the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on Nuclear
Weapons "created a novelty distinguishing between 'an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake' and
other circumstances." 25 This implies that "a wrong done in light of jus ad
bellum has an impact on the jus in bello" applicable in the resulting conflict, be-
cause an aggressor would not be entitled to argue that it was acting under such
"extreme circumstance of self-defense." 26
Notwithstanding the ICJ's advisory opinion, "it remains certain that all par-
ties have to equally abide by the requirements ofjus in bello" and in "that sense
these branches of the law are separate." 27 If there is a "bridge between the two
branches of international law" it "is the requirement of adequacy" because "an
act justified by the necessity of humanitarian intervention must be limited by
that necessity and kept clearly within it." 28 In the final analysis, it is important
to distinguish between political or moral reasons for applying a "maximum
standard" of compliance with the law of armed conflict, and a legal obligation
to do so. 29
Targeting Military Objectives
1. Defining military objectives
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of the law of armed conflict is that
of distinction. Professor Michael Bothe traces the development of the princi-
ple of distinction from Jean Jacques Rousseau's conception of the sovereign's
war. War is between States and their rulers, not their peoples, thus conflict
should be limited to combatants and military objectives. 30 Article 52(2) of
Protocol I contains the "binding definition of military objective:"31
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
25. Miillerson, infra, at 443.
26. Miillerson, infra, at 444.
27. Miillerson, infra, at 445.
28. Miillerson, infra, at 452-3.
29. Stein, infra, at 326-7.
30. Bothe, infra, at 173-4.
31. Dinstein, infra, at 140.
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While there should "be no doubt" that this definition "corresponds to exist-
ing principles as reflected in customary law and simply clarifies them," some of
the clarifications could be "open to different interpretations of the scope of
the obligations imposed on the attacker" and, thus, "incompatible with a con-
sideration of the provision as fully reflecting customary international law." 32
Judge Pocar offers as examples of imprecise clarifications the expressions "ef-
fective contribution to military action" and "definite military advantage."33
"The difficulty of the Article 52(2) definition" of military objective, Profes-
sor Bothe writes, "is its general character" particularly with respect to
"dual-use objects."34 Professor Dinstein is "not enamored" by the phrase "dual
use" and argues that legally the fact that an object may have both a military
use and a civilian use does "not alter its singular and unequivocal status as a
military objective."35
Professor Bothe asks how "the general principle of distinction" can be ren-
dered "more concrete in order to have secure standards for targeting" and
then agrees that an illustrative list of military objectives could be a possible solu-
tion.36 Professor Dinstein proffers that "only a composite definition—combining
an abstract statement with a non-exhaustive catalogue of illustrations—can
effectively avoid vagueness, on the one hand, and inability to anticipate future
scenarios, on the other."37 The likelihood of States ever reaching agreement
on such a list, however useful, is doubtful. Given what Professor Dinstein him-
self identifies as the "temporal framework" within which military objectives
are defined—what may be legitimately attacked at one time may not be at an-
other time—a list could include objects which by their "nature" are military
objectives, but would not likely include the myriad of objects that become mil-
itary objectives by their location, purpose or use. 38
2. Presuming civilian purpose
While the general definition of military objective contained in Article
52(2) of Protocol I can be considered customary international law, it is doubt-
ful that the same can be said about the requirement to assume civilian purpose
32. Pocar, infra, at 348.
33. Id.
34. Bothe, infra, at 177.
35. See comments by Professor Dinstein in the Discussion, infra, at 218-9.
36. Bothe, infra, at 177.
37. Dinstein, infra, at 142 (footnote omitted).
38. Dinstein, infra, at 144; see also Von Heinegg, infra, at 204.
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contained in Article 52 (3). 39 This was an issue that was much debated during
the drafting process and some argue that it "may reflect a '[r]efusal to recog-
nize the realities of combat' in some situations."40 Professor Dinstein points
out, however, that the presumption only arises in cases of doubt regarding the
civilian purpose. "The degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the emergence
of the (rebuttable) presumption is by no means clear. But surely that doubt
has to exist in the mind of the attacker, based upon 'the circumstances ruling
at the time."'41
3. Effects-based targeting
The target selection and review process in Operational Allied Force was
premised on "effects based targeting," which articulates a desired objective,
then seeks to identify "specific links, nodes, or objects" that, if attacked, will
achieve the objective.42 Judge Baker warned of "the impending collision
among the law of armed conflict, the doctrine of effects-based targeting, and a
shared desire to limit collateral casualties and consequences to the fullest
extent possible."43 The focus of the collaborative targeting sessions seems to
validate Judge Bakers fears, as they "revolved around three issues: 1) the link-
age to military effects—the key to obtaining legal approval, 2) the collateral
damage estimate, and 3) the unintended civilian casualty estimate."44
"[E]ffects-based targeting and the law of armed conflict may be on a collision
course" with respect to critical infrastructure, particularly factories owned
by supporters of regimes that could be quickly converted to military use. 45
A focus on desired effects could lead military commanders to target certain
objects for effect, rather than because of their "effective contribution to mili-
tary action."
4. Presidential review of targets
Contrary to popular belief, the president of the United States did not re-
view and approve all targets, but rather a "smaller subset" of the 200-300
39. Bring, infra, at 261; Pocar, infra, at 348.
40. Dinsetin, infra, at 149 quoting W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Laws of War, 32 AIR FORCE
LAW REVIEW 1, 137 (1990).
41. Dinsetin, infra, at 150.
42. Montgomery, infra, at 190.
43. Baker, infra, at 8.
44. Montgomery, infra, at 193.
45. Baker, infra, at 16.
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targets that were reviewed by the National Security Council.46 Traditional
military objectives were approved in theater, while military industrial, electric
power grid, critical infrastructure, and targets with a high likelihood of collat-
eral damage were reviewed by the Pentagon. Of these, maybe ten targets were
submitted for presidential review every four to five days.47
Nevertheless, General Short believes there was too much involvement by
civilians in the targeting process. He argues that because targets were chosen
by civilians rather than by military officers, NATO "bombed targets that were
frankly inappropriate for bringing Milosevic to the table."48 General Short asks
"whose responsibility should targeting be?" Answering his own question, he
asserts that the president should restrict himself to selecting target sets and
leave it to "professional military officers" to select individual targets in accor-
dance with the strategic guidance and the law of armed conflict.49
5. Targeting the will of the people
The morale of the population and of the political decision-makers is not a
contribution to 'military action.' Thus, the advantage of softening the
adversary's will to resist is not a 'military' one and, thus, cannot be used as a
legitimation for any targeting decision. If it were otherwise, it would be too easy
to legitimize military action which uses bombing just as a psychological
weapon—and there are other words for this.50
NATO did not target the will of the civilian population, but neither was it
so naive as to fail to see that there are valid military objectives that can be tar-
geted, a peripheral result of which will be to make the civilian population un-
happy with their leadership for choosing a course of action that allowed this to
happen. 51 NATO did seek to impose "discomfort" on the civilian population,
but this was secondary to targeting lawful military objectives.52
46. Baker, infra, at 13.
47. Dalton, infra, at 201.
48. Short, infra, at 20.
49. Short, infra, at 20. For more on this "'normal' theory of civil-military relations" and the
relationship between military leaders and political leaders during times of war, see ELIOT A.
Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Free
Press 2002).
50. Bothe, infra, at 180.
51. See Short, infra, at 29-30.
52. Miller, infra, at 1 10.
XXI
Preface
Collateral Damage and the Principle of Proportionality
1. The principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality, while codified for the first time in Article
51(5) (b) of Protocol I, is one of the core principles of the customary law of
armed conflict. While the Protocol I formulation of proportionality may have
included specifications that cannot be found in prior declarations of the prin-
ciple, these "specifications are aimed at clarifying the scope . . . rather than at
adding new elements that would lead to the modification of their contents or
effects."53 Simply put, the principle of proportionality prohibits attacks that
cause injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects "which is excessive in re-
lation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."54
The principle of proportionality rests on the presumption that the attacker
is complying with the principle of distinction, thus implicitly acknowledging
that some collateral damage is unavoidable. 55 Yet many fail to recognize or
acknowledge this simple fact. Professor Dinstein agues that they make the
mistake of confusing extensive with excessive: "injury/damage to noncomba-
tants can be exceedingly extensive without being excessive, simply because
the military advantage anticipated is of paramount important."56
"[S]ome have used Kosovo to advance a legal view that the law of armed
conflict virtually prohibits collateral casualties. This is an honorable and worthy
aspiration, but not the law. Nor should it be the law, or the tyrants of the
world will operate with impunity."57 Professor Dinstein reminds us that "[o]ne
has to constantly bear in mind that war is war; not a chess game. There is al-
ways a price-tag in human suffering."58 Rather than focusing on the unrealis-
tic goal of eliminating civilian casualties, the goal should be on their
mitigation—understanding their inevitability and the reality of mistakes, "ac-
cidents and just sheer bad luck."59
The principle of proportionality was "the guiding principle of paramount
importance" for US forces during Operation Allied Force.60 "Concern for col-
lateral damage drove us to an extraordinary degree," General Short states,
53. Pocar, infra, at 346.
54. Protocol I, Article 5 1 (5) (b).
55. Bring, infra, at 262-3.
56. See Discussion, infra, at 215.
57. Baker, infra, at 17.
58. See Discussion, infra, at 219.
59. Id.
60. Miller, infra, at 308-9.
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"and it will drive the next generation of warriors even more so, because
whereas I see this as an extraordinary failure, the leadership within the NATO
senior administrations would say this was indeed an extraordinary success."61
General Short emphasizes that NATO did its "very, very best to limit collat-
eral damage" but "[e]very time we failed in that effort, the reaction by political
leaders was hysterical."62 The political leadership ofNATO could not stand
collateral damage and "they did not understand war. They thought it was a
video game, and that no one ever dies. . . . Did you ever see anyone die in the
films from the GulfWar? I never did. I just saw crosshairs on a target in down-
town Baghdad, and then it blew up."63
2. Responsibility for civilian casualties
There is a very real danger in misplacing responsibility for civilian casual-
ties. It is wrong to place "the entire responsibility for civilian casualties on the
party to the conflict that has the least control over them."64 As an example,
Mr Parks argues that civilians "killed within an obvious military objective"
should not be counted as "collateral civilian casualties."65 To count them as
such "would only encourage increased civilian presence in a military objective
in order to make its attack prohibitive in terms of collateral civilian casual-
ties."66 In the same sense, placing too many targets off-limits because of the
presence of human shields would create the perverse effect of rewarding the
use of human shields.
3. The use of precision^guided munitions
Contrary to the arguments made by some, there is no obligation, in custom-
ary international law or treaty law, to use precision-guided munitions in at-
tacks on urban areas. 67 Such a rule would be "dysfunctional" and a far better
standard would be "to rely on the judgment of the commander."68 Nowhere in
the law of armed conflict is there a requirement to use specific weapons, rather
there is a legal standard of reasonableness that remains constant. A doctor in a
developing country has the same legal standard of care as a doctor in a
61. Short, infra, at 24.
62. Short, infra, at 23.
63. Id.
64. Parks, infra, at 288.
65. Parks, infra, at 291.
66. Id.
67. Murphy, infra, 231-43.
68. Murphy, infra, 241.
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developed country, but the doctor in the developed country may be expected
to perform more tests or expend more resources in order to properly treat his
patient. Mr Sandoz argues that this is an apt analogy to apply in analyzing the
reasonableness of a military commander's choice of weapons.69 Yet one won-
ders whether this isn't a false analogy. The doctor has no choice in whether to
treat his patient, yet the military commander always has a choice in whether
to target a particular military objective. If the commander does not have the
technological capability to attack the target without causing disproportionate
damage, then the law of armed conflict prohibits him from attacking it. Thus
the law simultaneously protects civilians and provides an incentive for the ac-
quisition of technology that increases the commanders freedom of action.
4. Flying above 15,000 feet
Collateral damage concerns must be balanced against "the risk that you are
asking your pilots to take." 70 Professor Murphy noted that NATO's "decision
to engage in high-altitude bombing did not by itself constitute a violation of
the law of armed conflict." 71 Colonel Sorenson is more blunt: it "sells newspa-
pers, airtime and interviews, but the facts just simply aren't there to suggest
that by keeping our pilots at 15,000 feet to protect them that we were engag-
ing in basically carpet bombing." 72
5. The environment
For those States that are party to Protocol I without reservation to Articles
35 and 56, causing damage to the environment is a war crime only if it reaches
"the triple cumulative threshold" of being "widespread, long-term and se-
vere." 73 Professor Bothe suggests that a lower threshold could be reached if the
"collateral environmental damage was excessive in relation to a military ad-
vantage anticipated." 74 However, Professor Von Heinegg counters that cus-
tomary international law would still not consider wanton destruction of the
environment a prosecutable war crime. 75 Judge Pocar agrees noting that the
provisions have "no clear precedent in customary law."76
69. Sandoz, infra, at 278.
70. Short, infra, at 22.
71. Murphy, infra, at 249.
72. See Discussion, infra, at 310.
73. Bothe, infra, at 181-3.
74. Id.
75. Von Heinegg, infra, at 204-
76. Pocar, infra, at 348-9.
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6. Collateral damage and future conflicts
Professor Bring asserts that NATO's "no-body bags policy . . . implies that
the lives ofyour own pilots are worth more than the lives of the innocent civil-
ians on the ground." 77 Yet Professor Adam Roberts cautions that this desire to
protect one's own servicemen was "entirely understandable" and, looking at
the speeches made by NATO leaders prior to the start of the air campaign, it
was not presumed going in to be a "no body bags war." 78 Those who argue that
NATO should have accepted an increase risk to their military service mem-
bers lose sight of the goals of democracy to stop democide, genocide, and ag-
gressive war. "The reality," Professor John Norton Moore points out, is that
we want to achieve those goals "as rapidly as we possibly can at the lowest cost
to all involved."79 By arguing that democracies must be willing to accept
greater risks to their personnel, proponents of humanitarian goals may in fact
raise barriers in a manner that would lead to increased suffering.
Professor Murphy closes his paper on collateral damage with the prescient
observation that future wars will increasingly see a "'happy congruence' be-
tween the needs of military efficiency and the avoidance of unnecessary injury
to civilian persons or property"; however, "the protections the law of armed
conflict affords to civilian persons and property are likely to be less and less ef-
fective in practice. This is because the technologically weaker States, as well
as terrorists or other non-governmental actors, may increasingly conclude
that they must attack the civilian population of the enemy State to offset the
latter's great advantage in firepower."80
Customary International Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
1 . The Martens Clause
The Martens Clause, which was codified in the 1899 and 1907 Hague con-
ventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocol I, recognizes the importance
of customary international law to the law of armed conflict. It reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high contracting
parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
77. Bring, infra, at 266.
78. Discussion, infra, at 304-5.
79. Discussion, infra, at 303.
80. Murphy, infra, at 254-5.
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established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience.81
"The Martens Clause," Professor Shearer writes, "is a powerful reminder
that in situations ofarmed conflict, ofwhatever kind, there is never a total gap
in the law, never a situation in which there cannot be an appeal to law in order
to mitigate the horror and the suffering."82 The powerful rhetoric invoking the
dictates of the public conscience should not be misunderstood as creating a
new source of customary international law, but rather as a safeguard thereof.
Anytime one discusses the application of the laws of armed conflict to new, or
perceived new, types of conflicts, it must never be forgotten that there is at the
very least customary law that regulates the application of military force.
Professor Dolzer notes that much of the "humanitarian law community"
emphasizes the "principles of humanity and . . . dictates of public conscience"
aspect of the Martens Clause, while the military tends to be primarily con-
cerned with the customary practice provision.83 This is understandable as cus-
tomary practice tends to be more easily defined, which is of primary
importance when potential criminal liability is at stake. The two approaches
should converge, however, upon the realization that the Martens Clause
encourages the view that customary international law is based not just on bat'
tlefield practice, but rather on opinio juris—battlefield practice combined with
a concurrent belief that it is lawful. It is upon the State's subjective belief in
the legality of its actions that "the principles of humanity and dictates of pub-
lie conscience" weigh most heavily. In any event, no tribunal has ever
trumped customary law by resting an opinion on the "dictates of the public
conscience."
2. The formulation of customary international law
Following the North Sea Continental Shelf case and the Nicaragua case,
"there is no doubt that for a rule to exist as a norm of customary international
law both its recognition as a legal obligation by States and the latter's conduct
which is consistent with the rule are required."84 The "cannon of principles
laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice" are
as applicable to the law of armed conflict as they are to other areas of public
81. Preamble, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, July 29,
1899, U.S.T.S. 403, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
82. Shearer, infra, at 72.
83. Dolzer, infra, at 356.
84- Pocar, infra, at 340 (footnote omitted).
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international law. 85 Thus, "[widespread practice and corresponding opinio
juris will be required for the formulation ofcustomary law, with or without par-
allel treaty law."86
The importance of State practice cannot be overstated as this is the first of
the three components of customary law listed in the Martens Clause. 87 How-
ever, equally important is the corresponding opinio juris. On this point it must
be noted that many of the steps taken by the United States during Operation
Allied Force to limit collateral damage were taken because they could be
taken, not because there was any sense of a legal obligation to do so. Thus,
these actions provide little in the way of clarifying customary international
law. 88 The "positivist approach" taken by the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice in the Lotus case, which argues that "restrictions on the practice
of States cannot be presumed," may be "particularly well-suited to issues of the
law of armed conflict, which, by their very nature, implicate the vital interests
of States."89
Professor Stein observes that the International Court of Justice and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have looked
beyond traditional sources for "evidence" of customary international law,
which the ICTY said could include "the number of ratifications to interna-
tional treaties and the dictates of military manuals."90 However, a "long list of
signatories" has very little to do with determining State practice in the area of
the law of armed conflict because the "vast majority of signatories of Protocol
I are at best interested observers—bystanders if you will—when it comes to
the actual application of the law of armed conflict in combat situations."91
On the issue of the precedential value of international case law, Judge
Pocar writes:
[I]t has to be stressed that previous decisions of international courts cannot be
relied on as having the authority of precedents in order to establish a principle of
law. The current structure of the international community, which clearly lacks a
hierarchical judicial system, does not allow consideration of judicial precedent
as a distinct source of law. Therefore, prior case law may only constitute
evidence of a customary rule in that it may reflect the existence of opinio juris
85. Dolzer, infra, at 353.
86. Dolzer, infra, at 354.
87. Graham, infra, at 384.
88. See Parks, infra, at 281-2.
89. Murphy, infra, at 235.
90. Stein, infra, at 318-9.
91. Graham, infra, at 383.
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and international practice, but cannot be regarded per se as having precedential
authority in international criminal jurisdiction.92
Finally, the traditional rules protecting the persistent objector still allow a
State to protect itself from a developing norm it finds objectionable.93
3. The customary nature of provisions of Protocol I
It is "undisputed" that Protocol I in part reaffirms and clarifies customary
international law and in part develops that law. 94 "For the first part [its] rules
bind all States, for the second only the State parties to the Protocols are
bound."95 The "fundamental principles" of "distinction between civilians and
combatants, the prohibition against directly attacking civilians, and the rule
of proportionality, are customary international law," Professor Stein writes,
but "it is very doubtful whether the same can be said about other provisions of
Protocol I—in particular those dealing with collateral damage."96
Three points are important to this debate: 1) the status of a particular pro-
vision in Protocol I (whether it is new law or customary international law) may
change with time, 2) if the provision is customary international law, it is cus-
tomary international law that is binding "not the treaty provision as such" and
3) the codification process necessarily involves new or more precise elements
which must themselves be distinguished from the customary principle. 97 In the
final analysis, "there is a trend in the increasing number of ratifications and
some case law in some international tribunals" towards recognition of Proto-
col I as customary law; however, there is also significant State practice involv-
ing the "major actors" that prevents consideration of many provisions of
Protocol I as customary international law.98
Reasonableness and Implementation of the Law of Armed Conflict
It has become a popular .mantra for commentators to decry the perceived
increasing influence of lawyers over the planning and execution of military op-
erations. Yet, "[w]hether actors like it or not, Kosovo may serve as a harbinger
92. Pocar, infra, at 342.
93. Dolzer, infra, at 354.
94. Pocar, infra, at 338-9.
95. Sandoz, infra, at 273.
96. Stein, infra, at 321-2.
97. Pocar, infra, at 338-9.
98. See comments by Judge Pocar, Discussion, infra, at 389-90.
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of the manner in which specific US military actions—down to the tactical
sortie—will receive legal scrutiny, from non-governmental organizations, ad
hoc tribunals, and the International Criminal Court."99 The concern, how-
ever, is not so much that military operations are subject to legal review, but
what standard will be applied in evaluating the wartime actions of military
commanders? Is it that of the reasonable man or the reasonable military com-
mander? As Professor Green wryly observes, a "reasonable man is the man on
a downtown bus; that is not the reasonable soldier." 100 Reasonableness during
times of armed conflict must be judged through the eyes of the man involved
in that armed conflict.
A particular challenge arises in the context of proportionality, the determi-
nation of which often gives rise to a "clash between the military and humani-
tarian Value genres'." 101 Can a "reasonable civilian" ever properly determine
military necessity and proportionality? Professor Bothe thinks they could with
proper training, but Professor Green is less confident that civilian judges could
ever appreciate "the circumstances that were prevailing at the time that led to
the soldier's actions." 102 This, of course, raises the issue of whether civilian
judges should try military cases. Professor Ronzitti offers a solution by distin-
guishing between wartime crimes that are battlefield crimes (war crimes) and
those that are not (crimes against humanity and genocide) . He suggests that
special chambers be established to hear the former. 103
Conclusion
There are many people to thank for their role in bringing this work to fru-
ition, foremost are the co-sponsors and participants in the colloquium from
which this book is derived. Many thanks to Professor Dennis Mandsager for
entrusting me with the opportunity to coordinate the colloquium and edit this
volume—for seeing through rank to the individual that holds it. I am also
grateful for two wise and experienced hands who patiently shepherded a
first-time editor from first-draft to completion: Ms Susan Meyer for her patient
and precise desktop publishing assistance, and Captain A. Ralph Thomas,
JAGC, USN (Ret.) for his indefatigable editorial input and assistance.
Thanks are also due Ms Pat Goodrich, Ms Erin Poe, Ms Margaret Richard,
99. Baker, infra, at 15.
100. Discussion, infra, at 212.
101. Murphy, infra, at 247 (footnote omitted).
102. Discussion, infra, at 211-2.
103. Id. at 212.
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During my nearly three years here at the Naval War College, I have had the
privilege of learning from many of the greatest minds in international law, in-
cluding the contributors to this volume. The most recent holders of the
Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law, Ruth Wedgwood, Ivan
Shearer, Nicholas Rostow and Yoram Dinstein, have selflessly illuminated me
with their brilliance and guided me with their mentoring wisdom. For that I
am forever grateful.
A note of personal thanks to my grandfather, Earl Wall, whose words of
wisdom led me to pursue my dream of military service and, in turn, to discover
a passion for international law, and to my beautiful wife, Yashmin, whose un-
conditional love is a source of continual strength and encouragement. This
book is dedicated to their honor.'
xxx
PARTI
KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

Opening Remarks
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski
he Naval War College is thrilled to have such a distinguished and di-
J-L verse group of participants in this colloquium. You represent the pre-
eminent international law and ethics scholars and the top military lawyers and
warfighters from the United States and at least ten of our friends and al-
lies—including Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Israel,
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
This colloquium, Legal and Ethical Lessons ofNATO's Kosovo Campaign,
is unique in that it is the first time that warfighters and international law
scholars alike have gathered to specifically address the jus in hello issues that
arose during Operation Allied Force. The opportunity to study, reflect, discuss
and debate the issues involved is a rare one that must be seized with zeal and
determination. The mission for this colloquium is simple: to examine the legal
and ethical lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign—focusing exclusively on
the jus in hello aspect of the campaign. Notice that we have not said lessons
learned, for only the future will reveal if they have in fact been learned. Your
work will lay the foundation that is necessary for policy makers and
warfighters to comply with international law today, tomorrow and for years
into the future.
The Information Age and Modern Warfare
How does law and ethics impact where we are headed with modern war-
fare? We here at the US Naval War College, whether looking at ancient bat-
tles or modern technology, always ask the question: what are the implications
for the military and its activities in the future?
Opening Remarks
Admiral Jay Johnson, the former Chief of Naval Operations for the United
States Navy, has described the future as being shaped by three increasing and
irreversible trends: networking, greater globalization and economic interde-
pendence, and technology assimilation. Each has enormous implications for
militaries and societies throughout the world.
Obviously, these trends have enormous implications for the armed forces.
We are now in the midst of a revolution in military affairs unlike any seen
since the Napoleonic Age. In that period, the practice of maintaining small
professional armies to fight wars was replaced by the mobilization of citizen ar-
mies composed of much of a nation's adult population. Henceforth, societies
as a whole would, perhaps tragically, become intricately vested in warfare. The
character of armed conflict had changed fundamentally.
Today we are witnessing an analogous change in the character of war and
warfare—an information revolution that enables a shift from what we call
platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare. Understanding of these
new operations remains nascent. No great body of collated wisdom has
emerged to explain how this revolution will alter national and international
security dynamics.
Allow me to briefly explain what network-centric warfare is, then raise
some concerns with how it intersects with law and ethics. Perhaps most nota-
bly, network-centric warfare enables a shift from attrition-based warfare to a
much faster effects-based warfighting style, one characterized not only by op-
erating inside an opponent's decision loop by speed of command, but by an
ability to change the warfare context or ecosystem. At least in theory, the re-
sult may well be decisional paralysis.
How might this be achieved? The approach is premised on achieving three
objectives:
• First, the force achieves information superiority, having a dramatically
better awareness or understanding of the battlespace.
• Second, forces acting with speed, precision, and the ability to reach out
long distances with their weapons achieve the massing of effects versus
the massing of the forces themselves.
• Finally, the results that follow are the rapid reduction of the enemy's
options and the shock of rapid and closely coupled effects in his forces.
This disrupts the enemy's strategy and, it is hoped, forecloses the options
available to him.
Underlying this ability is an alteration in the dynamics of command and
control. The key to this possibility is the ability to provide information access
to those force levels that need it most. In a sense, the middle-man is cut out.
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Traditionally, military commanders engaged in top-down direction to achieve
the required level of forces and weapons at the point of contact with the en-
emy. However, top-down coordination inevitably results in delays and errors
in force disposition. It is an unwieldy process that denies flexibility to subordi-
nate commands. Combat power is needlessly reduced and opportunities pres-
ent themselves to one's enemy. In contrast, bottom-up execution permits
combat to move to a high-speed continuum in which the enemy is denied op-
erational pause to regroup and redeploy.
Challenges
There are several challenges that arise from the information age and the re-
sulting bottom-up organizational structure. The ones you will address during
this colloquium concern the law of armed conflict as it relates to the conduct
of hostilities, rather than the jus ad bellum or legality of the conflict. Two con-
cerns related to targeting come immediately to mind. First is consistency: as
you are delegating decision-making down to the lowest levels, how do you en-
sure that commanders are uniformly applying the same standards of military
necessity and proportionality? The second concern related to targeting is ac-
countability: the information age ensures that we as warfighters will have
more and better information, but it also means that everyone else will as well.
Thus, our decision making—our targeting decisions—will continue to be
scrutinized in ever-increasing detail.
Allow me to remind you of an incident that occurred during Operation
Allied Force. On April 12, 1999 a NATO fighter was given the mission to de-
stroy the Leskovac railway bridge over the Grdelica Gorge and Juzna Morava
River in eastern Serbia. The fighter was to drop two electro-optically guided
bombs—one on each end of the bridge. The first bomb was launched and as it
was being remotely guided in to the aimpoint, at the last instant before impact,
a train came into view. It was too late to divert the bomb and the train and
bridge were struck. The fighter then circled around to complete his mission by
dropping the second bomb on the opposite end of the bridge as planned. The
bomb was dropped and as it broke through the clouds and smoke, again at the
last instant before impact, it became apparent that the train was covering the
expanse of the bridge. The train was struck a second time. All told 15 civilians
lost their lives.
The laws of armed conflict judge military commanders on the basis of the
information they have available to them at the time decisions are made. Now
the decision to target and destroy this particular railway bridge was reviewed
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and approved by the US National Command Authorities and, in general, by
the North Atlantic Council. The bridge was a valid military objective because
it was an integrated part of the communications and logistics networks in Ser-
bia. It was determined that the military necessity of destroying the bridge was
not outweighed by the potential incidental injury or collateral damage that
would occur should civilians be on or near the bridge at the time of the attack.
That was a reasonable determination consistent with the laws of armed
conflict. The challenge arose during the execution of the mission when the pi-
lot acquired information that the planners did not have—i.e. that a train, pos-
sibly a civilian passenger train, was on or near the bridge. The pilot then made
a split-second decision under the pressures of combat, while flying in enemy
airspace that he would execute his mission as planned. He was properly as-
suming that the possibility of incidental injury or collateral damage had been
accounted for during the target approval process. But while the pilot made
that decision as he flew above the clouds, at an altitude above 15,000 feet, in
enemy airspace, and while guiding the bomb on a five-inch screen in his cock-
pit, the public—including eventually the Prosecutor's Office for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—had the luxury of
hindsight and of viewing the cockpit video in slow-motion on large-screen
televisions in the comfort of their own homes or offices. Many critics were ap-
palled by the sight of crosshairs seemingly locked-on to a civilian passenger
train. The pilot was accused by many of having committed a war crime—of
having intentionally targeted civilians or recklessly disregarded the fact that
they would be struck.
So as our actions as warfighters will be increasingly analyzed in ever greater
detail, it is important that we reflect back on Operation Allied Force and
identify the legal and ethical lessons to be learned. There is no better venue
for this colloquium than here at the Naval War College. Here we have a proud
tradition of bringing the preeminent legal minds together with the leading
warfighters and policy makers. Together we can ensure that the law of armed
conflict is not only expertly articulated, but also applied to real world scenar-
ios in a manner that incorporates the crucial operational perspective and real-
ities. You will go even further by not just asking "what is lawful?" but also
"what is ethical?" Not just what can we do, but what should we do.
Judging Kosovo: The Legal Process, the
Law of Armed Conflict, and the
Commander In Chief
The Honorable James E. Baker
M;y objective is to give you some personal insights into the applicationof the law of armed conflict to the Kosovo air campaign from the per-
spective of a lawyer serving the United States' commander in chief. I am not
here out ofany desire to tell my story. Almost all ofmy instincts as a lawyer, for-
mer national security official, and judge run against my participation in this fo-
rum. However, I have overcome my reticence because I am committed to
constitutional government, and I believe that national level legal review is crit-
ical, to military operations, not just in determining whether the commander in
chief has domestic and international legal authority to resort to force, but also
in shaping the manner in which the United States employs force, which is the
focus of this colloquium.
In short, Kosovo was a campaign during which the law of armed conflict
was assiduously followed. The campaign was conducted with uncommon, if
not unprecedented, discrimination. I believe the process for reviewing targets
within the US government worked well. Where there were mistakes, they
were not mistakes of analytic framework or law. Where the process did not
work smoothly or effectively, the idiosyncratic nature of a NATO campaign
likely came into play. And, let us not lose sight of the fact that the combina-
tion of diplomacy and military operations that comprised the campaign was
successful in achieving NATO's objectives.
Judging Kosovo
I would like to focus on a particular aspect of Kosovo—the process of re-
viewing targets going to the president. At the outset I would like to correct a
misperception. In preparing for the opportunity to comment here today, I
asked military friends what they would be interested in hearing if they were in
the audience. I was struck by the number of times thoughtful officers asked me
why the president insisted upon approving all air targets; invoking images of
President Johnson crouched over maps of Vietnam. As a matter of fact, the
commander in chief did not approve all targets during Kosovo, but rather a
smaller subset, which I will describe later. Carrying the analysis to the next
step, in my opinion presidential review did not impede effective military oper-
ations in Kosovo. Rather, such review was efficient, contributed to the rule of
law, and allowed the president to engage more effectively with NATO allies.
During my preparation for this speech, I was also (perhaps as a courtesy)
asked about the role of lawyers, and particularly the role of a civilian lawyer at
the National Security Council. Therefore, I will begin by describing and as-
sessing my role in applying the law of armed conflict. I will close with a few
concerns about the impending collision among the law of armed conflict, the
doctrine of effects-based targeting, and a shared desire to limit collateral casu-
alties and consequences to the fullest extent possible.
The Targeting Process
Before, during and after the air campaign, I performed three integrated
roles with respect to the law of armed conflict.
1. Preparation
First, I educated and advised the president, the national security advisor,
the principals and deputies committees, 1 and the attorney general on the law
of armed conflict before (as well as during and after) the air campaign. As with
any client, the time you spend educating them up front pays huge dividends
when it comes time to apply the law in a live situation. (0400 on a secure
1. The Principals Committee, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, included the following core members during the Kosovo conflict: the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Representative to the United Nations, and the Director of
Central Intelligence. The Deputies Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, included the Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States
Representative to the United Nations, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
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conference call is not the time to introduce any client, especially the na-
tional decision-maker, to the concepts of proportionality, necessity and
discrimination.)
At the most practical level, I provided background and advice in the form
of memoranda, e-mail, and oral input. My sources were customary interna-
tional law (including those portions of Protocol I recognized by the United
States as customary international law), the Geneva conventions, the com-
mentaries on the Geneva conventions, US military manuals and academic
treatises, and all who taught me along the way, including a number of the par-
ticipants in this colloquium.
I have often thought that questions about the president's domestic author-
ity to resort to force are driven by one's constitutional perspective and doc-
trinal convictions. In contrast, and I know this is risky to say in a room full of
experts who have done so much to shape our understanding of the law of
armed conflict, the principles underlying the law of armed conflict are gener-
ally agreed upon: necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and military ob-
jective. It is the different application of these principles to decisions to resort
to force and to decisions regarding how force is used that generates most
debate.
The law of armed conflict is not law exclusively for specialists. We expect
junior personnel to apply these same principles on a tactical level. These are
principles that policymakers must understand and apply to their most solemn
responsibility: the exercise of force and the taking of human life. I would add,
particularly to this audience, that in this respect government lawyers share a
common duty with law professors and other experts to educate the
policymaker of today and tomorrow in advance of the crisis—and not just to
comment after the fact.
Advance guidance on the law of armed conflict also helps establish lines of
communication and a common vocabulary of nuance between lawyer and cli-
ent. In a larger, more layered bureaucracy than the president's national secu-
rity staff, I imagine that the teaching process is even more important where
the lawyer may be less proximate to the decision-maker. Not only does a good
advance law of armed conflict brief educate the policymaker, any policymaker
who hears such a brief will be sure his or her lawyer fully participates in the tar-
geting process. In addition, the policymaker will understand in a live situation
that the lawyer is applying hard law, and not kibitzing on operational matters.
I say that in part because some policymakers treat international law as soft
law, and domestic, particularly criminal law, as hard law. The law of armed
conflict is, of course, both. Indeed, reading some of the literature on Kosovo,
Judging Kosovo
limitations on collateral casualties and consequences seem always to be re-
ferred to as a political constraint and rarely as the legal constraint that it also
is. Whether this reflects lack of knowledge about the law, or merely recogni-
tion that the policy hurdle was often the first encountered, is hard to say. But
as you well know, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2441, war crimes committed by or
against US persons violate US criminal law.
2. Target Categories
My second law of armed conflict related role was the review of target cate-
gories, such as air defense or lines of communication, under which rubric spe-
cific targets were almost always approved in theater. Among other things, I
would ensure that such categories were consistent with the president's consti-
tutional authority and with his prior direction.
How did I play this role in practice? To the extent specific targets or catego-
ries of targets were briefed, suggested or debated at deputies or principals com-
mittee meetings, I was immediately available in the room to identify issues and
guide officials around legal rocks and shoals.
You may ask why principals were discussing military targets at all. First, as
General Wesley Clark makes clear in his book Waging Modem War, NATO al-
liance operations involved the careful orchestration of nineteen national poli-
cies and, I will add, nineteen legal perspectives, many of which hinged on the
nature of targets selected and the risk of collateral casualties. If the secretary
of state was to address an appeal from one foreign minister or another to
change the course of the campaign, she needed to understand the campaign.
Second, policymakers brought to bear extraordinary regional knowledge,
including insight into Serbian pressure points. The principals had special
knowledge into the effects of targeting that a military staff officer might not
have.
Principals also bore a heavy responsibility for the outcome of a policy car-
ried out through Operation Allied Force. I believe it was their duty to test the
scope of operations to ensure we were doing all that we should do to achieve
NATO's objectives, but in a way that would hold the alliance together. This
was a duty fulfilled.
3. Targets
My third law of armed conflict related role was to review specific targets. If
the president was going to approve or concur in a target, it was my duty to en-
sure the target was lawful. Time and again I returned to the same checklist:
What is the military objective? Are there collateral consequences? Have we
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taken all appropriate measures to minimize those consequences and to dis-
criminate between military objectives and civilian objects? Does the target
brief quickly and clearly identify the issues for the president and principals?
You might ask why the NSC legal adviser and not military lawyers was do-
ing this. There are at least three reasons. First, the European Command staff
judge advocate (EUCOM SJA) and legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Chairman's legal counsel) were performing these reviews. The
system of legal review, however, was sufficiently streamlined that I served as a
fail-safe to ensure legal review had occurred on targets going to the president.
Moreover, the authority to approve is also the authority to modify or to
change, and it was essential that any such changes receive legal review prior to
final approval and execution.
As you know, there is a propensity in government to adopt smaller and
smaller decision-making circles in the interest of operational security. The cir-
cle can become too small. A decision-making process limited to cabinet prin-
cipals may ask too much of too few if those principals are to address issues of
policy and law on operational timelines. In my view, there should be a lawyer
at the senior most policy level who is directly responsible at that level (in addi-
tion to the indispensable legal reviews conducted at other levels) for applying
the law of armed conflict to each decision involving the use of force.
Second, it was in Washington at the Pentagon, the State Department and
at the White House that issues of law, policy, and operations came together. A
NATO alliance objection to a particular target, at the "political" level, might
be couched in both policy and legal terms. Having a lawyer involved helped to
avoid a "default judgment" when legal issues were raised.
Finally, and importantly, I implicitly assumed an additional role as a trustee
to the process. I was not self-appointed; rather, this is what the national secu-
rity advisor expected from his lawyer. In short, it was my job to make sure that
in doing the right thing the US government was doing it the right way.
I had a standard mental checklist: Are all the relevant facts on the ta-
ble—do the president and his principal officials know what they are review-
ing? Are the longer-term repercussions of striking a target identified? Have
the right process steps been taken? These are, of course, not inherently legal
questions, but the lawyer in the room may be the staff person best positioned
to test the process with policy detachment.
It is also important to think broadly about whom may be missing from a par-
ticular process. For example, I would ask, is this a matter that the attorney
general should review? If not, will the attorney general nonetheless be asked
by the press or the congress for her legal view on whether an action is
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consistent with the president's constitutional authority. Did this lead to the
attorney general substituting her military judgment for those of the command-
ers? Of course not. Understanding the military objective for an action is not to
question the military recommendation. It is, however, central to evaluating
constitutional authority and the application ofUS law to particular facts, and
that is a lawyer's task.
At the level of practice points and lessons learned, the critical process link
was with the Chairman's legal counsel working closely with the Department of
Defense (DoD) general counsel. As the national level lawyer closest to the op-
erational line, Admiral Mike Lohr served as the primary communications
channel with whom I could track and review briefs as they came to the White
House. This ensured that I was ahead of, or at least even with, the operational
timeline and that the president and not just the Pentagon had the benefit of
military and DoD general counsel legal expertise. It also provided for one
chain of legal communication, avoiding confusion. Because I had the familiar-
ity of working with one person on hundreds of targets, we understood each
other's vocabulary, tone and expression.
Where I could, I provided my input and advice in writing. First, I felt I
should be no less accountable for my legal concurrence than the president for
his decision. Second, I wanted to make sure my advice was received. Relying
only on oral communication is to run the risk that the process will move for-
ward without your input, given the competing pressures for principals' time.
Finally, I found that my advice was cumulative and that policymakers were
ready to apply the law of armed conflict principles in other contexts, including
during conversations and meetings that I might not attend.
Assessment
Having given you a sense of the legal process in the White House involving
target review, let me now give you my assessment as to how that process
worked, focusing first on the role of the commander in chief and then on the
role of lawyers.
1. Role of the Commander in Chief
As part of the president's brief on military operations, he was briefed on all
categories of targets (that is, he concurred in the framework for addressing
certain classes of target such as air defense or ground force targets in Kosovo),
and he reviewed a sub-category of specific targets. These were for the most
part targets raising heightened policy concerns, because of, among other
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factors, potential allied reactions, and especially because of potential risk to
US personnel and collateral casualties. Not surprisingly, these were the targets
that also raised more difficult law of armed conflict questions. Of the approxi-
mately 10,000 strike sorties involving some 2,000 targets, review of targets by
the national security advisor and his legal adviser reached into the hundreds
of targets (200-300), with the president reviewing a smaller subset of this
number.
From my vantage-point, the president's review of targets was crisp; he
would hear the description, review the briefing materials and at times raise a
question he wanted answered. He expected issues to be addressed before they
reached him, or alternatively, that the issue
—
perhaps with an ally—be
quickly and clearly presented. This was not a ponderous process, but rather a
decision-making process that one would expect of a commander in chief.
There is a school of thought that would have preferred that the commander
in chief not review as many targets or the particular ones that he did, because
such review amounts to micromanagement of the armed forces. Under this
school, which has its genesis in the Vietnam era, the president should issue
strategic guidance, a presidential mission statement of commander's intent,
and give the authorization to pursue necessary targets.
While I think it is prudent to test whether the right balance was struck be-
tween military efficacy and civilian control, I disagree with the "minimal re-
view" school as applied to Kosovo. In my view, the right balance was struck
between national level and theater approved targets. I believe the success of
the campaign is highly relevant in this debate—the alliance was sustained and
NATO's objectives were achieved.
Why was presidential review important? As General Jumper, and others,
have pointed out, this was a highly idiosyncratic campaign involving coalition
warfare by nineteen democracies—fourteen with deployed forces. In this con-
text, some individual target decisions assumed strategic policy implications. A
government might fall. A runway might close. Or, NATO consensus might
collapse. In my view, those are implications of presidential dimension. Not
surprisingly, when there were allied concerns about targets, the president
would get called.
Further, some of the targets the president reviewed required his approval.
At the very least, his review removed any possible question of legal authority
with respect to targets reaching beyond the scope of what he had already
reviewed.
Finally, whether legally required or not, the president was accountable to
the American people for US operations and casualties. Whether a target was
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approved at the tactical, operational or national level, its consequences would
ultimately, and usually immediately, rest with NATO's political leader-
ship—and no leader more than the US president. This last argument is not
particular to Kosovo. Perhaps it is a truism, but it applies to an analysis of
Kosovo just the same.
If I were to strengthen the process, I would make doubly sure that national
level target suggestions, or nominations, were processed in the same manner
as targets originating in the military chain of command; no shortcuts and no
deference to grade or policy position. This would ensure that all targets re-
ceive the same measure of staff review and analytic scrutiny. Frankly, I am not
in a position to state whether this was a novel or recurring problem during
Kosovo. But there were times during the campaign when I would hear that so
and so was pushing for a certain proposed target to be included in the next
presidential brief. If I was aware of such "advice" I would channel it into the
normal process of selection and review. In any event, the potential for error
will diminish if target nominations all receive the same stepped process of re-
view. Where operational necessity dictates speed, my answer is to make the
process work faster, but do not adopt shortcuts.
2. Lawyers* Role
Although I think legal review at the NSC worked well with respect to
Kosovo targets, there is no one answer to good process. Indeed, the policy and
military context of one scenario is likely to be so different from the next that it
would be dangerous to generalize—or to insist on one shoe size for all con-
flicts. Kosovo was not Desert Storm. And Desert Storm was not Desert Fox.
One has to maintain situational awareness. If there is no one right way to law-
yer, however, there is a wrong way and that is to absent yourself from the deci-
sion-making process or be prone simply to defer to others' conclusions.
Lawyers are not always readily accepted into the military targeting team.
This reluctance has to do with concerns about secrecy, delay, lawyer creep
(the legal version of mission creep, whereby one legal question becomes 17,
which requires not one lawyer but 43 to answer). And, of course, fear that the
lawyer may "just say no" to something the policymaker wants to do. I was for-
tunate that the national security advisor, secretary of defense and chairman
and vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff needed no persuading on the
need for close-up lawyering. During the Kosovo campaign, legal advice may
not have always received warm and generous thanks, but policymakers never
hid from it or sought to shut it out.
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In return, I think the lawyers fulfilled their responsibilities under the con-
tract. We kept the number of participants to the absolute minimum; for exam-
ple, if a matter of domestic legal authority needed to be limited within the
Justice Department to the attorney general alone, then the attorney general
alone it was. And, within the US government, NSC legal review met all but
one operational deadline. One target was put on the president's brief before
legal review was complete. Therefore, when the president reached the target
during an Oval Office briefing, I asked that it be set aside until that review
could be completed.
While I always felt pressure, I never let pressure dictate my analysis. One
such pressure I did not fully anticipate was the extent to which US actions
would receive international legal scrutiny. In any event, we applied the law,
because it was the law, not because there was an audience.
Whether actors like it or not, Kosovo may serve as a harbinger of the man-
ner in which specific US military actions—down to the tactical sortie—will
receive legal scrutiny, from NGOs, ad hoc tribunals, and the International
Criminal Court, the latter two ofwhich may attempt to assert jurisdiction over
US actors. As a result, policymakers should anticipate that the same public
statement intended to influence an adversary might also influence the legal
observer. Policymakers, and not lawyers, should surely decide what points to
emphasize in public statements, but they should do so conscious of the legal
implications of what is being said. As the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) review of NATO action illustrates, although
that review concluded our actions were indeed lawful, merely doing the right
thing and doing it well and carefully will not necessarily immunize actors from
law of armed conflict scrutiny.
Areas of Future Tension
I will close with a few words of caution involving three areas where I would
forecast tension in the future between doctrine, policy and the law of armed
conflict.
1. Proportionality, Necessity, and "Going Downtown"
First, there is a potential tension between proportionality and necessity on
the one hand, and on the other hand, the military importance of striking hard
at the outset of a conflict to surprise, to shock, and thus to effect a rapid end to
conflict. There has been commentary about the incremental nature of the air
campaign, and the merits of "going downtown" earlier. On one level this
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aspect of the campaign was dictated by NATO's phased air campaign; that is
what NATO approved and therefore that was the limit of alliance authority
and consensus.
Legal considerations did not drive this result. Indeed, the political con-
straint agreed to by the alliance was reached well before any legal constraint
based on necessity or proportionality, particularly so given NATO's objectives
of preventing ethnic cleansing and avoiding a larger regional war. But looking
forward, we should not lose sight that there is a legal facet to any decision to
"go downtown." Legal judgments depend on factual predicate. If policymakers
believe a symbolic show of force alone will accomplish the permitted goal, a
lawyer would find it difficult to concur in the bombing of national level mili-
tary targets in a nation's capital.
2. Dual-Use Targets
Similarly, so called "dual-use targets" present any number of inherent ten-
sions. The law of armed conflict attempts to posit a clarity in the distinction
between military objective and civilian object that may not exist on the
ground. I found that dual-use targets largely appeared on a continuum. This
seemed particularly true because we were dealing with a dictatorship with
broad, but not always total, control over potential dual-use targets, like media
relay towers or factories. In such an environment, facilities can be rapidly con-
verted from civilian to military to civilian use at the direction of a government
not bound by Youngstown Sheet and Tube.
In such a context, effects-based targeting and the law of armed conflict may
be on a collision course. The tension is particularly apparent where a facility fi-
nancially sustains an adversary's regime, and therefore the regime's military
operations, but does not make a product that directly and effectively contrib-
utes to an adversary's military operations. The policy frustration is that in a
dictatorial context, these may be exactly the targets that not only might per-
suade an adversary of one's determination, but more importantly striking such
targets may shorten the conflict and therefore limit the number of collateral
casualties that will otherwise occur.
I am not arguing here for a change in the law; I am very conscious that too
malleable a doctrine of military objective will send the law hurdling down the
slippery slope toward collateral calamity. Nor, I should be clear, am I suggesting
that the United States applied anything other than a strict test of military ob-
jective as recognized in customary international law and by those states that
have adopted Protocol I. My purpose is to identify to you a very real area of ten-
sion that warrants further review and that will confront lawyers in the future.
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3. Protection ofNoncombatants and Traditional Understanding of Military
Objective
The law of armed conflict generates a number of ironic results in the inter-
est of a higher principle or in the interest of clarity. For example, "treacher-
ous" killing of military leaders (as that term is understood under the law of
armed conflict) is prohibited, but the law of armed conflict permits the use of
more dramatic force, even with significant collateral consequences, to attack
a military headquarters with essentially the same objective of disrupting com-
mand and control. During the Kosovo campaign, lawyers were never squarely
confronted with the target that would have the effect of ending the conflict
with minimal collateral consequences, but which nonetheless failed a tradi-
tional test of military objective. But I sensed that such an issue could have
arisen.
Without diminishing the paramount principle of protection for noncomba-
tants, I wonder whether the definition of military objective deserves another
look, in the interest of limiting collateral casualties. Are traditional definitions
adequate, or do they drive military operations toward prolonged conflict and
ground combat? Do they provide enough guidance to shield the commander
from prosecution where the commander has made legal judgments in good
faith?
These are more than academic questions of passing interest. The poten-
tially poor fit between traditional categories of military objective and the real-
ity of a conflict where targets fall on a continuum of judgment between
military and civilian, becomes more perilous in an age of international scrutiny
where good faith differences of view can take on criminal implications. Those
who do evaluate such actions should do so aware of the factual and temporal
context in which decisions are made. National security decision-making is not
judicial decision-making. Time is more of the essence, and information is not
necessarily of evidentiary quality.
Further, as much as I would hope that the United States is not engaged in
armed conflict in the future, there are no doubt national interests that will re-
quire the exercise of force. As Air Vice-Marshal Mason has said, it is honor-
able for democracies to strive to the fullest extent possible to eliminate
collateral casualties from armed conflict. Just as low and no casualty conflicts
have resulted in a public expectation, and some suggest a de facto policy con-
straint, regarding US military action, some have used Kosovo to advance a le-
gal view that the law of armed conflict virtually prohibits collateral casualties.
This is an honorable and worthy aspiration, but not law. Nor should it be law,
or the tyrants of the world will operate with impunity.
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The law of armed conflict does not prohibit collateral casualties any more
than international law prohibits armed conflict. It constrains, regulates, and
limits. War is almost never casualty free and we will be extraordinarily lucky if
the next conflict incurs as few collateral casualties as Kosovo.
Conclusion
In closing, I hope I have given you some insight into the process of legal re-
view at the commander in chief level during the Kosovo air campaign. I also
hope I have given you a sense of the issues, at least in a manner consistent
with my duty to safeguard deliberations.
My message is clear. First, lawyers are integral to the conduct of military op-
erations at the national command level. They must be in the physical and
metaphorical decision-making room. And, they can perform their duties to
the law in a timely and secure way that meets operational deadlines and needs.
Those who uphold the law of armed conflict bring honor to the profession and
to the armed forces.
Second, the law of armed conflict is hard law. It is US criminal law. Increas-
ingly, it will also serve as an international measure by which the United States
is judged. The law of armed conflict addresses the noblest objective of
law—the protection of innocent life. And the United States should be second
to none in compliance, as was the case with Kosovo.
Finally, application of the law of armed conflict is a moral imperative. If
international law regulates, but does not prohibit war, the law of armed con-
flict helps to ensure that force is used in the most economical manner possi-
ble. Whether we agree on the precise definition of military objective, or on
each and every Kosovo target, I am confident that we all agree on the moral
imperative of minimizing civilian casualties and suffering to the fullest extent
possible.
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I he forces that I was privileged to command bombed Milosevic for sev-enty-eight days flying over thirty-eight thousand sorties without the
loss of a single pilot, after which Milosevic accepted all of NATO's terms.
Those terms were: number one, the killing would stop in Kosovo; number two,
the professional military forces of the Serb Army and the paramilitary police
would leave Kosovo; number three, a NATO commander would come in on
the ground with a predominantly NATO force to occupy the province (this
was General Mike Jackson and the NATO forces that came in shortly after
the bombing campaign was over); number four, the Kosovar Albanians would
return to their homes; and, number five, we would facilitate the ICTY (Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) process. We did all that
despite some extraordinary restraints that were placed upon the warfighters in
this effort.
I would like to talk quite frankly tonight about three of the issues coming
out of Kosovo that are of most concern to me personally and for the future of
the US armed forces. I am not a lawyer. I will hopefully share with you some
things that will be of value to you who are military lawyers, or civilian lawyers
who impact the Department of Defense, about how the next generation ofmy
profession does its business. But I am not a lawyer. I am a professional soldier. I
did that for thirty-five years. The three things that are of particular interest to
me are targeting, collateral damage and coalition warfare.
Perspective of the NATO Air Commander
Targeting
Let's talk first about targeting. A lot has been said in a lot of different publi-
cations and by a lot of different people about how we did our targeting. Let me
first assure you that the professionals in the American and NATO militaries
understand the concept of effects-based targeting. We know what we were try-
ing to do. We were trying to compel Milosevic to accept NATO's terms as rap-
idly as possible with as little destruction of Serbian property as possible and
with as little loss of life on both sides as was humanly possible. That is what we
were trying to do. Unfortunately, because NATO was an alliance of nineteen
nations, you get the lowest common denominator. All those folks have to agree
on something.
Targeting became something that was not in my control. I spent thirty-four
years in my profession thinking that when I was in charge of an air effort, I
would indeed be in charge of targeting. I thought that the president of the
United States and the leaders of whatever alliance we were associated with
would give me broad guidance
—
political objectives that they wanted to
achieve. I thought that my boss, the combatant commander, would translate
those into military objectives for me. I thought I would perhaps brief the presi-
dent of the United States on target categories that I intended to strike, but
that individual targets would be mine to decide and mine to destroy. And,
thereby, I would achieve the effect ofbringing Milosevic to the table as rapidly
as possible. As all of you understand, that was not the case.
Targeting was not mine to decide. Targeting decisions were made in the
White House, at Number Ten Downing Street, and in Paris, Rome and
Berlin. The senior political leaders of the alliance approved individual fixed
targets—a fixed target being something that doesn't move. Mobile targets
were mine to decide upon. I could decide to attack tanks and armored person-
nel carriers any time I thought it was appropriate. Quite frankly I never
thought it to be appropriate, because the center of gravity was not the third
army in Kosovo. The center of gravity was Milosevic, the circle of leadership
around him, and the ruling elite. But that was not the way NATO wanted to
wage war.
We did our level best to target those things that we thought would have the
effect of bringing Milosevic to the table. Instead, because those targets were
not picked by professional soldiers and professional sailors and professional
airmen, we bombed targets that were quite frankly inappropriate for bringing
Milosevic to the table. I would say to you that in terms of targeting, this was
victory by happenstance more than victory by design.
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We had a video teleconference (VTC) every day for seventy-eight
days—clearly the highlight of my day—between myself and my staff and the
combatant commander, General Wesley Clark, and his staff. One ofmy favor-
ite video teleconferences occurred when General Clark was haranguing Admi-
ral Jim Ellis, a great American. (No one in this audience, no one in this country
will ever understand the extraordinary difficulties that Jim Ellis put up with
and the incredible difficult position he was placed in.) General Clark was tell-
ing Jim and I what we needed to do that day and at the end of his guidance he
said to us: "Mike, Jim, I hope this will work." Jim Ellis looked at the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on the VTC and said: "SACEUR,
hope is not a course of action." Course of action is kind of a military
term—maybe some ofyou are unfamiliar with it—but it is what we are going to
do today. Hope is not something we would like to be doing today. We like to
know what we are doing.
We were accused by a lot of folks of inaccurate targeting and not under-
standing what we were targeting. The fact of the matter is that every target we
intended to strike had passed an extraordinary series of tests, perhaps the most
important one being whether it fit with our definition of military objective un-
der the law of armed conflict. We had some targeting failures. We acknowl-
edge that. The Chinese embassy was a failure of intelligence, not a targeting
failure. The young men who worked for me hit exactly what I told them to hit.
It wasn't until two or three or four in the morning that I found out we had hit
the Chinese embassy as opposed to the Serbian logistics headquarters that we
thought we had struck.
As for the convoy that we struck early in the operations against the third
army in Kosovo, I reviewed that tape five times before it became clear to me
that those were indeed tractors hauling wagons as opposed to eighteen-wheel
military vehicles. The young man that dropped those bombs was flying at 450
miles an hour in bad weather and he was being shot at. He had one chance to
make identification and he made a mistake. That was not a war crime. He had
no intent to kill people he was not supposed to kill. He made a mistake.
The issue I would lay in front of you
—
particularly you youngsters who will
be the next generation in the civilian hierarchy or in the uniformed mili-
tary—is whose responsibility should targeting be. Should targeting be the re-
sponsibility of the president of the United States—someone not trained in my
profession, who does not fully understanding what I am trying to do in terms of
military objectives and the targets that he has given me? Should he approve
target sets? I believe he should. I believe we should have gone to Mr Clinton
and Mr Blair and Mr Chirac and Mr Schroeder and Mr D'Alema and said:
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"Gentlemen, we intend to target these sets. We will target the military pro-
duction capability. We will target command and control nodes. We will target
power grids. We will target lines ofcommunication. We will target field forces.
And we will target the integrated air defense capability of the nation. Now if
there are targets within those sets that you don't want me to strike, tell me,
and I will place those individual targets on a no-strike list. But once you have
done that, then give me that totality of target set, and let me achieve the effect
you want achieved as rapidly and with as little loss of life and as little destruc-
tion of property as possible."
Collateral Damage
Now let me move to the issue of collateral damage. It is inconceivable to me
that anyone who understands anything about modern warfare would think
that as a responsible commander that I would not take every step within my
command to limit collateral damage; that I would not provide to my air crews
from all the participating nations and all the American forces the most precise
guidance I could provide to them on limiting collateral damage; that I would
not package the forces we send into battle every day with collateral damage
foremost in my mind. But it becomes my job, your job as the next generation of
commanders and the commanders' advisers, to balance concern for collateral
damage and concern for loss of life on the one hand with the risk that you are
asking your pilots to take.
On about the fiftieth day of the war, we bombed the bridge outside the city
of Nis in broad daylight on a Saturday afternoon. It was a valid line ofcommu-
nication. We had seen Serbian troops moving across that bridge in reinforce-
ment efforts to Kosovo. Two F-16's dropped laser guided bombs on that
bridge. The first aircraft hit the right stanchion and the second aircraft hit the
left stanchion. Predictably, the bridge dropped in the river. That is what I had
told the pilots to do. Unfortunately, on or near the bridge were about twenty
Serb civilians. It was market day. It was Saturday. The young pilots could do
nothing about that. The next day Milosevic stretched the bodies out on the
street, called the press down from Belgrade, and announced that the NATO
war criminals had done their thing once again. As a result of that incident,
this was the guidance I got from the very highest levels of the NATO military
political leadership: you will no longer bomb bridges in daylight, you will no
longer bomb bridges on market days, on holidays or on weekends. In fact, you
will only bomb bridges between ten o'clock at night and three o'clock in the
morning in order to ensure that we do not kill civilians crossing those bridges.
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I will grant you that that may indeed lessen the possibility of killing civilians
crossing the bridges, but what does it do to your aircrews? Number one, it cre-
ates sanctuary for the enemy. It will take Milosevic about forty-eight hours to
figure out that no bridges are being bombed except between ten o'clock at
night and three o'clock in the morning; that they are not being bombed on
weekends or on market days. So he does not need to protect those bridges ex-
cept for between ten o'clock at night and three o'clock in the morning. At ten
o'clock at night the NATO aircrews become totally predictable because that
is the five hour limit that the air commander is allowed to send those young
men into harm's way to attack those bridges that must be struck. So the risk
for NATO aircrews is raised by a magnitude of three or four or five times what
it would have been if I were allowed to conduct the conflict the way I wish to.
No responsible commander wishes to kill civilians. Let me say that to you
again. No responsible commander wearing the NATO uniform wishes to kill
civilians. Never in seventy-eight days did we target Serb civilians, but unfortu-
nately in war civilians are sometimes where you would like them not to be.
Unfortunately sometimes in a war civilians are a very key part of the establish-
ment that you're targeting.
There are civilian workers on every one of our air fields in this country and
every shipyard and every aircraft factory. There are civilian workers who
would die if they were attacked by an adversary of the United States of Amer-
ica. Every day we did our very, very best to limit collateral damage and limit
the loss of life on the adversary's side. Every time we failed in that effort, the
reaction by political leaders was hysterical—along the lines I just outlined for
you. The restrictions that were placed on the young men and women who
were going in harm's way every day were extraordinary—losing all sight of
what effect we were trying to achieve. In fact, we got to the point that during
the last ten days of the war I was instructed to attack only those targets that
had a potential for low collateral damage. I was given no instruction with re-
gard to the impact this might have on Milosevic, whether this would injure
the war machine, whether this would bring the conflict to a close. Our young
people were to only to strike those targets that had the potential for a low col-
lateral damage, because the leaders of the nineteen nation alliance could no
longer stand collateral damage incidents and because they did not understand
war. They thought it was a video game, and that no one ever dies.
Did you ever see anybody die in the films from the Gulf War? I never did. I
just saw crosshairs on the target in downtown Baghdad, and then it blew up. I
never saw a body in the street. But Milosevic was extraordinarily good at putt-
ing bodies in the street of people that we had in all probability killed. That is,
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maybe a hundred Serbs, not in all cases did we kill who he said we killed. We
were on the defensive and our political leaders could not stand the heat. They
could not grit their teeth and say simply "get this done—do it as well as you
can, don't kill folks you don't haye to kill, and don't blow up things you don't
have to blow up, but go ahead and get it done
—
you know how to do this, we
do not, but we have given you the basic guidance." That is not what hap-
pened. Concern for collateral damage drove us to extraordinary degree, and it
will drive the next generation of warriors even more so, because whereas I see
this as an extraordinary failure, the leadership within the NATO senior ad-
ministrations would say this was indeed an extraordinary success. We bombed
for seventy-eight days; nobody died on our side; and Milosevic accepted all
our terms. What in the world is that burned-out old three star whining about?
This was an extraordinary success, they would say, yet indeed it was not.
Coalition Warfare
Finally, let me turn to the issue of coalition warfare. We do not want to fight
by ourselves. My country wants to fight as part of the coalition. We want to be
with our allies. We want to share the risk. We do not want just young Ameri-
cans to die on the first night and the second night and the third night. We want
our friends to be there with us. We do not want to be the lone wolf going out
striking wherever we think we need to strike. We need to represent the consid-
ered opinion of the NATO alliance, or the Western community of nations, or
whoever it happens to be, if we choose to employ military action. We want to
be part of a coalition. However, as a professional soldier, I would tell you I pre-
fer to be a member of a coalition of the willing as we had in the Gulf War.
In 1991 if you chose to throw in your forces with us and the Saudis and the
Kuwaitis and the Brits, you were welcome, but you came under our terms. We
explained to you how we were going to make war and if you did not like that
explanation, or if you could not sign up for those terms, then you did not need
to be part of our coalition. However, in 1999 it was NATO, not a coalition of
the willing. All nineteen nations had to agree, and so we ended up with the
lowest common denominator. That is how it was that a nation that was pro-
viding less than 10% of the total effort could say to the most powerful nation
on the face of the earth "you cannot bomb that target."
The United States of America lost its leverage on the first night. On the
first night of the war we lost any leverage we had, and we ended up being
leveraged. What was the US interest in Operation Allied Force? Was there a
US national interest? I make the case that our only national interest was the
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continuance of the NATO alliance in some successful form. If NATO had
been defeated by a third-rate war criminal and murderer, then I think NATO
would cease to exist. Before the war started, the United States ofAmerica en-
joyed ultimate leverage over its NATO allies. NATO wanted to go to war.
The Europeans were saying, "we need to do something about this tragedy that
is occurring in Europe's backyard." NATO wanted to go to war. There was no
maritime option and NATO did not want to commit ground troops, so the
only option was the air option. I do not wish to offend any of my NATO
friends in the audience, but NATO cannot make war without the United
States of America. It is just that simple. You do not have the technology. You
do not have the numbers. You do not have the precision. You do not have the
forces that allow you to do it. So if the United States ofAmerica was not going
to participate in that air war in Kosovo, it was not going to be a successful air
war in Kosovo. So we had the ultimate leverage. We were in the same position
we were in 1991 to dictate how this should be done. We did not do that be-
cause it was going to be a three night war. We were going to demonstrate re-
solve. Who cared what we bombed, because it was going to be over in three
nights. So we threw that leverage away and we ended up being leveraged.
Now what do the lawyers have to do with all of this? I expected that I
would be the targeteer, and so the advice of my lawyer would be extraordi-
narily important to me because everything I struck had to be a valid military
target for all the coalition members. Concern for the law of armed conflict was
absolutely paramount in my mind. However, as I said to you earlier, those tar-
get decisions were taken out of our hands. Target decisions were made by the
president of the United States, the prime minister of Great Britain, the presi-
dent of France, and the president of Germany, and targets were just issued to
me. So I really did not need to go to my lawyer and say "do you think this
passes the test? Is this a valid military target?" What my lawyers say is a valid
military target and consistent with the law of armed conflict, nation X's law-
yers may disagree with. So every day I put together what was called the air
tasking order which sent out to the thousand or more NATO airplanes what
targets they were going to strike that next day. I had to wait for the individual
nations to answer back, having gone to their capitals and asked whether they
should accept that target. And, indeed, in many capitals the answer was
no—we do not define that as a valid military target. Now if I could get that
answer back in a timely fashion, I could assign that target to a nation that
had a less restrictive view of the law of armed conflict, but if I got that infor-
mation late, and the aircraft were already airborne, then I ended up cancel-
ing the strike.
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Great Britain exercised control over all US airplanes stationed on UK soil.
AH B-52's and all B-l's stationed at Fairford and all F-15E's stationed at
Lakenheath had to have their targets approved by the British parliament before
they could be struck. US aircraft had to have their targets approved by other na-
tions because we were based on British soil. As many of you know, the French
exercised total veto over targets. They would take the position that not only
would their aircraft not strike the "Rock-and-roll Bridge," no one could strike
the "Rock-and-roll Bridge." That makes it very, very difficult to fight within a
coalition. It makes it very, very difficult for your lawyer to do his business.
Concluding Thoughts For Lawyers
A young man asked me earlier this evening what advice I would give an
up-and-coming young operational lawyer wearing the uniform in defense of
this country. Understand what your commander is up against. Understand and
participate in the development of his rules of engagement. Understand what
special instructions he is providing as supplemental to his rules of engagement,
to his troops in the field, or his men and women at sea, or his men and women
in the air. Then, do not be afraid to tell him what he really does not want to
hear—that he has put together this exquisite plan, but his targets indeed are
not valid ones or his targets may in fact violate the law of armed conflict.
Every target that we bombed for seventy-eight days had been reviewed at some
level by professional military lawyers and that is the way it has to be. I want to bomb
the targets. I want to get this thing done, but I must have advisers sitting at my right
hand telling me whether I am doing this properly or not. Am I breaking laws? Am I
doing things that are unacceptable? Will the eyes of a professional soldier believe
that to be a valid target or a valid target set? It will take enormous courage to do
that in particular circumstances because you're always going to be junior to your
boss. My lawyer most of the time was a lieutenant colonel. It is very difficult for him
to come in and say to a three star "you are out ofbounds, sir, you are about to break
the law." But you have got to be able to do that. You have got to know your busi-
ness inside and out and you have got to think like an operator. Your job as a military
lawyer is not to prevent me from doing my job, your job as a military lawyer is to
make it possible for me to do my job without breaking the law, without blowing up
things I should not blow up, without killing people I should not kill and without
committing war crimes. I want to get this done. You have got to help me. Do not be
a hindrance. Tell me the truth. Tell me when I have pushed it too far. Tell me when
I am in the gray area, but help me get this thing done that our country wants to get
done for the alliance. That's it.
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Brian O'Donnell:
General, did you ever feel constrained in the bombing campaign not to
strike a target because you did not have a precision-guided munition?
Michael Short:
We started this fight out as a totally precision-munitions fight. A lot has
been made in the press about the fifteen thousand foot floor that I placed on
my people. You need to understand that when we started this fight, we were
only going to attack fixed targets. We were not going to attack tanks. We were
not going to attack troops in the field. We were going to attack buildings and
airfields and aircraft shelters and bridges and those sorts of things, which are
easily identifiable from fifteen thousand feet. Restrictions were placed on me
that I could not lose any aircraft and any aircrews. So I had enormous concern
for force protection. You cannot fly high enough to avoid the radar of a sur-
face-to-air missile. But you can fly high enough to avoid small arms and light
triple-A (anti-aircraft artillery) and the IR (infra-red) missile. Fifteen thou-
sand feet was that floor, so that's where we started out.
Every bomb that was dropped for the first X number of days in Serbia and
Kosovo was a guided munition. There were a number ofNATO nations that
did not carry precision-guided munitions, and they were not allowed to drop
bombs. Then as we moved into the next phase, which was attacking the Third
Army in Kosovo, we continued to use nothing but precision munitions. Then
we found that if we controlled it properly and used the correct force that we
could drop a certain number of unguided munitions—what you and I call
dumb bombs. We did indeed drop a number ofdumb bombs, particularly from
B-ls and B-52s. I understand there was a discussion earlier today about
so-called carpet bombing B-52s. No carpet bombing occurred. Outside of
Kosovo, again with the exception of the B-52 and the B-l, we dropped noth-
ing that wasn't precision guided. Everything that hit Serbia proper was
Discussion
precision-guided munitions in an attempt to control collateral damage and in
attempt to control loss of civilian life.
Leslie Green:
Do you not think that it is time we took the line that we want the military
representative with perhaps their legal advisers from the members of the coali-
tion to get together and say, putting it brutally, to hell with our constitutional
political advisers—we are going to decide, not somebody sitting
three-and-a-half thousand miles away who has not the vaguest idea of what is
going on anyway?
Michael Short:
No, sir, I can never imagine giving up civilian control of the military.
Leslie Green:
It is the constitutional control that worries me, not the civilian control.
Michael Short:
No, as strongly as I feel about men and women in my profession being al-
lowed to do their jobs, and as strongly as I would advise against
micromanagement by political appointed or elected leaders, if that is the role
they choose to play, then I have to accept that role. I advise against it. I hope
that what my own country and I saw during the last eight years was an aberra-
tion driven by a particular administration that I will not see again. But you
need to understand, I hoped the same thing in 1967 when Lyndon Johnson
was on his hands and knees in the Oval Office reviewing targets with Robert
McNamara. Remember that my generation swore that would never happen
again. In the GulfWar, in fact, it did not. George Bush the elder gave us mission-
type orders. That was not the case in 1999. But I cannot imagine a military
professional saying to hell with the constitution and to hell with our elected
and appointed leaders, we'll do this as we see fit. That is not how we do
business.
Leslie Green:
What if the constitution of one country interferes with the military opera-
tions of the coalition?
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Michael Short:
I believe, sir, you've got to set those rules beforehand with that particular
country. In the case of the Canadians, there were targets I knew the Canadian
F-18s were not allowed to attack. Their pilots were dying to do it, but Ottawa
was not going to allow them. So it was my job to assign those targets to a na-
tion with less restrictive guidance. I could still use the Canadians in many
roles. It is my job to fold all those capabilities together and produce a coherent
war-making effort. Now I agree with you that before the fact is when we have
to agree on what the rules are. I would take the position that before the fact we
say "nation X, if you don't wish to attack any of these targets, that's fine, but
you cannot prohibit the rest of us from attacking those targets." But as far as I
can tell, that conversation never took place, and once the fight started, we
lost that leverage.
Ruth Wedgwood:
You said that the center of gravity to really win the campaign was the ruling
elite in Belgrade.
Michael Short:
Milosevic and the men and women around him who depend upon him and
who he, in turn, depends upon.
Ruth Wedgwood:
We had a big debate this afternoon about whether civilian morale as such is
ever an allowable target. From an operational point of view, fill me in on what
you make of that.
Michael Short:
Let me give you my perspective, and Colonel Sorenson who was my lawyer
will leap to his feet if I get out of bounds here even though I am retired now.
You cannot target civilians
—
pure and simple. Now, as a professional soldier, I
will target the power grid, which I believe will significantly impact command
and control of all Serb forces throughout the entire country. We will prohibit
their ability to move on trains, and we will make it very, very difficult for them
to do their military business. Now when I sit with my planners, I am not going
to think that you are so naive that I do not say to myself and to my planners
that this will also make the Serb population unhappy with their senior leader-
ship because they allowed this to happen. But that is a spin-off—a peripheral
result—of me targeting a valid military target.
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If I had gone to my bosses with Colonel Sorenson and said I want to target
something because it will impact the Serb civilian population, from my per-
spective, that would be totally out of bounds. That would be unacceptable.
But any thinking military professional knows that there are certain target sets
that if targeted are going to have an effect on the population which in turn will
pressure the senior leadership. There were factories that we were never able to
get to for a number of different reasons that were dual-use factories. They pro-
duced Yugos from midnight until noon and tank turrets from noon to mid-
night. That is a valid military target. Now if I blow that up, two thousand
Serbs probably just lost their jobs, and they will demonstrate outside
Milosevic's palace because they would be unhappy. I know that, but that is not
why I targeted that facility. I will stand in any court in the land and swear to
that because that is how we hit our targets. But certainly we understand the
peripheral in that.
Christopher Greenwood:
My question is this General: Britain would have been in the dock along with
the United States, so can you see any circumstances in which it would have
been responsible for a British government not to have insisted on reviewing
targets? Can you think of any circumstances in which the United States would
allow British aircraft to fly from a US air base to attack a target without the
United States checking to see whether it would be attacking a lawful target?
Michael Short:
No, I understand your position. There were strange aircraft taking off from
Germany every day and the Germans did not exercise their prerogative to ap-
prove the targets of those aircraft. The vast majority ofUS strike aircraft were
stationed at Aviano, Italy and Mr D'Alema, who was struggling with extraordi-
nary skills to hold together a coalition government, never approached us and
asked to review the targets of our aircraft taking off from Aviano. So while I
certainly understand the position taken by the British government, when the
rest of my allies did not take that position, then the British position stands out
to me as a problem. Okay? I was able to work around this as long as I got a noti-
fication time or as long as I was able to understand the sensitivity of what Brit-
ain thought was good, bad, or indifferent. But on more than one occasion when
the system wasn't working, I had dozens of strike aircraft on the tanker within
ten minutes of pushing into Serbian airspace when the word came through
from Ten Downing Street that the target was not acceptable to the British.
30
PART II
THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Introduction
Scott Silliman
T his first panel will address the overall applicability of the law of armedconflict, also called international humanitarian law, to the NATO op-
eration in Kosovo. We are also going to be focusing on several specific issues
that arose during that campaign, one being the legal status of the three Army
soldiers who were captured while on a routine mission near the border. As you
recall, immediately after they were captured, our State Department an-
nounced to the press that the three were "illegal detainees" and many of
us—and several are here at this conference—responded vehemently that they
were clearly prisoners ofwar under the Third Geneva Convention, and that to
consider them otherwise was to denude them of the protections afforded them
under international law.
Fd like to lay a foundation by reading from a portion of the very controver-
sial Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1
on this linkage between the jus ad bellum, which is a very large debate as all of
you know, and the more particular jus in bello, which is the focus of this collo-
quium. It reads:
32. The precise linkage between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is not completely
resolved. . . . [I]n the 1950's there was a debate concerning whether UN
authorized forces were required to comply with the jus in bello as they
represented the good side in a battle between good and evil. This debate died
out as the participants realized that a certain crude reciprocity was essential if
the law was to have any positive impact. An argument that the 'bad' side had to
1
.
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
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comply with the law while the 'good' side could violate it at will would be most
unlikely to reduce human suffering in conflict.
33. More recently, a refined approach to the linkage issue has been advocated by
certain law of war scholars. Using their approach, assuming that the only lawful
basis for recourse to force is self defence, each use of force during a conflict must
be measured by whether or not it complies with the jus in bello and by whether or
not it complies with the necessity and proportionality requirements of self
defence. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not adequately address
what should be done when it is unclear who is acting in self defence and it does
not clarify the obligations of the 'bad' side. 2
The Report to the Prosecutor went on to say that the Committee deliber-
ately refrained from assessing jus ad bellum issues and focused exclusively on
whether violations of the law of war occurred within the confines of the jus in
bello. It concluded that there was no basis for further investigation and no ba-
sis whatsoever for the referral of war crimes charges against any of the NATO
combatants.
With regard to the question of linkage between the jus ad bellum and the jus
in bello, though, there seems to be no ambiguity in the United States position.
If there is an armed conflict, whether deemed just or unjust, right or wrong
under the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello applies equally to both sides. That's the
position I personally take, but I know that many will disagree with that.
2. Id.
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Humanitarian Law and the Law of
Neutrality to the Kosovo Campaign
Christopher Greenwood
he purpose of this paper 1 is to examine the applicability of interna-
tional humanitarian law and the law of neutrality to Operation Allied
Force, the NATO campaign over Kosovo in 1999. The paper is thus chiefly
about jus in hello (which is treated here as synonymous with the law of armed
conflict and international humanitarian law), not about jus ad bellum. It is not
intended, therefore, to enter into the controversy regarding the legality of the
decision to resort to force over Kosovo or the long-running debate over
whether contemporary international law recognizes a right of humanitarian
intervention in the face of large scale violations of human rights. The present
writer has already made clear in other publications his view that a right of
humanitarian intervention (albeit one of a strictly limited character) exists in
1. This paper has been revised since the colloquium in order to take account of points made by a
number of commentators in the immensely valuable discussion periods, although the
responsibility for the views here expressed remain mine alone. I have also taken the opportunity
to take account of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic v. Belgium
and Others delivered on December 19, 2001 since that decision is directly concerned with the
Kosovo conflict. Conflicts occurring since Kosovo are not discussed here.
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international law and that the conditions for the exercise of that right were
present in Kosovo in 1999, 2 although that view is by no means universal. 3
That, however, is a debate for another occasion. For present purposes, it is
sufficient—but also necessary—to note three points regarding the legal justifi-
cation advanced by the NATO States for their resort to force, since these
points have a bearing on the application of international humanitarian law
and the law of neutrality during the campaign.
First, the Kosovo campaign was one in which some actions against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were undertaken pursuant to a mandate
from the United Nations Security Council, while others were taken by the
2. See Christopher Greenwood, Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
Foreign Affairs Committee Fourth Report, 1999-2000, HC Paper 28-11, p. 137, reprinted in 49
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 926 (2000), and Humanitarian
Intervention: the Case of Kosovo, 10 FINNISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(forthcoming)
.
3. Amongst the literature on the subject, which reflects the very different positions taken by a
wide range of international lawyers, see the evidence given by Ian Brownlie, Christine Chinkin
and Vaughan Lowe to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom House of
Commons, supra note 2, reprinted in 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 876-943 (2000); Louis Henkin, Ruth Wedgwood, Jonathan Charney, Christine
Chinkin, Richard Falk, Thomas Franck and W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments: NATO's
Kosovo Intervention, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 824-878 (1999); Bruno
Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
European Journal Of International Law 23 (1999) and A Follow-Up: Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, id., at 791; Nico Krisch, Unilateral
Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 YEARBOOK OF UNITED
NATIONS LAV/ 59 (1999); Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application ofArmed
Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 330 (2000) ; Steven Blockmans, Moving into UNchartered Waters: An Emerging Right
of Unilateral Intervention?, 12 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 759 (1999); and
Francesco Francioni, Of War, Humanity and Justice: International Law After Kosovo, 4 YEARBOOK
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 107 (2000). The Kosovo crisis has also attracted an unusual number
of studies by official and semi-official bodies. These include the report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United Kingdom House of Commons, HOUSE OF COMMONS PAPER
(1999-2000) NO. 28-1 together with the response by the United Kingdom Government at
COMMAND PAPERS 4825 (August 2000) ; the report of the Advisory Council on International
Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law of the Netherlands
Government, Report No. 13 (April 2000), available at http://www.aiv-advice.nl (reviewed by Ige
Dekker in 6 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 115 (2001)); the report of the Danish
Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects
(1999); and the Kosovo Report published by the Independent International Commission on
Kosovo (2000).
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NATO States on their own initiative. The Security Council had imposed an
arms embargo on the FRY when it adopted Resolution 1160 in 1998, a year
before the NATO military action commenced. After the cessation of the
bombing campaign on June 10, 1999, the Council adopted Resolution 1244,
which provided the legal basis for ground forces led by NATO and known as
KFOR, to enter Kosovo and assume responsibility for the security situation
there, to the exclusion of the armed forces and paramilitary police of the FRY.
The bombing campaign itself, however, was not authorized by the Council.
Although that campaign was undertaken byNATO in support of goals identi-
fied by the Security Council in Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 (all of which
contained provisions which were legally binding upon all States, including the
FRY), none of those resolutions authorized military action. Unlike the situa-
tion in the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, therefore, Operation Allied Force was not a
case of enforcement action taken with the authority of the Security Council.
A distinction must accordingly be drawn between the bombing campaign
which occurred between March 24, 1999 and June 10, 1999, on the one hand,
and the military presence in Kosovo thereafter. As will be seen, this distinc-
tion is of some importance in considering the law applicable to military opera-
tions after June 10, 1999.
Secondly, while some members of NATO were more forthright on this
matter than were others, the only substantial justification advanced for the
decision to resort to military action was that such action was justified as a re-
sponse to the humanitarian situation which had been created in Kosovo in the
immediate run-up to the commencement ofOperation Allied Force on March
24, 1999. For example, the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to
the United Nations told the Security Council, on the day that the military op-
eration commenced, that:
The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent
an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances in
Kosovo, there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent.
Renewed acts of repression by the authorities of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia
would cause further loss of civilian life and would lead to displacement of the
civilian population on a large scale and in hostile conditions.
Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation. In these
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming
humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force
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now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe,
and is the minimum judged necessary for that purpose.4
The emphasis on the limited purpose for which force was being employed
and the reference, inherent in that statement, to the requirement that the
force used should be proportionate to that goal has led some commentators to
argue that the application of international humanitarian law in the NATO
operation should have been different from that required of States engaged in a
"normal" armed conflict. That argument is considered later in this paper.
Finally, it needs to be remembered that, while the jus ad helium and the jus
in hello are separate bodies of law (a fact which has important legal conse-
quences), for military action by a State to be lawful, it must comply with both
bodies of law. The Gulf conflict of 1990-91 may be used as an illustration.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the clearest possible violation of the jus ad
helium. It followed that the subsequent occupation of Kuwait and the Iraqi re-
sistance to the coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait were also a violation of
the jus ad helium, even though some aspects of Iraq's behavior (e.g., some of
the property requisitions which occurred or the missile attacks on the Dahran
airbase) complied with the jus in hello. 5 Thus, Iraq's liability to make repara-
tion in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 for
the consequences of its unlawful invasion is not confined to damages caused
by acts unlawful under the jus in hello.
In this context, it has to be recognized that there was considerable contro-
versy about the legal justification advanced by the NATO States for their re-
sort to force against the FRY. That controversy about the application of the
jus ad helium may have affected the way in which certain issues regarding the
jus in hello and, in particular, the law of neutrality were perceived. Specifically,
it may have affected the approach of various governments to the question
whether the NATO States would have been entitled to impose an embargo on
4. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988, at 12. See also the views expressed in the same debate by the
Permanent Representatives of the United States of America (4-5), Canada (6) and the
Netherlands (8) . In the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force brought by the FRY against ten
of the NATO States in the International Court of Justice, Belgium advanced the same
justification for military action; see Oral Pleadings of Belgium (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J.
CR/99/15, available at http://www.icj'Cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm. The other
respondent States did not address this issue during that phase of the case.
5. For a discussion of these issues, see Christopher Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The
Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 MODERN LAW REVIEW 153-178 (1992) and the
articles cited at note 38, infra.
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shipments of oil and other supplies to the FRY, even where those supplies
were carried in ships flying the flags of States not involved in the conflict.
This paper will first consider the applicability ofinternational humanitarian
law to Operation Allied Force before examining certain general issues regard-
ing the manner in which that law had to be applied in the Kosovo campaign.
The question whether persons captured during the operation were prisoners
of war within the Third Geneva Convention will be addressed next, followed
by discussion of the issue of a naval embargo and the law of neutrality. The le-
gal regime applicable to KFOR operations in Kosovo since June 10, 1999 will
be briefly considered before closing with a discussion of the various judicial
proceedings relating to the conduct of the Kosovo conflict. Questions of tar-
geting and proportionality are considered only in passing, as these are the sub-
ject of other papers in the present volume.6
The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law
1. The Existence of an Armed Conflict between the NATO States and the
FRY
The first question to consider is whether international humanitarian law
was applicable to Operation Allied Force. Though much discussed at the
time, there is less to this question than meets the eye. The answer—which can
be given without qualification—is that international humanitarian law was
fully applicable from the moment that Operation Allied Force began on
March 24, 1999 until the cessation of hostilities on June 10, 1999. Through-
out that period an international armed conflict existed between the FRY on
the one hand and the NATO States on the other.
There is no definition of an international armed conflict in any of the trea-
ties on international humanitarian law. It is agreed, however, that the concept
is a factual one based on the existence of actual hostilities between two or more
States, even if those hostilities are at a low level and of short duration. The Ap-
peals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via (ICTY) has stated that an "armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States." 7 That test was undoubtedly satisfied in the
case of Operation Allied Force. The fact that no declaration of war was made
was, of course, irrelevant to the applicability of international humanitarian law
6. See the papers by Professors Bothe and Dinstein and Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery on
targeting and by Professors Bring and Murphy on collateral damage.
7. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction, 105 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 453, 11 70 (1997). See
also Commentary on Geneva Convention III 23 Oean Pictet ed., i960).
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to that conflict. It is well established that it is the fact of armed conflict be-
tween two or more States, not the formality of a declaration of war (which has
been almost unknown since 1945) which triggers the application of that law. 8
Nor does it make any difference to the applicability of international humani-
tarian law that the decision to resort to force was taken by the North Atlantic
Council, the governing body ofNATO, or that the military conduct of the cam-
paign was in the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
and the NATO military authorities, who acted in consultation with the NATO
Secretary-General under the authority given them by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil. While NATO is an international organization which possesses a legal person-
ality separate from those of its members, that separate personality does not affect
the applicability of international humanitarian law to the armed forces of any
member State which implements a NATO decision.9 That fact was expressly rec-
ognized both by NATO and the member States during Operation Allied Force.
Thus, the North Atlantic Council's authorization to SACEUR and the military
authorities expressly required that operations were to be conducted in accor-
dance with international humanitarian law. Similarly, the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment stated that "action by our forces is in strict conformity with international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols." 10 Other NATO governments adopted a similar position.
The fact that NATO acted for humanitarian reasons, so that the legal justifi-
cation offered for the decision to resort to force was different from the reliance on
self-defense or Security Council authorization which has been characteristic of
most armed conflicts since 1945, is also irrelevant to the applicability of interna-
tional humanitarian law. The principle that international humanitarian law
8. See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in International Law, 36 INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 283 (1987). US forces are specifically required to comply
with international humanitarian law in any armed conflict, irrespective of its formal
characterization; see Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive
5100.77, Dec. 9, 1998 and ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 290-1 (A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999)
(Vol. 73, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
9. Whether it affects the issue of State responsibility for a violation of those rules is currently
under consideration in the proceedings in the International Court of Justice and the European
Court ofHuman Rights discussed later in this paper. No one, however, has suggested that armed
forces operating under NATO command and control are not subject to customary international
humanitarian law and the treaty provisions binding upon the State concerned.
10. Answer to a Parliamentary question on May 18, 1999 by Baroness Symons, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 70 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
International Law 605 (1999).
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applies equally to both sides of a conflict irrespective of the reasons for resort to
force or its legality is one of the best established principles of the jus in hello} 1
It follows that the humanitarian law of international armed conflicts was
applicable throughout the period March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999 to the hos-
tilities between the NATO States and the FRY. Two questions, however, re-
quire further consideration.
2. The Status of the FRY as a Party to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I
The first question concerns the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and Protocol I of 1911.u This question arises because of the peculiar sta-
tus of the FRY at the relevant time. The FRY was one of the States which
emerged from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
when that State collapsed in 1991-92. Of the six republics which had made up
the SFRY, four—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and
Slovenia—had declared their independence between June 1991 and May
1992 and had, in due course, been recognized and admitted as members of the
United Nations. The two remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro,
formed the FRY. The Government of the FRY from its foundation until the
overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 considered the FRY to be the con-
tinuation of the old SFRY (just as the Russian Federation was the continua-
tion of the USSR) and not a successor State. It therefore maintained that the
FRY continued the SFRY's membership in all international organizations and
1 1. See, e.g., the decision of the United States Military Tribunal in United States v. List, 8 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1234, 1247. See also Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Preamble to which states that "the provisions of the Geneva Conventions . . .
and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by
those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict." Protocol
Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
12. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3 1 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR supra note 11, at 197 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, id. at 222 [hereinafter Geneva II];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, id. at 244 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
id. at 301 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. Protocol I, supra note 11.
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that all treaties concluded by the SFRY, including the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I, continued to apply to the FRY without any need for an act of
succession. Accordingly, whereas the other States which emerged from the
SFRY each made a declaration of succession to the Conventions and Proto-
cols, the FRY did not.
The FRY's claim to be the continuation of the SFRY was not, however, ac-
cepted by the rest of the international community. Thus, the Arbitration
Commission of the Peace Conference for the Former Yugoslavia (known as
"the Badinter Commission" after the name of its Chairman, Judge Robert
Badinter of the French Constitutional Court) rejected the FRY's claim and
gave the opinion that the States which emerged from the SFRY were all suc-
cessor States, none of which had any special claim to continue the personality
of the old State. 13 The United Nations Security Council and General Assem-
bly also rejected the FRY's claim and stated that it should apply for member-
ship of the United Nations. 14 The then Government of the FRY, however,
adhered to its position that it continued the personality of the SFRY and thus
continued to be bound by, and to have the benefit of, all of the latter's treaty
obligations. Thus, in the cases brought against it in the International Court of
Justice by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia for alleged violations of the Geno-
cide Convention, it did not contest that it was bound by that Convention. 15
The FRY took the same position in the cases which it brought against ten
NATO States in 1 999. 16
The change of government in the FRY in 2000 brought a complete reversal
of this position. The post-Milosevic government accepted that the FRY was a
new State, one of five successors to the SFRY. In October 2000 it applied for,
13. Opinions 9 and 10, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 203, 206 (1998); 31
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1488 (1998). See Michael Wood, Participation of Former
Yugoslav States in the United Nations and in Multilateral Treaties, 1 YEARBOOK OF UNITED
Nations Law 231 (1997).
14. S.C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992); S.C. Res. 777 (Sep. 19, 1992),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992); S.C. Res. 821 (Apr. 28, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/821 (1993); and
G.A. Res. 47/1 (Sep. 22, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992).
15. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) 1996 I.C.J. 595 (Preliminary Objections) and 1997 I.C.J. 243
(Counter-claims) ; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croat, v. Yugo.), available on the ICJ website at http://www.icj-cij.org. At
the time this was written, the Court had not held hearings on the merits of the Bosnian case or
taken any substantive decision in the Croatian case.
16. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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and was admitted to, membership of the United Nations. 17 On March 8, 2001,
the new government deposited an instrument of accession to the Genocide
Convention, which became effective ninety days later in accordance with Ar-
ticle XIII of the Convention. By the same instrument, the FRY entered a res-
ervation to Article IX (the provision which confers jurisdiction on the
International Court ofJustice). The FRY subsequently applied to the Interna-
tional Court under Article 61 of the Court's Statute to re-open the jurisdic-
tion phase of the Bosnia case on the grounds that the FRY had not been bound
by the Genocide Convention at the relevant times and had never been bound
by Article IX. 18 At the time of writing, the Court had not taken any decision
regarding this application.
The FRY had, however, been treated throughout the Kosovo conflict as a
party to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols both by other States (includ-
ing the NATO States) and by the ICRC, which sent a formal note to the FRY
and the NATO member States on March 24, 1999 reminding them of their
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. 19
On October 16, 2001, the new government of the FRY deposited with the
Swiss Federal Government a declaration regarding the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols. In contrast to the position taken by the new government with
regard to the Genocide Convention, however, this declaration was an instru-
ment of succession, not accession. Moreover, it was expressly made retrospec-
tive, stating that it took effect as from April 27, 1992. Any element of doubt
which might therefore have arisen regarding the status of the FRY as a party to
the Geneva Conventions and Protocols is therefore removed. The new gov-
ernment had earlier deposited instruments of succession to a large number of
multilateral conventions.
Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions were applicable to all the States in-
volved in the conflict, while Protocol I applied as between the FRY and those
NATO States which were parties to it (all of them except France, Turkey and
17. S.C. Res. 1326 (Oct. 31, 2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1326 (2000); G.S. Res. 55/12 (Nov. 1,
2000), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/12 (2000).
18. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 (23
April 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
19. ICRC Press Release 99/15, Mar. 24, 1999, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
news_by_date.
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the United States of America). 20 The customary law of armed conflict was also
applicable.
3. The Relationship between NATO and the KLA/UCK
The second question concerns the extent to which the hostilities between
the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) were governed by
international humanitarian law. There is little doubt that, even before the
start of Operation Allied Force, an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between
the FRY and the KLA/UCK. The possibility that such a conflict might exist
was impliedly recognized by the Security Council as early as March 1998,
when it urged the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) "to begin gathering information relating to the vio-
lence in Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction." 21 Since the Tribunal's
jurisdiction is largely confined to crimes committed in armed conflict, 22 this
invitation appears to have proceeded on the basis that, at least, an armed con-
flict might already exist. The events of early 1999 also strongly suggested that
an armed conflict existed within Kosovo. 23
At least until March 24, 1999, that conflict was of a non-international char-
acter, since it consisted of "protracted armed violence between governmental
20. France became a party to Protocol I in 2001. Peter Kovacs, Intervention armee des forces
del'OTAN au Kosovo, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 103 (2000), argues that
the United States had agreed to comply with Protocol I and was therefore bound by it. This
argument is unconvincing. It confuses the willingness (and, indeed, the obligation) of the United
States to apply the rules of customary international law codified in some of the provisions of
Protocol I with a declaration of readiness to apply the entire Protocol as such. The United States
has never agreed to apply all of the provisions of Protocol I.
21. S.C. Res. 1160 11 17 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).
22. The existence of an armed conflict is an inherent feature of grave breaches (Article 2 of the
Tribunal's Statute) and war crimes (Article 3); it is also expressly required as a condition for
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity (Article 5). Only genocide (Article 4) can be
prosecuted in the Tribunal without the need to demonstrate the existence of an armed conflict.
The ICTY was created by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 827 (May 25,
1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The ICTY Statute and the Secretary-General's
Commentaries are contained in the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (May 3, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32
International Legal Materials 1163, 1192 (1993).
23. See the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic and others issued by the Prosecutor on May
22, 1999 and confirmed by Judge Hunt on May 24, 1999 (IT-99-37-I). Note also the ICRC
statement ofJanuary 18, 1999 regarding the massacre at Racak, which called on "both sides to
comply with international humanitarian law and to spare those not, or no longer, involved in the
fighting." ICRC Press Release 99/04, Jan. 18, 1999, available at the ICRC website, supra note 19.
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authorities and organized armed groups . . . within a State."24 As such, it was
governed by the provisions ofcommon Article 3 and the customary law appli-
cable to non-international conflicts. 25 Although the KLA/UCK has at
times claimed to be a national liberation movement, so that its struggle for
self-determination would constitute an international armed conflict under
Article 1 (4) of Protocol I, that claim has not been accepted by the interna-
tional community. 26
The question is whether the intervention of NATO on March 24, 1999
"internationalized" that conflict, so that all the hostilities became subject to
the law applicable to international armed conflicts considered above. The
ICTY has recognized, in its two decisions in the Tadic case, 27 that an interna-
tional armed conflict can co-exist alongside a non-international one and that
the latter will be internationalized only if there is a clear relationship between
the non-governmental party to that conflict and one of the States party to the
international conflict. While the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber on the
nature of that relationship is open to criticism, the requirement that some
kind of relationship exist is surely right—the mere fact that a conflict between
States comes into being alongside a conflict within one of those States cannot,
in and of itself, be sufficient to make the law of international armed conflicts
applicable to the latter. At least until the end of May 1999, however, NATO
kept its distance from the KLA/UCK and even after that time it is far from
clear that the relations between them were sufficiently close for the conflict
24. The definition of a non-international armed conflict given by the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Tadic, supra note 7, 11 70.
25. It is more doubtful whether Protocol II applied. Until the closing stages of the fighting, it is
unclear whether the KLA/UCK exercised sufficient control over a defined area of territory to
meet the requirements of Article 1(1) of Protocol II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 609, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 1 1, at 483 [hereinafter Protocol II].
26. It is noticeable, for example, that none of the NATO States argued that the KLA/UCK was
a national liberation movement or that the population of Kosovo had a right to
self-determination, nor is such a view reflected in the various UN Security Council resolutions
regarding Kosovo. The Prosecutor has not charged Slobodan Milosevic with grave breaches
under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute—the only offense within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
which can only be committed in an international armed conflict (Tadic, supra note 7)—in
respect of Kosovo, even though some of the incidents in Kosovo in early 1999 (such as the
massacre of forty-five villagers at Racak on January 15, 1999 (U.N. Doc. S/PRST/ 1999/2)) would
appear to have qualified as a grave breach had there been an international conflict.
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995), 105 INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
419 (1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic (Merits), 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1518 (1999).
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between the KLA/UCK and the FRY to be regarded as part of the interna-
tional armed conflict, rather than a separate internal conflict governed by a
different set of rules. 28
Application of International Humanitarian Law in the Kosovo Conflict
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the law of interna-
tional armed conflicts (both the customary law and that contained in the rele-
vant treaties) was applicable to the Kosovo conflict. Since it is a well
established principle that international humanitarian law applies equally to
both sides in a conflict, irrespective of the lawfulness of the resort to force or
the purpose for which force is used, it should follow that there was nothing
special about the application of international humanitarian law in the Kosovo
campaign. 29
That means, in particular, that the two main principles of targeting—dis-
tinction and proportionality—were applicable throughout. While these prin-
ciples are discussed in greater detail in other papers in the present volume, it is
useful to recall the way in which they are formulated in Protocol I, which is
generally regarded as stating the customary law on the subject. The principle
of distinction is evident throughout Articles 48 to 58 of the Protocol but three
provisions are particularly important:
Article 48
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.
Article 51(2)
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
28. On the subject of prisoners captured by the KLA and handed over to NATO forces, see infra
this paper.
29. The principle of equal application is clearly stated in the List case, supra note 11, and was
more recently reaffirmed in the Preamble to Protocol I, supra note 11.
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Article 52(2)
Attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
The principle of proportionality is succinctly stated in Article 51(5)(b),
which prohibits "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated."
Two very different schools of thought have suggested that the purpose of
the NATO intervention and the unusual character of the conflict meant that
the rules of international humanitarian law—and, in particular, these rules of
distinction and proportionality—were to be applied in a manner different
from that in other recent conflicts such as the 1990-91 hostilities in the Gulf.
The purpose for which NATO employed force—to halt the attacks on the
Kosovars and to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—has al-
ready been considered. The unusual character of the conflict may be said to
have manifested itself in two ways. First, for most of the period of Operation
Allied Force, the ability of the NATO States directly to influence events on
the ground in Kosovo was very limited. With no ground forces available for
immediate deployment, they were obliged to rely on air power and their ability
to strike effectively at the FRY forces engaged in the process of ethnic cleans-
ing in Kosovo was limited, at least until the closing stages of the conflict. In-
stead, their strategy was to attack targets throughout much of the FRY in
order to bring about a change of policy on the part of the FRY government.
Secondly, while the FRY's anti-aircraft defenses continued to attack
NATO aircraft throughout the conflict, the FRY did not attack the territory
of any of the NATO States, nor, apart from the capture of a US patrol on the
border between the FRY and Macedonia, did it conduct any operations
against NATO forces anywhere outside the FRY. The result was that the con-
flict was exceptionally one-sided—in contrast, for example, to the Gulf con-
flict, where Iraq launched missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and other
coalition States, as well as against Israel.
The purpose for which NATO resorted to force and these unusual charac-
teristics of the conflict have led to two very different theories, each of which
suggests a departure from the normal principles of the law of armed conflict
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and each of which, in this writer's view, is a heresy which demands emphatic
rejection.
The first of these heresies is that NATO's motives and the manner in
which it was obliged to fight the conflict permitted it a greater latitude in
choosing the targets which it would attack than would otherwise be the case.
In particular, since the purpose of the bombing campaign was not to defeat the
FRY armed forces (in the normal sense of that term, i.e., by successfully engag-
ing them in battle) but to produce a change of policy on the part of the FRY
Government, objects whose destruction was particularly likely to increase the
pressure on the FRY Government were legitimate targets in this conflict irre-
spective of whether they fell within the definition of military objectives codi-
fied in Article 52(2) of Protocol I. An important part of this thesis is that
attacks carried out in order to undermine support amongst the enemy civilian
population for the policy of its government would be lawful.
Tempting though such an approach may be, it is difficult to reconcile with
contemporary international humanitarian law. As demonstrated above, the
principle that the enemy civilian population and individual civilians are not
themselves legitimate targets is now clearly established in that law. 30 More-
over, the definition of a military objective requires both that the object in
question make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action and
that the destruction or damage of the object offers a definite military advan-
tage to the State whose forces attack it. 31 Nothing in any of the treaties on the
law of armed conflict or the practice of States suggests that a State's motives
or the fact that it seeks to procure a change in its adversary's policy rather
than that adversary's total defeat can expand the range of targets which is law-
fully open to it. It follows that an object does not become a target simply be-
cause of its political significance or the effect which its destruction is likely to
have on civilian morale and support for a hostile government. Only something
which meets the criteria of a military objective laid down by international hu-
manitarian law may lawfully be attacked.
That does not mean that the political effect (including the effect on enemy
morale) of attacking a particular target cannot legitimately be taken into con-
sideration. Provided that the target constitutes a military objective and the
30. See, e.g., the provision to that effect in Protocol I, Articles 48, 50 and 51(2), supra note 11,
and the statement in 11 8. 1.2 of Naval Doctrine Command, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 144M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1) (1995),
reprinted in the ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 403.
31. Protocol I, Article 52(2), supra note 1 1, at 450; COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 30,
11 8.1.1 (the wording of which is slightly different).
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principle of proportionality contained in humanitarian law is respected, 32 it is
entirely legitimate to seek to undermine the will of and support for the en-
emy's government. But the desire to achieve that goal cannot convert into a
lawful target something which does not otherwise meet those criteria. It is
noteworthy that none of the NATO governments suggested otherwise. 33
The rival heresy is that, because the campaign was fought for a humanitar-
ian objective, international humanitarian law has to be interpreted as impos-
ing upon NATO more extensive restrictions than would otherwise have been
the case. Such an approach is apparent in the report of the Independent Inter-
national Commission on Kosovo (an unofficial body of non-governmental
commentators established at the initiative of the Prime Minister of Sweden)
.
As part of what it describes as a "Framework for Principled Humanitarian In-
tervention," the Report proposes that in cases of humanitarian intervention
"there must be even stricter adherence to the laws of war and international
humanitarian law than in standard military operations."34
This suggestion (which is admittedly made de lege ferenda) is open to criti-
cism on at least three grounds. First, there is something distinctly woolly-
minded about the whole idea. The Report does not appear to suggest that the
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to a force engaging in hu-
manitarian intervention should differ from those applicable to forces engaged
in other military operations, but rather that those rules should be more strictly
applied. Yet the idea that the law can prescribe the same rules for all types of
military operations but require a higher standard of adherence in some cases
than in others is untenable. International humanitarian law requires that,
whenever it applies, it should be complied with. One violation may, of course,
be less serious than another and, as a matter of fact, one force may have a
better record of compliance than another. It is, however, illogical and contrary
to principle to say that the law requires one party to comply with all of the
rules which are binding upon it but requires another party—albeit bound by
all of the same rules—to comply only with some, or to comply with all but to a
lesser degree. In reality what the Commission is proposing is that differ-
ent—and stricter—rules should apply to a State which resorts to force by way
32. See Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b), supra note 11, at 448-9; COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 30, H 8.1.2.1.
33. See also the article by James Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis:
Lessons Learned or to be Learned, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129, 131-2
(2000).
34. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 195
(2000); see also page 179.
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of humanitarian intervention than to one which resorts to force for any other
purpose. But the Commission's proposal begs many questions about which
rules are involved and what degree of modification might be involved.
Secondly, whichever way the Commission's suggestion is put, it would have
the effect of driving a coach and horses through the principle that interna-
tional humanitarian law applies equally to both sides in any conflict, without
regard to the cause which they espouse or the legality of their action under the
jus ad helium. A State whose forces were resisting humanitarian intervention by
another State or group of States would, presumably, be required to comply with
the normal rules of international humanitarian law (or to display the normally
required degree of adherence) . It would therefore be entitled to a greater de-
gree of latitude than its opponent. The implications of the Commission's pro-
posal in this respect are concealed by the unusual circumstances of the Kosovo
conflict. As has already been noted, the FRY did not respond by force against
the NATO States (other than by the use of anti-aircraft fire) and did not at-
tack the NATO States themselves. It would be naive, however, to assume that
the same conditions will necessarily apply in any future humanitarian interven-
tion. Indeed, had NATO proceeded to a ground campaign, it would not have
been the case in the Kosovo conflict, as the FRY could, and almost certainly
would, have put up a strenuous resistance to NATO ground forces.
Thirdly, the effect of the Commission's suggestion would be that interna-
tional humanitarian law would impose greater constraints on a State engaging
in humanitarian intervention than on a State which acted in self-defense or
even one which invaded a neighbor in clear violation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter. It is not immediately obvious why an aggressor
should be subject to less rigorous rules in respect, for example, of targeting
than a State which intervenes to prevent genocide or other large-scale viola-
tions of human rights.
A more sophisticated suggestion is canvassed by Professor Bothe in a cri-
tique of the Report to the Prosecutor. 35 After examining the Report's findings
regarding the NATO campaign, Professor Bothe states:
Both in relation to the question of the definition of the military objective and in
relation to the proportionality principle, the report fails to raise yet another
fundamental question. Do traditional considerations of military necessity and
35. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1257 (2000), reprinted herein as AppendixA [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor!
.
The Report is discussed infra this paper.
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military advantage have a legitimate place in a conflict the declared purpose of
which is a humanitarian one, namely to promote the cause ofhuman rights? The
thought would deserve further consideration that in such a conflict, more
severe restraints would be imposed on the choice of military targets and of the
balancing test applied for the purposes of the proportionality principle than in a
'normal' armed conflict.36
The reasoning which seems to underlie this proposal can be summarized as
follows: humanitarian intervention, in so far as it justifies military action at all,
does so only for strictly limited purposes. It follows that only military action
which serves those limited purposes is legitimate and the traditional consider-
ations of military advantage and military necessity must be adapted (and cir-
cumscribed) accordingly. In effect, it requires reading the definition of a
military objective codified in Article 52(2) of Protocol I and the statement of
the proportionality principle in Article 5 1 (5) (b) as though they referred to a
legitimate military advantage.
Professor Bothe's approach37 avoids the first objection raised in relation to
the Kosovo Commission proposals but it still falls foul of the other two objec-
tions and must therefore be rejected. As soon as one qualifies the concept of
military advantage (or military necessity) by reference to considerations of le-
gitimacy drawn from the purpose for which a party resorts to force, the jus ad
bellum and the jus in hello become inextricably mixed and the principle of
equal application of international humanitarian law is fatally compromised. If
a State, whose resort to force is in jus ad bellum terms lawful only for strictly
limited purposes, violates the jus in hello whenever it attacks a target whose de-
struction will not contribute to the achievement of those purposes, it follows
that a State whose resort to force is unlawful under the jus ad helium will vio-
late the jus in hello whenever it targets anything. Yet that is precisely the argu-
ment which was advanced and comprehensively rejected both in the trials at
the end of World War Two and in the negotiation of Protocol I.
The difficulties, both practical and theoretical, of such an approach are ob-
vious when one asks what standards would have been applicable to attacks by
the FRY on targets in the NATO States had such attacks been carried out
during the Kosovo conflict. The FRY was plainly not acting by way of humani-
tarian intervention. Would its actions therefore have been judged by
36. Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia:
Comments on the Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
International Law 531, 535 (2001).
37. See the papers by Professors Bothe and Bring in the present volume.
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reference to the modified jus in hello considered to apply to a humanitarian in-
tervention or would they have been subject to the jus in hello applicable in a
"normal" armed conflict? Neither answer would be at all satisfactory, for the
first treats the FRY as engaged in an activity which was entirely alien to it
while the second would mean that the FRY would enjoy greater latitude in
targeting than the NATO States for no apparent reason. It is only because the
circumstances of the Kosovo conflict were such that the FRY was not, in prac-
tice, able to attack the NATO States that these difficulties were obscured.
That is not to say that the legal basis for resort to force has no bearing on
the manner in which that force may be used. As the statement by the United
Kingdom Representative, quoted in Part I above, makes clear, the force used
in humanitarian intervention has to be necessary in order to achieve the goal
of ending (or preventing) the humanitarian emergency. In other words, the
purpose for which force is permitted under the jus ad helium—in the case of
Kosovo, a humanitarian purpose—limits the degree of force which may be
used. However, this recognition of the relationship between the degree of
force used and the goal to be achieved is different from the suggestion ad-
vanced by Professor Bothe in two important respects.
First, considerations of necessity and proportionality here operate as part of the
jus ad helium, not the jus in hello. This is much more than a theoretical distinction
and has important practical consequences. It leaves intact the jus in hello defini-
tion of what constitutes a military objective and such concepts as military neces-
sity and proportionality for the purposes of Article 51(5)(b). The proportionality
limitation in the jus ad helium measures the use of force as a whole against the
yardstick ofwhat is proportionate to the overall goal to be achieved; it does not re-
quire analysis of each individual attack by reference to that overall goal. More-
over, the limits of the jus ad helium, unlike those of the jus in hello, do not carry
with them the possibility of criminal sanctions for individual servicemen. Sec-
ondly, a requirement that the force used must be proportionate to the goal to be
achieved is not confined to humanitarian intervention. Proportionality in this
sense is also a requirement of the law of self-defense.38
38. See, e.g., the decision of the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, H 194 (June 27); this principle
was common ground between the United States of America and Nicaragua. For further
discussion of the principle of proportionality in self-defense and its relationship to the jits in bello,
see Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between lus ad Bellum and lus in Bello, 9 REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 221-34 (1983) and Self-Defence and the Conduct of International
Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 273-88 (Yoram Dinstein
ed., 1989).
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Both of the "heretical" views considered here are the product of under-
standable (though largely contradictory) concerns but they involve an unjus-
tified muddling ofjus ad bellum and jus in hello issues in a way which is contrary
to principle and unsupported by authority. In this writer's view, the true posi-
tion can be stated very simply: the NATO States and the FRY were bound to
comply with the relevant rules of international humanitarian law in this con-
flict, as they would have been in any other—nothing more or less.
Prisoners of War
Issues concerning prisoners of war arose in two contexts during the Kosovo
conflict. First, three US soldiers serving with the multinational peacekeeping
force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were cap-
tured by FRY forces on March 31, 1999. Secondly, two members of the FRY
forces captured by the KLA/UCK were subsequently handed over to United
States forces who held them for a short period. Both cases gave rise to a degree
of confusion about the status of the prisoners, which is surprising in view of
the clarity of the Third Geneva Convention. In both cases the status of those
concerned as prisoners ofwar entitled to the full protection of the Convention
should never have been in doubt.
At the time of their capture, the three US soldiers were serving in a multi-
national peacekeeping force in the FYROM. That force had originally been a
United Nations one (UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)) but
in February 1999 the People's Republic of China had vetoed the Security
Council resolution required to renew the mandate ofUNPREDEP, because of
the FYROM's diplomatic links with Taiwan. The contingents which had com-
posed UNPREDEP had remained in the FYROM at the request of its govern-
ment and had reconstituted themselves as a multinational force outside
United Nations control. At the time of their capture, the three US soldiers
were not involved in the military operations against the FRY and were con-
ducting a patrol as part of the multinational force's operations. There was
some doubt as to whether at the time of their capture they had inadvertently
strayed into the FRY or whether they were captured in the territory of the
FYROM.
Neither their membership in the multinational force nor the place of their
capture, however, affects their status. Under Article 4A(1) of the Third Con-
vention, members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who have
"fallen into the power of the enemy" automatically have the status of prisoners
of war. The three US servicemen were undoubtedly members of the US armed
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forces and the United States was clearly a party to an armed conflict with the
FRY at the time of their capture. Moreover, it is difficult to think of words
more apt to describe what happened to the three than that they had "fallen
into the power of the enemy." Nothing in the Convention, or the subsequent
practice in its interpretation leaves any room for excluding them on the
ground that they were not involved in the conflict itself or that they were
members of a non-United Nations peacekeeping force.
Nor would their status be affected by the fact that they were captured in the
FYROM. Whether the FYROM was, strictly speaking, a neutral State is a
controversial question but even if it was, the place of their capture does not af-
fect the applicability of the Convention. If the FYROM was properly regarded
as a neutral State, then the FRY incursion into its territory which resulted in
the capture of the three would have been unlawful but the status of prisoner of
war is made contingent on the fact of being in the hands of an enemy, not the
legality of the means by which that was accomplished.
In these circumstances, it is surprising and disturbing that there was ever
any doubt about the status of the three captured soldiers. James Burger has
commented that "[sjome persons thought initially that it would be better to
assert that the captured soldiers were illegal detainees, allowing the United
States to demand their immediate release, rather than waiting until the end of
active hostilities"39 but that the United States instead took the position that
the men were prisoners of war, which he describes as "the right decision." It
was certainly that but the point needs to be emphasized that the status of the
three as prisoners of war was an automatic consequence of the fact that they
met the requirements of the Convention, not the result of a policy choice. The
status of a detainee as a prisoner of war is not something dependent upon the
choice of either his or her own State or the detaining power. The initial uncer-
tainty may have contributed to the refusal by the FRY to allow access by the
ICRC to the three until more than three weeks after their capture, a clear
breach of the Convention.40
In passing, it should be noted that, had the force in which the three men
been serving remained a United Nations peacekeeping force, then the answer
would probably have been different. In principle, when a national unit is as-
signed to the United Nations for a mission under United Nations com-
mand—i.e., a "blue beret" operation—the members of the unit are, for the
39. Burger, supra note 33, at 136.
40. ICRC Press Releases 99/21, Apr. 23, 1999 (protesting lack of access) and 99/25, Apr. 27,
1999 (recording a visit by the ICRC to the three men) available at ICRC website, supra note 19.
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duration of their assignment and at least as long as they do not act outside the
scope of the United Nations mandate (e.g., by engaging in surveillance activi-
ties unauthorized by the United Nations), to be considered as United Nations
personnel, not members of the armed forces of their own State. In those cir-
cumstances, they would be protected by the provisions of the Convention on
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, assuming that
the States concerned were parties, or the Convention on Privileges and Immu-
nities of 1946.
The position of the FRY soldiers captured by the KLA/UCK is also straight-
forward, at least once they came into the custody of the United States. As-
suming that, at the time of their capture, the conflict between the KLA/UCK
and the FRY was still an internal conflict (a matter considered above), the
captured soldiers did not become prisoners of war when they fell into the
hands of the KLA/UCK, as that status does not apply to prisoners in internal
conflicts. Nevertheless, once they were transferred to the custody of a State
which was engaged in an international armed conflict against their own State,
they fulfilled the requirements of Article 4A(1) of the Third Convention and
were thus entitled to treatment as prisoners of war. It appears that they were
treated as such throughout the time they were held by the United States and
access by the ICRC was allowed in accordance with the Convention. 41
The Naval Embargo
By contrast, the naval operations against the FRY gave rise to more serious
legal questions. The focus of discussion was the proposal—in fact never imple-
mented—that the considerable naval forces available in the Adriatic should
prevent shipments of oil to the FRY, even where the oil was being carried by
ships flying the flag of States not involved in the conflict. There was obviously
no obstacle in international law to the NATO States preventing ships flying
their own flags from engaging in this trade.42 Nor was there any such obstacle
where the flag State, though not a member of NATO, consented to NATO
warships intercepting its vessels, as a number of States did. The question
which gave rise to difficulty was whether NATO could lawfully intercept and
41. See ICRC Press Releases 99/20, Apr. 18, 1999 and 99/29, May 18, 1999; available at ICRC
website, supra note 19.
42. Whether the national laws of the States concerned permitted such action is another matter
and one which falls outside the scope of this study.
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___
divert ships flying the flag of a neutral State which did not consent to such ac-
tion, such as Russian merchant ships.
The problem was, in part, of a political, rather than a legal, character.
There was an understandable desire on the part ofNATO not to risk an esca-
lation of the conflict or further to embitter their relations with Russia. A fur-
ther political complication was that the FRY's only port, Bar, was in
Montenegro, not Serbia. Throughout the conflict, the Government of
Montenegro sought to distance itself to the greatest extent possible from the
actions of the FRY Federal Government and the Government of Serbia.
While Montenegro, as part of the FRY, could not be regarded as a neutral in
the legal sense of the term, it nevertheless sought something akin to a neutral
status in political terms. NATO, although it bombed some targets in
Montenegro, wished to bolster the position of the Montenegro Government
and thus to minimize military action against Montenegro.
By contrast, international law appeared to present few problems. Although
the matter is not entirely free of controversy, the general view is that the cus-
tomary international law of armed conflict still permits a State engaged in an
international armed conflict to prevent strategic commodities such as oil from
reaching its opponent by sea, even if carried in neutral flagged vessels. The
majority view is that that can be done either by the imposition of a blockade43
or by less drastic measures of visit, search and capture designed to prevent the
flow of contraband to an enemy.44 Since the NATO States were engaged in an
armed conflict with the FRY, the imposition of an oil embargo (with or with-
out a general blockade) would, in principle, have been compatible with the jus
in hello.
It would, however, be wrong to dismiss the doubts about the proposed em-
bargo as having no legal basis. Two different legal issues need to be consid-
ered. First, in order to be lawful an oil embargo would have had to comply not
only with the jus in hello but also with the jus ad helium. A blockade of Saudi
Arabia by the Iraqi navy (had that been possible) during the 1990-91 Gulf
conflict might well have complied with the requirements of the jus in hello but
it would nevertheless have been unlawful, because the entire Iraqi resort to
force contravened the jus ad helium. The need to comply with the jus ad helium
is particularly important when the measures in question are taken against
43. See, e.g., COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 30, 11 7.7; SAN REMO MANUAL ON
International Law Applicable to armed Conflicts at Sea 1111 93-104 (Louise
Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
44. Commander's Handbook, supra note 30, 11 7.4.1; San Remo Manual, supra note 43,
1111 146-152.
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neutral States. An oil embargo of the FRY would have involved enforcing re-
strictions on the exercise by the shipping of neutral States of the normal rights
of freedom of navigation under international law. Accordingly, while it is nec-
essary to show that those restrictions were compatible with the jus in hello, it is
not sufficient to do so; they must also be within the limits of the jus ad helium.
The uncertainty about the possible imposition of an oil embargo was there-
fore, for many, the reflection of their uncertainty about whether NATO had a
solid legal justification for resorting to force at all. In addition, even if interna-
tional law does recognize a right to use force by way of humanitarian interven-
tion, it is still necessary to ask whether that extends to the exercise of
belligerent rights over the shipping of neutral States. As was made clear earlier
in this paper, the present writer is firmly of the view that there is a right of hu-
manitarian intervention in an extreme case. Moreover, if international law
permits States to use force in such a case against the State responsible for the
humanitarian crisis, then it is logical that it should also permit the taking of
action which is both necessary and proportionate against neutral shipping to
prevent that State from acquiring supplies needed to continue its human
rights abuses or resist attempts to prevent them. But it is in considerations of
this kind, and not just in references to the traditional rights of belligerents at
sea, that the justification for an oil embargo needed to be found.
Secondly, both the jus ad helium and the jus in hello require that action
taken against neutral shipping be necessary and proportionate. In view of the
limited port facilities at Bar, the difficulty of moving oil from the port to the
rest of the FRY and the relative ease with which the NATO States could have
disrupted links between Bar and the rest of the FRY, it is questionable
whether interference with neutral shipping was really necessary on the facts of
the case.
The Military Presence in Kosovo after June 10, 1999
On June 10, 1999 the NATO airstrikes were suspended and active hostili-
ties came to an end. The FRY Government accepted the principles on a settle-
ment presented to it by the European Union envoy, Mr Ahtisaari, and the
Russian Federation envoy, Mr Chernomyrdin, on June 2, 1999, themselves
based on an earlier set of principles laid down by the G-8 foreign ministers. 45
On June 9, 1999, a military technical agreement was concluded between
NATO and FRY commanders. United Nations Security Council Resolution
45. Annexes 1 and 2 to S.C. Res. 1244 Gune 10, 1999), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
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1244, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter on June 10, 1999 approved
these steps. The resolution went on, in paragraph 7, to authorize "member
States and relevant international organizations to establish the international
security presence in Kosovo . . . with all necessary means to fulfill its responsi-
bilities." The responsibilities of KFOR, as the security presence became
known, were set out in paragraph 9 of the resolution as follows:
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into
Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces,
except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
(b) Demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups;
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons
can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a
transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be
delivered;
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can
take responsibility for this task;
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the
international civil presence;
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organisations.
AlthoughNATO was not expressly mentioned, the reference in paragraph 7 to
"relevant international organizations" was clearly intended to mean NATO
and KFOR was, from the start, largely NATO-led. While KFOR derived its le-
gal authority from the Security Council, it was not a United Nations force and
was not subject to United Nations command and control.
By contrast, the international civil presence, UNMIK, was a United Na-
tions body, created and controlled by the United Nations. It is worthwhile
noting UNMIK's terms of reference. Paragraph 10 of Resolution 1244 autho-
rized the United Nations Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations (a reference not confined to NATO) to establish a
civil presence:
58
Christopher Greenwood
[I]n order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the
people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for
all inhabitants of Kosovo.
Under paragraph 11, the responsibilities given to the international civil
presence were:
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2
and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as
required;
(c) Organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political
settlement, including the holding of elections;
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of
Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future
status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
(0 In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction;
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organisations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces
and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel
to serve in Kosovo;
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes in Kosovo.
Resolution 1244 (1999) is of the utmost importance. By using its powers
under Chapter VII of the Charter to create a civilian administration for
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Kosovo and to authorize an international military presence there, the Security
Council ensured that Kosovo did not fall under a regime which was subject to
the law of belligerent occupation. Whatever the doubts regarding the applica-
bility of international humanitarian law to United Nations military operations
generally,46 the United Nations is not bound by the basic framework of the
law of belligerent occupation (in particular, the duty codified in Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare to respect "unless absolutely pre-
vented" the law in force in the occupied territory) where it establishes a new
administration for a territory after a conflict. To hold otherwise would place a
wholly unreasonable fetter on the power of the Council to provide for political
change in territories such as Kosovo and East Timor. Resolution 1 244 has to
be seen as an exercise of that power and the legal regime governing both the
security and civil presences is derived primarily from that Resolution, not from
the law of belligerent occupation.47 That said, individual principles of the law
of belligerent occupation, such as those requiring humane treatment of de-
tainees, would be applicable.
International Proceedings Relating to the Kosovo Conflict
One of the unusual features of the Kosovo conflict was the extent to which
the military operations became the subject of scrutiny by international courts
and tribunals. Three different tribunals have considered different aspects of
the Kosovo conflict (and, at the time of writing, proceedings were continuing
in two of them). While space does not permit a detailed analysis of these pro-
ceedings, it is nonetheless important briefly to consider each of them.
1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
International humanitarian law has long expressly provided for its enforce-
ment through criminal proceedings against individuals. Nevertheless, while
the grave breaches machinery established by the Geneva Conventions and
46. On which, see the Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law,
Secretary-GeneraVs Bulletin, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 2
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 563 (1999); Christopher Greenwood,
International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1 YEARBOOK OF
International Humanitarian Law 3-34 (1998).
47. For a contrary view, see John Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in
Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 469 (2001).
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Protocol I48 requires States to take action in cases of grave breaches and to
bring offenders to justice irrespective of nationality, proceedings of this kind
have in fact been almost unknown. In the case of Kosovo, however, there was
already in existence an international tribunal able to exercise criminal juris-
diction. The ICTY, which was established by United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 827 (1993), had "the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."49 Although drawn up with the
conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the early 1990's in mind, the
Statute was not limited to those conflicts and was clearly applicable to
events in Kosovo (as the Security Council recognized in Resolutions 1160
and 1199 (1998)).
The attacks by the FRY armed forces and police on the majority commu-
nity in Kosovo led to the indictment, on May 22, 1999, by the ICTY Prosecu-
tor of the then FRY President, Slobodan Milosevic, and a number of other
prominent political and military figures on charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 50 While this indictment was dismissed as a political gesture
by Milosevic at the time, the new government of the FRY surrendered him to
the custody of the Tribunal in 2001. At the time of writing, Milosevic was
standing trial on these and other charges.
The Prosecutor also considered that the ICTY had jurisdiction over any se-
rious violations of humanitarian law which might have occurred in the
NATO air campaign. Although her stance in this regard attracted some criti-
cism in political circles, it was plainly correct. The ICTY's jurisdiction under
Article 1 of its Statute is confined to the territory of the former Yugoslavia but
it is not limited to offenses committed there by Yugoslavs and clearly extends
to offenses by NATO personnel. The Prosecutor established a committee to
inquire into various allegations that NATO forces had violated interna-
tional humanitarian law and to advise whether there was "a sufficient basis
to proceed with an investigation into some or all of the allegations or into
other incidents related to the NATO bombing."51 The committee concluded
48. See Geneva I (Article 49), Geneva II (Article 50), Geneva III (Article 129), and Geneva IV
(Article 146), supra note 12. See also Protocol I (Article 85), supra note 1 1.
49. Statute of the Tribunal, Article 1, supra note 22.
50. The indictment is available on the ICTY website at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/
english/mil-ii990524e.htm. On May 24, 1999, Judge Hunt confirmed the indictment, Case No.
IT-99-37-I.
51. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 11 3.
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that no investigation should be commenced.52 The Prosecutor accepted that
recommendation and told the Security Council that:
[T]here is no basis for opening an investigation into any of those allegations or
into other incidents related to the NATO bombing. Although some mistakes
were made by NATO, I am very satisfied that there was no deliberate targeting
of civilians or of unlawful military targets by NATO during the bombing
campaign. 53
The committee's report and the conclusions drawn by the Prosecutor have
attracted much criticism. Most of that criticism has come from those who
wanted to see charges brought against members of the NATO armed forces
and who accused the committee of adopting too lenient a stance in its ap-
praisal of the NATO actions. 54 More surprisingly, however, others have criti-
cized the committee for subjecting decisions taken in the heat of the moment
and sometimes in conditions of considerable danger to too close and detached
a scrutiny. 55 In the opinion of this writer, both criticisms are misconceived.
The report suggests neither undue leniency nor an excessive dose of hind-
sight. While scrutiny of military decisions with a view to prosecution is never a
comfortable experience for those who might be the subject of charges, it is
what the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I envisage and what has been ap-
plied to non-NATO defendants by the ICTY for several years. What the re-
port shows is that armed forces today cannot expect to be immune from the
kind of legal scrutiny—seeking to apply rules which have long been binding
on all States—which has become commonplace in other walks of life. It also
shows that a body like the committee established by the Prosecutor of the
ICTY is capable of applying those rules in a fair and sensible manner.
2. The International Court of Justice
The NATO air campaign was also the subject of proceedings instituted by
the FRY before the International Court of Justice against ten of the NATO
52. Id., 11 91.
53. United Nations Security Council 4150th Meeting; S/PV.4150, at 3, col. 1.
54. See, e.g., Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1 2 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 503 (2001) and, for more moderate criticism, see the article by Professor Bothe, supra note
36.
55. See the Commentary by Judith Miller in the present volume.
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States while the campaign was in progress. 56 The FRY maintained both that
the NATO resort to force was a violation of the principles oijus ad helium en-
shrined in the United Nations Charter and that the conduct of the campaign
violated obligations contained in a wide variety of treaties ranging from the
Geneva Conventions to the Convention on Navigation on the River Danube.
In each case the FRY sought provisional measures in the form of an order that
the respondent State should immediately cease military action against the
FRY pending the hearing of the merits. In order to obtain provisional mea-
sures, however, an applicant must demonstrate the existence of a prima facie
basis for jurisdiction on the merits. The Court held, by large majorities, that
the FRY had failed to satisfy this threshold requirement.
The result is scarcely surprising. None of the treaties which were the basis
for the FRY's substantive claim contain provisions conferring jurisdiction on
the International Court and the two bases for jurisdiction advanced by the
FRY57—Article IX of the Genocide Convention of 1948 (which was invoked
against all the respondents) and Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, the
so-called "Optional Clause" (which was invoked against six out of the
ten)—were rightly rejected by the Court.
Even assuming that the FRY was a party to the Genocide Convention, a po-
sition which it has subsequently repudiated, Article IX manifestly offered no
basis for jurisdiction against Spain and the United States of America, both of
which had entered reservations rejecting the application of that provision
when they became party to the Convention. Moreover, Article IX confers ju-
risdiction only with regard to a dispute "relating to the interpretation,
56. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. The Orders of the Court refusing the FRY's request
for provisional measures of protection and ordering the removal of the cases against Spain and
the United States of America from the Court's list are each reported under the title Case
concerning Legality of Use of Force, 1999 I.C.J. 124 (Belgium), 259 (Canada), 363 (France), 422
(Germany), 481 (Italy), 542 (the Netherlands), 656 (Portugal), 761 (Spain), 826 (United
Kingdom) and 916 (United States of America). At the time of writing, the cases against the
respondents, other than Spain and the United States ofAmerica, were still before the Court. The
eight remaining respondents have all objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and the
admissibility of the applications. The writer acted as counsel for the United Kingdom in these
proceedings; the present paper represents his personal views.
57. In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the FRY also attempted at a late stage to
rely upon a bilateral treaty. The Court held that this treaty had been invoked too late in the
proceedings; see, e.g.
y
Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (FRY v. Belgium), 1999 I.C.J. 124
Gun. 2) (Order—Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures), 11 44.
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application or fulfillment" of the Genocide Convention. Not surprisingly, the
Court held that:
[T]he essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction of a
'national, ethnical, racial or religious group' (Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Provisional Measures Order of 13
September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, p. 345, para. 42); . . . the threat or use offorce
against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning
of Article II of the Genocide Convention; and ... in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which
form the subject of the Yugoslav Application 'indeed entail the element of
intent, towards a group as such, required by [Article II]' (Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996 (I), p. 240, para.
26) .58
In effect, the FRY was seeking to use Article IX of the Genocide Convention as
a device to establish jurisdiction over complaints relating to quite different
agreements. The FRY's interpretation of the Genocide Convention would
have entailed watering down the crime of genocide to the point that it was de-
prived of its separate identity as the most serious of international crimes.
The other provision relied on by the FRY—Article 36(2) of the Statute of
the Court—could afford jurisdiction only in the event that both the FRY and
the respondent State in question had each made a valid declaration accepting
the Court's jurisdiction under that provision and the dispute fell within the
scope ofboth declarations. The FRY had purported to make a declaration un-
der Article 36(2) on April 25, 1999 (a month after the commencement of the
NATO campaign and three days before the FRY filed its applications against
the respondent States). It then sought to rely upon that declaration as a basis
for jurisdiction in the proceedings against those respondent States which had
extant declarations under Article 36(2) (Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom).
In view of the dispute regarding the status of the FRY, the question imme-
diately arose whether the FRY declaration was valid. If, as the Security Coun-
cil and the General Assembly had decided,59 the respondent States claimed
and the FRY has now accepted, the FRY was not at the relevant time a mem-
ber of the United Nations, then it was not a party to the Statute of the Court
and could not have made a valid declaration under Article 36(2) of that
58. Id.,U40.
59. See supra note 14.
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Statute. The Court, however, understandably chose not to decide that ques-
tion in provisional measures proceedings when there were other, more obvi-
ous, reasons for holding that there was no basis for jurisdiction. In the cases
against Spain and the United Kingdom, Article 36(2) of the Statute could not
have provided a basis for jurisdiction, because those two States had accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court only as between themselves and another State
which had made a similar declaration not less than one year earlier. The FRY's
declaration, even if valid, plainly did not fulfill that requirement.
The Court's reason for holding that Article 36(2) did not afford a basis for
jurisdiction in the cases against Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portu-
gal is of more general interest. The FRY declaration accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court as between the FRY and other States with Article 36(2) declara-
tions "in all disputes arising or which may arise after the signature of the pres-
ent declaration [i.e., after April 25, 1999], with regard to the situations or
facts subsequent to this signature."60 The Court held that the dispute which
the FRY wished to bring before the Court had arisen before April 25, 1999.
That was clear from the terms of the FRY applications, which referred primar-
ily to events before that date, and from the debates in the Security Council on
March 24 and 26, 1999 in which the legality of the NATO action was the sub-
ject of extensive discussion. The Court rejected the suggestion that the air
campaign could be sliced up like salami, so that each air raid gave rise to a
fresh dispute. The decision is not a technical one. The temporal reservation in
the FRY's declaration was carefully drafted to ensure that no proceedings
could be brought against the FRY in respect of the abuses in Kosovo which
had led to the NATO campaign. It was entirely in accordance with precedent
and principle that the FRY was not allowed, in the words of the old saying, "to
have its cake and eat it too."
The International Court proceedings are, nevertheless, an important re-
minder that military action can be the subject of scrutiny by the International
Court not merely after the action has ended but while it is in progress. Provi-
sional measures proceedings can be brought before the Court in a compara-
tively short time and the Court has now held that an order for provisional
measures is legally binding. 61 Since it cannot be assumed that there will always
be a jurisdictional ground for dismissing a request for provisional measures in
60. The full text of the FRY declaration is quoted in Order in the case against Belgium, supra
note 57, H 23.
61. LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), 40 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1069 (2001) Oudgment of June 27, 2001).
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such a case, the possibility clearly exists that States involved in ongoing mili-
tary operations might be forced to defend them before the Court in such pro-
ceedings. The stakes, in such an event, could be very high indeed. Moreover,
the Court's findings were, for the most part, provisional and, at the time of
writing, the proceedings against all of the respondent States except for Spain
and the United States of America remained on the Court's list.
3. The European Court of Human Rights
The third proceedings were in the European Court of Human Rights. The
case of Bankovic v. Belgium concerned the attack on the building in Belgrade
housing the studios of Radio Televizije Srbije (RTS) .62 That building was hit in
an air raid on April 23, 1999. Sixteen people were killed and sixteen injured.
The application was brought by one of those injured and relatives of some of
those killed against the seventeen NATO States which were also parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights (i.e., all of the NATO States ex-
cept Canada and the United States). The applicants alleged that the attack
had violated the right to life, under Article 2 of the Convention, and the right
to freedom of expression, under Article 10, of those killed or injured. They
maintained that the respondent States were responsible for those violations
even though they had occurred outside the territory of any of them (and, in-
deed, in the territory of a State not party to the European Convention). In ar-
guing that the Convention was not confined to events occurring on the
territory of the States parties, the applicants relied on the decisions in Loizidou
v. Turkey, in which the European Court had held Turkey responsible for viola-
tions of the Convention occurring in the north ofCyprus where large numbers
of Turkish forces have been stationed since 1974 and in which the Court
found that Turkey exercised effective control.63 In addition they argued that
the respondents were responsible for the alleged violations irrespective of
which State's forces had actually carried out the attack, because they con-
tended that NATO operated on the basis that any NATO State could have
62. The decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court on December 12, 2001 (Bankovic et al. v.
Belgium et al.) 11 BUTTERWORTHS HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 435 (2002) is also available at the
website of the Court, http://www.echr.coe.int. The present writer was counsel for the United
Kingdom in those proceedings; this paper represents his personal views.
63. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 103 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 622
(1995); Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), 108 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 443 (1996). These
decisions were confirmed by the Court's decision in Cyprus v. Turkey (10 May 2001), available on
the Court's website, supra note 62.
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vetoed the decision to attack the RTS building.64 In doing so, they high-
lighted the whole issue of the geographical extent of the European Conven-
tion and Its applicability to operations involving the armed forces of States
party to the Convention which occur outside the territory of those States.
The case also raised important questions about the relationship between
the principles of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. The applicants contended that human rights law and international
humanitarian law were not mutually exclusive and denied that military opera-
tions in an international armed conflict were governed solely by humanitarian
law.65 The first argument of the applicants was that the legality of the attack
on the RTS building had to be assessed by reference to provisions of the Euro-
pean Convention, quite independently of whether that attack complied with
international humanitarian law, although they also contended, in the alterna-
tive, that the Convention in effect incorporated the principles of humanitar-
ian law, so that the Convention would have been violated if the attack on the
RTS building had been in breach of international humanitarian law.
These are arguments of very considerable breadth which, had they been ac-
cepted, would radically have altered the legal framework within which mili-
tary operations have to be conducted. A Grand Chamber of the Court,66
however, rejected the applicants' arguments and unanimously declared the
application inadmissible. The Grand Chamber accepted the respondents' ar-
gument that the case fell outside the scope of the Convention. Article 1 of the
Convention defines that scope by providing that "the High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section I of this Convention." The Court held that this pro-
vision reflected a largely (though not exclusively) territorial concept of
jurisdiction and that it was only in exceptional cases that persons outside the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties would be considered as falling
within the jurisdiction of that Party. The Court contrasted Article 1 of the Eu-
ropean Convention with common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions,
64. Benvenuti, supra note 54, at 526-9, broadly supports these propositions.
65. They relied in part on the report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in
Coard et al. v. United States of America, Case 10, 951 (Sept. 29, 1999) 9 BUTTERWORTHS
HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 150 (2001), which considered that the detention by United States
forces of persons captured in the Grenada operation was subject to the American Convention
on Human Rights. Available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/
unitedstatesl0.95.htm.
66. While most cases in the Court are heard by a Chamber of seven judges, the Chamber
originally constituted to hear Bankovic relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber of
seventeen judges because of the importance of the issues raised by the case.
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under which "the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." The parties to the
Geneva Conventions were expressly required to respect the Conventions in
all their military operations and could be held responsible for any failure on
the part of their forces anywhere in the world to observe those Conventions.
By contrast, Article 1 of the European Convention was clearly narrower and
imposed responsibility only in respect of treatment of a person who was within
the jurisdiction of the State concerned at the relevant time. The Court held
that a person was not to be treated as falling within the jurisdiction of a State
merely because he or she was affected by the military operations of that State's
forces.
The Bankovic judgment removed the possibility that military operations by
the European members of NATO would henceforth be measured not only
against the yardstick of international humanitarian law but also by reference
to the very different standards of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Indeed, had the applicants' arguments been accepted it would not only
have been NATO that would have been affected. Coalition military opera-
tions in the Gulf and United Nations operations in, for example, East Timor
would also presumably have come within the purview of the European Court
and the provisions of a regional human rights treaty would have been superim-
posed on the requirements of international humanitarian law. The Court did
not reverse its earlier decisions in the Cyprus cases, but it noted that the cir-
cumstances in Cyprus were unusual in that both Cyprus and Turkey were par-
ties to the European Convention so that the inhabitants of northern Cyprus
should not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by reason of the
changes brought about by the Turkish intervention of 1974. It remains to be
seen what attitude the Court would take in a case where armed forces of a
party to the European Convention occupied territory of a non-Convention
country.
Conclusions
The Kosovo conflict raised important questions about the jus in hello in ad-
dition to the difficult issues of the jus ad bellum which have already attracted so
much attention. Indeed, in one sense the former group of questions are more
important, because they may have a wider impact. Although, for the reasons
given above, the Kosovo conflict was unusual in certain respects (notably its
asymmetric character), many of the lessons learned should be relevant to fu-
ture conflicts.
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The following conclusions seem warranted:
1
.
International humanitarian law applies to a conflict between two or
more States irrespective ofwhat that conflict is called or the cause for
which force is used; the use of force by way of humanitarian
intervention is no different in this respect from the use of force for
other purposes.
2. While the jus ad bellum requires that the use of force be proportionate
to the goals which the State or States using force are permitted to
pursue, that does not mean that the jus in hello principles on such
issues as targeting are to be interpreted or applied differently and it
should never be used as an excuse to undermine the principle of the
equal application of the jus in hello.
3. Members of the armed forces of a party to an international conflict
who find themselves in the power of the enemy are prisoners of war,
irrespective of the purpose for which the conflict is waged, whether
prisoner of war status is claimed on their behalf or how or where they
were captured.
4. It might have been lawful for the NATO States to have imposed an
oil embargo on the FRY but the legal issues involved went beyond a
simple application of the law of neutrality.
5. The KFOR and UNMIK presence in Kosovo pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) was not governed by the law of
belligerent occupation.
6. Scrutiny by international courts and tribunals of military operations
was a fact of life even before the establishment of the International
Criminal Court. The approach of the three tribunals which
considered the conduct of the Kosovo conflict suggests that much of
the concern which has been expressed on this subject is misplaced.
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I he Russian Orthodox Church recently canonized the last Czar of Rus-sia, Nicholas II. A fantasy ofmine is that the Church will at some point
also consider for sainthood (assuming his private life met appropriate stan-
dards) the czar's legal adviser, Baron Feodor de Martens, who was responsible
for the wording of what has come down to us as the "Martens Clause."
As it first appeared in the Preamble to the Second Hague Convention of
1899, the Martens Clause reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high contracting
parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience. 1
In common articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens
Clause is substantially repeated, with the substitution of the word "dictates"
1. Preamble, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, U.S.T.S. 403, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
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for "requirements" in relation to the public conscience. 2 The Clause also ap-
pears in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. 3
The Martens Clause is a powerful reminder that in situations of armed con-
flict, ofwhatever kind, there is never a total gap in the law, never a situation in
which there cannot be an appeal to law in order to mitigate the horror and the
suffering. Baron de Martens correctly foresaw in 1899, and again in 1907, that
unscrupulous commanders and their cunning legal advisers might seek to ex-
ploit loopholes or ambiguities in the written law. An egregious example is the
"general participation clause" of the Hague Conventions of 1907, according
to which the provisions of the Conventions did not apply to any of the
belligerents unless all of them were parties to the Conventions. Thus, the de-
tailed Hague Regulations might not apply but, according to the Martens
Clause, standards of civilized behavior deriving from custom, humanity and
the public conscience do.
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 63, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 197 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed., 2000)
[hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, Article
142, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, id. at 222 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 142, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, id. at 244 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 158, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, id. at 301 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, Article 1(2), 1 125 U.N.T.S. 3, id.
at 422 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims ofNon- International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977, Preamble, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 609, id. at 483 [hereinafter Protocol II].
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I take this as my starting point in the discussion of the jus in hello in relation
to humanitarian intervention operations.4 Whatever may be the uncertainties
in the identification and application of this law to a relatively new form of
armed conflict, at least we can be confident that we start from a firm, albeit
general, basis in humanitarian law. That basis is indeed becoming more de-
tailed in content as consensus emerges that certain principles and rules of the
jus in hello have achieved recognized status in customary law. Note should be
taken in this regard of ongoing discussions in Geneva to identify those parts of
Protocol I that may be regarded as customary, notwithstanding the inability of
certain States to ratify the Protocol by reason of particular objections. 5
The other firm foundation for my approach is that the application of the jus
in hello is not dependent upon the demonstration of a legal basis for the resort
to armed force in the jus ad helium. The law of armed conflict (which term I re-
gard as including international humanitarian law) applies its protection
equally to the just and the unjust sides to a conflict. This is an established and
undoubted proposition.
What is "Intervention"?
We may consider first a number of actions that constitute (for the most
part) non-forcible and thus uncontroversial forms of intervention. These are
sometimes listed under the heading "Military Operations Other than War"
(MOOTW) and include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peace
4. Some recent literature on the topic includes: Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, THE BLUE
HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATION OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS (1996);
Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, The applicability of international humanitarian law to UN
peacekeeping operations: conceptual, legal and practical issues, in SYMPOSIUM ON HUMANITARIAN
ACTION AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (Umesh Palwankar, ed., 1994); Willy Lubin,
Towards the international responsibility of the UN in human rights violations during peace-keeping
operations: the case of Somalia, 52 BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS
47 (1994); Julianne Peck, Note: The UN and the Laws of War: How Can the World's Peacekeepers
Be Held Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
283 (1995); Brian Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian
law to UN Peace Operations, 33 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997); Garth
Cartledge, Legal constraints on military personnel deployed on peace-keeping operations, in THE
Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian
LAW (Helen Durham and Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 1999).
5. Yoram Dinstein, The Thirteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law, 166 MILITARY
Law Review 93 (2000).
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operations, arms control, military support to the civil authorities, enforcement
of sanctions, foreign internal defense, counter-drug operations, evacuation of
noncombatants, hostage rescue, and others.6 The law applicable to such oper-
ations consists principally of the norms of human rights, as recognized in the
major international covenants and conventions, and established as general in-
ternational law. The domestic law of the country where the intervention takes
place will also call for respect, except in so far as it may conflict with estab-
lished international human rights law or the provisions of a higher law, such as
a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.
Some of these examples may, of course, in the circumstances, involve the
use of armed force or grow through "mission creep" to require the use of armed
force. A hostage rescue almost certainly requires the use of armed force, but
the swiftness of the insertion and withdrawal of force hardly allows for the ap-
plication of the law of armed conflict as such: only the general principles of
proportionality and humanity guide us here. Lengthier presences, such as the
operation in Somalia, may come to pose questions of the applicability of the
laws of armed conflict as the situation escalates from a peaceable and unop-
posed intervention to armed conflict. A peacekeeping operation authorized by
the United Nations may envisage the necessity of the use of force beyond the
elementary right of UN forces to defend themselves against armed attack. 7
These are sometimes referred to as "robust" peacekeeping operations. This
type of operation also raises the question of application of the laws of armed
conflict.
Finally, intervention may be avowedly a forcible action—a peace enforce-
ment action usually authorized by the UN Security Council (as in the case of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), but in certain cases not authorized by it (as in the
case of the bombing by NATO forces of Yugoslavia by reason of the situation
in Kosovo). This is the type of intervention most clearly requiring the applica-
bility of the laws of armed conflict. But what laws?
6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07,
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (1995).
7. In September 1992 the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced that
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina "would follow normal peace-keeping rules of
engagement [and] would thus be authorized to use force in self-defense It is to be noted that
in this context self-defense is deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by
force to prevent UN troops from carrying out their mandate." Cited by LESLIE GREEN, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 344 (2d ed. 2000).
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The Applicability of the Conventional Laws of Armed Conflict
to Forcible Intervention
We speak more narrowly of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) as "Hague
Law," since it finds its principal elaboration in the now rather dated Hague
Conventions of 1907. We speak of international humanitarian law (IHL) as
"Geneva Law", since it derives principally from the Geneva (Red Cross) Con-
ventions of 1949. These two sets of laws, of separate origin in the nineteenth
century and flowing in separate if parallel streams through most of the twenti-
eth century, were brought together in one stream and updated in Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977. 8 Those Proto-
cols have since been widely (although not universally) ratified. It is now usual
to speak of "the law of armed conflict" and "international humanitarian law"
interchangeably. Either expression generally includes the other.
What is the threshold of application of these laws? The Hague Conventions
are silent on the point, assuming that their application to "war" was objectively
ascertainable by reason of a declaration to that effect by one or more parties.
The Charter of the United Nations no longer envisages declarations ofwar as a
right of States and restricts the use of force by States against other States to sit-
uations of self-defense and actions authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter. (Some also believe that there is a limited range of
uses of armed force which are not prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter,
such as "humanitarian intervention.") Hence, the UN Charter does not estab-
lish a definition of a state ofwar or armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions of
1949, however, adopted soon after the creation of the United Nations, do es-
tablish a threshold in general terms, a threshold that is also adopted in Proto-
col I. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention [s] shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention[s] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with
no armed resistance.9
8. Protocol I and Protocol II, supra note 3.
9. See Article 2 in each of the four Geneva Conventions, supra note 2.
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The threshold of application of the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol I is
thus not set high: it merely requires the objective existence of an "armed con-
flict," which presumably exists from the first moment after an exchange of
fire.
The Conventions and Protocol I apply between "the Contracting Parties."
Can the United Nations, as such, be a Contracting Party? Following the Advi-
sory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Reparations for In-
juries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, 10 the United Nations
could, if it chose, become a party to such conventions. But it has not done so
for reasons to be discussed further below. The national contingents of UN
forces participating in an armed conflict would, however, be bound by the
conventions to which their States are parties.
It is also necessary to note that under the Geneva Conventions and Proto-
col I they may apply between Contracting Parties and other parties to the con-
flict which are not represented by a government or an authority recognized by
the adverse party. These latter forces must, however, "be subject to an inter-
nal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict." 11 Essentially this
means voluntary de facto compliance by a entity not competent to become a
Contracting Party to the Conventions, which—if offered—must be recipro-
cated. More formal status, however, is accorded by Protocol I, Article 96(3) to
the particular case of an "authority representing a people engaged against a
High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 4 [self-determination struggles against colonial, alien, or rac-
ist regimes]" provided that the authority undertakes to apply the Conventions
and the Protocol by means of a declaration addressed to the depositary (the
Swiss Federal Council).
So far as non-international armed conflicts (civil wars) are concerned,
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions similarly refers merely to the
objective existence of an armed conflict, and applies as between "the parties
to the conflict," an expression distinct from, and wider than, "Contracting
Parties." Protocol II supplements this by defining such a conflict in terms of
the parties being the armed forces of the Contracting Party in whose terri-
tory the conflict takes place and "dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
10. 1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr. 11).
11. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43.
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a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operation and to implement this Protocol." Thus, police-type actions
against armed individuals or bands that do not fulfill these conditions do not
engage the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or
Protocol II.
As can be seen, there are a number of issues of interpretation and applica-
tion of the above instruments to particular situations. Notwithstanding these,
one must always remember the Martens Clause and the growing body of cus-
tomary law of armed conflict and human rights law as relevant sources of law
to apply to any situation.
The United Nations and International Conventions Relating to
Armed Conflict
The United Nations is not, as an international personality in its own right,
a party to any of the conventions relating to armed conflict. It is sometimes
suggested that it should become a party. This, however, could impede its
peacekeeping missions. The problem is the threshold of application of the
conventions. There are situations in peacekeeping, especially those that re-
quire—or come to require
—
"robust" measures, that may cross the threshold,
but it may be undesirable for the operation to "change gears" notionally from a
peacekeeping mission into an armed conflict. This could well be escalatory in
effect. Moreover, there would be something odd about a situation in which
the United Nations, in the name of the international community, is conduct-
ing an essentially peaceful operation in accordance with the United Nations
Charter, which could be characterized nonetheless as an "armed conflict" in
which United Nations forces and opposed forces are equally "combatants." It
has rightly been suggested that the threshold of armed conflict must be set
higher than that set by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols where United
Nations peacekeeping operations are concerned. 12
Notwithstanding that understandable view, the United Nations has consis-
tently taken the view that "the principles and spirit of general international
12. Joseph Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations: The Applicable Norms and
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, LL.M thesis, University of Iowa College
of Law, published by Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Technical Information
Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, AD No. ADA380930 (2000) ; Joseph Bialke, United Nations Peace
Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law ofArmed Conflict, 50 AIR FORCE LAW
Review 1 (2001).
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conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel" shall be observed
by forces participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. 13 This, of
course, is to underline the fundamental consideration that the absence of for-
mal applicability of the laws of armed conflict/international humanitarian law
does not open up a vacuum in which no laws apply.
It might stick in the throats of right-thinking people that there should be an
equality of arms (and the equal moral stature that might be implied by the for-
mal applicability of international conventions relevant to armed conflict) in
the case of enforcement actions carried out under the authority of the United
Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. After all,
in such a case there is a party clearly identified by the Security Council as be-
ing in the wrong, and United Nations forces are being deployed to right that
wrong. That, however, would be a wrong approach, if it led to the proposition
that the conventions could not apply. Both the law of armed conflict and in-
ternational humanitarian law have throughout their development been con-
sistently agnostic so far as the Tightness or wrongness of a belligerent party's
position is concerned. The jus in hello applies equally among the parties how-
ever strong or weak their claims may be to have the right to resort to force un-
der the jus ad bellum. And of course that must be so, otherwise the conflict
could be fought without restraint.
Peace enforcement personnel acting on behalf of the United Nations are
essentially engaged in hostilities as belligerents and "are treated in exactly the
same way as the armed forces of a state." 14 Looked at from the practical point
of view, as Professor Greenwood has remarked, if those laws did not apply
13. In 1991 the United Nations formulated a Model Participation Agreement, to be concluded
between itself and Member States contributing forces, to be used in peacekeeping operations.
Paragraph 28 of the Model Agreement provides:
[The United Nations peacekeeping forces] shall observe and respect the principles and
the spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military
personnel. The international conventions referred to above include the four Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the
UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict. [The participating State] shall therefore ensure that the
members of its national contingent serving with [the UN peacekeeping force] be fully
acquainted with the principles and spirit of the Conventions.
U.N. DOC. A/46/185 (1991).
14. Christopher Greenwood, Protection of peacekeepers: the legal regime, 7 DUKE JOURNAL OF
Comparative and International Law 185, 189 (1996).
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then a commander of the force opposed to the UN force could well conclude
that he "might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb." 15
The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
The difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is
clearly marked by the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Asso-
ciated Personnel, adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature
on December 9, 1994. 16 The convention applies to protect military, police or
civilian personnel engaged or deployed in a "United Nations operation." It is
made a crime for any person to murder, kidnap, or otherwise attack personnel
so engaged or deployed. The convention provides for quasi-universal jurisdic-
tion over offenders. 17 The term "United Nations operation" is defined to
mean:
[A]n operation established by the competent organ of the United Nations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and conducted under
United Nations authority and control:
where the operation is for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international
peace and security; or
where the Security Council or the General Assembly has declared, for the
purposes of this Convention, that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of
the personnel participating in the operation.
Thus there is no "equality ofarms" betweenUN personnel and others in peace-
keeping operations authorized under what Secretary-General Dag Hammar-
skjold, referring to the situation in the Congo, once dubbed "Chapter VI and a
half—even "robust" ones under what some others have dubbed "Chapter VI
and three quarters." However, as mentioned above, the policy of the United
15. Id.
16. 34 International Legal Materials 482 (1995). Note also the protection of
peacekeepers contained in Protocol I (1977), art. 37(1) (d), supra note 3.
17. By "quasi-universal jurisdiction" is meant jurisdiction of a pattern common in modern
conventions creating international crimes (aircraft hijacking, torture, etc.) which provide that
any State may exercise jurisdiction over offenders in accordance with its national law. If a
suspected offender is in the territory of any contracting State, that State must either prosecute
the offender itself or extradite to a State competent and willing to prosecute: aut dedere aut
judicare. It is not truly universal jurisdiction as in the case of piracy.
79
Rules of Conduct During Humanitarian Intervention
Nations is that "the principles and the spirit of the general conventions appli-
cable to the conduct of military personnel" apply to those operations.
In relation to peace enforcement operations the situation is different. Arti-
cle 2(2) of the Convention provides:
This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by
the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as
combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of
international armed conflict applies.
This provision thus indirectly recognizes that while the principles and spirit
of LOAC/IHL apply to peacekeeping, the letter of that law applies to peace
enforcement.
The UN Secretary-General's Bulletin of 1999
On August 6, 1999 the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued a
Bulletin entitled "Observance by United Nations forces of international
humanitarian law." 18 In this document one can discern that United Nations
parlance has come out of the shadows of "the principles and spirit" formula
and has embraced "international humanitarian law" as such, which the docu-,
ment then proceeds to summarize in substance (sections 5 to 9). These sec-
tions are "promulgated" by the Secretary-General "for the purpose of setting
out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law appli-
cable to UN forces conducting operations under United Nations command
and control."
It will be noted that these principles and rules apply only to UN forces
"conducting operations under United Nations command and control." While
this covers most UN peace operations, it would not have applied in the case of
Iraq, where the Security Council approved the operations of a "coalition of
the able and willing," led by the United States, acting in support of the right to
self-defense of Kuwait. Nor does it apply to current operations in the Balkans,
which have been approved by the UN Security Council but the command of
which has been entrusted to NATO.
18. Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law, Secretary'General's
Bulletin, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 2 YEARBOOK OF
International Humanitarian Law 563 (1999).
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The statement in Section 1 of the Bulletin—"Field of application"—is of
importance. It provides:
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set
out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in
situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged as combatants, to the
extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly
applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use
of force is permitted in self-defence.
1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of
members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants,
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the law of
armed conflict.
There are some possible problems of interpretation of the first paragraph of
this provision. In the first place, one wonders whether, in the course of a single
operation, UN forces can move in and out of "situations of armed conflict"
and "engagement" as the paragraph implies. Thresholds of application are not
so neatly marked in situations of the kind likely to be encountered. In the sec-
ond place, rather than to search for some more polite and more exact defini-
tion of "robust peacekeeping," such situations are described as "peacekeeping
operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence." Just as self-de-
fense is described in the UN Charter, Article 51, as an "inherent" right of
States, it is also in all major legal systems of the world an inherent right of indi-
viduals to use necessary, proportionate and reasonable force in personal
self-defense. The right ofmembers ofUN forces to use force in immediate per-
sonal and unit self-defense in all operations should be assumed; it should not
be used in order to characterize a particular type of operation.
Conclusions
While the difference between interventions authorized by the United Na-
tions and those not so authorized may have everything to do with the debate
regarding the jus ad bellum—the right to use force—it is, for all the reasons
given above, not relevant to the jus in hello—the law applicable in armed con-
flict. Whether an intervention is carried out under the authority of the United
Nations, or by a single State, or by a coalition of States (e.g., NATO) without
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the authority of the United Nations, the participants are equally bound by the
law of armed conflict.
The effect of the various statements and documents discussed above re-
garding the applicability of the law of armed conflict and international hu-
manitarian law to forces acting under the authority of the United Nations is to
make the entire corpus of that law, as presently understood to represent cus-
tomary international law, applicable. National contingents may, in addition,
apply various rules and interpretations of that law contained in conventions
binding on them (notably Protocol I) that may not have reached customary
law status. In the interests of consistency in adopting combined rules of en-
gagement among the participating forces and for the avoidance of disagree-
ment, US forces acting against Iraq in 1991 applied certain of the provisions of
Protocol I de facto, even though that instrument has not been ratified by the
United States.
The application of the law relating to armed conflict is not a difficult matter,
at least for most of the armed forces of the world likely to contribute forces to
UN operations. They are trained constantly in their use, secured through rules
of engagement. It would be difficult indeed for them to act in any other way.
Michael Ignatieff has recently observed that "legal constraints are neces-
sary if wars are to preserve public support. The real problem with the entry of
lawyers into the prosecution of warfare is that it encourages the illusion that
war is clean if the lawyers say so. A further illusion is that if we play by the
rules, the enemy will too." Then, after describing the way in which Serbian
forces behaved in Kosovo, he concludes: "The lesson is clear: it is a form of
hubris to suppose that the way we choose to wage a war will determine how
the other side fights. Our choice to wage 'clean' war may result in wars of ex-
ceptional dirtiness." 19 That may be so, but neither public opinion nor the
training and instincts of modern armed forces in civilized countries would
have it any other way.
The real problem may lie elsewhere. It lies not so much in the observance of
the laws of armed conflict as in the manner of conducting operations. The
problems of discrimination in targeting, illustrated by certain tragic errors in
the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, do not result in any sense from a
desire to ignore or avoid the law, but may have more to do with the tendency
of forces, especially Western forces, to be averse to taking casualties. As an-
other writer has observed: "In recent years the key results of these concerns
19. Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond 200 (2000).
82
Ivan Shearer
for the military have been rules of engagement and force-protection direc-
tives—designed largely to protect political and military leaders from recrimi-
nations that often follow casualties."20 "Duke et decorum est pro patria mori."
But human sentiment, and public opinion, may be less understanding when a
life is lost in the course of nasty wars between other peoples. To die, or suffer
injury, for the human rights of other people is indeed a noble, even heroic, act.
20. John Gentry, Complex Civil-Military Operations: A U.S. Military-centric Perspective, 53
Naval War College Review 57, 61 (2000).
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Application of the Law of Armed Conflict
During Operation Allied Force:
Maritime Interdiction and
Prisoner of War Issues
George Walker
Introduction
N;ATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force, to succor Albanian Kosovarsand others (e.g., Roma) indigenous to the former Yugoslavia's 1
Kosovo province subjected to brutal actions, including murder, rape and dis-
placement from their homes by Serbian forces under SFRY President Slobodan
Milosevic's direction, was a legitimate collective action for humanitarian inter-
vention pursuant to principles of state of necessity under circumstances known
at the time. 2 NATO's Kosovo intervention was but one of those crises where
States, individually or collectively, succored indigenous nationals, as part of a
rescue operation for their own or other non-State nationals, or with the sole
1. Hereinafter referred to as SFRY. There may be no "Yugoslavia" in the future. A March 14,
2002 agreement, which must be approved by Serbia and Montenegro, declares the area of the
former Yugoslavia will be known as Serbia and Montenegro. See Ian Fisher, Serbia and
Montenegro Sign a Plan for Yugoslavia's Demise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A3.
2. For analysis of principles of the state of necessity doctrine for collective humanitarian
intervention and its application to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, see George Walker,
Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries' Imperiled Indigenous
Nationals, published in the American University International Law Review (2002). Milosevic
raised the issue of the NATO campaign's lawfulness in his opening statement in his genocide and
war crimes trial in The Hague. See Ian Fisher &. Marlise Simons, Defiant, Milosevic Begins His
Defense by Assailing NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al.
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goal of protecting indigenous nationals. Some occurred during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries before the United Nations Charter era, in some cases
pursuant to the Concert of Europe, which lasted in one form or another from
1815 through most of the nineteenth century. Scholars have traced these prin-
ciples to ancient times. 3 Others have arisen since 1945, i.e., after the Charter
became effective for interState relations. 4 Among the more important of the
latter was NATO's bombing and sea interdiction campaigns, conducted pursu-
ant to UN Security Council decisions authorizing them, that led to the 1995
Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included protection for indig-
enous peoples. NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force action was among the
latest of this kind ofcampaign. What made Allied Force unique was that it was
the first time a collective self-defense organization constituted under Article
5 1 of the Charter intervened while the Security Council was seized of a crisis
the Council had said threatened international peace and security.
A. Relevance of the General Law of Armed Conflict and Neutrality Law
Other papers in this volume discuss the lawfulness of particular NATO at-
tacks. A more fundamental question is whether the law of armed conflict and
the law of neutrality, which apply during war in the traditional sense, govern
during operations like Operation Allied Force.
There is a developing view that military operations operating under UN Se-
curity Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter do not
necessarily follow the law of armed conflict. When a Council decision is con-
trary to law of armed conflict principles, particularly those in a treaty, the de-
cision must be followed. This rule, rooted in Article 103 of the Charter and
the obligatory nature of Council decisions, does not account for contrary
3. See Walker, supra note 2.
4. See id.
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customary or general principles norms, nor does it consider the possibility of a
jus cogens norm in the law of armed conflict. 5 If a Council decision does not
specify rules of conduct for conducting military operations that would appear
to contradict the law of armed conflict, and this is the usual case, the law of
armed conflict should be followed. If non-mandatory UN resolutions6 are con-
trary to law of armed conflict rules, the only established body of law for stan-
dards is the law of armed conflict, and it should be followed. The same is true
for Council decisions authorizing force with unspecified standards; the law of
armed conflict should be followed. Thus although the law of armed conflict,
strictly speaking, does not govern because a UN resolution-authorized
5. UN CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103. Jus cogens, i.e., a peremptory norm that trumps inconsistent
treaty, customary and general principles rules, is a vague doctrine whose contours are less than
certain; it is not cited in traditional international law sources, e.g., Statute of the International
Court ofJustice, Articles 38, 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 102-03 (1987). See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 33 1, 345, 347; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 19, 514-17 (5th ed. 1998); T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF
Treaties 177-87 (1974); 1 Oppenheim's International Law §§ 2, 642, 653 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 8th ed. 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §§ 102 r.n.6, 323
cmt. b, 331(2), 338(2); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1 1 18-19 (Bruno Simma ed.,
1994); Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 17-18, 85-87,
94-95, 160, 184-85, 218-26, 246 (2d ed. 1984) (Vienna Convention, supra is progressive
development); GRIGORII I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (William E. Butler
trans., 1974); Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature ofJus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 172
RECUEIL DES COURS 219, 262-63 (198 1) ; John Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking,
7 DenverJournal of International Law and Policy 9, 25-29 (1977); Eduardo Jimenez
de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third ofa Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 64-69
(1978); George Walker, Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the
Continent, 6 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER 1, 60, 63 (1993); Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of
the Concept ofJus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICHIGAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1995). For UN Charter Article 103 analysis, see generally LELAND
Goodrich et al, Charter of the United Nations 614-17 (3d ed. 1969); The Charter
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra at 1 1 16-25; W. Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United
Nations, 87 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1993).
6. Non-mandatory UN resolutions include General Assembly resolutions and Council
resolutions recommending action. Assembly or Council recommendations passed pursuant to
UN Charter Articles 10-1 1, 13-14 and Chapters VI-VII are non-mandatory, although they may
strengthen preexisting customary and treaty norms recited in them. SYDNEY BAILEY & SAM
Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council ch. 1.5 (3d ed. 1998); Brownlie,
supra note 5, at 14-15, 694; JORGE CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS ch. 3 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 126, 144,
290-314; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 16, at 47-49; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, §
103(2) (d), cmt. c, r.n.2; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 5, at 284, 407-18,
605-36, 652.
87
__
Maritime Interdiction and Prisoner of War Issues
operation is not a conflict between States in the traditional sense of war, the
law of armed conflict should govern in these situations. IfUN resolution-gov-
erned operations grow in number and complexity and intensity of conflict, an
ultimate result may be a parallel body of law that should be, and hopefully will
be, the same as the law of armed conflict for war.
Humanitarian intervention under Operation Allied Force stood on footing
similar to the latter situations. The campaign was not war in the classical
sense, although there are reports the United Kingdom's Prime Minister and
maybe others characterized later phases of the NATO campaign as war. Par-
ticipants, whether the collectively intervening States or the affected State,
should have applied the law of armed conflict as in the case ofUN resolution-
authorized actions. No Council decision governed the Allied Force situation
with respect to humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian law issues covered
by, e.g., the 1949 Geneva Conventions, stand in a special place. 7 The same
principles of applying the law of armed conflict and neutrality law should gov-
ern during collective humanitarian interventions operating under state of ne-
cessity principles.
Standards of necessity and proportionality in self-defense situations may be
different from law of armed conflict standards of necessity and proportionality
for attacks during traditional armed conflict. What is necessary or propor-
tional for a self-defense response may not be necessary or proportional in an
armed conflict situation. The reverse is also true; what is necessary or propor-
'
tional under the law of armed conflict for attacks may not be necessary or pro-
portional in a self-defense context. The same is true for humanitarian
intervention pursuant to state of necessity. What is necessary or proportional
for humanitarian intervention may not be necessary or proportional in a
self-defense or law of armed conflict situation, and what is necessary or pro-
portional in a self-defense or law of armed conflict situation may not be neces-
sary or proportional in attacks incident to a particular humanitarian
intervention. Depending on the scope of the intervention and the timing of
attacks (immediately after a decision to intervene is made as distinguished
from attacks made well into a campaign) , the law of self-defense or the law of
armed conflict may be examined as guides.
7. See infra this paper.
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There are some per se forbidden targets, e.g., cultural property unless used
for military purposes. 8 Under the law of armed conflict, there are some meth-
ods of warfare, e.g., no first use of poison gas,9 that are per se indiscriminate
under the law of armed conflict. These targets or methods and means of war-
fare, forbidden under the law of armed conflict, should also be followed in hu-
manitarian intervention operations under state pf necessity.
Decision makers should only be held accountable for what is known, or rea-
sonably should have been known, at the time a decision to attack is made.
Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time may be clouded with the fog of
war. 10 Declarations of understanding by countries party to Protocol I 11 to the
8. See generally, e.g., Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereunafter Cultural Property Convention];
Protocol for Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 358; Second Protocol to Hague Convention of 1954 for Protection ofCultural Property
in Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, art. 1(f), 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
769 (1999) [hereinafter Second Protocol]; Treaty on Protection of Artistic &. Scientific
Institutions & Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 290; JlRI
Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(1996); George Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy 507-11
(2000) (Vol. 74, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
9. Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, &. of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1965, & US Reservation, 26 U.ST. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS HH 10.3-10.4.2 (A. Thomas & J. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73.,
US Naval War College International Law Studies).
10. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 117-21 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret ed. & trans.,
1976).
1 1. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, & Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I].
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1949 Geneva Conventions state that for civilians' protection in Article 51, 12
protection of civilian objects in Article 52, 13 and precautions to be taken in at-
tacks, stated in Article 57, 14 a commander should be liable based on that com-
mander's assessment of information available at the relevant time, i.e., when a
12. Protocol I, id., art. 5 1, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 26. Articles 5 1 (2) and 5 1 (5) prohibitions on attacks on
civilians, absent other considerations, e.g., civilians who take up arms, restate customary law.
Michael Bothe et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict 299 & n.3 (1982);
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 11
39 (Louise Doswald-Becked., 1995); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 11 6.2.3.2; 1 JEAN
PlCTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 224-29 (1952); CLAUDE
PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 618, 623-26 (1987); Julius Stone, Legal
Controls of International Conflict 684-732 (1959); Michael Matheson, Remarks, in
Session One: The United States' Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, in Symposium, The Sixth Annual American Red
Cross - Washington College ofLaw Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on
Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
,
American University Journal of International Law and Policy 423, 426 (1987);
William Schmidt, The Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts: Protocol I Additional to
the Geneva Conventions, 24 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 225-32 (1984); Waldemar Solf, Protection
of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol
1, 1 American UniversityJournal of International Law and Policy 130-31 (1986).
13. Article 52 states a general customary norm, except its Article 52(1) prohibition on reprisals
against civilians, upon which commentators divide. See generally BOTHE ET AL., supra note 12, at
320-27; C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 510-11, 524-25, 528-29
(6th rev. ed. 1967); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, UH 6.2.3 &n.36, 6.2.3.2, 8.1.1 &
n.9, 8.1.2 & n.12 (noting U.S. position that Protocol I Article 52(1) "creates new law"); 2 D.
O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 1 105-06 (I. Shearer ed., 1984) ; 4 Pictet,
supra note 12, at 131 (1958); PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 630-38; Matheson, supra note
12, at 426; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed
Conflict, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS: LlBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK
GRUNAWALT 197 (Michael Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International
Law Studies); Solf, supra note 12, at 131. Frank Russo, Jr., Targeting Theory in the Law of Naval
Warfare, 30 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 1, 17 n.36 (1992) rejects applying Protocol I Article 52(2) to
naval warfare.
14. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 1IH 8.1-8.1.2.1; BOTHE ET AL., supra note
12, at 359-69; PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 678-89. Rules of distinction, necessity and
proportionality, with the concomitant risk of collateral damage inherent in any attack, recited in
Article 57, generally restate customary norms. See supra note 12.
90
George Walker
decision is made. 15 Two 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention 16 protocols
have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound by information available
when a decision to attack is made. 17 The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Cultural Property Convention also recites this principle. 18
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons Con-
vention protocols are on their way to acceptance, among States. 19 These trea-
ties' common statement, in text or declarations, that commanders are held
15. Declaration of Belgium, May 20, 1986, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents 706, 707 (Dietrich
Schindler &Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988); Declaration of Italy, Feb. 27, 1986, reprinted in id at
7 12; Declaration of the Netherlands, June 26, 1977, reprinted in id. at 713, 714; Declaration of the
United Kingdom, Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in id. at 717.
16. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No.
,
1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention!.
17. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines, Booby Traps &. Other Devices,
Oct. 10, 1980, art. 2(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (Protocol II (Mines)); as amended, May 3, 1996, art.
2(6), 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1206, 1209 (1996) (Amended Protocol II);
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Oct. 10,
1980, art. 1(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, 172. The United States has ratified the Convention and
Protocols I and II (Mines) supra; Protocol III is not in force for the United States. United States
Department of State, Treaties in Force 478-79 (2000) [hereinafter TIF]. Amended Protocol II,
Protocol III and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, May 3, 1995, 35 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1218 (1996) are now before the US Senate. Marian Leich, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 91 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (1997). Protocol IV and Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
(Protocol I), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, do not have these provisions. Protocol II (Mines)
and III commentators say little about these provisions; they state the obvious. See Burrus
Carnahan, The Law of Land Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, 105 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 73 (1984); W. Fenrick, Comment, New
Developments in the Law Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, 19
Canadian Year Book of International Law 229 (1981); Howard Levie, Prohibitions and
Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons, 68 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW 643 (1994); J.
Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1 (1984); William Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention:
Implications for the American Soldier, 24 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 279 (1984).
18. Second Protocol, supra note 8, art. 1 (f). Second Protocol is not in force; 10 States are party,
and 101 have ratified the Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 8. International
Committee of the Red Cross website as of March 24, 2002, available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc.
19. 159 States are party to Protocol I, but not the United States. See International Committee of
the Red Cross website, supra note 18. International Committee of the Red Cross website, id.,
listed 88 States as parties to the Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 16; 79 for
Protocol II (Mines), 63 for Amended Protocol II, 81 for Protocol III, supra note 17, as of March
24, 2002.
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accountable based on information they have at the time for determining
whether attacks are necessary and proportional has become a nearly universal
norm. The San Remo Manual recognizes it as the naval warfare standard. 20
It can be said with fair confidence that this is the jus in hello customary stan-
dard. It is also the standard for self-defense situations. It was the standard for
Allied Force.
Collective action after a decision to intervene raises problems of consensus
on action within a campaign. Even as collective self-defense situations may
raise scope and definitional problems (i.e., whether anticipatory self-defense is
admissible in the Charter era, what are proportional and necessary responses)
,
and the same kinds of issues can surface in the law ofarmed conflict under col-
lective action situations, analogous problems will arise during collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity. What are proper targets?
Is the proposed attack necessary and proportional? These issues arose with re-
spect to targeting during Allied Force and were resolved, like the decision to
mount the campaign, by consensus among the 19 NATO member States.
One issue, perhaps for Operation Allied Force and certainly for the future,
is how far consensus decision making should penetrate into operational mat-
ters. To take an extreme example from a hypothetical ground campaign, must
a NATO squad leader seek a necessity and proportionality determination all
the way up the chain ofcommand to take a particular building, with almost as-
sured damage to it? US commentators and military commanders have decried
the "rudder orders" approach to military command and control; is there a col-
lective consensus decision version of it? Should there be one? How does a rud-
der orders policy, or the opposite of letting field and at sea commanders and
perhaps lower echelon commanders decide, affect accountability under inter-
national law if things go wrong?
B. NATO's Right to Conduct Maritime Interdiction as Part of Allied Force
NATO considered but did not implement visit and search of ships that may
have carried goods to the SFRY through Adriatic Sea ports. Nothing in the
law of state of necessity or the law of armed conflict forbade these kinds of op-
erations if they had been ordered.
20. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, H 46(b) & Commentary 46.3. See also BEN CHENG,
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 90
(1983) ; Myres McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
Order 220 (1961).
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1. NATO Naval Assets Available; Naval Operations during Allied Force
There were no naval engagements at or under the sea connected with
Allied Force; some apparently had been projected. 21 But, as the following indi-
cates, naval forces had a role:
NATO forces provided defense and logistics support [undoubtedly including
sealift after the campaign,] for the alliance forces deployed in Italy, Albania,
and . . . Yugoslavia; . . . and carried out naval operations in the Adriatic Sea. The
latter included, at one time, aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships from
four nations, all operating within the same confined space.22
These vessels included the US Navy's USS Kitty Hawk and USS Theodore
Roosevelt battle groups and UK Royal Navy units, including a missile-launching
submarine. 23 When Allied Force began the USS Enterprise battle group was in
the Persian Gulf; there was no other battle group within bombing range of Ser-
bia. 24 In late March 1999, incident to sponsoring a Security Council resolution
condemning Operation Allied Force and conversations with Yugoslavia, Rus-
sia sent several naval vessels to the Mediterranean where they could enter the
Adriatic. This caused tension between NATO and Russia, leading to worries
that the SFRY might get information on NATO flight operations from these
ships. 25 The Roosevelt battle group arrived April 5, the first in the area since
mid-March. 26 There is no record of NATO-Russian maritime confrontations.
There is also no report of blue-water NATO-SFRY naval confrontations. 27
21. General Wesley Clark, while Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), spoke to the
Yugoslav Chief of Staff [by telephone] at least once during the campaign, warning him that if he
sent any of his navy out into the Adriatic it would be sunk. WESLEY CLARK, WAGING MODERN
War 184 (2001); Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond 137 (2000).
22. United States Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force
After-Action Report xiv (Jan. 3 1, 2000) [hereinafter After-Action Report] ; but see id. at 41 (little
reliance on sealift)
.
23. Id. at 92; North Atlantic Council, Statement on Kosovo, Apr. 23, 1999, reprinted in IVO
Daalder & Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo 104
(2000). The Roosevelt battlegroup had been in the Adriatic; it had been sent to the Persian Gulf
in March 1999 as the Kosovo crisis deepened. Clark, supra note 21, at 240, 421.
24. Daalder & O'Hanlon, supra note 23, at 103.
25. CLARK, supra note 21, at 212; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 127.
26. Daalder & O'Hanlon, supra note 23, at 23 1.
27. The SFRY had been warned of the risks. See supra note 21.
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Although NATO land-based aircraft (for the United States, US Air Force
and US Marine shore-based aircraft) predominantly conducted strike opera-
tions, "Navy carrier-based aircraft, Marine . . . sea-based strike aircraft and
cruise-missile equipped ships and submarines played a significant role." 28 Navy
electronic warfare aircraft, operating off the carriers, protected NATO air-
craft from attack by Yugoslav air defenses. These aircraft were the only US
platforms able to use electronic jamming to suppress enemy air defenses. Na-
val aircraft also launched air defense suppression support for strike aircraft. 29
The Navy flew unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify Yugoslav naval
vessels, survey potential landing areas for Marines if amphibious landings were
ordered, and to target coastal defense radar sites. Navy F-14 aircraft with the
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System identified targets; Navy maritime
patrol aircraft made significant intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) collection contributions. 30 Although never used for at-sea interdiction,
these assets were available to contribute to that effort, besides warships in the
Adriatic.
There were differences of opinion at NATO headquarters after the 1999
NATO summit on the possibility of boarding ships in the Adriatic "to enforce
the maritime blockade of Yugoslavia. . . ."31 Oil reached Serbia through
Montenegro's port of Bar; the "stop and search" regime would have aimed to
halt this. However, there was concern over provoking Russia, Serbia's princi;
pal oil supplier. 32 This was reflected at national levels. In the Danish parlia-
ment, e.g.,
[a] minor controversy arose over the possible contribution to a naval blockade
and the modes of its implementation. Not only was this blockade probably a
violation of international law; it also [was seen to entail] risks of a direct
confrontation with the Russian Navy. As a compromise it was decided (by
NATO) to enforce the blockade only with . . . countries . . . parties to the [prior]
sanctions regime, on which basis Denmark decided ... to participate.
28. After-Action Report, supra note 22, at 55, 79, 92-3.
29. Id. at 66-7.
30. Id. at 57-8.
31. Nicola Butler, NATO: From Collective Defence to Peace Enforcement, in KOSOVO AND THE
Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention 279 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur
eds., 2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE]. See also Continued NATO Air-Strikes
on Yugoslavia, 45 Keesing's Record of World Events 42901 (1999) [hereinafter 45 Keesing].
32. Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 31, at 42901.
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Denmark promised a corvette from July 1999 onwards, but the conflict
ended first. Later its navy contributed a mine-clearing vessel and a minelayer
to clear NATO munitions dumped in the Adriatic. 33 Poland was not "asked to
participate in the maritime blockade against Yugoslavia."34
After the Alliance pledged to impose a binding naval embargo in its April
statement, European Union (EU) foreign ministers met April 26 and proposed
an embargo, to begin April 30, to cut off oil shipments to the SFRY, coming
primarily from Italy and Greece. The EU ministers also approved economic
measures targeting Milosevic and his family and closing loopholes halting ex-
port credits and investment flows to the SFRY previously agreed in 1998. A
statement offered support to Montenegro and pledged EU upgrade ofEU rela-
tions with Albania and Macedonia through association agreements. 35 The
naval embargo
became a somewhat hollow promise . . . when NATO decided it would not
physically enforce [it] through a blockade at Montenegro's two main ports, Bar
and Kotor Bay. But all was not lost. It did go into effect and was joined by a
number of non-EU and non-NATO countries. . . . [T]he voluntary "visit and
search" scheme at least had the benefit of preventing profiteers using ships
flagged in cooperating countries from shipping oil into Montenegro.
NATO also used its influence and NATO SFOR troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to cut off oil coming from there to the SFRY.36
2. Proposed NATO Naval Interdiction during Allied Force: A Lawful
Option
There were two principles concerning any projected naval interdiction dur-
ing Allied Force. First, would vessel interdiction, considered with other as-
pects of Operation Allied Force, i.e., the aerial bombing campaign, have been
a necessary and proportional part of the campaign when the overall goal of
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity was taken into
33. Bjorn Moller, The Nordic Countries: Whither the West's Conscience?, in KOSOVO AND THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 31, at 156.
34. Peter Talas & Laszlo Valki, The New Entrants: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, in
KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 31, at 207.
35. They encouraged EU members not to organize sports events with SFRY participation.
DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 146; Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia,
supra note 31, at 42901.
36. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 146.
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account? If the response is Yes (and the record suggests this), the second prin-
ciple is that under the view that parties to a humanitarian intervention should
follow the law of armed conflict for these operations, 37 NATO could have im-
posed vessel interdiction, visit and search, and capture or diversion, subject to
the usual law of armed conflict rules and limitations. 38
Blockade was an option discussed outside NATO circles, probably reflect-
ing media and others' confusion between blockade and interdiction. IfNATO
wanted to establish a blockade, traditional rules—notice of start and end,
grace period, area, impartiality, effectiveness, limitation to belligerents' coasts
and ports and other requirements or limitations39—would have been required
under law of armed conflict standards after an affirmative answer to the first
question on blockade's place in necessity and proportionality, etc., for Allied
37. See supra Part A.
38. See generally Convention for Amelioration of Wounded, Sick & Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 31,6 U.S.T. 3217, 3226, 3230, 3234, 75 U.N.T.S. at 85,
92-96 [hereinafter Second Convention] ; Convention Concerning Rights & Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415; Convention Relative to
Certain Restrictions with Regard to Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (Hague XI),
Oct. 18, 1907, id. 2396; Convention for Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of Principles of the
Geneva Convention (Hague X), Oct. 18, 1907, art. 4, id. 2371, 2384; Hague Cultural Property,
Convention, supra note 8, art. 14(2), 249 U.N.T.S. at 252; Convention on Maritime Neutrality,
Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135 L.N.T.S. 187; Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules of Air
Warfare, Dec. 1922 - Feb. 1923, arts. 49-50, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 15, at 207, 215 [hereinafter Hague Air Rules]; International Law Association
Committee on Maritime Neutrality, Final Report: Helsinki Principles on Maritime Neutrality,
reprinted in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference Held at
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China 497, Principles 1.4, 2.1-2.4, 5.2.1-5.2.9 (1998) [hereinafter
Helsinki Principles]; Institute of International Law, The Laws of Naval Warfare Concerning the
Relations Between Belligerents, Aug. 9, 1913, art. 41, reprinted in id. at 857, 864 [hereinafter
Oxford Naval Manual]; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 1111 7.6-7.6.2, 7.10-7.10.2; 2
PlCTET, supra note 12, at 181-84 (1960); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, HU 112-34;
WALKER, supra note 8, at 357-64.
39. See generally Hague XI, supra note 38, art. 1, 36 Stat, at 2408; Declaration Concerning
Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, U 4, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 3; Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval
War (Declaration of London), Feb. 26, 1909, Annex, arts. 1-21, 208 Consol. T.S. 338, 341,
343-44, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 15, at 843, 846-47, never in
force; Hague Air Rules, supra note 38, art. 53(i), id. at 215; Helsinki Principles, supra note 38,
Principles 5.2.10, 5.3; BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 432-39, 694-97; ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 1JH 7.7-7.7.5; Oxford Naval Manual, supra note 38, arts. 30, 53, 92,
at 862, 866, 872; 4 PlCTET, supra note 13, at 309-12, 3 18-24; PlLLOUD ET AL, supra note 12, at
812-36, 1476-81; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, 1111 93-104; WALKER, supra note 8, at
389-94.
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Force's overall goals for intervention which laid primary stress on humanitar-
ian intervention.40 Any blockade imposed during Operation Allied Force
would not have been a "pacific blockade," i.e., a blockade imposed on an ad-
versary's coasts during time of peace, generally thought to be unlawful under
the Charter. 41
C. Captured Armed Forces Members' Entitlement to Prisoner of War Status
SFRY forces took three NATO ground service personnel into custody dur-
ing Allied Force, perhaps kidnapping them across the Macedonia border. The
three suffered beatings at the hands of their captors. 42 Two downed NATO
pilots risked capture before NATO rescued them.43 NATO forces later took
SFRY army personnel into custody after moving into Kosovo. On May 16,
1999 President Clinton authorized releasing two SFRY force members the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) captured in April.44 Although the record is
not clear, it is likely that the SFRY captured members of the KLA and that the
KLA captured other SFRY armed forces members.
40. See generally North Atlantic Council, Statement on Kosovo, Apr. 23, 1999, reprinted in
DAALDER& O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 262 (2000) ; NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana,
Statement by NATO Secretary General, Mar. 23, 1999, 45 Keesing, supra note 31, at 42847;
After-Action Report, supra note 22, at 10; supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
41. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 13, at 1157-58, citing UN Charter Article 2(4); ANTHONY
D'Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect 43-46 (1987) (same, listing rules
for permissible blockades); WALKER, supra note 8, at 389; but see COLOMBOS, supra note 13, §§
484-88B; 2 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law §§ 44-49, 52b-52e, 521 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); U.S. Department of the Navy, Law of Naval Warfare: NWIP
10-2, 1 632a n.26 (1955 through Change 6, 1974). UN Charter Article 42 authorizes the
Security Council to impose a blockade. See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 14-17; THE
Charter of the United Nations, supra note 5, at 629-36. Annotated Supplement,
supra note 9, It 7.7.2. 1 n. 13 1 correctly says, "It is not possible to say whether, or to what extent, a
U.N. blockade would be governed by the traditional rules." See also The Charter of the United
Nations, supra at 632. This is an example of how a Council decision can trump LOAC treaty
rules. UN Charter arts. 25, 48, 103. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. Reverend Jesse Jackson, US President Bill Clinton's friend, was involved in negotiating their
release; there had been fears the detainees would be held hostage. CLARK, supra note 21, at 229,
286-87; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 119, 146; Continued NATO Air-Strikes
Against Yugoslavia, supra note 31, at 42957; Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra
note 31, at 42900.
43. CLARK, supra note 21, at 214-18, 274-
44. Id. at 286; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 146, 233.
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These personnel were entitled to those parts of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, other applicable humanitarian law treaties, and customary law or gen-
eral principles of law governing them, absent a Security Council decision to
the contrary.45 (There was none.)
1. NATOSFRY Aspects of Allied Force
First, as between NATO and the SFRY, the 1949 Geneva Conventions ap-
plied. Although Operation Allied Force was not a war in the traditional sense,
Common Article 2 declares their provisions apply to "other" international
armed conflicts. For example, the Third Convention, establishing prisoner of
war treatment standards, provides in part in Article 2:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
lit] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of
a . . . Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one . . . Power . . .in the conflict may not be a Party to
the . . . Convention, the Powers that are parties thereto shall remain bound by it
in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention
in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.46
The SFRY and all NATO States were parties to the 1949 Conventions be-
fore the SFRY's dissolution.47 Although there was no official record of the
SFRY's having accepted and applied the Conventions in accordance with
45. UN CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46. Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T.3316,
3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (hereinafter Third Convention). See also Convention for
Amelioration ofCondition ofWounded & Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
2, 6 U.S.T. 31 14, 31 16, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 (hereinafter First Convention); Second Convention,
supra note 38, art. 2, id. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288
(hereinafter Fourth Convention)
47. TIF, supra note 17, at 330, 450-52.
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Article 2 before or during the NATO campaign, after Allied Force ended, the
SFRY accepted them retroactive to 1992 on October 16, 200 1.48 Neverthe-
less, treaty succession principles,49 even if the SFRY and other States had for-
mal acceptance of the former country's treaties under review at the time of
Allied Force, 50 may have bound the SFRY during the NATO campaign. The
SFRY was also bound to the extent the Conventions restated custom or gen-
eral principles of law. 51 The general view is that much, but maybe not all, of
the Third Convention restates customary rules or general principles of law.52
Therefore, it bound the SFRY and NATO to that extent as custom or general
principles. The Third Convention also has a Martens clause; even denuncia-
tion of the Convention "shall in no way impair the obligations which the
Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public con-
science."53 The clause may reflect a general principle of law or custom. 54 If so,
the SFRY was bound to apply principles of humanity for detainees' treatment,
even if not bound by the Conventions as treaty law.
Not all States party to NATO-SFRY aspects of Allied Force, e.g., the
United States, were parties to 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Conventions. The
48. International Committee of the Red Cross website, supra note 18. See also Christopher
Greenwood, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Neutrality to the
Kosovo Campaign in the present volume. When this paper was researched and delivered in June
2001, the SFRY's acceptance had not been deposited. The ensuing and sometimes convoluted
discussion based on treaty succession principles and the Conventions and Protocols as restating
custom or general principles of law demonstrates the importance of the Conventions and
Protocols as treaty law.
49. See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, 33
Virginia Journal of International Law 253 (1993); Walker, supra note 5.
50. TIF, supra note 17, at 330, 450-52.
51. Today 189 States are party to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. International Committee
of the Red Cross website, supra note 18. This suggests that many if not all of their provisions
represent customary norms. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
5, § 102 cmts. f, i; 1 OPPENHEIM supra note 5, § 10, at 28, 31; George Walker, Anticipatory
Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era.What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL
International Law Journal 321, 367-68 (1998); The Law of Military Operations,
supra note 13, at 391-92. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 11H 8.5.1.1,
8.5.1.4-8.5.1.5,11.2-11.3.
52. See Annotated Supplement, supra note 9, 1111 1 1.4, 1 1.7-1 1.7.4; supra note 51.
53. Third Convention, supra note 46, art. 142, 6 U.S.T. at 3424, 75 U.N.T.S. at 242. See also 1
PlCTET, supra note 12, at 41 1-13; 2 id., supra note 38, at 281-83; 3 id., supra note 12, at 647-48
(1960); 4 id., supra note 13, at 624-26.
54. BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 44. See also I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 5, §§ 102-03.
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former Yugoslavia was, 55 but this is subject to treaty succession principles and
other considerations as to whether the SFRY was bound in 1999.56 To the ex-
tent the Protocol's terms relating to prisoners ofwar57 reflected custom or gen-
eral principles,58 they bound States involved in Allied Force, includingNATO
countries and the SFRY. Protocol I also has a Martens clause: "In cases not
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of in-
ternational law derived from established custom, from the principles of hu-
manity and from the dictates of public conscience."59 The clause may reflect a
general principle of law or custom;60 if so, like the analysis applied to its Third
Convention counterpart, 61 the SFRY was required to treat its prisoners of war
with humanity even if Protocol I did not apply as treaty law.
The same principles apply to the 1907 Hague IV Regulations relating to
prisoners of war, insofar as they reflected custom. 62 Yugoslavia was not a for-
mal party to them, but, e.g., the Regulations' provision forbidding killing or
wounding those who have laid down arms, or who no longer have means of
55. Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions Concerning the Protocols I and 11 Additional to the
Geneva Conventions, 1977, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 15, at 703. The
SFRY accepted Protocol I, supra note 1 1, on October 16, 2001, retroactive to 1992, but was also
bound by customary and general principles norms stated in Protocol I. As in the case of the 1949
Conventions, the ensuing and sometimes convoluted discussion based on treaty succession
principles and the Protocol as restating custom or general principles of law demonstrates the
importance of Protocol I as treaty law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
56. TIF, supra note 17, at 330; Symposium, State Succession, supra note 48; Walker, supra note 5.
57. Protocol I, supra note 1 1, arts. 8-1 1, 1 125 U.N.T.S. at 10-12, 22-24. See also ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 1JU 11.4, 11.7; BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 82-116, 216-62;
PILLOUD ET AL, supra note 12, at 107-63, 473-559.
58. See supra notes 5, 11-15, 19, 53 and accompanying text.
59. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 1(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7. See also supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
62. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 102 cmts. f, i; 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 10, at 28, 31; Walker, supra note 51, 31, supra note 13, CORNELL
International LawJournal at 367-68; The Law of Military Operations at 391-92.
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defense,63 bound the SFRY and NATO States as a customary norm.64 The
Third 1949 Convention and Protocol I are complementary to the extent that
they do not supersede the 1907 Hague IV Regulations.65 Moreover, Hague
IV's preamble, and its 1899 predecessor's preamble include Martens clauses.66
To the extent these clauses reflect custom or a general principle of law,67 the
SFRY was bound to apply principles of humanity in its custody of prisoners of
war whether the Hague treaties were binding as treaty law or not.
2. The SFRY-KLA Aspects of Allied Force
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions establishes minimum
criteria for armed conflicts that are not of an international nature; e.g., the
Second Convention relating to prisoners of war says:
63. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting Laws & Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
Regulations, art. 23(c).
64. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, H 11.4. See also Protocol I, supra note 11, arts.
40-41, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 22; BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 216-24; PlLLOUD ET AL, supra
note 12, at 473-91; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, H 47(i), cmt. 47.56; Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., The Obligation to Accept Surrender, in READINGS FROM THE NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE REVIEW ch. 40 (John Moore & Robert Turner eds., 1994) (Vol. 68, US Naval War
College International Law Studies); supra note 62 and accompanying text. Serbia was a party,
but the Ottoman Empire, predecessor State to modern Turkey, a NATO member, and some
areas today within the SFRY, only signed 1899 Hague Convention II with Respect to Laws &
Customs ofWar on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (hereinafter 1899 Hague II), Regulations,
art. 23(c), 32 Stat, at 181 1, 1817, identical with Hague IV, supra note 62, Regulations, art. 23(c),
36 id. at 2301-02, which Montenegro, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire signed but did not ratify.
Austria-Hungary, a predecessor State to parts of the SFRY and its successor States and Hungary,
a NATO member, was party to the 1899 and 1907 Conventions. See Convention of 1899,
Convention of 1 907: Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 15, at 94-98. There is a circuitous argument that the SFRY, constituted as it was in
1999, was bound by treaty succession principles as well as custom. See generally Symposium, State
Succession, supra note 49; Walker, supra note 5. The same kind of issues might plague analysis
within NATO because of, e.g., Canada's status as a NATO member; Canada had a different
status a century ago within the British Empire. TIF, supra note 17, at 455 does not list Canada,
Montenegro, Serbia or Yugoslavia but does list Turkey as Hague IV parties; 1899 Hague II is not
listed.
65. Third Convention, supra note 46, art. 135, 6 U.S.T. at 3422, 75 U.N.T.S. at 240; Protocol I,
supra note 1 1, art. 96, 1 125 U.N.T.S. at 46. See also BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 554-57; 3
PlCTET, supra note 53, at 636-40; PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1084-92
66. Hague IV, supra note 63, preamble, 36 Stat, at 2277-80; 1899 Hague II, supra note 64,
preamble, 32 id. at 1803-05. See also supra notes 53, 59 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 54, 60 and accompanying text.
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In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place . . . with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of [this] . . . Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict.68
If Allied Force was not an international armed conflict with respect to
KLA-SFRY confrontations but would be within the Common Article 3
68. Third Convention, supra note 46, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 33 19, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136. See also First
Convention, supra note 46, art. 3, id. at 31 16, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Second Convention, supra note
38, art. 3, id. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Fourth Convention, supra note 46, art. 3, id. at 3518, 75
U.N.T.S. at 288; 1 PlCTET, supra note 12, at 38-61; 2 id., supra note 38, at 33-38; 3 id., supra note
53, at 28-44; 4 id., supra note 13, at 26-44-
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definition, its standards applied to those taken into custody, e.g., KLA mem-
bers the SFRY captured, or SFRY armed forces members the KLA captured.
It is doubtful whether the SFRY and the KLA negotiated Article 3 special
arrangements. Article 3 recites minimum standards; other provisions of the
Third Convention reciting customary law may also have applied to these per-
sons. Protocol II, applying to non-international conflicts as a supplement to
the Third Convention,69 lists additional protections. 70 The former Yugoslavia
was a Protocol II party subject to a declaration, 71 but this is also subject to
treaty succession principles and other considerations as to whether the SFRY
was bound in 1999. 72 To the extent Protocol II standards recited custom, 73 the
SFRY and the KLA were bound. The SFRY and the KLA were also bound by
the Martens clause principle ("in cases not covered by the law in force, the hu-
man person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and
the dictates of the public conscience") stated in Protocol II, 74 even if they were
not bound under Protocol II or other formal treaty rules.
Conclusions
Operation Allied Force's legitimacy under international law is, as US sports
commentators would say, a close call. Because of its history, intervention, like
69. Protocol Additional (II) to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, & Relating to
Protection ofVictims ofNon-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1, 1125U.N.T.S.
609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol II]. See also BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 604-0.8, 623-29;
PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1319-36, 1343-46.
70. Protocol II, supra note 69, arts. 4-1 1, 1 125 U.N.T.S. at 612-15. See also BOTHE ET AL., supra
note 12, at 640-64; PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1368-1436.
71. Signatures, supra note 55, at 703, 718.
72. TIF, supra note 1 7, at 330; Symposium, State Succession, supra note 49; Walker, supra note 5.
The SFRY accepted Protocol II, supra note 69, on October 16, 2001, retroactive to 1992, but was
also bound by customary and general principles norms stated in Protocol II. As in the case of the
1949 Conventions, the ensuing and sometimes convoluted discussion based on treaty succession
principles and the Protocol as restating custom or general principles of law demonstrates the
importance of Protocol II as treaty law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
73. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
74. Protocol II, supra note 69, preamble, 1 125 U.N.T.S. at 61 1, which does not add "established
custom" as in other Martens clauses, because of the relative newness of law applying to
non-international armed conflicts, although time since 1977 may argue for including that norm
as well. See also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 12, at 44, 620; PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at
134 1
—42; supra notes 53-54, 59-61, 66-67 and accompanying text.
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war, is a loaded word for many States or commentators and in many contexts.
Today, in the UN Charter era, intervention in some contexts may be less law-
ful than it was before 1945, given Charter provisions on sovereignty, territorial
integrity and the political independence of States. On the other hand, the
growing body of the law of human rights, also recognized in the Charter, and
humanitarian law, recognized by UN organizations' resolutions, within the
world arena must be considered. Under the perhaps (and hopefully) unique
circumstances of Kosovo, the NATO campaign was legitimate under princi-
ples of collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.
With regard to the application of the law of armed conflict, as an operation
involving the use of force, Allied Force certainly met the threshold of Com-
mon Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Therefore NATO was obli-
gated to conduct its campaign in accordance with the standards of that body
of law. Additionally, state of necessity principles mandated that NATO oper-
ations, to be considered legitimate, must have been undertaken only when
necessary and proportional to Operation Allied Force's overall goal of protect-
ing the Albanian Kosovars from the depredations of Serbian forces. Under law
of armed conflict standards and consistent with that objective, NATO, al-
though choosing to implement only voluntary measures, could have con-
ducted traditional visit and search ship interdiction operations to halt the
shipment of oil to the SFRY. On the issue of the status of captured NATO and
SFRY military personnel, the Third Convention was binding as either treaty
or customary law on both sides; thus captured personnel were entitled to pris-
oner of war status. The situation with regard to KLA personnel is more com-
plex. If the KLA-SFRY conflict is viewed as an international armed conflict,
then captured KLA personnel would also be prisoners of war and entitled to
the protections of the Third Convention. If, however, that conflict is consid-
ered to be non-international in nature, then detained KLA personnel would
be subject to the more general protective standards of Common Article 3.
Intervention to protect indigenous nationals such as occurred in 1999 in
the SFRY creates two distinct legal issues for the international community.
First, is the intervention itself lawful? I believe that long-accepted state of ne-
cessity principles would apply and that interventions that meet state of neces-
sity criteria are legitimate. This will limit humanitarian interventions to the
most immediate and egregious situations when no reasonable alternative to
intervention exists. Second, what law applies to the use of military force dur-
ing humanitarian interventions? Except in the most extraordinary circum-
stances (none of which I can currently envision) , it must be the law of armed
conflict applicable to international armed conflicts. It is that body of law to
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which military forces train, and it is that body of law that provides the greatest
protections to both combatants and noncombatants. Any lesser standard risks
inflicting greater harm than the good sought to be accomplished.
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In several instances during this colloquium scholars have alluded to UN Se-
curity Council Resolutions as having the impact "as law." I'm not sure that
I would be willing to accord the Security Council such overarching authority. I
certainly agree that the member States of the United Nations, in Article 24 of
the Charter, conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agreed that the Secu-
rity Council, in carrying out its responsibility, acts on their behalf. Further-
more, member States agreed, in Article 25, to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. In Chapter VI of the
Charter the member States conferred on the Security Council the authority
and responsibility to inquire into disputes which may endanger international
peace and security, and to investigate those disputes and recommend measures
with a view towards pacific settlement. Member States also conferred on the
Security Council in Chapter VII the responsibility to determine the existence
of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, make recommendations, and de-
cide what measures shall be taken pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of the Char-
ter, which we all know involve non-forcible and forcible measures to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
The international security paradigm established by the Charter, in my view,
is an international mutual security agreement, in which sovereign States mem-
bers of the UN have by mutual agreement conferred on the UN Security
Council certain responsibilities for the maintenance and restoration of inter-
national peace and security, and have agreed to abide by the decisions of the
Security Council in this respect. I do not read the Charter, however, as confer-
ring law-making authority on the UN Security Council. In my view, neither
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the UN Security Council nor the UN General Assembly commands the au-
thority or the responsibility to establish rules of law applicable to the interna-
tional community or to any particular State. The Security Council, of course,
may by its decisions reinforce applicable principles of international law, and
may even advance developing principles of international law.
Each dispute or threat to international peace and security addressed by the
Security Council is unique, having its own factual basis. UN Security Council
decisions in respect to those factual situations must of necessity be tailored to
the factual situation at hand. Because of this, and because decisions of the Se-
curity Council often do not reach out and touch all members of the interna-
tional community, the resolutions of the Security Council do not and should
not establish principles of international law applicable to all members of the
international community. I think it is a stretch, and a dangerous one at that,
to read into the UN Charter authority and responsibility which is not articu-
lated, and which was never intended for those institutions established therein.
Even the decisions of the International Court of Justice are applicable only to
the parties to a case before the Court, although those decisions can be power-
fully persuasive evidence of applicable international legal principles. And, al-
though some may disagree, Article 13 of the Charter authorizes the General
Assembly only to initiate studies and make recommendations concerning the
progressive development of international law and its codification—it is not a
law-making body.
I am sure everyone is aware of the difficulty we are now experiencing in the
International Criminal Court Preparatory Committee in arriving at a suffi-
ciently precise definition of the crime of aggression. One of the difficulties is
the insistence of some States on adopting the definition of aggression embod-
ied in UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 of December 14, 1974, arguing
that the resolution articulates the international legal principle defining ag-
gression. If one looks into the preparatory work on the definition, the debate
in the General Assembly, and the interventions by States after its adoption by
consensus, one would clearly discern that the definition does not represent by
any means a definitive statement of aggression, much less the crime of
aggression.
This is but one example of the difficulties posed by UN General Assembly
declarations purporting to reflect the state of the law. Such pronouncements
are so often political in nature, not supported by State practice or the realities
of international discourse, and so tainted by underlying political agendas as to
be highly suspect. Yet we are confronted with such pronouncements years
later as definitive statements of the law. The same would hold true of UN
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Security Council decisions, and I would hope that we would not lose our per-
spective on just how limited UN Security Council resolutions are intended to
be, the fact that they too are political statements, and that they do not have
the force and effect of law.
Turning now to the applicability of the law of armed conflict to the Kosovo
air operation, I think that the appropriate point of departure must be the ap-
plicable rules of engagement. Since this was a 1NATO operation, the NATO
rules of engagement were applicable and were employed by all NATO forces.
In this respect, the NATO ROE specify that: "ROE first must be lawful. Inter-
national law defines the lawful limits for the use of force during military opera-
tions. . . . The conduct of military operations is circumscribed by international
law, to include the applicable provisions of the law of armed con-
flict. . . . NATO ROE, and the application of them, never permit the use of
force which violates applicable international law." Furthermore, each NATO
member is bound by its own domestic law, which may further constrain the
use of force in certain circumstances and complicate the conduct of combined
operations. For United States armed forces, service regulations specify that
the international law of armed conflict applies to the use of force in hostilities,
and that at all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commands
to observe, the principles of international law, including the observation and
enforcement of the law of armed conflict.
So from the outset of hostilities on March 24, 1999, indeed during the plan-
ning process in preparation for Operation Allied Force, there was no question
that the law of armed conflict was fully applicable and that it was incumbent
that there be scrupulous compliance with the principles of the law of armed
conflict at all times. This was particularly important in the selection of targets,
in weaponizing those targets, in choosing aimpoints, and in employing weap-
ons against those targets. US Department of Defense (DoD) attorneys played
a critical role in conducting legal reviews and analyses during the entire tar-
geting process, and applied the traditional principles of the law of armed con-
flict throughout. Allow me to briefly provide you with a couple of examples of
the target sets which were attacked during Allied Force, and walk you through
the legal issues and concerns posed by those target sets.
In addition to targeting purely military objectives (i.e., tanks, barracks,
bunkers, fighter aircraft, etc.) NATO targeted so-called "dual-use" infrastruc-
ture assets such as command, control and communication (C3), electric
power, industrial plant, leadership lines of communication (LOCs) and petro-
leum, oil and lubricant (POL) facilities. This immediately raised issues of dis-
crimination and the prohibitions against attacking civilians and civilian
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objects. We were also acutely aware of the rules of proportionality—that col-
lateral damage to civilians and civilian objects was not to be excessive in light
of the military advantage anticipated.
It is no secret that NATO targeted electrical power facilities. Such facilities
are normally targeted during hostilities, because they do provide energy re-
sources to military forces, and their destruction has a direct military advan-
tage. Nevertheless, during Kosovo, we were careful to avoid undue and
prolonged power outages which would have a disproportionate effect on the
civilian population. In most cases, attacks on electrical power facilities em-
ployed "soft kill" capabilities, which could take the system down for a few
hours or a day or two, but would not permanently shut down the power grid.
We also were mindful of the possible cascading effects of the attacks on power
grids, which could spill power outages over into neighboring countries not in-
volved in the hostilities, and we were careful to ensure that these outages did
not occur. There were some "hard kill" power grid attacks, and NATO did
shut down the grid throughout Serbia at one point, but the outage was not
permanent.
I will readily admit that, aside from directly damaging the military electrical
power infrastructure, NATO wanted the civilian population to experience
discomfort, so that the population would pressure Milosevic and the Serbian
leadership to accede to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, but the in-
tended effects on the civilian population were secondary to the military ad-
vantage gained by attacking the electrical power infrastructure.
Likewise, NATO mounted attacks on "dual-use" industrial facilities, those
having both military and civilian purposes. But each and every target of this
nature was carefully scrutinized by our lawyers, both at the Joint Staff level
and in my office (DoD General Counsel). In each case a direct military link
was required, or only those portions of the facility having military utility, or
conducting military work, were targeted. An example of this type facility was
the Kragujevac Arms/Motor Vehicle Plant—one side of which produced au-
tomobiles while the other side produced tanks. NATO targeted only that side
of the plant producing tanks. I might add that initially this facility was identi-
fied as a heavy bomber target, but later disapproved as such because of the
proximity of civilian housing.
You might find it interesting to review a recently published RAND study by
Stephen T. Hosmer, entitled "Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He
Did." Hosmer concluded that it was the attacks and the threat of attacks on
"dual-use" infrastructure targets that generated the decisive pressure for war
termination. Furthermore, Milosevic and the Serbian leadership capitulated
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because they expected an unconstrained bombing campaign of even greater
magnitude, including carpet bombing of Belgrade, if they rejected the NATO
ultimatum delivered by Chermnomyrdin and Ahtisaari on June 2, 1999. This
study also concluded that the air campaign against military targets did not sig-
nificantly influence Milosevic's decision to come to terms. This in my view,
has significant and disturbing implications for the application of the law of
armed conflict in future conflicts of this type. There very well could be serious
consequences for the civilian population should decision makers no longer ap-
preciate the military utility of striking military targets, and applying military
pressure solely against military objectives.
These are but two examples of the application of the law of armed conflict
during the targeting process for Operation Allied Force. I wish to assure all of
you that careful and thorough legal reviews of all targets were conducted at
every echelon of command, from the Supreme Allied Commander up through
the Joint Staff and in my office prior to the target lists being sent over to the
US National Command Authorities (President and Secretary of Defense) for
final approval. In many cases sound legal advice led to the deletion of targets,
change of ordnance assigned, adjustment of aimpoints, or disapproval of tar-
gets because of law of armed conflict concerns. Principles of distinction, pro-
portionality and military advantage were applied on a daily basis throughout
the conflict. Although mistakes were made, and weapons did not always per-
form as accurately as we had hoped, in my view NATO scrupulously complied
with the law of armed conflict in every instance. We should be gratified that
civilian casualties were kept remarkably low considering the intensity of the
air campaign. In many ways, we have the lawyers, and the incredibly talented
and dedicated targeteers, to thank for such a superb effort.
One final comment. You undoubtedly are aware of, and may have read the
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FRY. 1 The Report concludes that for
several reasons, not the least because the law of armed conflict in the area of
"dual-use" targets is not clear, no "in-depth" investigation of the NATO air
campaign as a whole was warranted, nor should there be further investigations
into specific incidents. While I found this aspect of the Report to the Prosecu-
tor gratifying, the manner in which the committee reached its conclusions is
deeply disturbing. To have twenty-twenty hindsight scrutiny, done at leisure,
I. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A.
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of decisions and determinations made in the fog of war, often under instanta-
neous time constraints and life-threatening conditions by military command-
ers, pilots, soldiers and airmen, based on allegations by those who do not hold
Western nations in very high regard, is a chilling and frightening prospect. I
fear that the reservations of the United States with respect to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court are well-founded, based on the aftermath of the Kosovo
conflict. I also fear that a precedent has been established, and we can expect
such allegations in future instances where the use of force is employed, even in
instances of humanitarian assistance. The prospects for Western participa-
tion in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations do not necessarily look
good, and one wonders if this bodes well for the force and effect of interna-
tional law for the future.
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i n order to assess the relevance of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and
J-L Protocol I to the Kosovo conflict, one has to ascertain, first of all, the na-
ture of the conflict. Without a doubt, the hostilities between NATO countries
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) should be qualified as an inter-
national armed conflict.
On the contrary, the qualification of hostilities between the FRY and the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is more controversial. At first glance, it
would seem that it should be regarded as an internal conflict, since the con-
flict took place between the constituted government and an insurgent com-
munity within a State. Can the hostilities between the FRY and the KLA be
qualified as an international armed conflict, since Article 1 (4) of Protocol I
applies? 1 Article 1 (4) refers to peoples under colonial domination or alien oc-
cupation and racist regime fighting for the implementation of their right to
self-determination. It does not apply to mere secessionist movements. The
question, therefore, is whether the Kosovars are a people entitled to self-
determination, or whether they are simply a minority.
The distinction between people and minority is a moot point and interna-
tional law, while conferring different categories of rights on peoples and minor-
ities, does not define either peoples or minorities. It is true that UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 2 qualifies the inhabitants of Kosovo as "people."
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
Protocol I].
2. S.C Res. 1244 Gune 10, 1999), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
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However, it does not clarify whether this people enjoys the right of self-deter-
mination. It only says that the people of Kosovo should enjoy "substantial au-
tonomy." Autonomy fits more with the rights of minorities than with those of
people. Be that as it may, the KLA, as a liberation movement representing
Kosovo's "people," did not address any declaration to the depositary of Proto-
col I in order to bring into effect both the Geneva Conventions and the Proto-
col, as required by Article 96(3) of Protocol I.
The other possibility is to consider the KLA as being so close to NATO
countries that the Kosovar militias, under the control ofNATO, did not rep-
resent an autonomous party to the conflict. The Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY, in the Tadic case relied on the control criterion to qualify the conflict,
which took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serb Army
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as international. 3 Since the Bosnian Serb Army was
under the strict control of the FRY, the conflict was in reality between the
FRY, on one hand, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other. The FRY did not re-
gard the conflict against the KLA as international. NATO countries, on the
other hand, did not take any stance on that point. Hence, the dual qualifica-
tion of the Kosovo conflict (NATO countries-FRY; FRY-KLA) still holds
good, unless contradicted by a future judgment of the ICTY.
I will now turn my attention to the applicability of the relevant instruments
of international humanitarian law (IHL). While the Hague Conventions are
mostly regarded as declaratory of customary international law, this is only true
in part for the Geneva Conventions and in particular for Protocol I. All
NATO countries are party to the Geneva Conventions. As for Protocol I, all
were party to it at the time of Operation Allied Force except for France, Tur-
key and the United States.4 All the NATO countries which conducted hostil-
ities against the FRY are parties to Protocol II except the United States,
although the United States does consider its provisions to be reflective of cus-
tomary international law.
The FRY was admitted to the United Nations in 2000 as a new State. How-
ever, during the hostilities the FRY considered itself the continuation of the
former Yugoslavia, which was party to the Geneva Conventions and to Proto-
cols I and II. If one disregards the continuity claim, other principles could be
applied to affirm that the FRY was obliged, during hostilities, to abide by the
Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols. Article 34 of the
3. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction, 105 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 453, 11 70 (1997).
4- France acceded to Protocol I on April 11, 2001.
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1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States, 5 imposing the rule of
automatic succession in case of dissolution of States, is regarded as declaratory
of customary international law, or it could be argued that the declaration by
the FRY that it would honor the treaties stipulated by the former Yugoslavia
should be considered equivalent to a declaration of succession to all multilat-
eral treaties binding the predecessor State.
As far as conduct of hostilities is concerned, the Kosovo war consisted
mostly of air warfare, with the exception of cruise missiles launched by war-
ships in the Adriatic, which fall under the aegis of naval warfare. Hague Con-
vention IX regulates naval bombardment. For air bombardment there are no
conventional rules, although some commentators have argued that the 1923
Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare are declaratory of customary international
law.6 Protocol I, Article 49(3) subjects all three kinds of attacks (land, naval
and air) to the same rules. Is that provision declaratory of customary interna-
tional law? The point is important, since France and the United States were
not parties to Protocol I. However, the very fact that all NATO countries
were not parties to the same conventional instruments, did not raise any seri-
ous problem as far as the legal interoperability of forces (for instance, target-
ing) was concerned.
Three US soldiers were captured on March 31, 1999 at the Macedonia-Yu-
goslavia border. They were entitled to prisoner of war status. They were wear-
ing uniforms and could not be considered spies. The pretense by Milosevic,
subsequently abandoned, to subject them to criminal proceedings was without
any legal foundation. Given the nature of the operations, the allies did not
capture any FRY soldier. Personnel captured by the KLA and handed over to
NATO countries were entitled to prisoner of war status. KLA personnel were
covered by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by Protocol II.
As previously mentioned, the conflict between the FRY and the KLA should
be regarded as an internal one.
The Kosovo conflict raised a new problem, that of the interface of the law
of neutrality and peacekeeping operations. The case in point refers to the sta-
tus of military personnel, belonging to a party to the conflict, in the territory of
a non-participating State. During the Kosovo war, personnel belonging to
NATO countries were stationed in foreign territory, close to the theater of
war. They were either part of a peacekeeping operation, such as SFOR in
5. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.80/31/Corr2 (1978), 17 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1448 (1978).
6. See authorities cited infra note 14-
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, or dispatched as a measure of preventive deployment,
such as UNPREDEP in Macedonia, whose mandate was terminated on Febru-
ary 28, just before the commencement of hostilities.
According to the customary law of neutrality and the rules of the Hague
Convention V, belligerent military units present in neutral territory should be
interned. Is the same principle applicable to units, belonging to a party to the
conflict, but part of a peacekeeping force? The danger for the enemy is that
the military unit might be diverted to a combat mission and take part in the
hostilities.
This is a new problem, which should be resolved taking into account the
principles embodied in Article 1 1 of the Hague Convention V of 1907, on the
one hand, and the law of the UN Charter, on the other. The resolution of the
issue could be along the following lines:
• If personnel are under the command and control of UN Headquarters,
the danger that troops be diverted to take part in combat operations is
remote;
• The same is true, however with difficulty, if the force, even though under
national command and control, is mandated by the United Nations;
• A further line of reasoning could be to invoke Charter Article 103,
overriding the law of neutrality, on this point;
• A policy of non-belligerency might also be invoked by the neutral State,
hosting foreign troops, insofar as they do not commit any warring act.
During the conflict, NATO aircraft dropped weapons, not used during
their mission in Serbia, in the Adriatic, before landing at Aviano, Italy. Land-
ing with the weapons represented a hazard to the safety of the aircraft. The
weapons were dropped in jettison areas that had been identified by NATO in
previous years on the high seas.
The use of the high seas for military purposes is without any doubt lawful.
Therefore one may conclude that jettison areas are not contrary to interna-
tional law. However, the weapons dropped byNATO aircraft lie on the conti-
nental shelf of both Italy and Croatia. Italy was a member of the warring
coalition, which took part in the identification of jettison areas, and con-
sented to the weapon dropping. However, the case of Croatia, a State that did
not take part in the armed conflict, is different. Could the continental shelf of
a neutral State be used for warring activities? Our answer is yes, since the con-
tinental shelf is not under the sovereignty of the coastal State, which only en-
joys sovereign rights on it. The same solution proposed for mines or other
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devices on the continental shelf should be followed. Military activities on the
continental shelf of a foreign State are lawful, provided that the economic ac-
tivities of the coastal State are not irremediably impaired. The principle of
"due regard" should be taken into account.
Unlike total exclusion zones, jettison areas are a new phenomenon. Should
they be regulated? The first problem is whether there is a duty of notification.
Incidents may occur, as happened with Italian trawlers in the upper Adriatic,
which caught a number of weapons in their nets. A duty of notification of
minefields, as soon as military exigencies permit, is established under Article 3
of the Hague Convention VIII. The same rationale could be invoked as far as
dropping of weapons is concerned, even though the danger is more remote
than with mines. It should also be taken into account that in the Corfu Chan-
nel case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that Albania had the
duty to notify of the danger to navigation represented by mines floating in its
territorial waters. 7
The second problem is whether there is a duty to remove weapons dumped
in the high seas at the end of hostilities. Article 5 of the Hague Convention
VIII establishes a generic duty to remove mines. De-mining is a duty, which
has been rendered more stringent by new conventions on land mines. Envi-
ronmental considerations play a role, not only during the armed conflict (Ar-
ticles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I), but also after its termination. After the
termination of hostilities, Italy and other NATO countries dispatched 13
minesweepers to remove the weapons dropped during the war. However, that
operation was considered a sort of exercise and not regarded by NATO as a
duty imposed by international law.
The law of neutrality has not been abolished by the entry into force of the
United Nations Charter. The ICJ reaffirmed the permanent validity of this
body of law in 1996 in its advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons, even though
the Court took into consideration only the rights of neutral States and not
those of belligerents vis-a-vis neutrals. 8 The right to visit and search neutral
shipping in order to confiscate contraband of war is a well-established right
under the law of neutrality, which has also been exercised during naval con-
flicts that have occurred since the entry into force of the UN Charter.
During the Kosovo war, NATO envisaged exercising belligerent rights against
neutral shipping in order to stop the oil supply to FRY. This position was opposed
7. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Dec. 5).
8. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 78
(July 8).
117
__
Commentary
by the Russian Federation, according to which the control of shipping bound for
the port ofBar could be enforced only if authorized by a UN Security Council res-
olution. Also, amongNATO allies, France and Italy were not enthusiastic. Reso-
lution 1 160 established an embargo on the sale and supply ofwar material to FRY,
but did not authorize any enforcement measures, except those which could be ex-
erted by a country on its own shipping.9
It is true that foreign shipping may not be visited and searched, unless a Secu-
rity Council resolution authorizes appropriate measures to enforce an embargo es-
tablished by the Security Council. This is a well established practice going back to
the Rhodesia case 10 and implemented more recently against Iraq, 11 the former Yu-
goslavia 12 and the FRY. 13 However, this statement holds true in time of peace, i.e.,
in a situation in which there is no armed conflict. In such a case, in the absence of
a Security Council resolution, States are authorized to control shipping flying
their flag or belonging to foreign countries, which agree that their ships, usually
under reciprocity, may be visited. A completely different situation arises when an
armed conflict is going on. Warring States, as practice shows, are entitled to exer-
cise belligerent rights, including visit and search. One can only discuss whether
there is any geographical limitation or whether visiting and searching may be con-
ducted anywhere. This depends on the scale of hostilities. The principle of neces-
sity and proportionality might advise that those activities be conducted close to
the theater of war.
A blockade of the port ofBar was also envisaged byNATO countries to im-
pede the oil supply to the FRY. This idea was immediately qualified by the
Russian Federation as contrary to international law and was also opposed by
France and Denmark within the Alliance. Lacking a Security Council resolu-
tion, those countries did not regard a blockade as in keeping with interna-
tional law. A blockade is still considered a lawful measure, at least when
established by the United Nations, as it is one of the measures referred to in
Article 42 of the Charter. But a blockade is a far more intrusive measure than
visit and search and might contribute to an escalation of the conflict. Yet
these are policy considerations. From a legal viewpoint, the considerations
9. S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998) 11 8. This was restated in
paragraph 7 of S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998) without any
mention of enforcement measures.
10. S.C. Res. 221 (Apr. 9, 1966), U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966).
11. S.C. Res. 665 (Aug. 25, 1990), U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
12. S.C. Res. 713 (Sep. 25, 1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991); S.C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
13. S.C. Res. 787 (Nov. 16, 1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992).
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made before, in relation to visit and search, are also valid, mutatis mutandis,
with regard to blockade. In time of peace, a blockade to enforce an embargo
requires an authorization by the Security Council; in time of armed conflict,
Security Council authorization is not necessary.
The Kosovo conflict once again brought attention to the question of the
use of neutral territory as a base for hostile operations or in a manner contrary
to neutrality rules. The 1923 Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare, regarded by sev-
eral writers as declaratory of customary international law, establish two basic
principles, as far as neutrality is concerned. 14 Belligerent military aircraft are
forbidden to enter the jurisdiction of a neutral State (Article 40); a neutral
State should prevent the entry into its jurisdiction of belligerent military air-
craft (Article 42).
Austria and Switzerland did not permit NATO aircraft to over fly their ter-
ritory. This posture is in keeping with law of neutrality, as proven by the
Hague rules. On the contrary, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia
agreed that their airspace could be used by NATO aircraft. This practice
might be justified only if one admits that a policy of non-belligerency is in
keeping with international law. If a deviation from the rule of impartiality is
the consequence of a Security Council resolution, non-belligerency does not
raise any particular difficulty. Security Council Resolution 1160 established
an arms embargo against the FRY. Consequently, States not taking part in the
hostilities were forbidden to supply the FRY with war material, but were al-
lowed to sell weapons to NATO countries (something which did not happen
in practice). It is more difficult to justify derogation from neutrality rules, in
the absence of a Security Council resolution, imposing sanctions on the en-
emy and/or qualifying it as an aggressor. Even if it is argued that non-belliger-
ency does not constitute a violation of international law, one has to admit that
the belligerent, without infringing any neutrality rule, would be allowed to re-
act against non-belligerent States, since their territory is being used by the ad-
versary for warlike purposes.
14- Remigiusz Bierzanek, Commentary to the 1923 Hague Rules for Aerial Warfare, in THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE 404-6 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988). R.R. Baxter says in commenting on
the Rules: "While these Rules were never put in treaty form, they nevertheless had a profound
impact on the customary international law governing aerial bombardment." This passage is
quoted by Yoram Dinstein, The Law of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 n.2 (1977). See also the decision by the Tokyo District Court, December
7, 1963 in the Shimoda Case, in 8 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212ff
(1964).
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I am going to shift the focus just a little bit to what is appropriate for mybackground as a military operational law attorney. During Operation
Allied Force, I served at the headquarters of the United States Air Forces in
Europe, at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. Along with Lieutenant Colonel
Tony Montgomery, I worked targeting issues in theater in concert with
NATO. Tony Montgomery from the US European Command and myselfdown
at the air component level can discuss what we did to comply with the law of
armed conflict as we planned and executed this operation.
By way of background, both NATO and the United States were doing de-
tailed planning in June 1998 to address the situation in Kosovo. It was simply
untenable to accept another Srebrenica, where five to eight thousand individ-
uals were taken out and slaughtered wholesale. As you know, the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted General Krstic for
his activities at Srebrenica on August 2, 2001. Neither NATO nor the United
States, individually, could allow another Srebrenica. In the event we were un-
able to get consensus in NATO to go with military action, the United States
was also planning for the possibility of a US-only operation. My principal role
was in planning and executing the US portion of the operation.
The United States had over forty air campaigns developed as a result of de-
tailed planned during the ten months preceding Operation Allied Force. US
and NATO planning was occurring in parallel. We had very detailed intelli-
gence information at very high levels of classification. We also had lawyers
looking at each and every individual target throughout that time period.
There is no question that we had more scrutiny of every single target in Oper-
ation Allied Force than has ever been done in the history of warfare.
Commentary
Military planners and lawyers applied the jus in hello as we considered mili-
tary necessity and proportionality. Every effort was made to eliminate unnec-
essary suffering whenever possible and to discriminate between military and
non-military objectives. There is no question that Operation Allied Force was
a successful campaign—it covered seventy-eight days, thirty-eight thousand
aircraft sorties, over ten thousand strike sorties, and yet resulted in the unin-
tended deaths of only about 500 civilians. While the loss of every civilian life is
regrettable, the proportion of unintended deaths relative to the scale of the
operation is unprecedented in warfare.
To plan for those strike sorties we conducted target analysis using a predic-
tive model for collateral damage. The United States used this targeting pro-
cess with its four-tier collateral damage model to look at each and every
target. We used imagery and distance rings around the proposed target to de-
termine whether we had non-military objects within range of the targets. We
then would analyze the type of weapon we were putting against the target and
adjust our aim point or the weapon employed as required to minimize collat-
eral damage. The model would, for example, predict the damage likely from
the use of a particular weapon against a particular building—whether it would
cause panel collapse, glass breakage, or eardrum rupture.
Regarding the obligation to discriminate between military and non-military
objects, it is difficult to discriminate regardless of what altitude you're flying
when you have a high threat level in a very sophisticated air defense environ-
ment. Since emissions are created every time a bomb is dropped or a target is
otherwise taken down, aircrews are exposed to increased risk with every suc-
cessive mission. Regardless of risk to our own forces, however, we still have to
comply with the law of armed conflict during offensive operations and we did.
Weapons reliability is always an issue during proportionality analysis. You
can talk about the possibility of using missiles that are 100% reliable; however,
even the United States cannot afford to buy 100% reliable weapons because
the costs are about one to three million dollars per weapon. No country in the
world is required by the law ofarmed conflict to have 100% reliable weapons.
Another problem with weapon accuracy is the delivery system. When you
have pilots in the cockpit dropping ordinance or submarines launching Toma-
hawk land attack missiles, the systems don't always function as advertised
when you hit the switch to launch the missile or you "pickle off the bomb.
But, again, the law of armed conflict does not require weapons and delivery
systems with 100% reliability, rather it requires the acquisition ofweapons sys-
tems that are lawful under international law and the exercise of due care when
utilizing them. Once it is determined that a target is a legitimate military
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objective, we must then determine that any unnecessary damage to non-mili-
tary objects or loss of civilian lives caused by either the choice of weapon, de-
livery system, or reliability is not excessive in relation to the military
advantage anticipated. Of course we must avoid civilian casualties whenever
possible and we did that during Operation Allied Force.
The applicability of Protocol I 1 was not an issue from my perspective, be-
cause all NATO States applied a common understanding based on customary
international law. It is well known that the United States has some reserva-
tions with regard to Protocol I, but as far as the execution of Allied Force with
our NATO allies, we were able to reach common ground on all the important
issues. Every nation signed up to the common NATO rules of engagement de-
veloped for Operation Allied Force. These rules also allowed for national res-
ervations when appropriate so that if a country's national laws or policies
didn't allow for certain activities, then its national forces would be exempted
from those functions.
In summary, I agree with Professor Greenwood's remarks that the law of
armed conflict was fully applicable during Operation Allied Force. The target-
ing analysis was conducted the same as in any other conflict and the captured
military personnel were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war.
1. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelffeds., 3d ed. 2000).
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The UN Security Council and the Creation of International Law
John Murphy:
Regarding Judy Miller's comment about the United Nations Security
Council and its powers of law creation, I would suggest with respect that the
Security Council of the United Nations—at least if it's acting under
Chapter VII—has the authority to debate, decide, and enforce international
law. For more on this issue, I would recommend the two-volume book United
Nations Legal Order 1 edited by Oscar Schachter and Chris Joyner, which goes
into the authority of the UN Security Council and other bodies of the United
Nations to create, to interpret, to apply and enforce international law.
George Walker:
I think I agree that Security Council's decisions under Chapter VII are law.
Any other resolution of the Security Council, any General Assembly resolu-
tion except those governing United Nations governments and most other or*
ganizations unless the participants have agreed that they are law, are either
supportive of law or the like. General Assembly resolutions may never declare
law and they are not law in their own light, but I believe that on the political
side of things they can contribute to soft law.
The Law of Neutrality Under the UN Charter
Christopher Greenwood:
Regarding the question of the application of the law of neutrality in an en-
vironment where you have Security Council action. I think it is clear that if
the Security Council adopts a decision under Chapter VII, that decision or
1. UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER (2 vols.), (Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner
eds., 1995).
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rather the obligation to comply with it prevails over any other rule of interna-
tional law. There is, therefore, no difficulty if you have a Security Council de-
cision which, for example, prohibits the delivery of particular goods to a
particular State. That is why I have some reservation in trying to draw lessons
from what happened in the second Gulf conflict and applying them to the
conflict in Kosovo.
In the second Gulf conflict, you had a very clear, unambiguous Security
Council Resolution 66 1, 2 which forbid the delivery of virtually anything to
Iraq or Kuwait, and a second resolution, 665, 3 which authorized navies of gov-
ernments cooperating with the government of Kuwait to enforce 661. Now
neither of those conditions was satisfied in the Kosovo conflict. Resolution
1 1604 only applied to the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Yugo-
slavia and there was no equivalent of 665. So on the critical point about inter-
cepting deliveries of oil to Yugoslavia, there was no Security Council
authority. For legal basis, you would have had to fall back on the customary in-
ternational law principles. That's where I would suggest there is a real diffi-
culty in practice.
Peacekeepers or an Occupying Force?
Christopher Greenwood:
I would just like to say something about the situation after Resolution
12445 was adopted because we've only briefly touched on that so far. It seems
to me that 1244 moved the goalposts completely with respect to Kosovo be-
cause it meant that when ground troops went into Kosovo, they did so under a
Security Council mandate. Had that not happened, then I think the legal po-
sition would have been a very murky one indeed. Suppose that the Yugoslav
government had capitulated as it did, but we had not been able to get a resolu-
tion through the Security Council because of the Chinese veto. You would
then, I think, be in a position where the troops that now make up KFOR
would have been there in effect as belligerent occupants or at least under a re-
gime of belligerent occupation tempered by whatever Yugoslavia had agreed
to. That would have been an extremely uncomfortable position indeed. How-
ever much we might find 1244 limiting, the law of belligerent occupation
would have been a limit a great deal more difficult to live with.
2. S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
3. S.C. Res. 665 (Aug. 25, 1990), U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
4. S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).
5. S.C. Res. 1244 Qune 10, 1999), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
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The Legality of Blockade or Visit & Search
Adam Roberts:
As I recall the way the issue of visit and search arose during the Kosovo
events of 1999, there should have been no problem about the application of
most of the law of armed conflict because it applies when there is fighting. But
I recall it being said that one oi the difficulties was that numerous Western
leaders in their wisdom had proclaimed that this was not a war. In the United
Kingdom we had, for example, a Minister of Defence then, now Secretary-
General ofNATO, proclaiming repetitiously that this was not a war. Then the
suggestion was made that it was particularly difficult to exercise rights of visit
and search when Western leaders had been so industriously and, in my opin-
ion, so absurdly claiming that this was not a war. I wonder if there was a con-
nection there between this jus ad bellum problem and the application of that
particular branch ofjus in hello.
Christopher Greenwood:
Well I don't think it has anything to do with whether there was a state of
war in the formal sense. I really think that is an issue which has become almost
completely a museum piece. Having said that, I think that if you repeatedly
say in public we are not fighting a war, you are not simply saying there is no
technical state of war in being. You are trying to damp down expectations of
the level of violence that is going to occur. If you do that, then you almost in-
variably as a matter of political reality—if not a matter of law—constrain your
freedom of action in the future.
Wolff H. von Heinegg:
Let me address the subject of visit and search. I really don't understand this
debate over the legal issues involved, because when we are just concentrating
upon the legal issues and not on the policies, it is quite clear that at least that
part of the law of neutrality would strictly be labeled the law of maritime neu-
trality. If you look at the law of maritime neutrality and if you look at the
works of the International Law Association as well as the San Remo Manual,6
there is no doubt that as soon as a belligerent decides to conduct visit and
search operations it is perfectly in order and in conformity with the existing
6. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at
SEA HI 93-104 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
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law. In my opinion, this is customary law and there is a customary right of
belligerents to conduct visit and search operations.
Now when it comes to certain legal limitations that have been suggested
this morning, well I warn you against mixing up self limitations with legal obli-
gations. A belligerent would be entitled to conduct visit and search operations
with regard to neutral shipping everywhere in the high seas outside neutral
territorial waters. Of course, he probably would not do that in the Atlantic if
he is engaged in the Indian Ocean, but that is just a self limitation and nothing
else. So when it comes to this part of the law of neutrality that means maritime
neutrality, I think there can be no real doubt about the legality of conducting
visit and search operations.
Natalino Ronzitti:
We both agree that visit and search is legal as soon as there is an armed
conflict. About the legal limitation, there is some practice and precedent that
you are entitled to search a ship within the limits of self defense, but it's very
difficult to exemplify what these limitations are.
Christopher Greenwood:
I take the point that there are any number of texts from the Naval Com-
mander's Handbook7 in the United States to the International Law Associa-
tion to the San Remo Manual that talk about rights of visit and search. I
subscribe to the views that the right could have been exercised in these cir-
cumstances if it was really necessary to do so. The problem was more a politi-
cal than a legal one. But I do think we have to go into this with our eyes open.
Our own governments would be exceptionally reluctant to accept the exercise
of those kind of belligerent rights if we were on the receiving end of them in
conflicts in which we were neutral. It is simply not the case today that one can
give the kind of confident advice that "don't worry this right is clearly estab-
lished in customary international law, nothing else to bother about." I think
that that would not today be responsible advice for a lawyer to give. Also, I
don't accept that limitations as to area are purely politically self-imposed imi-
tations. I think that if Iran had sent frigates to the Mediterranean during the
first Gulf war, which it could just about have done, and made a few token visit
7. Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
OPERATIONS (A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War College
International Law Studies).
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and searches there, we would not have accepted the legality of that in Britain.
The United States would not have accepted its legality either.
Ove Bring:
I think I rather stand on the line with Chris Greenwood being more cautious
of the applicability of the law of neutrality in warfare than Wolff von Heinegg
who takes a more cock-sure attitude that the traditional law of neutrality is still
in place. I take this view because the law of 1907 was adopted at a time when
there was no law of collective security—there was no UN Charter. In 1907 the
use of force for visit and search purposes was not doubted at all. What has hap-
pened since then is that we have the law of collective security: belligerents may
not automatically, or perhaps should not automatically at least, rely on the op-
tion of the use of force in relationship to States that are not involved in the
armed conflict. There is a tension between the law of 1907 and the law of 1945,
and that is a logical, legal and ideological tension. I'm not sure that this has re-
sulted in state practice confirming one thing or the other, but it is a matter that
should be discussed in legal circles because I think that it is a problem.
Christopher Greenwood:
First of all, without looking to get into the argument about whether the
NATO operation in Yugoslavia was lawful or not, I agree entirely that there is
a real problem if you have a State that maintains that there is no right of hu-
manitarian intervention at all, or that, if there is, it doesn't apply to Yugosla-
via, and then takes the position "what right have you to stop us from trading
with an existing trading partner?". But that same problem arises where you
have a State not involved in the conflict that says we don't accept your
self-defense argument. Obviously you can't contend that there is no right of
self-defense in international law.
Exactly the same problem arises if a neutral country says it doesn't accept
that Iran is acting in self-defense against Iraq. "We don't accept Iraq is acting
in self-defense against Iran, thus what power do you have to prevent us from
trading with an existing trading partner." It is, I think, the question mark that
hangs over this area of the law of neutrality in the twenty-first century. Now
there is an answer to that, and the answer is that the customary international
law of neutrality continues to provide certain elements of rights to belligerents
irrespective of the legality of the resort to force. Ifyou didn't have some princi-
ple of that kind, then you would in effect be scrapping the law of neutrality all
together. But I come back to a point I made in my opening statement. Where
you have a combination of real doubt—admittedly doubt I don't share, but
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real doubt nonetheless—about the legal basis for an operation in the first
place, coupled with doubts about how far the law of neutrality has survived
into the modern era in relation to intercepting ships and doubts about the ne-
cessity for such action, then you have a real problem about stopping neutral
ships irrespective of what your lawyers tell you.
Applying the LOAC: A Question of Intent or Act?
Ruth Wedgwood:
I had a question for Judy Miller and for anybody else who wants to com-
ment on it. When I recently spoke to Dejan Sahovic who's the new Yugoslav
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, he concurred essentially
with the conclusion of the Rand Study. His answer to the question "why did
Milosevic ultimately step down from the campaign?" was that he thought that
Milosevic doubted the ultimate loyalty of the Yugoslav Army. The disloyalty
was not ideologically based, but rather that they would fear for the safety and
comfort of their own families.
My question is the old catholic question of motive versus purpose, or inten-
tion versus act. If in fact we succeeded because the Serbs believed we would
reduce Belgrade to a flattened version of Frankfurt or Hamburg after the Sec-
ond World War, was that a licit kind of animation? The threat of force versus
the actual use of force, because we may indeed have chosen our target. I know
we chose our targets with great care, but if the Serbs believed we would not let
up until everything they used in civilian life was destroyed, then we may have
won the war by intimating, or allowing them to conclude, that we would use
force in a much more unrelenting way that would raise far greater questions of
proportionality.
Judith Miller:
I don't think objectively speaking that the people of Yugoslavia should
have had that fear. In point of fact we were not razing parts of Belgrade. In
fact, NATO and the United States were saying throughout—and we were
saying it because it was true—that we were going to follow the law of armed
conflict. So I can't account for the belief, if it occurred, among the army and
the civilian population that we were going to practice total war. That simply
wasn't in the cards from anyone's perspective, or from anyone's formal or in-
formal statements.
I do think that if in fact somehow that perception is what really drove
Milosevic to relent, then that does create some issues for people going forward
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because you're presumably going to hear military commanders say that we
want to do X or Y. We're going to have lawyers even harder pressed to explain
you can't do that because it's not allowed under the law of armed conflict. I
think it does challenge one's ideas about what it is to engage in hostilities in a
world where our every move is covered on CNN and reported instanta-
neously. It may have reverberations that are somewhat different than we've
been accustomed to previously.
H
Enforcement of the Laws of Armed Conflict and 20/20 Hindsight
Christopher Greenwood:
If I may respond to something Judy Miller said on the question of enforce-
ment. I take the point entirely, and I recognize the difficulty for a civilian in
speaking on a subject of this kind to a predominantly military audience. I rec-
ognize entirely that it is uncomfortable to have the idea of a judge and a court
with twenty-twenty hindsight second guessing the decisions you took in the
heat of the moment, but I don't think we should be afraid of this. I don't think
we should be worried by the sight of our own shadow.
If you take for example what was happening in Northern Ireland over the
last thirty years; any British soldier firing a weapon at somebody in Northern
Ireland did so knowing that the decision that he took in the heat of the mo-
ment was likely to be hauled over afterwards in great detail by people with
twenty-twenty hindsight. The fact of the matter is, it didn't chill all military
activity in Northern Ireland. It may have produced some circumstances and
cases where we would question the result, but the fact of the matter is that it
hasn't handicapped the British forces in what they set out to do, And I don't
think the prospect of an International Criminal Court or the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is going to have that effect on
military action in general. Perhaps a more important point is that whether we
like it or not, this is a fact of life. It's not something we're going to be able to es-
cape from and there's no point in our pretending otherwise.
W. Hays Parks:
I agree that we often times are judged in law enforcement situations with
twenty-twenty hindsight. Every law enforcement officer in the United States,
any soldier who uses force in the United States, is subject to a line of cases that
govern whether that person should have used deadly force in that circum-
stance. We have those processes at both the state and federal level. We are
not blessed like you are with a European Court of Human Rights. That's your
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burden. You can have it; we don't want it. The example I can think of is the
1988 SAS killing of the three Irish Republican Army terrorists in Gibraltar.
There was a very political 10 to 9 decision that found the use of force unlaw-
ful. 8 That's the kind of chilling decision that we are concerned about when
talking about judging decisions that commanders make in the fog of war.
Christopher Greenwood:
First, I understand where you're coming from and the answer is you need to
make sure you get the right judges. You need to make sure you have people
who are not there just because they have a political axe to grind, but are genu-
inely seeking to apply the law impartially. Then I think you have nothing to
fear provided that you get over the second hurdle. It has got to be clearly un-
derstood by everybody concerned that you are looking at an event after it hap-
pened. Therefore, there is inevitably a degree of detachment and a degree of
hindsight, but you have got to apply a test that is actually capable of being ap-
plied by somebody in the heat of the moment. There's an English case on self
defense from about thirty years ago which contains the passage that detached
reflection is not to be expected in the face of an uplifted knife. I think it's es-
sential to appreciate that that is the standard which has to be applied, for ex-
ample, to any investigation of a pilot's decision to fire a missile on the basis of a
couple of seconds in which he had a chance to appreciate the situation in
front of him.
Judith Miller:
The problem I have with the International Criminal Court (ICC) is that as
it's currently constituted it does not have the sort ofground rules that Christo-
pher Greenwood has pointed to. Impartial judges, impartial prosecutors, and a
body of law that is knowable in advance and fairly applied has not been guar-
anteed by the ICC as currently envisioned and embraced by so many people in
the world. I regret personally that we are in this situation. I do not believe the
United States is entitled to do what it wants to do without scrutiny. I simply
want to have an institution set up that we can rely on, and everyone else in the
world can rely on, to do it in a fair way.
8. See McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) holding by
only ten votes to nine that United Kingdom had violated the European Convention on Human
Rights. The European Commission on Human Rights had previously voted eleven to six that the
use of lethal force was "no more than 'absolutely necessary.'" McCann and Others v. the United
Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Comm'n. H.R. (Mar. 4, 1994), p. 251.
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My point about the Report to the Prosecutor is that you must look at that
and think about it from the point ofview of a lawyer in the Department of De-
fense trying to give good advice to the secretary and the chairman and every-
one else trying to carry out a military mission. If you read that Report and try
to figure out what kind of advice you're going to give, then I think it raises a lot
of serious questions. So the point I'm making is that there are issues that it
raises and approaches that it took that I think are not necessarily the obvious
way to interpret the law ofarmed conflict and apply it in individual instances.
Are the Laws of War a Constraint?
Adam Roberts:
There has been an implication that the laws of armed conflict are essen-
tially a constraining factor on the waging of war. Of course they are a con-
straining factor, but there are two sub-aspects of that that should be brought
out. One is that some of the most important parts of the law of armed conflict
don't deal with combat as such, but with the treatment of victims of war, pris-
oners of war, inhabitants of occupied territory and so on. Those crucially im-
portant bits of the law of armed conflict are not as it were affected by this
critique, but the law of armed conflict is still constraining in a number of
respects.
It's also true that the law of armed conflict is a very important means
whereby the conduct of war can be kept within limits which Western publics
will accept. In that sense, it is enabling and not constraining. We've seen
plenty of evidence of that in the at least three major wars in which Western
democracies have been involved in the last twenty years—the Falklands War,
the 1991 Gulf War and Kosovo. In all three, a sense that the forces involved
were fighting within certain constraints and were treating prisoners honorably
and everything else was an important precondition for continued public sup-
port for the operations. So while it is true that the laws of war may be con-
straining, we should not think of them as exclusively a constraining and
restraining factor.
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PART III
TARGETING

Introduction
Robert F. Turner
I his panel will focus on the legal and ethical lessons ofNATO's Kosovocampaign as they concern targeting—the jus in hello issues of what ob-
jects may lawfully be attacked by weapons that are themselves not prohibited
by the jus in hello.
In my view, no development in US national security law in recent decades
has been more important than the development and growth of the field of op-
erational law in the military and the cooperative relationship between the fin-
est legal minds in the US military and the leading scholars on these issues from
the United States and around the world has been truly remarkable. The Naval
War College anticipated the benefits of such cooperative relationships de-
cades ago with the establishment of the Stockton Chair of International Law
and this remarkable colloquium is but a continuation of that tradition.

Legitimate Military Objectives Under The
Current Jus In Bello
Yoram Dinstein
The Principle of Distinction and Military Objectives
In its Advisory Opinion of 1996 on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the International Court of Justice recognized the "principle of
distinction"—between combatants and noncombatants (civilians)—as a fun-
damental and "intransgressible" principle of customary international law. 1 The
requirement of distinction between combatants and civilians lies at the root of
the jus in hello. It is reflected in Article 48 of Protocol Additional I of 1977 to the
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection ofWar Victims, entitled "Basic
rule:" "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civil-
ian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." 2 There is no doubt that, irrespective ofobjections to sundry other
1. Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Reports
226,257 (July 8).
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 447 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3d. ed.
2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
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stipulations of Protocol I, 3 "the principle of the military objective has become
a part of customary international law for armed conflict" whether on land, at
sea or in the air.4
The coinage "military objectives" first came into use in the non-binding
1923 Rules of Air Warfare, drawn up at The Hague by a Commission of
Jurists5 (set up in 1922 by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of
Armament). It also appears in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protec-
tion of War Victims6 (which fail to define it7), the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict8 and
especially the 1999 Second Protocol appended to the Cultural Property
Convention, 9 as well as the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court. 10
A binding definition of military objectives was crafted in 1977, in Article
52(2) of Protocol I:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
3. See, e.g., Guy Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case against Ratification of
Additional Protocol I, 26 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 124-170
(1985-1986).
4. See Horace Robertson, The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law ofArmed Conflict 197,
207, in The Law of Military Operations, Liber Amicorum Professor Jack
GRUNAWALT (Michael Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International Law
Studies).
5. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art.
24(1), at 139, 144.
6. See Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,1 949, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2,
art. 19 2d para., at 195, 205; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id., art. 18 5th para., at 299, 308. Both texts refer to the
perils to which medical establishments may be exposed by being situated close to "military
objectives."
7. See Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal
and Material Fields of Application 141 (1992).
8. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art. 8(1) (a), at 371, 376.
9. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event ofArmed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2,
art. 6(a), 8, 13(1) (b), at 699, 702, 703-4, 706.
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(ii), (v), (ix), at 667, 676-7.
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action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 11
The term "attacks" is defined in Article 49(1) of the Protocol as "acts of vi-
olence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence." 12 Any act of
violence fits this matrix: not only massive air attacks or artillery barrages, but
also small-scale attacks (like a sniper firing a single bullet). As Article 52(2)
elucidates, all attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives.
The definition of military objectives appearing in Article 52(2) is repeated
word-for-word in several subsequent instruments: Protocols II and III, An-
nexed to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively In-
jurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; 13 and the 1999 Second Protocol to
the Hague Cultural Property Convention. 14 It is also replicated in the
(non-binding) San Remo Manual of 1995 on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea. 15 Many scholars regard the definition as embodying
customary international law. 16 With one significant textual modification—to
be examined infra—that is also the view of the United States, which objects
on other grounds to Protocol I. 17
Notwithstanding its authoritative status, Article 52 (2) 's definition leaves a
lot to be desired. It is an exaggeration to claim (as does Antonio Cassese) that
"[t]his definition is so sweeping that it can cover practically anything." 18 Still,
it is regrettable that the wording is abstract and generic, and no list of specific
military objectives is provided (if only on an illustrative, non-exhaustive basis).
Under Article 57(2) (a) (i) of the Protocol, those who plan or decide upon an
11. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 450.
12. Id. at 447.
13. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10,
1980, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 5 15; Protocol II on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, id., art. 2(4), at 528; Protocol
III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, id., art. 1(3), at 533.
14. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1(f), at 701.
15. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to armed Conflicts at
SEA 114 (Louis Doswald-Becked., 1995).
16. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
Law 64-65 (1989).
17. See Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
NAVAL OPERATIONS 402 n.9 (A.R. Thomas & J.C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval
War College International Law Studies).
18. Antonio Cassese, International Law 339 (2001).
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attack must "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be at-
tacked ... are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
52.
"
19 Due to its abstract character, the definition in Article 52(2) does not
produce a workable acid test for such verification. The text lends itself to "di-
vergent interpretations" in application, and, needless to say, perhaps,
"[a]mbiguous language encourages abuse."20
The relative advantages of a general definition versus an enumeration of mili-
tary objectives—or a combination of both—have been thoroughly discussed in
connection with the preparation of the San Remo Manual. 21 The present
writer believes that only a composite definition—combining an abstract state-
ment with a non-exhaustive catalogue of concrete illustrations22—can effec-
tively avoid vagueness, on the one hand, and inability to anticipate future
scenarios, on the other. No abstract definition standing by itself (unaccompa-
nied by actual examples) can possibly offer a practical solution to real problems
emerging—often in dismaying rapidity—on the battlefield.
The noun "objects," used in the definition, clearly encompasses material
and tangible things. 23 However, the phrase "military objectives" is certainly
not limited to inanimate objects, 24 and it is wrong to suggest that the Proto-
col's language fails to cover enemy military personnel. 25 To be on the safe side,
the framers of Article 52(2) added the (otherwise superfluous) words "[i]n so
far as objects are concerned," underscoring that not only inanimate objects
constitute military objectives. Human beings can categorically come within
19. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 452.
20. ESBJORN ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 71
(1979).
21. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 114-116. See also William Fenrick, Military
Objectives in the Law of Naval Warfare, in THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare: Report, Commentaries and
Proceedings of the Round-Table of Experts on International Humanitarian
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 1, 4-5 (Wolff Heimschel v. Heinegg ed.,
1991).
22. This legal technique is epitomized in Articles 2-3 of the 1974 General Assembly consensus
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 15 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS:
Series I, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly 392, 393 (Dusan Djonovich
ed., 1984).
23. Claude Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Article 52, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 633-4
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
24. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 33 (1996).
25. Such a suggestion is made by Hamilton DeSaussure, Comment, 3 1 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Law Review 883, 885 (1981-1982).
142
Yoram Dinstein
the ambit of military objectives. 26 Indeed, human beings are not the only living
creatures that do. Certain types of animals—cavalry horses and pack mules in
particular—can also be legitimate targets.
The pivotal issue is what ingredient or dimension serves to identify a mili-
tary objective. On the face of it, under Article 52(2), an object must fulfill two
cumulative criteria in order to qualify as a military objective: (a) by nature, lo-
cation, purpose or use it must make an effective contribution to military ac-
tion; and (b) its destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, must offer a definite military advantage. 27 However,
In practice . . . one cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or
neutralization of an object contributing to the military action of one side would
not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult to imagine how
the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object could be a military
advantage for one side if that same object did not somehow contribute to the
military action of the enemy. 28
Article 52(2) refers to "a definite military advantage" that must be gained
from the (total or partial) destruction, capture or neutralization29 of the tar-
gets. The expression "a definite military advantage" (like "military objec-
tives") is derived from the Hague Rules of Air Warfare, which resorted to the
formula "a distinct military advantage."30 There is no apparent difference in
the present context between the adjectives "distinct" and "definite" or, for
that matter, several other alternatives pondered by the framers of Article
52(2). 31 Whatever the adjective preferred, the idea conveyed is that of "a
concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and
26. See Elmar Rauch, Attack Restraints, Target Limitations and Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons, 18 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MlLITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE 51, 55 (1979).
27. See Marco Sassoli & Antoine Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War: Cases,
Documents, and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in
International Humanitarian Law 161 (1999).
28. Id. at 140.
29. The term "neutralization" in this setting means denial of use of an objective to the enemy
without destroying it. See Waldemar Solf, Article 52, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 318, 325 (Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch & Waldemar Solf eds.,
1982).
30. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 5, art. 24(1), at 144.
31. See Frits Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977, Part //, 9
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 107, 111 (1978).
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speculative one."32 The advantage gained must be military and not, say,
purely political 33 (hence, "forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes" of
the adverse party34 cannot be deemed a proper military advantage). But when
coalition war is being waged, the military advantage may accrue to the benefit
of an allied country—or the alliance in general—rather than the attacking
party itself. 35
The process of appraising military advantage must be made against the
background of the circumstances prevailing at the time, so that the same ob-
ject may be legitimately attacked in one temporal framework but not in oth-
ers.
36 A church, as a place of worship, is not a military objective; nor is it a
military objective when converted into a hospital; yet, if the church steeple is
used by snipers, it becomes a military objective.37 In this sense, the definition
of military objectives is "relativized:"38 there is "no fixed borderline between
civilian objects and military objectives."39
The trouble is that the notion of "military advantage" is not singularly
helpful. Surely, military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains.40 The
spectrum is necessarily wide, and it extends to the security of the attacking
force. 41 The key problem is that the outlook of the attacking party is unlikely
to match that of the party under attack in evaluating the long-term military
benefits of any action contemplated.42 Moreover, the dominant view is that
assessment of the military advantage can be made in light of "an attack as a
32. Solf, supra note 29, at 326.
33. See Hamilton DeSaussure, Remarks, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
International Law and Policy 511, 513-514 (1987).
34. Forcing such a change is viewed (wrongly) as a legitimate military advantage by Burrus
Carnahan, 'Linebacker IV and Protocol I: The Convergence of Law and Professionalism, 31
American University Law Review 861, 867 (1981-1982).
35. See Henri Meyrowitz, Le Bombardement Strategique d'apres le Protocole Additionnel I aux
Conventions de Geneve, 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT (ZAORV) 1, 41 (1981).
36. See DeSaussure, supra note 33, at 513.
37. See B.A. Wortley, Observations on the Revision of the 1 949 Geneva 'Red Cross' Conventions, 54
British Year Book of International Law 143, 154 (1983).
38. Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, at 272 (1994).
39. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Civilian Objects, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 603, 604 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
40. See James Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to
Be Learned, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129, 132 (2000).
41. See Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 402.
42. See Dieter Fleck, Strategic Bombing and the Definition of Military Objectives, 27 ISRAEL
Yearbook on Human Rights 41, 48 (1997).
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whole," as distinct from "isolated or specific parts of the attack."43 The attack-
ing party may thus argue, e.g., that an air raid of no perceptible military
advantage in itself is justified by having misled the enemy to shift its stra-
tegic gaze to the wrong sector of the front.44 Nonetheless, "an attack as a
whole" is a finite event, not to be confused with the entire war.45
The Definition of Military Objectives by Nature, Location, Purpose and Use
The text of Article 52(2) incorporates helpful definitional guidelines by ad-
verting to the nature, location, purpose and use of military objectives "making
an effective contribution to military action." The requirement of effective
contribution relates to military action in general, and there need be no "direct
connection" with specific combat operations.46 All the same, an American at-
tempt (reflected in the United States' Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations47) to substitute the words "military action" by the idiom
"war-fighting or war-sustaining capability," goes too far.48 The "war-fighting"
limb can pass muster, since it may be looked upon as equivalent to military ac-
tion.49 But the "war-sustaining" portion is too broad. The American position
is that "[e]conomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support
and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability may also be attacked," and the
example offered is that of the destruction of raw cotton within Confederate
territory by Union forces during the Civil War on the ground that the sale of
cotton provided funds for almost all Confederate arms and ammunition. 50 As
will be seen infra, multiple economic objects do constitute military objectives,
inasmuch as they directly support military action. Yet, the raw cotton illustra-
tion (which may be substituted today by the instance of a country relying
43. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 162 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
44. See Solf, supra note 29, at 325.
45. See Francoise Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE
Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law 89, 94 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993).
46. See Solf, supra note 29, at 324.
47. Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 402.
48. See James Busuttil, Naval Weapons Systems and the Contemporary Law of
War 148 (1998).
49. Roberts, supra note 4, at 209.
50. Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on The Law of
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 403.
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almost entirely on the export of coffee beans or bananas) 51 displays the danger
of introducing the slippery-slope concept of "war-sustaining capability." The
connection between military action and exports, required to finance the
war effort, is "too remote."52 Had raw cotton been acknowledged as a valid
military objective, almost every civilian activity might be construed by the
enemy as indirectly sustaining the war effort (especially when hostilities
are protracted). For an object to qualify as a military objective, there must ex-
ist a proximate nexus to military action (or "war-fighting") . No wonder that
the San Remo Manual rejected an attempt to incorporate the wording "war-
sustaining effort."53
As far as "nature, location, purpose or use" are concerned, each of these
terms deserves a closer look.
1 . The Nature of the Objective
"Nature" denotes the intrinsic character of the military objective. To meet
this yardstick, an object (or living creature) must be endowed with some in-
herent attribute which eo ipso makes an effective contribution to military ac-
tion. As such, the object, person, etc., automatically constitutes a legitimate
target for attack in wartime.
Although no list of military objectives by nature has been compiled in a
binding manner, the following non-exhaustive enumeration is believed by the
present writer to reflect current legal thinking:54
(a) Fixed military fortifications, bases, barracks55 and installations, including
training and war-gaming facilities;
(b) Temporary military camps, entrenchments, staging areas, deployment
positions, and embarkation points;
51. See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 41.
52. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 161.
53. Id. at 150.
54. Compare the various lists of legitimate military objectives offered by ANNOTATED
Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
supra note 17, at 402; A.P.V. ROGERS & PAUL MALHERBE, MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
Armed Conflict 72 (1999). See also Leslie Green, The contemporary law of armed
CONFLICT 191 (2d ed. 2000).
55. A question has been raised about the status of deserted military barracks (see Konstantin
Obradovic, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 699, 720 (2000)). But the whole point about military barracks is that they
constitute a military objective per se, irrespective of being deserted. When military units are
stationed there, they qualify as military objectives by themselves (see (c)).
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(c) Military units and individual members of the armed forces, whether
stationed or mobile;
(d) Weapon systems, military equipment and ordnance, armor and artillery,
and military vehicles of all types;
(e) Military aircraft and missiles of all types;
(f) Military airfields and missile launching sites;
(g) Warships (whether surface vessels or submarines) of all types;
(h) Military ports and docks;
(i) Military depots, munitions dumps, warehouses or stockrooms for the
storage of weapons, ordnance, military equipment and supplies (including
raw materials for military use, such as petroleum)
;
(j) Factories (even when privately owned) engaged in the manufacture of
arms, munitions and military supplies;
(k) Laboratories or other facilities for the research and development of new
weapons and military devices;
(1) Military repair facilities;
(m) Power plants (electric, hydroelectric, etc.) serving the military;
(n) Arteries of transportation of strategic importance, principally mainline
railroads and rail marshaling yards, major motorways (like the interstate
highways in the US,56 the Autobahnen in Germany and the autostradas in
Italy), navigable rivers and canals (including the tunnels and bridges of
railways and trunk roads)
;
(o) Ministries of Defense and any national, regional or local operational or
coordination center of command, control and communication relating to
running the war (including computer centers, as well as telephone and
telegraph exchanges, for military use)
;
(p) Intelligence-gathering centers (even when not run by the military
establishment).
56. Appropriately enough, the mammoth US interstate highway network (with a total length of
more than 45,000 miles)—initiated by President Eisenhower—is formally known as the
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. See 26 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 324 (15th ed. 1997).
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2. The Purpose of the Objective
More often than not, the "purpose" of a military objective is determined ei-
ther by its (inherent) nature or by its (de facto) use. But if the word "purpose"
in Article 52(2) is not redundant, it must be distinguished from both nature
and use. The present writer is of the opinion that the purpose of an object—as
a separate ground for classifying it as a military target—is determined after the
crystallization of its original nature, yet prior to actual use. In other words, the
military purpose is assumed not to be stamped on the objective from the outset
(otherwise, the target would be military by nature). Military purpose is de-
duced from an established intention of a belligerent as regards future use. As
pointed out by the official ICRC Commentary: "the criterion ofpurpose is con-
cerned with the intended future use of an object, while that of use is con-
cerned with its present function."57
At times, enemy intentions are crystal clear, and then the branding of an
object (by purpose) as a military target becomes rather easy. A good illustra-
tion might be that of a civilian luxury liner, which a belligerent overtly plans
(already in peacetime) to turn into a troop ship at the moment of general mo-
bilization. Although by nature a civilian object, and not yet in use as a troop
ship, it may be attacked as a military objective at the outbreak of hostilities
(assuming that it is no longer serving as a passenger liner)
.
Unfortunately, most enemy intentions are not so easy to decipher, and
then much depends on the gathering and analysis of intelligence which may
be faulty. In case of doubt, caution is called for. Thus, field intelligence reveal-
ing that the enemy intends to use a particular school as a munitions depot
does not justify an attack against the school as long as the munitions have not
been moved in. 58 The Allied bombing in 1944 of the famous Abbey of Monte
Cassino is a notorious case of a decision founded on flimsy intelligence re-
ports, linked to a firm supposition ("the abbey made such a perfect observa-
tion point that surely no army could have refrained from using it") which
turned out to have been entirely false. 59 This writer cannot accept the conclu-
sion that the Abbey was a military objective only because it appeared to be
important to deny its potential use to an enemy (who in reality refrained from
using it) .60 Purpose is predicated on intentions known to guide the adversary,
and not on those figured out hypothetically in contingency plans based on a
"worst case scenario."
57. Pilloud & Pictet, supra note 23, at 636.
58. See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 36.
59. Id. at 54-55.
60. Id. at 55.
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3. The Use of the Objective
Actual "use" of an objective does not depend necessarily on its original na-
ture or on any (later) intended purpose. A leading example is that of the cele-
brated "Taxis of the Marne" commandeered in September 1914 to transport
French reserves to the frontline, thereby saving Paris from the advancing
German forces. 61 "So long as these privately owned taxicabs were operated for
profit and served their normal purposes, they were not military equipment.
Once they were requisitioned for the transportation of French troops, their
function changed."62 They became military objectives through use.
Article 52(3) of the Protocol prescribes: "In case of doubt whether an ob-
ject which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of wor-
ship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."63
There are three elements here:
(a) Certain objects are normally (by nature) dedicated to civilian purposes
and, as long as they fulfill only their essential function, they must not be
treated as military targets. The examples given are places of worship, civilian
dwellings and schools.
(b) The same objects may nevertheless be used in actuality in a manner
making an effective contribution to military action. When (and as long as)
they are subject to such use, outside their original function, they can be
treated as military objectives. The dominant consideration should be "the cir-
cumstances ruling at the time" (referred to in the text of Article 52(2)).
(c) Article 52(3) adds a caveat that, in case of doubt whether an object
normally dedicated to civilian purposes is actually used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it must "be presumed not to be so used." The
presumption has given rise to controversy at the time of the drafting of this
clause, and an attempt to create an exception with respect to objects located
in the contact zone failed in the ensuing vote. 64 While the results of the vote
may reflect a "[r]efusal to recognize the realities of combat" in some situa-
tions,65 it must be taken into account that the presumption (which is
rebuttable) comes into play only in case of doubt. Often there is no doubt at
all, especially when combatants are exposed to direct fire from a supposedly
61. See George Schwarzenberger, 2 International Law as applied by
International Courts and Tribunals: The Law of Armed Conflict 112 (1968).
62. Id. at 113.
63. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 450.
64. See Solf, supra note 29, at 326-327.
65. See W.Hays Parks, AirWar and the Law ofWar, 32 A\K FORCE LAWREVIEW 1, 137 (1990).
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civilian object.66 If, for instance, the minaret of a mosque is used as a sniper's
nest, the presumption is rebutted and the enemy is entitled to treat it as a
military objective.67 The degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the emer-
gence of the (rebuttable) presumption is by no means clear. But surely that
doubt has to exist in the mind of the attacker, based upon "the circumstances
ruling at the time."
It follows that, by dint of military use (or, more precisely, abuse) , virtually
every civilian object—albeit, innately, deemed worthy of protection by the jus
in hello—can become a military objective.68
4. The Location of the Objective
"Location" of an objective must be factored in, irrespective of the nature,
purpose and use thereof. Logic dictates that, if a civilian-by-nature object (like
a supermarket) is located within a sprawling military base, it cannot be im-
mune from attack. If a merchant vessel is anchored in a military port, it be-
comes a military objective by location.
The real issue with respect to location goes beyond these elementary obser-
vations. The notion underlying the reference to location is that a specific land
area can be regarded per se as a military objective.69 Surely, the incidence of
such locations cannot be too widespread: there must be a distinctive feature
turning a piece of land into a military objective (e.g., a mountain pass, a spe-
cific hill of strategic value, a bridgehead or a spit of land controlling the en-
'
trance of a harbor). 70
5. Bridges
The quadruple subdivision of military objectives by nature, purpose, use
and location is not as neat as it sounds, and certain objectives can be cata-
logued within more than one subset. Bridges may serve as a prime illustration.
Bridges constructed for the engineering needs of major motorways and rail
tracks are surely integrated in the overall network: like the roads and the
tracks that they serve, they constitute military objectives by nature. But even
where bridges connect non-arterial lines of transportation, as long as they are
66. See Solf, supra note 29, at 327.
67. Countless other examples can be postulated. Rogers refers to the case of a cathedral used as
divisional headquarters. ROGERS, supra note 24, at 35.
68. See SASSOLI & BOUVIER, supra note 27, at 161.
69. For the underlying reasons, see ROGERS, supra note 24, at 38-39.
70. See Elmar Rauch, The Protection of the Civilian Population in International Armed Conflicts and
the Use ofLandmines, 24 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262, 273-277 (198 1).
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apt to have a perceptible role in the transport of military reinforcements and
supplies, their destruction is almost self-explanatory as a measure playing
havoc with enemy logistics. It is wrong to assume (as does Michael Bothe in
the context of bridges targeted during the Kosovo air campaign of 1999) that
bridges can be attacked only "where supplies destined for the front must pass
over" them. 71 The destruction of bridges can be effected to disrupt any
movements of troops and military supplies, not necessarily in the direction
of the front.
If not by nature, most bridges may qualify as military objectives by purpose,
use or—above all—location. 72 Every significant waterway or similar geophysi-
cal obstruction to traffic (like a ravine) must be perceived as a possible military
barrier, and there comes a time when the strategy of either belligerent would
dictate that all bridges (even the smallest pedestrian overpass) across the ob-
stacle have to be destroyed or neutralized. Surely, there is nothing wrong in a
military policy striving to effect a fragmentation of enemy land forces through
the destruction of all bridges—however minor in themselves—spanning a
wide river. Thus, in the GulfWar in 1991, destruction of bridges over the Eu-
phrates River impeded the deployment of Iraqi forces and their supplies (sev-
ering also communications cables). 73
It has been asserted that "[b] ridges are not, as such, military objectives," 74
and that a bridge is like a school: the question whether it "represents a military
objective depends entirely on the actual situation." 75 However, the compari-
son between bridges and schools is meretricious. A school is recognized as a
military objective only in the extraordinary circumstances of military use by
the adverse party. A bridge, as a rule, would qualify as a military objective (by
nature, location, purpose or use). It would fail to be a military objective only
under exceptional conditions, when it is neither actually nor potentially of any
military use to the enemy.
71. Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia:
Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
Law 531, 534(2001).
72. For the view that bridges are military objectives by location, see Pilloud & Pictet, supra note
23, at 636.
73. See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 42.
74. Francoise Hampson, Proportionality and Necessity in the Gulf Conflict, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF
the american society of international law 45, 49 (1992).
75. Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War 90 (1987).
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6. Military Objectives Exempt from Attack
The determination that an object constitutes a military objective is not al-
ways conclusive in legitimizing an attack. Some objects are exempted from at-
tack, notwithstanding their distinct character as military objectives. The most
extreme illustration appears in Article 56(1) of the Protocol:
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and
nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack,
even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works
and installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause
the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population. 76
Granted, according to Article 56(2), the special protection is not unquali-
fied: it ceases when the dam, dyke or nuclear electrical generating station
regularly, significantly and directly supports military operations, and there is no
other feasible way to terminate such support. 77 In any event, the entire stipu-
lation of Article 56 is innovative and binding only on contracting Parties.
For their part, the Geneva Conventions prohibit attacks against protected
military persons, i.e., those combatants who become hors de combat, either by
choice (through surrender) or by force of circumstances (being wounded, sick
or shipwrecked); 78 fixed establishments and mobile military medical units of
the Medical Service; 79 hospital ships; 80 medical aircraft; 81 medical personnel
engaged in the treatment of the wounded and sick; 82 and chaplains attached
to the armed forces83 (to name the most important categories). Protection
76. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 45 1.
77. Id.
78. Geneva Convention (I) , art. 12, supra note 6, at 379; Geneva Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition ofWounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 221, 226-7;
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id. art.
13, at 243, 250.
79. Geneva Convention (I), supra note 6, art. 19, at 205.
80. Geneva Convention (II), supra note 78, art. 22, at 230.
81. Geneva Convention (I), supra note 6, art. 36, at 210-1.
82. Id., art. 24, at 207.
83. Id.
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from attack is also granted by customary international law to other categories,
like cartel ships. 84
Additionally, an attack against a military objective—which is not protected
as such—may be illicit owing to the principle of proportionality, whereby the
"collateral damage" or injury to civilians (or civilian objects) must not be ex-
cessive. This issue is dealt with separately by the present writer.
General Problems Relating to the Scope of Military Objectives
The definition of military objectives, as discussed supra, raises a number of
question marks:
1 . Retreating troops
It is sometimes contended that when an army has been routed, and its sol-
diers are retreating in disarray—as epitomized by the Iraqi land forces during
the GulfWar—they should not be further attacked.85 But this is a serious mis-
conception. The only way for members of the armed forces to immunize them-
selves from further attack is to surrender, thereby becoming hors de combat. 86
Otherwise, as the Gulf War amply demonstrates, the fleeing soldiers of today
are likely to regroup tomorrow as viable military units.
2. Targeting Individuals
Is it permissible to target specific individuals who are members of the
armed forces? As a rule, when a person takes up arms or merely dons a uni-
form as a member of the armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to en-
emy attack (even if he does not participate in actual hostilities and does not
pose an immediate threat to the enemy) . The jus in bello prohibits treacherous
assassination, yet nothing prevents singling out as a target an individual en-
emy combatant (provided that the attack is carried out by combatants). 87 The
prohibition of assassination does not cover "attacks, by regular armed military
forces, on specific individuals who are themselves legitimate military tar-
gets."88 The United States was, consequently, well within its rights during
84. See Louise Doswald-Beck, Vessels, Aircraft and Persons Entitled to Protection during Armed
Conflicts at Sea, 65 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 1, 239 (1994).
85. See Eric David, Principes de Droit des Conflits Arm£s 246 (2d ed. 1999).
86. See Peter Barber, Scuds, Shelters and Retreating Soldiers: The Laws of Aerial Bombardment in the
Gulf War, 31 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW 662, 690 (1993).
87. See ROGERS & MALHERBE, supra note 54, at 62.
88. Burrus Camahan, Correspondent's Report, 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
Humanitarian Law 423, 424 (1999).
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^Vo^ld War II when it specifically targeted the Commander-in-Chief of the
Japanese Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, whose plane was ambushed (subsequent
to the successful breaking of the Japanese communication codes) and shot
down over Bougainville in 1943.89 The ambush of the car of SS General
Heydrich in 1942 is different, but only because he was killed by members of
the Free Czechoslovak army (parachuted from London) who were not wear-
ing uniforms and were therefore not lawful combatants: otherwise,
Heydrich—as a military officer—was a legitimate target, just like
Yamamoto.90
3. Police
Can police officers and other law enforcement agents be subsumed under
the heading of members of armed forces (who are legitimately subject to at-
tack) ? The answer to the question depends on whether the policemen have
been officially incorporated into the armed forces91 or (despite the absence of
official incorporation) have taken part in hostilities.92 If integrated into the
armed forces, policemen—like all combatants—"may be attacked at any time
simply because they have that particular status."93
4. Industrial plants
It is exceedingly difficult to draw a dividing line between military and civil-
ian industries. Sometimes, even the facts are hard to establish. Who is to say
whether a textile factory is producing military uniforms or civilian clothing?
In wartime, civilian consumption gives way as a matter of course to military
priorities. Can one seriously asseverate that certain steel works ought not to
be classified as military objectives only because their output has heretofore
been channeled to the civilian market? The long-time civilian-oriented char-
acter of an industrial center in peacetime provides no guarantee that produc-
tion would not transition in the course of hostilities into war materials. A line
of production, even when introduced for plainly civilian ends (e.g., tractors
for agricultural use), can often be swiftly adjusted to military use (in this
89. See Joseph Kelly, Assassination in War Time, 30 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 101, 102-103
(1965).
90. See Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER LAW REVIEW
615, 628 (1991-1992).
91. On such incorporation, cf. Article 43(3) of Protocol I, supra note 2, at 444.
92. See Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1 999: The Air Campaign, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 147, 150-151 (2000).
93. Id. at 151.
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instance, the assembly of tracked vehicles, such as tanks) . The children's toys
factory of today may become tomorrow's leading manufacturer of electronic
precision-munitions. Besides, in the present era of high technology, the con-
struction of any computer hardware architecture or software program can
turn into a central pillar of the war effort.94 "The problem is that the [com-
puter] technology capable of performing . . . [military] functions differs little,
if at all, from that used in the civilian community."95 If that is not enough,
subcontracting in the manufacture of components of modern weapon systems
causes a dispersion in the fabrication of war materials which is almost impossi-
ble to trail.96 All in all, it is easy to object to the automatic removal of any in-
dustrial plant from the list of military objectives.
5. Oil, coal and other minerals
What is the status of oil fields and rigs, refineries, coal mines, and other
mineral extraction plants, which are not ostensibly tied to military produc-
tion? In the final analysis, despite their civilian bearings, all of them can be
deemed to constitute the infrastructure of the military industry. It can well be
argued that "oil installations of every kind are in fact legitimate military objec-
tives open to destruction by any belligerent."97 As for petrol filling stations,
only those functioning in civilian residential areas—away from major motor-
ways—may be exempted from attack.
6. Electric grids
Can power plants in civilian metropolitan areas be set apart from military
power plants? During the Gulf War, the Coalition air campaign in 1991
treated as a military target the integrated Iraqi national grid generating and
distributing electricity (used both by the armed forces and civilians).98 Unde-
niably, an integrated power grid makes an effective contribution to modern
military action: 99 any shortfall in military requirements can be compensated at
94. As regards the growing military reliance on computers, see Michael Schmitt, Computer
Network Attacks and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885, 887 (1998-1999).
95. Michael Schmitt, Future War and the Principle of Discrimination, 28 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON
Human Rights 51, 68 (1998).
96. See Parks, supra note 65, at 140.
97. Leslie Green, The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare, 29 CANADIAN
Yearbook of International Law 222, 233 (1991).
98. See Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of
1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91, supra note 45, at 63, 73.
99. Id. at 74.
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the expense of civilian needs. Indeed, the Coalition attacks against Iraqi power
generating plants and transformer stations had a great impact on the Iraqi air
defense structure (supported by computers), unconventional weapons research
and development facilities, and telecommunications systems. 100 The large-
scale attacks also had unintended—albeit inevitable—non-military conse-
quences, such as the disruption of water supply (due to loss of electric pumps)
and the inability to segregate the electricity that powers a hospital from "other"
electricity in the same lines. 101 But these unfortunate results did not detract
from the standing of the Iraqi electric grid system as a military objective. 102
7. Civilian airports and maritime ports
It would be imprudent to disregard the possibility that civilian airports and
maritime ports can become hubs of military operations, side by side with con-
tinued civilian activities (which can conceivably be a fig leaf) . No wonder that
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention refers to "an aerodrome" or "a
port"—in a generic fashion—as a military objective. 103
<
8. Trains, trucks and barges
If strategic arteries of transportation come within the bounds of military
objectives (as stated), should the definition not incorporate all the railroad
rolling stock, the truck fleets which are the backbone of motorway traffic,
and the barges plying the rivers and canals? The consequences for civilian
traffic are palpable. Unlike passenger liners or airliners (mentioned infra)
,
passenger trains do not have any visible hallmarks setting them apart from
troop-carrying trains. If an inter-urban train (as distinct from a city tram) is
sighted from the air, there being no telling signs of the civilian identity of the
train riders, this writer believes that the train would be a legitimate military
objective. In the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, a passenger train (not targeted
as such) was struck while crossing a railway bridge. 104 In analyzing the case,
100. See Daniel Kuehl, Airpower vs. Electricity: Electric Power as a Target for Strategic Air
Operations, 18 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 237, 251-252 (1995).
101. Id. at 254.
102. See Christopher Greenwood, Current Issues in the Law of Armed Conflict: Weapons, Targets
and International Criminal Liability, 1 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 461 (1997).
103. Hague Cultural Property Convention, art. 8(1) (a), supra note 8, at 376.
104. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, HU 58-62, 39 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1273-1275 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter
Report to the Prosecutor]
.
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Natalino Ronzitti seems to take the position that—although the bridge was
no doubt a legitimate military objective—a passenger train should not be at-
tacked. 105 However, in the opinion of this writer it would all depend on
whether or not the passengers were identified by the aviators as civilians.
9. Civilian television and radio stations
In wartime, control of civilian broadcasting stations can at any time be as-
sumed by the military apparatus, which may wish to use it in communications
(e.g., summoning reservists to service), in pursuit of psychological warfare,
and for other purposes. In April 1999, NATO intentionally bombed the
(State-owned) Serbian Television and Radio Station in Belgrade. 106 Was the
bombing legally warranted? The Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
averred that if the attack was carried out because the station played a role in
the Serbian propaganda machinery, its legality might well be questioned. 107 In
the Committee's opinion, the attack could be justified only if the TV and ra-
dio transmitters were integrated into the military command and control com-
munications network. 108 However, it is noteworthy that the Hague Cultural
Property Convention of 1954 refers to any "broadcasting station" as a military
objective (in the same breath with an aerodrome and a port). 109 The phrase
clearly covers civilian TV and radio stations. 110
10. Government offices
It is occasionally questioned "whether government buildings are excluded
under any clear rule of law from enemy attack." 111 But this sweeping statement
is wrong. Government offices can be considered a legitimate target for attack
only when used in pursuance or support of military functions. The premises of
the Ministry of Defense have already been mentioned. Any subordinate or in-
dependent Department of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Munitions and so forth
105. Natalino Ronzitti, Is the Non Liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Acceptable?, 82
International Review of the Red Cross 1017, 1025 (2000).
106. See Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 75.
107. Id., 11 76.
108. Id., H 75.
109. Hague Cultural Property Convention, art. 8(1) (a), supra note 8, at 376.
1 10. For reference to a radio broadcasting station in the Vatican City, see the UNESCO
Commentary on the Hague Cultural Property Convention: THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary 106 Oiri Toman ed., 1996).
ill. Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 294 (2d ed. 2000).
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is embraced. As for the edifice of the Head of State, circumstances vary from
one country to another. Whereas the White House in Washington would
constitute a legitimate military target (since the American President is the
Commander-in-Chief of ail US armed forces), Buckingham Palace in London
would not (inasmuch as the Queen has no similar role).
11. Political leadership
Obviously, members of the political leadership of the enemy country can be
attacked (even individually) if they serve in the armed forces. 112 Additionally,
when civilian leaders are present in any military installations or government of-
fices constituting military objectives—or when they are visiting either the front
line or munitions factories in the rear areas, when they board military aircraft
or are driven by military command cars, etc.—they expose themselves to dan-
ger. However, notwithstanding the personal risk run when present in a military
objective, a civilian member of the political leadership does not become a mili-
tary objective by himself and cannot be targeted away from such objective.
Defended and Undefended Localities in Land Warfare
The real test in land warfare is whether a given place, inhabited by civilians,
is actually defended by military personnel. Should that be the case, the civil
object becomes—owing to its use—a military objective. The criterion of the
defense of an otherwise civilian place is highlighted in Article 25 of the Hague
Regulations: "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, vil-
lages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." 113
Similar language appears in Article 3 (c) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 114 Article 8(2)(b)(v) of
the Rome Statute brands as a war crime: "Attacking or bombarding, by what-
ever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and
1 12. See ROGERS & MALHERBE, supra note 54, at 62.
1 13. Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to 1899
Hague Convention (II) and 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 63, 83-84 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d
ed. 1988). The words "by whatever means" were added to the text in 1907.
114. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1159, 1193
(1993).
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which are not military objectives." 115 The last words are plainly an addition to
the original Hague formula. They sharpen the issue by denoting that some un-
defended civilian habitations may still constitute military objectives.
Article 59(1) of Protocol I sets forth: "It is prohibited for the Parties to the
conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities." 116
Once more it is the Hague criterion of defending a place that counts: if a
place is defended, it may be attacked. But the expression "localities," em-
ployed by the Protocol, is wider than single buildings, albeit narrower than a
whole city or town. This is important to bear in mind, for land warfare cannot
always be analyzed on a building-by-building basis. Not infrequently,
large-scale combat is conducted in an extensive built-up area, particularly a
large city. It goes without saying that "any building sheltering combatants be-
comes a military objective." 117 In extreme cases, when fierce fighting is con-
ducted from house to house (a la Stalingrad), a whole city block—or even
section—may be regarded as a single military objective: partly by (actual) use
and partly by purpose (namely, potential use). The fact that, in the meantime,
a given building within that block or section is not yet occupied by any mili-
tary unit is immaterial. The reasonable expectation is that, as soon as the tide
of battle gets nearer, it would be converted into a military stronghold. Hence,
it may be bombarded even prior to that eventuality. Yet, the old Hague
sweeping reference to a town in toto (defended or undefended) must be re-
garded as obsolete. 118
A belligerent desirous of not defending a city—with a view to saving it from
harm's way—can convey that message effectively to the enemy. Article 59(2)
of the Protocol prescribes:
The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a
non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces
are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party. Such a locality
shall fulfill the following conditions:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment,
must have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
115. Rome Statute, supra note 10, at 676.
1 16. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 454-
1 17. Pilloud & Pictet, supra note 23, at 699, 701,
1 18. See Oeter, supra note 43, at 171.
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(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the
population; and
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken. 119
There seem to be some complementary implicit conditions not enumerated in
the text: roads and railroads crossing the locality must not be used for military
purposes, and factories situated there must not manufacture products of mili-
tary significance. 120 Nevertheless, the presence in the non-defended locality of
police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining law and order is per-
missible under Article 59 (3). 121
Apart from the explicit and implicit cumulative conditions, it is sine qua
non that (i) the declared non-defended locality would be in or near the con-
tact zone, 122 and that (ii) it would be open for occupation. 123 A declared non-
defended locality cannot be situated in the hinterland—far away from the con-
tact zone—for the simple reason that it is not yet within "the effective grasp of
the attacker's land forces." 124 Au fond, a non-defended locality cannot be
established in anticipation of future events, but only "in the 'heat of the mo-
ment', i.e., when the fighting comes close." 125
Article 59(4) goes on to state that the declaration mentioned in para-
graph (2)—defining as precisely as possible the limits of the non-defended
locality—is to be addressed to the adverse party, which must treat the locality
as non-defended unless the prerequisite conditions are not in fact fulfilled. 126
The outcome is that, subject to the observation of all the conditions (specified
and unspecified in the text), the unilateral declaration of a locality as non-
defended binds the adverse party by virtue of the Protocol. 127
1 19. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 454.
120. See Pilloud & Pictet, supra note 23, at 702.
121. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 454.
122. A contact zone means the area where the most forward elements of the armed forces of
both sides are in contact with each other. See Pilloud &. Pictet, supra note 23, at 701 n.2.
123. Indeed, prior to Protocol I, the expression commonly used was not a "non-defended
locality" but an "open city." For the transition in terminology, see J. Starke, The Concept ofOpen
Cities in International Humanitarian Law, 56 AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL 593-597 (1982).
124. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the
DYNAMICS OF DISPUTE—ANDWAR—LAW 622 (2d ed. 1959). The comment was made prior to
the drafting of Protocol I, but it is still valid.
125. Claude Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Localities and Zones under Special Protection, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 23, at 697. See also M. Torrelli, Les Zones de
Security 99 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 787, 795 (1995).
126. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 454.
127. Solf, Article 59, supra note 29, at 379, 383-384.
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Article 59(5) adds that the two parties to the conflict may agree on the es-
tablishment of non-defended localities, even when the conditions are not
met. 128 But manifestly, in that case, it is the bilateral agreement (as distinct
from the unilateral declaration) that is decisive. Article 15 of Geneva Con-
vention (IV) 129 provides that the belligerents may establish in the combat zone
neutralized areas intended to serve as a shelter for (combatant or noncomba-
tant) sick and wounded, as well as for civilians who perform no work of a mili-
tary character, but the creation of such areas and their demarcation is
contingent on the agreement of the parties.
Special Problems Relating to Sea Warfare
1. Areas of Naval Warfare
Hostile actions by naval forces may be conducted in or over the internal
waters, the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone
and (where applicable) the archipelagic waters of the belligerent States; the
high seas; and (subject to certain conditions) even the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone of neutral States. 130 Military objectives at sea in-
clude not only vessels but also fixed installations (especially weapon facilities
and detection or communication devices), which can be emplaced on—or
beneath—the seabed, anywhere within the areas of naval warfare. 131 Cables
and pipelines laid on the seabed and serving a belligerent may also constitute
legitimate military objectives. 132
2. Warships
Every warship is a military objective. The locution "warships" covers all
military floating platforms, including submarines, light craft (e.g., torpedo
boats), and even unarmed auxiliary naval vessels (except hospital ships). A
warship can be attacked on sight and sunk (within the areas of naval warfare).
"These attacks may be exercised without warning and without regard to the
safety of the enemy crew." 133
128. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 454.
129. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 6, at 307.
130. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 80.
131. See Tullio Treves, Military Installations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed, 74 AMERICAN
Journal of International Law 808, 809, 819 ff (1980).
132. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1 1 1.
133. William Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval Warfare, 29 CANADIAN
Yearbook of International Law 238, 269 (1991).
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3. Enemy Merchant Vessels
Enemy merchant vessels are generally deemed to be civilian objects, and
are therefore exempt from attack (even though they are subject to capture as
prize). 134 Still, the San Remo Manual lists no less than seven exceptions to the
rule. 135 In these seven instances, merchant vessels may be attacked and sunk
as military objectives:
(a) When an enemy merchant vessel is engaged directly in belligerent acts
(e.g., laying mines or minesweeping).
(b) When an enemy merchant vessel acts as an auxiliary to the enemy armed
forces (e.g., carrying troops or replenishing warships).
(c) When an enemy merchant vessel engages in reconnaissance or otherwise
assists in intelligence gathering for the enemy armed forces.
(d) When an enemy merchant vessel refuses an order to stop or actively resists
capture.
(e) When an enemy merchant vessel is armed to an extent that it can inflict
damage on a warship (especially a submarine)
.
(0 When an enemy merchant vessel travels under a convoy escorted by
warships, thereby benefiting from the (more powerful) armament of the
latter.
(g) When an enemy merchant vessel makes an effective contribution to
military action (e.g., by carrying military materials). 136
Some vessels—above all, passenger liners exclusively engaged in carrying
civilian passengers—are generally exempted from attack. 137 Even if the pas-
senger liner is carrying a military cargo in breach of the requirement of
134. See Natalino Ronzitti, he Droit Humanitaire Applicable aux Conflits Armes en Mer, 242
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 69-71 (1993).
135. San Remo Manual, supra note 15, at 146-151.
136. The war materials under this rubric cannot be exports. Except in the context of refusing an
order to stop while blockade running, a private tanker would not constitute a military objective
when carrying oil exported from a belligerent oil-producing State, even though the revenue
derived from the export may prove essential to sustaining the war effort. See Michael Bothe,
Neutrality in Naval Warfare: What Is Left of Traditional International Law?, in HUMANITARIAN
Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven
387, 401 (Astrid Delissen &. Gerard Tanja eds., 1991). C/. the comments supra about raw cotton
in the American Civil War.
137. On passenger liners, see SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 132.
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exclusive civilian engagement, an attack against it may be unlawful because it
would be clearly disproportionate to the military advantage expected. 138
4. Neutral Merchant Vessels
Neutral merchant vessels are generally immune from attack, although sub-
ject to visit and search by belligerent warships (and military aircraft) and pos-
sible capture for adjudication as prize in appropriate circumstances. 139
Nevertheless, according to the San Remo Manual, neutral merchant vessels
are liable to attack—as if they were enemy military objectives—in the six fol-
lowing cases: 140
(a) When a neutral merchant vessel is engaged in belligerent acts on behalf of
the enemy.
(b) When a neutral merchant vessel acts as an auxiliary to the enemy armed
forces.
(c) When a neutral merchant vessel assists the enemy's intelligence system.
(d) When a neutral merchant vessel is suspected of breaching a blockade or of
carrying contraband and clearly refuses an order to stop, or resists visit,
search or capture.
(e) When a neutral merchant vessel travels under a convoy escorted by enemy
warships.
(f) When a neutral merchant vessel makes an effective contribution to the
enemy's military action (e.g., by carrying military materials). 141
Thus, "[t]he mere fact that a neutral merchant vessel is armed provides no
grounds for attacking it." 142 As for traveling under convoy, the entitlement to
attack a neutral merchant vessel exists only when the convoy is escorted by
enemy warships. Neutral merchant vessels traveling under convoy escorted by
neutral warships, in transit to neutral ports, cannot be attacked (and are not
subject to visit and search). 143 The neutral escort can also belong to a State
other than the State of the flag. 144 During the Iran-Iraq War, the practice de-
veloped of reflagging the merchant vessels of one neutral State (like Kuwait)
138. See id.
139. See id. at 154, 212-213.
140. Id. at 154-161.
141. See supra note 136.
142. San Remo Manual, supra note 15, at 161.
143. see george politakis, modern aspects of the laws of naval warfare and
Maritime Neutrality 560-561 (1998).
144. See id. at 571-575.
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escorted by warships of another (like the United States). 145 But reflagging (in
the absence of a "genuine link" between the merchant vessels and their new
flag State 146) is not strictly necessary. Suffice it for the two neutral States to
conclude an agreement enabling the flag State of the escorting warships to
verify and warrant that the merchant vessel (flying a different neutral flag) is
not carrying contraband and is not otherwise engaged in activities inconsis-
tent with its neutral status. 147
Of course, neutral passenger liners would benefit from special protection. 148
5. Destruction of Enemy Merchant Vessels after Capture
When enemy merchant vessels are protected from attack that does not
mean that they cannot be destroyed. The rule is that warships (and military
aircraft) have a right to capture enemy merchant vessels, with a view to taking
them into port for adjudication and condemnation as prize. 149 As an excep-
tional measure, when circumstances preclude taking it into port, the captured
merchant vessel may be destroyed. 150 The legality of the destruction of the
captured ship is to be adjudicated by the prize court. 151
There is a vital distinction between the destruction of an enemy merchant
vessel subsequent to capture and an attack launched against it on the ground
that it constitutes a military objective. An enemy merchant vessel liable to at-
tack as a military objective can be sunk at sight with all those on board. Con-
versely, the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel in the exceptional
circumstances following capture can only take place subject to the dual condi-
tion that (i) the safety of passengers and crew is assured; (ii) the documents
and papers relating to the prize proceedings are safeguarded. 152 A special
145. See id. at 560-571.
146. See Myron Nordquist & Margaret Wachenfeld, Legal Aspects of Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers
and Laying of Mines in the Persian Gulf, 31 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138,
140-151 (1988).
147. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 197-199.
148. See George Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1079, 1164 (2000).
149. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 205, 208.
150. See id. at 209.
151. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare:
Part I, The Traditional Law, 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 309
(1991).
152. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 209.
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Proces-Verbal of 1936 applies this general rule to submarine warfare. 153 The
Proces-Verbal specifies that the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of
safety for the passengers and crew unless that safety is assured by the existing
sea and weather conditions, the proximity of land, or the presence of another
vessel in a position to take them on board. 154 The San Remo Manual follows
the Proces-Verbal, adding an important caveat: the vessel subject to destruc-
tion must not be a passenger liner. 155
6. Exclusion Zones
The San Remo Manual rejects the notion that a belligerent may absolve it-
self of its duties under international humanitarian law by establishing mari-
time "exclusion zones," which might enable it to attack enemy merchant
vessels and even neutral ships entering the zones. 156 The practice of establish-
ing exclusion zones evolved during World Wars I and II, and was resorted
to—albeit with considerable conceptual differences—in the Iran-Iraq War
and in the Falkland Islands War. 157 It is clear from the 1946 Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that the sinking of neutral mer-
chant vessels without warning when entering unilaterally proclaimed exclu-
sion zones, is unlawful. 158 This holding is not germane, however, to enemy
merchant vessels in such zones. 159
Most commentators agree that, given the on-going practice, the legality of
exclusion zones should be acknowledged in some manner. 160 The San Remo
Manual itself concedes that belligerents may establish exclusion zones as ex-
ceptional measures, subject to the condition that no new rights be ac-
quired—and no existing duties be absolved—through such establishment. 161
153. Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules ofSubmarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of
London of 22 April 1930, 1936, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 1 13, at 883, 884.
154. Id.
155. San Remo Manual, supra note 15, at 210.
156. Id. at 181.
157. See William Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law ofNaval Warfare, 24 CANADIAN
Yearbook of International Law 91-126 (1986).
158. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentence, 41 AMERICAN
Journal of International Law 172, 304 (1947).
159. See Edwin Nwogugu, 1936 London Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare
Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty ofLondon of22 April 1 930, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A
Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries 349, 358-359
(Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988).
160. See POLITAKIS, supra note 143, at 145.
161. San Remo Manual, supra note 15, at 181-182.
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The condition is somewhat softened when the Manual adds that, should a bel-
ligerent create an exclusion zone, "it might be more likely to presume that
ships or aircraft in the area without permission were there for hostile pur-
poses." 162 This proviso "allows a 'grey area,'" 163 although incontestably exclu-
sion zones must not become "free-fire zones," and specified sea lanes ensuring
safe passage to hospital ships, neutral shipping, etc., must be made available. 164
Evidently, the specifics of a new law regarding exclusion zones have not yet
crystallized. 165 Until the new law emerges in detail, the lex lata remains valid,
so that "an otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by
crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent." 166
The reverse side of the coin is that enemy warships—being military objec-
tives subject to attack at sight—do not gain any protection by staying away
from an exclusion zone. Consequently, there was no legal fault in the sinking
by the British of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano outside a pro-
claimed exclusion zone (in the course of the Falkland Islands War of 1982):
an enemy warship "has no right to consider itselfimmune" from attack beyond
the range of an exclusion zone. 167
7. Bombardment of Coastal Areas
A special problem arises with respect to the bombardment from the sea of
enemy coastal areas. The matter is governed by Hague Convention (IX) of
1907, which sets forth in Article 1: "The bombardment by naval forces of un-
defended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden." 168 Article
2, for its part, clarifies that military works, military or naval establishments,
depots of arms or war materials, workshops or plants which can be utilized for
the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and warships in the harbor, are excluded
162. Id. at 181.
163. Fausto Pocar, Missile Warfare and Exclusion Zones in Naval Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
on Human Rights 215, 223 (1997).
164. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law ofArmed Conflicts at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, supra note 43, at 405, 468.
165. See L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime War Zones & Exclusion Zones, in THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS 156, 193-194 (Horace B. Robertson ed., 1991) (Vol. 64, US Naval War College
International Law Studies).
166. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 395-396.
167. See Howard Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War, in THE FALKLANDS WAR:
Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law 64, 66 (Alberto Coll &
Anthony Arend eds., 1985).
168. Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18, 1907, Documents on the Laws of War, supra note 2, at 1 1 1, 1 13.
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from this prohibition. 169 Article 3—which is "a throwback to a bygone era of
naval warfare" 170—permits the bombardment of ports, towns, etc., if the local
authorities (having been summoned to do so) fail to furnish supplies to the
naval force before them. 171
Article 1 of Hague Convention (IX) applies to coastal bombardment a land
warfare rule, laid down in Article 25 of Hague Convention (IV). As noted,
the sweeping reference in the Hague Conventions to entire towns as either
defended or undefended (and accordingly subject to, or exempted from, at-
tack) is obsolete, and the term "localities"—employed by Protocol I—is
more precise. Additionally, coastal bombardments are in general different
from land warfare. Whereas on land a bombardment usually serves as a pre-
lude to assault on the target with a view to its occupation, naval bombard-
ment is more frequently intended to inflict sheer destruction on the enemy
rear (only exceptionally is the intention to land troops). 172 If there is room for
some elasticity in treating whole sections of a city as a single military objec-
tive—when house-to-house combat is raging—no similar impetus affects
coastal bombardment. The grafting of a land warfare rule onto coastal bom-
bardment is therefore inappropriate. 173
A specific issue in the context of coastal bombardment is that of light-
houses. Can they be treated as military objectives? On the one hand, they de-
serve protection as installations designed to ensure the safety of navigation in
general. 174 On the other hand, the French Court of Cassation held in 1948
that a lighthouse is a military objective, since it can be used for the needs of a
hostile fleet. 175 The present practice of States is certainly not conclusive.
169. Id.
1 70. Horace Robertson, 1 907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in
Time of War, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 159, at 149, 166.
171. Hague Convention (IX), supra note 168, at 113.
172. See ROBERT TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 143 (1955) (Vol. 50,
US Naval War College International Law Studies).
173. See Robertson, supra note 170, at 163-164.
174. See Matthias Hartwig, Lighthouses and Lightships, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997).
175. In re Gross-Brauckmann (France, Court of Cassation [Criminal Division], 1948), 1948
Annual Digest and Reports of public International Law Cases 687, 688.
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Special Problems Relating to Air Warfare
1. Military Aircraft
Enemy military aircraft—and any other military aerial platforms, including
gliders, drones, blimps, dirigibles, etc.—are legitimate targets for attack. In
fact, air combat is intrinsically different from land or sea combat, considering
that (i) it is most difficult for a military aircraft in flight to convey a wish to
surrender (i.e., there is no effective counterpart in the air to the land or sea
method of hoisting a white flag, striking colors or—in the case of subma-
rines—surfacing) ; and (ii) it is generally permissible to continue to fire upon a
military aircraft even after it has become clearly disabled. 176 (Although, under
Article 42 of Protocol I, persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress—in
contradistinction to airborne troops—must not be made the object of attack
during their descent, and upon reaching hostile ground must be given an op-
portunity to surrender. 177 )
2. Civilian Aircraft
Enemy civilian aircraft per se do not constitute military objectives. Still,
civilian aircraft are subject to rather stringent strictures under the non-
binding Hague Rules of Air Warfare, whereby enemy civilian aircraft in flight
are liable to be fired upon—as if they were military objectives—in the follow-
ing circumstances:
(a) When flying within the jurisdiction of their own State, should enemy
military aircraft approach and they do not make the nearest available
landing. 178
(b) When flying (i) within the jurisdiction of the enemy; or (ii) in the
immediate vicinity thereof and outside the jurisdiction of their own State;
or (iii) in the immediate vicinity of the military operations of the enemy by.
land or sea (the exceptional right of prompt landing is inapplicable). 179
Even neutral civilian aircraft are exposed to the risk of being fired upon if
they are flying within the jurisdiction of a belligerent, are warned of the ap-
proach of military aircraft of the opposing side, and do not land
176. See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 407-408.
177. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 444.
178. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 5, art. 33, at 147.
179. Id., art. 34.
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immediately. 180 Thus, the only advantage that neutral civilian aircraft have
over belligerent civilian aircraft within enemy airspace, is that the neutral ci-
vilian aircraft must be warned first (belligerent civilian aircraft in that situa-
tion must establish at their own peril whether the enemy military aircraft are
approaching)
.
These provisions have been criticized as impractical, addressing an improb-
able contingency (of civilian aircraft venturing into the enemy's jurisdiction),
and creating new and difficult categories (what is the vicinity of the enemy's
jurisdiction?). 181 Although the Hague Rules have generally had a substantial
influence on the evolution of customary international law 182—and their im-
pact on the terminology adopted by the framers of Protocol I has been
noted—it is impossible to forget that they were enunciated in 1923, at the
dawn of civil aviation and prior to the exponential growth of passenger traffic
by air. The normal modern procedure of declaring air exclusion zones in war-
time is supposed to preclude any type of undesirable overflight in sensitive
areas.
183 But even within a "no-fly" zone, it is arguable that attack against
civilian aircraft in flight should follow a due warning. 184 Outside "no-fly"
zones, the contemporary jus in hello (as corroborated by military manuals) for-
bids attacks against civilian aircraft in flight unless they are utilized for military
purposes or refuse to respond to interception signals; and civilian airliners (en-
gaged in passenger traffic) are singled out for special protection. 185 Still, as
demonstrated by the lamentable 1988 incident of the US cruiser VSS
Vincennes shooting down an Iranian passenger aircraft (with 290 civilians on
board) , the speed of modern electronics often creates insurmountable prob-
lems of erroneous identification. 186
The status of civilian aircraft is different when they are not in flight (nor in
the process of taking off or landing with passengers), but parked on the
180. Id., art. 35, at 148.
181. See J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 402 (3d ed. 1947).
182. See Richard Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of the
Hague), in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 93, 115 (1988).
183. See F.J.S. Gomez, The Law ofAir Warfare, 38 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
347, 356 (1998).
184. See Torsten Stein, No-Fly-Zones, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 193, 196
(1997).
185. See Horace Robertson, The Status of Civil Aircraft in Armed Conflict, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
on Human Rights 113, 125-126 (1997).
186. On this incident, see Jose Reilly & R.A. Moreno, Commentary, in THE MILITARY
Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare, supra
note 21, at 111, 114-115.
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ground. It must be recalled that the airport in which they are parked is liable
to be deemed a military objective, so the civilian aircraft may be at risk owing
to its mere presence there. 187 Moreover, irrespective of where they are situ-
ated, civilian aircraft are often viewed as constituting "an important part of
the infrastructure supporting an enemy's war-fighting capability," since they
can be used later for the transport of troops or military supplies. 188
3. Strategic and "Target Area" Bombing
The most crucial issue of air warfare is that of strategic bombing, to wit,
bombing of targets in the interior, beyond the front line (the contact zone)
.
Conditions of air warfare have always defied the logic of the distinction be-
tween defended and undefended sites, enshrined in the traditional law of Ar-
ticle 25 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, although the words "by whatever
means" were inserted into the Article with the deliberate intention of cover-
ing "attack from balloons." 189 After all, there is no real meaning to lack of de-
fenses in situ as long as the front line remains a great distance away. First, a
rear zone is actually defended (however remotely) by the land forces facing
the enemy on the front line. Secondly, the fact that a place in the interior is
undefended by land forces while the front line is far-off is no indication of fu-
ture events: it may still be converted into an impregnable citadel once the
front line gets nearer. Thirdly, and most significantly for air warfare, the em-
placement of anti-aircraft guns and fighter squadrons en route from the front
line to the rear zone may serve as a more effective screen against intruding
bombers than any defense mechanism provided locally. 190
For these and other reasons, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare introduced
the concept of military objectives, endorsed and further elaborated—with a
new definition—by Protocol I. However, strategic bombing triggers the com-
plementary question whether it is permissible to treat a cluster of military ob-
jectives in relative spatial proximity to each other as a single "target area."
The issue arises occasionally in some settings of long-range artillery bombard-
ment. But it is particularly apposite to air warfare, in which target identifica-
tion may be detrimentally affected by poor visibility (especially as a result of
187. Cf. Leslie Green, Aerial Considerations in the Law ofArmed Conflict, 5 ANNALS OF AIR AND
Space Law 89, 109(1980).
188. Robertson, supra note 185, at 127.
189. Thomas Holland, The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten) 46
(1908).
190. See R.Y. Jennings, Open Towns, 22 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 258,
261 (1945).
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inclement weather), effective air defense systems, failure of electronic devices
(sometimes because of enemy jamming), sophisticated camouflage, etc. Thus,
when the target is screened by determined air defense, the attacking force may
be compelled to conduct a raid from the highest possible altitudes, compro-
mising precision bombing (especially when "smart bombs" are unavailable). 191
The practice which evolved during World War II was that of "saturation
bombings," aimed at large "target areas" in which there were heavy concentra-
tions of military objectives (as well as civilian objects). 192 Such air attacks were
designed to blanket or envelop the entire area where military objectives
abounded, rather than search for a point target. 193 The operating assumption
was that, ifone military objective would be missed, others stood a good chance
of being hit. This practice (entailing, as it did, immense civilian casualties by
way of "collateral damage") was harshly criticized after the war. 194
The World War II experience may create the impression that "target area"
bombing is relevant mostly to sizeable tracts of land—like the Ruhr Valley in
Germany—where the preponderant presence of first-class military objectives
stamps an indelible mark on their surroundings, thereby creating "an indivisi-
ble whole." 195 But the dilemma whether or not to lump together as a single tar-
get several military objectives may be prompted even by run-of-the-mill
objects when they are located at a relatively small distance from each other.
The dilemma is addressed by Article 5 1 (5) (a) of Protocol I, where it is prohib-
ited to conduct "an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects." 196
While placing a reasonable limitation on the concept of "target area"
bombing, Article 51 (5) (a) does not completely ban it. "Target area" bombing
is still legitimate when the military objectives are not clearly separated and
191. It must be appreciated that "smart bombs" are not a panacea: much can go wrong even
when they are available. See A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INTERNATIONAL
Review of the Red Cross 165, 170-172 (2000).
192. See STONE, supra note 124, at 626-627.
193. See E. Rosenblad, Area Bombing and International Law, 15 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL
MlLITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 53, 63 (1976).
194. See, e.g., Hans Blix, Area Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
International Law 31, 58-61 (1978).
195. Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 335-336 (1959).
196. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 651.
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distinct. Understandably, "the interpretation of the words 'clearly separated
and distinct' leaves some degree of latitude to those mounting an attack." 197 In
particular, the adverb "clearly" blurs the issue: is the prerequisite clarity a mat-
ter of objective determination or subjective appreciation (depending, e.g., on
the degree of visibility when weather conditions are poor)? 198 Another ques-
tion is what a "similar concentration" of civilian objects within the "target
area" means in practice. The ambiguities are regrettable, keeping in mind that
"target area" bombing stretches to the limit the principle of distinction be-
tween military objectives and civilian objects.
Conclusion
It is difficult to overstate the importance of establishing authoritatively the
compass of military objectives in conformity with the jus in hello. In exposing
military objectives to attack, and (as a corollary) immunizing civilian objects,
the principle of distinction provides the main line of defense against methods
of barbarism in warfare. The validity of the principle cannot be seriously con-
tested today, and it may be regarded as lying at the epicenter of the law regu-
lating the conduct of hostilities. Unfortunately, the Devil is in the detail. As
this paper should amply demonstrate, the detail is far from resolved by the cur-
rent lex scripta (specifically Protocol I). There is an evident need for further
expounding quite a few aspects of the accepted definition of military objec-
tives. This need becomes more urgent with the dramatic changes in the mod-
ern techniques of combat. The jus in hello cannot afford to lag far behind the
changing conditions of combat.
197. See Pilloud & Pictet, supra note 23, at 613, 624.
198. See Hamilton DeSaussure, Belligerent Air Operations and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 4
Annals of Air and Space Law 459, 471-472 (1979).
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Michael Bothe
I he international legal rules which determine whether certain targetsmay or may not be lawfully attacked are based on one of the pillars of
the international law applicable in armed conflicts, namely the distinction be-
tween the civilian population on the one hand and the military effort of the
State on the other. The development of this distinction is a historical and cul-
tural achievement of the age of enlightenment. This fact needs to be empha-
sized when there is a temptation to consider certain consequences of this
distinction as too cumbersome for what is supposed to be a necessary military
operation.
Distinction
In the centuries before the enlightenment, war was often, and then lawfully
so, conducted in a way that made the "civilian" population suffer very drasti-
cally. 1 It was in particular the philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau who, in the
second half of the 18 th century, developed the idea that war did not constitute
a confrontation between peoples, but between States and their rulers ("sover-
eign's war"). 2 This principle limited both the group of persons entitled to per-
form acts harmful to the enemy (combatants) and the scope of persons and
objects which may be the target ofsuch acts (combatants/military objectives).
In the 18 th and early 19th century, this distinction corresponded to the real-
ity of the conflicts of those days. It was possible and practicable to keep
1. Fritz Munch, War, Laws of, History, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
1386 et seq. (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
2. WlLHELM GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2000).
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military activities well apart from the day-today life of the citizens, unless
such unusual things as a levee en masse occurred. It was the technological de-
velopments of the late 19th and early 20th century which created the funda-
mental challenge to this distinction, namely the development of long-range
weapons, in particular air warfare. The first rather comprehensive reaction to
this challenge was an attempt at international rule making, the so-called
Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923, 3 drafted by a group of experts based on a
mandate given by the 1922 Washington Conference on Disarmament. These
rules constituted a confirmation of the old distinction and developed its con-
crete application to the new situation. Rules elaborated by scientific bodies
such as the International Law Association were formulated along the same
lines.4
The great practical challenge to the traditional principle of distinction oc-
curred during the Second World War. There were so many violations of the
traditional principle that it was quite appropriate to ask the question whether
that rule had survived or whether it had become obsolete. 5 The biggest chal-
lenge to the traditional rule of distinction was the development of nuclear
weapons. It is, thus, necessary to critically analyze the attitude which States
and other relevant actors adopted after the war in relation to that rule.
State practice immediately following the Second World War was somewhat
puzzled and puzzling. The definition of war crimes in the Statute of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal is based on the assumption that the rule of distinc-
tion was applicable ("wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity"). But neither the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal nor the judgments of the American mili-
tary courts really address the principle of distinction as a limitation on the
choice of targets for bombardments. 6 Furthermore, there was a kind of re-
sounding silence of States in relation to that rule. The Geneva Conventions of
1949, which in many ways clarify and develop the law taking into account the
experience of the Second World War, do not address the question, yet most
3. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 139 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds.„3d. ed.
2000).
4- Draft Convention for the Protection of the Civilian Population Against New Engines ofWar,
adopted by the 40th Conference of the International Law Association, Amsterdam 1938. THE
Law of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other
DOCUMENTS 223 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988).
5. For a brief analysis of the practice, see ERIK CASTREN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND
Neutrality 402 et seq (1954).
6. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, H 1828 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
174
Michael Bothe
writers were loath to accept that the bombing practices of the war had
changed the law. 7
In 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made an
attempt to have the question of the validity of the principle of distinction clar-
ified by what was meant to become the Delhi Rules for the Limitation of the
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War. 8 This attempt
was based on the assumption that the traditional rule of distinction was still
valid, but it failed. It became, so to say, the victim of the development of nu-
clear weapons or, more precisely, of a dispute concerning their legality. The
military establishment of the day, it appears, remained completely outside the
legal discourse concerning the legality of those nuclear weapons, of which the
resolution of the Institut de Droit International of 19699 concerning the pro-
hibition of weapons of mass destruction is a lively testimony.
That insulation of the legal discourse disappeared when the issue of the re-
affirmation and development of international humanitarian law came on the
political agenda as a consequence of the debate about the conduct of the
Vietnam War and the issue of "human rights in occupied territory." 10 In 1968,
the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the traditional principle in
its resolution "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts," which de-
clared: "That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population
as such; That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking
part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population. . . ."n
The negotiations from 1974 to 1977 that led to the Additional Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 12 and the reactions of States, including
major military powers, after the adoption of the Protocol in 1977 are clearly
based on the assumption that the basic content of the rule of distinction is
part of customary international law. This is, in particular, reflected in the for-
mulation of the declarations made by the United States and the United King-
dom on the occasion of the signature of the Protocol. In respect of so-called
7. CASTREN, supra note 5, at 200 et seq.
8. The Law of Armed Conflicts, supra note 4, at 251.
9. The Distinction between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects in General and
particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, Resolution adopted by
the Institut de Droit International at its session at Edinburg on September 9, 1969. Id. at 265.
10. Michael Bothe in MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH AND WALDEMAR SOLF, NEW RULES
for Victims of Armed Conflicts 2 (1982).
11. G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7128 (1969).
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 3, at 422 [hereinafter Protocol IJ.
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non-conventional weapons, they deny that the "new rules" of the Protocol ap-
ply to those weapons, the clear implication being that the "old," i.e., custom-
ary law rules do apply. It is made clear that the principle of distinction figures
among these old rules. 13
In addition, a legal discourse developed which now included military law-
yers dealing with practical implications of this rule. Military lawyers explained
and continued to explain that major bombing campaigns like those during the
Vietnam 14 and 1991 Persian Gulf15 wars were indeed conducted on the basis of
these rules. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the rule has survived all ma-
jor challenges; that it is still part and parcel of customary law. This, however,
raises the question of the interpretation of the rule in the light of changing
circumstances.
The Two-Pronged Test of the Military Objective
As to the selection of targets in general and in air warfare in particular, the
basic rule that follows from the distinction between the civilian population
and the military effort is the distinction between military objectives and civil-
ian objects. That distinction is to be made on the basis of two interrelated ele-
ments, namely the effective contribution the military objective makes to
military action and the "definite military advantage" that the total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization of the objective offers. There is no
doubt that this is a rule of customary international law and its binding force is,
thus, not limited to the parties to Protocol I, which formulates this very prin-
ciple as follows in Article 52(2): "military objectives are limited to those ob-
jects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite mil-
itary advantage." 16
13. See inter alios Waldemar Solf, in BOTHE, PARTSCH AND SOLF, supra note 10, at 276, 282.
14- Burrus Carnahan, "Linebacker II" and Protocol I: the Convergence of Law and Professionalism,
31 American University Law Review 861 (1982).
15. See Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I, 88
American Journal of International Law 678, 681 (1994).
16. Protocol I, supra note 12, at 450.
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The most recent practical confirmation of the customary law character of
these principles is the experts report 17 published by the Chief Prosecutor of the
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia concerning the question whether
the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) involved the commission of crimes which were subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal—a report which constitutes an important document if
lessons are to be drawn from the Kosovo experience.
The difficulty of the Article 52(2) definition is its general character. There
are, of course, clear cases of "pure" military objectives: military barracks,
trenches in a battlefield, etcetera. Where objects are used or usable for differ-
ent, military and non-military purposes (dual-use objects), their qualification
as a military objective or civilian object becomes more difficult. What consti-
tutes an "effective contribution" to military action? What is a "definite" mili-
tary advantage? What is the difference, if any, between an "indefinite" or a
"definite" military advantage? This brings us to the crucial problems of target-
ing. It must be realized that the application of rules formulated in general
terms is a problem lawyers often encounter, not only in the law of war, but also
in international law in general—even law in general. Legal rules expressed in
general clauses need concretization for their practical application. The ques-
tion, thus, is how to render the general principle of distinction more concrete
in order to have secure standards for targeting.
A standard legislative method of rendering a general rule more concrete is
the establishment of a list of cases of application, be it exhaustive or illustra-
tive. This approach has been proposed by Professor Dinstein. 18 It presents a
few problems of its own. An illustrative list may be useful for certain purposes,
but it cannot terminate the discussion because the qualification of items that
are not on the list remains open. The exhaustive list is dangerous, because it
17. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the
Prosecutor]. For an analysis, see, inter alia, Symposium: The International Legal Fallout from
Kosovo, 12 European Journal of International Law 391 (2001), in particular the
contributions by William Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing
Campaign against Yugoslavia, at 489, Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY's Prosecutor and the Revievj of the
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at 503, and Michael Bothe,
The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report
to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, at 53 1. In addition, see Natalino Ronzitti, Is the non liquet of the Final
Report Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia Acceptable?, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1017 (2000).
18. See, e.g. Professor Dinstein's paper in this volume.
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can exclude clear cases falling under the general rule, which were just forgot-
ten or not foreseen when the list was drafted. Thus, there is often a tendency
to add a catchall clause at the end of a list. 19 At that point one is for all practi-
cal purposes back to the illustrative list.
Despite these deficiencies of the list method, the ICRC in 1956 attempted
to draft such a list of military objectives. 20 In relation to the difficult or contro-
versial questions, this list shows all the problems of this method. The list is
based on the undisputed fact that there are certain typical military objectives
which can indeed be listed, but this is possible only to a limited extent. There
are objects that in one context may constitute a military objective, making an
effective contribution to military action, while in other circumstances they do
not. This is clearly shown in the items on the list that have become quite con-
troversial in the context of the Kosovo campaign, namely lines and means of
communication and in particular telecommunication facilities.
As to traffic infrastructure, the formulation of the ICRC list is as follows:
"Those of the lines and means of communications (railway lines, roads,
bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance."
Thus, a distinction has to be made between those lines and means of commu-
nications that are of fundamental military importance and those that are not.
Only those lines of communication that are of fundamental military impor-
tance are military objectives. This is clearly stated in Article 7, Paragraph 3 of
the ICRC Draft Rules to which the list was to be annexed: "However, even if
they belong to one of those categories, they cannot be considered as a military
objective where their total or partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers no military advantage."
As a consequence, in every instance the question of the military impor-
tance of a bridge or railway line is unavoidable. It is submitted that to ask this
very question is the only correct application of the rule of distinction. There is
no rule saying that railway lines and bridges are always a military objective.
Their military importance has to be ascertained in each particular case. This is
19. See, e.g., Article 61(a) (xv) of Protocol I ("complementary activities necessary to carry out
any of the tasks mentioned above, including, but not limited to, planning and organization").
20. The list was drafted by the ICRC "as a model" to be annexed to the "Draft Rules for the
Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Times ofArmed Conflict" (see
note 8 supra) which the ICRC submitted in 1956 for consideration by the Red Cross Conference
of 1957. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 6, H 2002. These rules became the victim of bitter
controversies between governments during that conference (see J. Pokstefl and Michael Bothe,
Bericht tiber Entwicklungen und Tendenzen des Kriegsrechts seit den Nachkriegskodifikationen, 35
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 574, 575, 601
(1975).
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the crucial problem of dual-use facilities. This problem applies to traffic infra-
structure, telecommunication infrastructure and also to energy production
and transmission facilities.
In the traditional context of land warfare, the military importance of traffic
infrastructure is quite obvious. This traffic infrastructure is needed in order to
bring supplies to the front or, as the case may be, to allow a swift retreat of the
troops which may then reorganize afterwards. The examples given by Profes-
sor Dinstein21 in order to prove his thesis are all taken from this context. Dur-
ing the so-called Christmas bombing of Hanoi, it was the use of railway lines
for logistical support that was put forward as a justification for choosing cer-
tain targets (mainly railroads) in the very center of this city. 22 But what was
the military importance of the many bridges crossing the Danube River that
were destroyed during the Kosovo campaign? There was no front to which
supplies could have been moved. It was the declared policy of the NATO
States not to create such a front but to renounce to ground operations and to
restrict military action to an air campaign. In such a situation, it is very hard to
see any military importance of this traffic infrastructure. If there is no such
military importance, these means of communication are civilian objects, not
military objectives.
With respect to the telecommunication network, the situation may be
somewhat different. This network is of military importance even in the con-
text of a conflict where one side uses the strategy of air warfare only, while the
other side, by necessity, would have to rely on anti-aircraft defense. This de-
fense certainly depends on telecommunications, but it remains questionable
whether each facility using telecommunications equipment that may be found
in the country belongs, for that reason, to a network of military significance. Is
there a kind of presumption that telecommunication facilities are always, un-
less the contrary is apparent, related to the military network?
This seems to be the underlying rationale of the Report to the Prosecutor. 23
It brings us to a question of precautionary duties, duties of due diligence in
evaluating the military importance of certain objects and more generally the
decision-making process to which we will revert below. This was the crucial
problem in evaluating the lawfulness of the attack against the television facili-
ties in Belgrade. Could the target selectors just proceed on the basis of the as-
sumption or presumption that the technical equipment of this station was so
21. See Professor Dinstein's paper in the present volume.
22. Carnahan, supra note 14, at 864 et seq.
23. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 72.
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closely linked to the military network that, although there was an obvious ci-
vilian use, its military importance was significant enough that its destruction
provided a definite military advantage?
So far, the notion of contribution to the military effort or of military advan-
tage has been discussed in tactical or operational terms. The question then
arises whether this notion could also be understood in a broader sense. Can
objects that are not related to specific military operations also "contribute to
the military effort?" Air attacks have a definite impact on the morale of the
entire population and, thus, also on political and military decision-makers. It
may well be argued that it was not only the diplomatic efforts by
Chernomyrdin and Ahtassari, but also or even mainly the impact of the bomb-
ing campaign that finally induced Milosevic to agree to a withdrawal of the
Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo. Did the bombing for that rea-
son provide a "definite military advantage"?
As is rightly pointed out by Professor Dinstein and the Report to the Prose-
cutor, 24 this type of "advantage" is political, not military. The morale of the
population and of political decision-makers is not a contribution to "military
action." Thus, the advantage of softening the adversary's will to resist is not a
"military" one and, thus, cannot be used as a legitimation for any targeting de-
cision. If it were otherwise, it would be all too easy to legitimize military action
which uses bombing just as a psychological weapon—and there are other
words for this.
The practical importance of this limitation is considerable and not new. It
would indeed be impossible to make any meaningful distinction between civil-
ian objects and military objectives as the psychological effect can be produced
by an attack on any target, including entirely civilian living quarters. The mo-
rale of the civilian population and of political decision-makers was the main
target of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—not a legit-
imate one. During the bombing of North Vietnamese targets, already men-
tioned, in addition to the military significance of the traffic infrastructure as
channels for military supplies, "forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes of
the North Vietnamese leadership" was also recognized as a goal of the bomb-
ing campaigns against that country. 25 The NATO bombing campaign against
the FRY was also designed to induce the Belgrade leadership to accept a set-
tlement of the status of the Kosovo along the lines ofNATO terms. Although
24. Professor Dinstein's paper in the present volume and Report to the Prosecutor, id., 11 55
("civilian objects and civilian morale . . . are not legitimate military objectives")
.
25. Carnahan, supra note 14, at 867.
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the psychological impact of a certain attack may be a legitimate consideration
in choosing between targets that are for other reasons of a military character,
that impact alone is not sufficient to establish the qualification of a certain tar-
get as a military objective.
This legal situation introduces a basic ambiguity, or a fictitious character,
into targeting decisions to be made within the framework of an armed conflict
conducted for humanitarian purposes. As the goal of such a "war" is not the
military defeat of an adversary, but the protection of the human rights of the
population, the traditional notion of military advantage loses much of its sig-
nificance. In the Kosovo campaign target selection was made on the basis of
the fiction that military advantages and military victory in the traditional
sense were sought, although this was not the case. The only real goal was a
change of attitude of the Belgrade government. Thus, the question ofwhat re-
ally constitutes a military objective within the framework of a humanitarian
intervention has to be asked. It would better correspond to the specific char-
acter of that particular type of military operation if only "pure" military objec-
tives, in the sense mentioned already above, were considered to be legitimate
targets.
The Environment—A Military Objective?
An additional comment is necessary concerning the environment as a mili-
tary objective or civilian object. The rules of Protocol I relating to the protec-
tion of the environment, i.e., Articles 35(3) and 55, not only limit the
permissible collateral damage to the environment caused by attacks against
military objectives, but also limit permissible attacks where the environment
itself constitutes a military objective, which is quite possible. Military objec-
tives are not just persons or manmade structures: a piece of land can become a
military objective if its neutralization offers a definite military advantage. In-
terdiction fire is an example. This type of military action is not directly tar-
geted at combatants. The military usefulness consists of the fact that by
bringing a certain area under constant fire, the enemy is deterred from enter-
ing that area. Cutting down, or defoliating, trees in order to deprive the enemy
of cover is another example. The consequences of such actions for the envi-
ronment may be disastrous. In such cases, for the reasons indicated, the rules
of Articles 35(3) and 55 protect the environment when it is a military
objective.
An attack against the environment, however, is unlawful only where the
damage caused or expected is "widespread, long-term and severe." These
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three conditions are cumulative. All three must be met for there to be a viola-
tion. Therefore, we are back to the problem of general clauses and their
concretization. It is true that many of the delegations present at the confer-
ence in Geneva that drafted Protocol I favored a very high threshold. 26 It ap-
pears that the Kosovo campaign has not really given any new impetus to
concretize this threshold, as the actual environmental damage remained be-
low that limit. The threshold is still an open question, but the very fact that
the Report to the Prosecutor starts its legal assessment of the bombing cam-
paign by analyzing the question ofenvironmental destruction27 shows that en-
vironmental considerations have indeed become an important restraint on
military activities, although the legal reasoning of the report in this respect is
highly questionable. 28
In a first approach, the Report to the Prosecutor uses Articles 35(3) and 55
of Protocol I as the basic yardstick to determine the legality of any damage
caused to the environment. It does not give a final answer to the question
whether these provisions have become a rule of customary international law.
The report simply finds that the damage caused by the NATO air campaign
does not meet the triple cumulative threshold established by these provisions
of being "widespread, long-term and severe."
If one takes the factual findings of the Balkan Task Force established by, the
United Nations Environment Programme, this conclusion is probably un-
avoidable. What is interesting, however, is that the assessment made by the
committee does not stop at this point. It also analyses environmental damage
in the light of the proportionality principle which is the usual test for the ad-
missibility of collateral damage caused by attacks against military targets. This,
as a matter of principle, is a valid point. This line of argument could be used as
a means to lower the difficult threshold of Articles 35 and 55. Once it was es-
tablished that collateral environmental damage was excessive in relation to a
military advantage anticipated, it would also be unlawful even it was not wide-
spread, long-lasting and severe.
A systematic interpretation of Protocol I would lead to the conclusion that
the environment is protected by the combined effect of the general provision
limiting admissible collateral damage and the particular provision on environ-
mental damage. It would mean that in a concrete case, the stricter limitation
26. BOTHE, PARTSCH AND SOLF, supra note 10, at 346 et seq.
27. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1iH 14-25.
28. Bothe, supra note 17, at 532 et seq.; Thilo Marauhn, Environmental damage in times of armed
conflict - not "really" a matter of criminal responsibility?, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
Cross 1029 (2000).
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would apply. Unfortunately, the report does not draw this conclusion. Instead,
it refers to the formulation of Article 8(2) (b) (iv) of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) Statute as "an authoritative indicator of evolving customary in-
ternational law."29 This provision, which is quite unfortunate from the point
of view of environmental protection, creates a different type of cumulative ef-
fect of the rules on the protection of the environment and the proportionality
principle. Causing environmental damage is only a war crime if it goes, first,
beyond the threshold established by the triple cumulative conditions and, sec-
ond, beyond what is permissible according to the proportionality principle. In
the light of the reservations which the military establishment shows vis-a-vis
taking into account environmental concerns as a limitation on military vio-
lence, this is probably as far as one could go in the definition of a war crime. It
should be stressed, however, that this stance can be accepted only for the defi-
nition of the war crime, not as far as the interpretation of the primary rules of
behavior relating to the protection of the environment in times of armed con-
flicts are concerned. The damage caused to the environment is unlawful if it is
either excessive or widespread, long-term and severe. Causing the damage,
however, is a war crime only if damage fulfils both criteria.
Decision-Making: Ascertaining Relevant Facts
As already pointed out, a targeting decision must involve a certain factual
evaluation of the actual or potential use of specific objects as to whether they
make or do not make a contribution to military action. Protocol I prescribes
that efforts have to be made in order to ascertain the military character of an
objective. 30 On the other hand, the targeting decision is certainly one which
has to be taken in a context of uncertainty. It is unrealistic to require absolute
certainty concerning the military importance of a specific object before it can
be lawfully attacked, but not requiring absolute certainty is not the same as
permitting disregard of the facts.
Whatever the actual standard of due diligence, there is an obligation of due
diligence in ascertaining the character of a proposed target. This question
arises, in modern decision making, on two different levels, that of target selec-
tion at the command level and that of launching the actual attack, which is
not the same, as the case of the attack on a bridge which also hit a civilian
29. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 21.
30. Article 57(2)(a)(i).
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train (not a selected target) demonstrates.31 A violation of this duty of due dil-
igence is a violation of the law of armed conflict. In such cases as the attack
against the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, there are reasons to believe that in-
deed the selection of that particular building as a target was due to a violation
of this obligation of due diligence and therefore a negligent violation of the
law of armed conflict.
Decision-Making: Balancing Processes and Value Judgments
The evaluation of the military advantage to be derived from an attack is not
only a matter of the relevant facts, but also a matter of value judgments. What
constitutes an advantage is a matter of subjective evaluation. This raises the
question of "whose values matter?" In a somewhat different context, namely
the value judgment involved in the assessment of proportionality, the Report
to the Prosecutor states that this must be the judgment of the "reasonable mil-
itary commander."32 This statement, plausible as it may appear at a first
glance, is problematic. In a democratic system, the value judgment which
matters most is that of the majority of the society at large. The military cannot
and may not constitute a value system of its own, separated by waterproof
walls from that of civil society. Such separation would be to the disadvantage
of both the military and civil society. A dialogue between the two, critical and
constructive in both directions, is needed.
This is essential for a number of reasons. There is no denying the fact that
public opinion in many countries views the military with a critical eye. This is
particularly true for certain organizations of civil society engaged in the pro-
motion of human rights. It is certainly in the interest of both the military and
civil society organizations to avoid a situation where such critique is based on
a lack of understanding and on misconceptions. 33 Furthermore, the practice
observed in recent conflicts indeed recognizes that targeting decisions have
political implications. This is why certain decisions are reserved to persons
31. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1111 58-62.
32. Id., 11 50.
33. A good example for the problem was the case of a German organization for the preservation
of the language which chose "collateral damage" as the "bad expression of the year" for 1999. See
the Unwort des Jahres website at http://www.unwortdesjahres.org. The mistake was on both
sides. The organization was unaware of the technical character and meaning of the term, and the
NATO spokesmen who had used it did not realize that the term transported a wrong message to
the public, namely that damage to the civilian population and civilian objects were something
which was unimportant and negligible for those who decided on targets in the Kosovo conflict.
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that are very high in the governmental hierarchy. Targeting decisions engage
the political responsibility to the electorate, i.e., civil society, of those holding
high governmental offices. Therefore, these decisions have to be understand-
able and acceptable to civil society; hence the need for a dialogue.
The Problem of Errors
The question of values or value judgments leads to the problem of error or
mistake in judgment. Such an error may relate to the facts or to the law. In the
case of the Chinese Embassy, it was an error of fact. When the decision was
made to attack a particular building, the decision-makers thought, or at least
this is what we were told, that the building had a military use. The deci-
sion-makers did not know that it was the Chinese Embassy, which was obvi-
ously not a military objective.
In relation to attacks against railways and bridges, another question arises,
namely the error of law. In this case, there was probably no erroneous evalua-
tion of the actual use of those bridges and railway lines as a matter of fact. The
essential error, if the view submitted by this paper is correct, consisted in a
mistaken view of the law that considered traffic infrastructure as military ob-
jectives without asking the question of their military importance in the con-
crete context. As a matter of principle, an error of law does not exclude
responsibility. Ignorantia iuris is no excuse or even circumstance excluding the
wrongfulness of the behavior.
What are the consequences of these problems of due diligence and error on
criminal accountability? The definition of war crimes contained in the statute
of the permanent International Criminal Court34 requires intent.35 Violations
of the laws of war committed by negligence are not subject to the jurisdiction
of that court. The situation is, however, different with respect to the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) . Any viola-
tion of the laws and customs ofwar comes within the jurisdiction of that court
according to Article 3 of its statute. 36 Thus, the ICTY would have had juris-
diction to prosecute and punish negligent violations of the laws of war which,
as indicated, appear to be quite possible in this case. It is in this context that
the question of error becomes most relevant. An error concerning the facts
34. U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9, July 17, 1998, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
3, at 667.
35. Id., art. 30, at 690.
36. Statute of the International Tribunal, U.N. Doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993. The text of the
Statute is reprinted in 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1 192 (1993).
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may entail a negligent violation of the respective rule, an error concerning the
law, as a rule, does not constitute a valid defense.
The Law of War and Humanitarian Intervention—Some General
Reflections
It must be stressed that all these considerations concerning lawful means
and methods of combat are independent from the question whether the
Kosovo air campaign was or was not a violation of the rules of the United Na-
tions Charter prohibiting the use of force. Jus ad helium and jus in hello have to
be kept separate. This is the essential basis for a realistic approach to the law of
armed conflict that has to treat both parties to a conflict on an equal footing.
Questions of the legality or illegality of the use of force in a particular context
have to be raised in other contexts, not in that of the application of the jus in
hello. The equality of the parties in relation to the jus in hello is an essential pre-
condition to the effective functioning of this body of law. This is why the
Preamble to Protocol I reaffirms this principle in no uncertain terms: "Reaf-
firming that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances . .
., without any ad-
verse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the
causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict."
The principle of the equality of the parties to a conflict does not exclude the '
need to consider the entire context of a conflict, its intrinsic character, when
determining the concept of military objective. Military advantage, as already
pointed out, is a contextual notion. Where the declared purpose of a military
action is limited from the outset, where the goal pursued is not just victory, but
something else, it is difficult to ignore this limitation when it comes to the
question what constitutes an advantage in that particular context. Thus,
where the exclusive purpose of a military operation is to safeguard the human
rights of a certain population, this very context excludes, it is submitted, a legal
construction of the notion of military advantage or contribution to the military
effort which disregards the life and health of this very population. In other
words, in this context, the notion of military objective has to be construed in a
much narrower way than in other types of conflict.
This contextual concept of military advantage is, it is submitted, lex lata. It
must not be confused with proposals de legeferenda demanding special rules for
the conduct of so-called humanitarian interventions. If such rules were to be
adopted, they could only mean an additional unilateral restraint imposed on
those States or organizations which intervene for the sake of safeguarding the
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human rights of a certain population. Such rules could not and should not af-
fect the rights and duties of the other party to the conflict.
More critical review of the notion of military advantage is needed. If the
law were to be developed by a specific legal instrument relating to humanitar-
ian intervention, why not impose on the forces maintaining the rule of law and
human rights, obligations that are stricter than the usual rules of targeting
valid for any belligerent?
187

Legal Perspective from the EUCOM
Targeting Cell
D
Tony Montgomery
The Beginnings
uring Operation Allied Force I was assigned to Headquarters, US Eu-
ropean Command (EUCOM) as the Deputy StaffJudge Advocate and
Chief, Operations Law. My responsibilities included being the legal member of
the group that reviewed all fixed targets. In early July 1998, I attended one of
the first meetings of the Kosovo Planning Group. This cross-functional group
of officers was formed to evaluate the situation in Kosovo and make recom-
mendations on possible courses of action (COAs). As the months passed, and a
military confrontation seemed more likely, sets of targets were developed to
support each of the various COAs. Target sets were refined, modified and dis-
cussed along with each COA.
The legal advisor's role/responsibility in this process is to offer well-rea-
soned advice, based on relevant data, in accordance with existing law and pol-
icy guidance. In the target development process, legal advisors help to ensure
that a decision to attack a target or set of targets is based on known facts or
reasonable assumptions. Usually, only after sifting through the facts do the as-
sumptions come to light. There are always assumptions: about the weather,
weapon effectiveness, absence or presence of people, impact on the enemy
and others. Legal advisors identify and then voice concerns when the assump-
tions being made go beyond the reasonable person standard. This requires
knowing the law, awareness of other restrictions, understanding of the mili-
tary and political objectives, familiarity with the methods of achieving those
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objectives and, finally, the ability to synthesize and make a recommendation
on a target or set of targets.
Actions at the time of the attack will be held to the standard of reasonable-
ness; based on the evidence available at the time, factoring in the situation,
time to attack and enemy actions. A commander must be reasonable in un-
covering facts but clairvoyance is not a requirement. The legal advisor—if do-
ing their job—will point out where in the rush for victory the line of
reasonableness appears about to be crossed. Legal advisors provide recom-
mendations on whether the proposed use of force abides by the law of war and
do this by offering advice on both restraint and the right to use force.
Oi course, the final decision on attacking a target is the subjective one of
assessing the value of innocent human lives against the value of capturing/de-
stroying a particular military objective. To assist a commander in making this
subjective determination, a legal advisor
—
just like anyone involved—can
provide an opinion and, a recommendation on a target or any other aspect of
the operation. However, the final decision will always be the commander's.
Legal advisors do not set the political or military objectives of a campaign, nor
do they approve or disapprove targets.
Targeting—Some Basics
>
For those with no personal experience, it may come as a surprise to know
that targeting is more than just looking at some "things" and deciding that to-
day those will be destroyed. Objects are selected as targets based on campaign
goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, and compliance with the law of
war. Targeting is the process that identifies, detects, selects, and prioritizes
targets in order to achieve a specific result based on the commander's objec-
tives, guidance, and intent, then matches weapons systems to achieve that re-
sult, and finally assesses the results. Target selection is not at all
haphazard—at least not at the planning level.
The current theory around which targets were developed during Operation
Allied Force is known as "effects based targeting." Effects based targeting the-
orizes that by attacking specific links, nodes, or objects the effect or combina-
tion of effects will achieve the desired objective. If the theory is correct,
following this approach will conserve resources, reduce the overall risk to
friendly forces and civilians and, ultimately, shorten the conflict. However,
the increasing ability to routinely hit targets with great accuracy has not been
matched by a commensurate understanding of exactly which targets must be
hit to achieve specific outcomes. Establishing a causal link between targeting
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some "thing" and achieving the desired ultimate political outcome is still the
challenge.
I say "challenge" because once a decision to use force has been made, un-
derstanding the enemy well enough to accurately predict the enemy's reaction
to being bombed is key to the overall efficacy of effects based targeting. Ulti-
mately the goal of Operation Allied Force was to coerce Milosevic to comply
with the demands of NATO. Without Milosevic explicitly telling us why he
yielded when he did, we simply do not know for sure. We know NATO did
achieve its principal military objective of a Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo;
however, we were not able to halt ethnic cleansing before it was essentially
complete.
The Mechanics of the Operation Allied Force Targeting Process
CINC
-Campaign
Objectives
EUCOM JCS/J2T
Targeting
Strategy
- Task IC to Develop
Tgt Materials
-J3/DC1NC Review
CINC
- Approves Tgt
- Some on to NCA
Review and
Forward to NCA
EUCOM
"Prioritizes Tgts
-Tasks Execution
_ Forward for
execution
EUCOM S ! CINC - Forward for execution
or NAC approval
Gains NAC Approval
(As Required)
Figure 3.1
Recognizing the acronyms in Figure 3.1 is not as important as knowing that
each fixed target basically followed the above route to approval. During Allied
Force, those who had authorized the use of force very much wanted to limit
the consequences and this process helped achieve that objective. Legal input
was embedded throughout the process, with issues being addressed at the
point where they were identified. However, this paper will focus on the efforts
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related to obtaining the approval of the commander of the United States Eu-
ropean Command (EUCOM/CINC).
Once the air campaign began, a daily list ofproposed new targets (or targets
that had been previously reviewed, but additional information had been ob-
tained on) was provided to those working within the targeting group. All tar-
get nominations were maintained on a spreadsheet that was electronically
updated and available for review on a classified website. I would review the in-
formation on the new targets using this list.
Early and unfettered access to data is critical for an effective and efficient
target review. During Operation Allied Force, target data was stored on and
accessed through our classified computer system. Those with access to the
system had the ability to have most of the data on any individual target avail-
able for review with just a few keystrokes and mouse clicks. This information
consisted of imagery, descriptions of the facility and its functions, analysis on
impact (military advantage anticipated) if destroyed, possible collateral dam-
age concerns, and historical information on the target. There, literally at my
fingertips, was all the data needed to make a good initial legal evaluation of
the target.
The results of the legal reviews were inputted into the targeting process
using two primary methods. A spreadsheet format that was provided to those
working within the targeting group and updated as new targets were proposed.
This spreadsheet contained the target identification information, collateral
damage concerns, justification for attack, and a law of war determination or
recommendation. This method ensured a permanent record for each target re-
viewed and provided an easy means of recalling inputs on each target.
The second method of input was through the collaborative targeting
(CTT) sessions. These sessions were an outgrowth of Serbia's failure to acqui-
esce as quickly as some had hoped would happen. Continuing the conflict
translated into a demand for more and better targets, and faster identification.
Increasing the pace of target development meant, in part, more people de-
voted to the task. Throwing more people into the mix initially created addi-
tional problems. Groups worked and coordinated target products in a serial
fashion. One group would forward its work as e-mail attachments, message
traffic, fax, and/or phone calls to others with responsibility for different por-
tions of the process. The next group would make changes and forward (or, de-
pending on the changes, return to the first group for reconsideration) to other
groups involved in the process. This process continued until the lead group
believed the proposed target was ready for decision-maker review. Deci-
sion-makers would receive an e-mail with the attached product information
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and would either accept the product information or send it back for further
development.
The disadvantages of this early process were information overload, uncer-
tainty, and duplication of effort. Using a serial workflow extended the process
timeline and provided more opportunities for confusion, ambiguities and er-
rors. There was no consensus among the participants on the rationale for at-
tacking targets. While no illegal targets were attacked during this period,
others and myself were concerned that as the tempo increased our ability to
provide the necessary oversight would continue to degrade.
The solution to this serial process was the development of the collaborative
targeting sessions. The CTT sessions ensured ail targeting organizations had a
common understanding of objectives and guidance, built consensus, validated
targeting assessments and integrated operational and legal concerns early into
the targeting process. Using NetMeeting, a Microsoft product, on the classi-
fied internet system, the sessions "virtually" united representatives from com-
mands throughout the theatre and the United States. Similar in concept and
format to an internet "chat room" conducted over our classified computer sys-
tem, these sessions brought all of the players into the same "virtual" room at
the same time. All participants could see the proposed target on their com-
puter monitor, could talk via headsets in real time to each other, and could
ask questions and resolve issues. This format enabled everyone's input—in-
cluding legal—to get to all those involved at the same time. With all the rele-
vant functional experts gathered together, questions could be asked and
resolutions made in minutes rather than days. What might have taken a week
before could be done in one night's session.
Collaborative targeting sessions were generally conducted every night.
During a CTT session, the group reviewed proposed targets to determine
whether they could be forwarded for approval. For each target, discussion re-
volved around three issues: 1) the linkage to military effects—the key to gain-
ing legal approval, 2) the collateral damage estimate, and 3) the unintended
civilian casualty estimate. The one aspect of this process that consumed most
of the time was the collateral damage estimate. Whether it was the nature of
the conflict, an outgrowth of the ever increasing visibility of the results of mili-
tary actions, over sensitivity by political authorities, the desire to make a deci-
sion based on some objective "number" (no matter how unscientifically
reached or misunderstood) rather than a subjective "value," or a combination
of the above, the collateral damage estimate quickly became central to much
of the targeting process. An integral part of this estimate was the Tier System.
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The Tier System was developed prior to Operation Allied Force as an effort
to standardize the methodology to be used for estimating collateral damage.
Though some aspects of this methodology are classified, the unclassified infor-
mation provides a general understanding. The system currently has four tiers
or levels. Each tier represents an ever-increasing level of analysis. Tier 1 con-
sists of a 1500-foot circle drawn around the outer boundary of a proposed tar-
get. If there is no collateral damage concern within that circle, then there is no
need to move on to the next tier. Tier 2 involves applying fragmentation data
of a specific munition to the actual target. This results in a smaller circle being
drawn around the target. If a collateral damage concern still exists, then Tier 3
is used. This involves taking a specific munition, applying its record of accu-
racy, along with the possibility of error, and determining the probable or possi-
ble extent of collateral damage. Finally, if the level of possible collateral
damage is still viewed as unacceptable; and the target in question is deemed of
sufficient value, then a Tier 4 analysis, involving computer simulation and
modeling can be conducted.
Here is an illustrative analogy: Tier 1 is like looking at an object with the
naked eye, Tier 2 is like using a hand held magnifying glass, Tier 3 is like using
a microscope, while Tier 4 is like using a high-powered electron microscope.
The tier system is a useful tool that provides a methodology for evaluating the
structural collateral damage and possible effects upon any human within the
target area. However, it does not provide the actual number of injuries. Also,
just because a target is Tier 1 or Tier 4 does not tell the reviewer anything
about the actual value of striking that target within the context of the ongo-
ing campaign. Whether or not destroying a particular target is going to
achieve the stated military or political objective is not a part of the tier system
analysis.
A target may have zero possibility of collateral damage, but if it also has zero
impact on the campaign, then bombing that target is wasting resources, putt-
ing aircrews and civilians in danger, and possibly violating the law of war. Still,
it is very tempting to point to the tier level of some target and make a value
judgment solely on those criteria.
Returning to the target approval process, once a collaborative targeting ses-
sion approved a target, it was sent forward to the decision authority. Ob-
taining approval from both the appropriate authorities within the United
States and NATO was required before any target could be attacked. (Note
that as I was not involved in the NATO process, my discussions are focused
exclusively on the US process.) Upon this final approval, the Joint Task Force
(JTF) could add the target to the master list and schedule it for attack.
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However, approval to strike meant much more than just satisfying the rather
low thresholds set out by the law of war. The intense concern over the issue of
collateral damage meant that targets were approved for strike only at a certain
tier level. To achieve that level often meant that only a certain type of muni-
tion could be used or the target could only be attacked at certain times of the
day. Thus, something as simple as a change in munition could raise the level of
collateral damage above what had been approved and, thus, remove a target
from the "approved for strike" category.
As a result, though not listed as an official step in the targeting process, re-
viewing the daily list ofproposed strikes for the next two days became a part of
the process. This review was simply a quality check—not because people
would intentionally ignore orders, but because people enter the data into the
computers, people hit the wrong keys and people make mistakes. A single
wrong entry or a miscommunication to the personnel who actually had to exe-
cute the mission could mean an attack occurring that had not been approved.
This is not saying that a law of war violation would occur, just that a target
would be struck in a manner that our civilian authorities had not authorized.
In contrast to the hi-tech world of the collaborative targeting sessions, this
review was a simple line-by-line comparison of the strike list to the approved
target list and the legal review. Usually, this review found no discrepancies;
however, on occasion targets listed as approved for attack had not yet been
approved at the appropriate level or were being attacked with a munition that
raised the possible collateral damage above that approved for the target.
When such discrepancies were found, the target would be expedited through
the approval process if possible, or the munition would be changed to bring
the collateral damage estimate back down. Sometimes this necessitated can-
celing a strike. After this quality review, the proposed new list of targets would
arrive and the process would begin for another day.
Conclusion
After giving this presentation to various audiences, I have found that
there is generally surprise at how the targeting process worked. People are
surprised to hear that such effort was devoted to each individual target. Of
the nearly 2000 fixed targets that were reviewed, each received an inde-
pendent evaluation within the requirements of the law of war. Is the target
a military objective? What military value or advantage is gained from de-
stroying this target? Are we being proportional? Are there any issues with
distinction/discrimination?
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For those who disagree with the decisions to attack individual targets, I
would simply suggest that the laws of war are certainly subject to different in-
terpretations. It is easy to state that there must be an acceptable relation be-
tween the legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. In
reality, whether a specific set of results is "acceptable" is going to depend on
the objectives being sought, as well as both the military and political risk those
in charge are willing to take. Human rights activists and experienced combat
commanders will often not agree on individual targeting decisions. The legal
advisor must keep both views in mind and still be able to make a recommenda-
tion on a target without losing perspective.
Legal involvement in the targeting process was not limited to just my level.
Just as each level of command has its own operators and intelligence officers,
so too do they have their own legal advisor. The legal advisors were in con-
stant contact discussing both the broad impact of changes in guidance, as well
as specific issues on individual targets.
Operation Allied Force had its share of mistakes, errors, miscalculations
and systems malfunctions. Those usually made the evening news and are the
subject of continuing, intense discussion and condemnation. The literally
thousands of decisions that were made in order to reduce casualties, to limit
effects and to deflect the impact do not make the news. The result can be that
those who are listening or watching come away with a very one-sided view of
the events.
This, in my own view, was—and still is—our biggest miscalculation. Failing
to explain before, during and after the fact the efforts that went into the
bombing campaign allowed others to interpret it as they saw fit. It did not take
being clairvoyant to know that no matter how "just" our cause (at least in the
minds of some), our actions would be scrutinized. No one liked what was go-
ing on in Kosovo but no one wanted Serbia bombed to oblivion either. This
simple truth apparently came as a surprise when the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—in compliance with its charter—asked
questions about the bombing.
Even when we make some feeble attempt at explaining our efforts, we do
not provide the depth or detail necessary. Saying we will comply with the law
ofwar is a conclusion that does not do justice to the efforts expended. Further,
as a conclusion, there is nothing for people to evaluate and judge. What does
the statement "we will comply with the law ofwar" actually mean? What steps
are in place, what guidelines, what processes to ensure compliance?
The assumption that just because we think our cause is "just" that people
are going to blindly accept everything we do is born out of arrogance. The
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price paid for that arrogance is a lack of trust, a disbelief, a lingering disquiet
that may be kept at bay only so long as those being opposed can be viewed as
the "bad" guy. If we care about our obligations under the law of war, then
learning the lesson from Kosovo means that the next time we will do a better
job of educating people about the process ahead of time. I am confident that
this lesson has not been learned.
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Harvey Dalton
A s I am standing in for Admiral Michael Lohr, I want to approach thisfrom the standpoint of the legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff—the position that then Captain Lohr held during Operation
Allied Force. I will explain the process he employed in providing legal advice to
the Chairman and to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense with
respect to targeting in Kosovo. We have heard from the former General Coun-
sel, Ms. Judy Miller, from Judge Jamie Baker who provided the National Secu-
rity Council point of view, and from Lieutenant Colonel Tony Montgomery
who provided the US European Command point ofview. So this is another link
in the legal chain in terms of targeting and the approval of targets at the na-
tional level.
At the outset of the conflict, it was expected that Operation Allied Force
was going to be quick and easy. There were about fifty to seventy-five pre-
designated targets approved in advance. These were very traditional targets
that were chosen for immediate military impact. They involved command and
control, integrated air defense system, airfields, and aircraft—thoroughly tra-
ditional military targets. But Operation Allied Force was not quick and short
lived. We realized very quickly that the Serbs were not going to leave Kosovo
easily. This caused two things to happen: there was a need for more targets,
and there was a need to move to different type of targets other than just the
traditional military targets.
The requirement for more targets led to two routes for approval. Most tar-
gets, mainly the traditional military targets, were approved in the theater by
the US European Command. These targets did not come up to the Joint Staff
level, or up to the General Counsel level, or to the Secretary of Defense or
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president. So this idea that the president approved each and every target is
simply not true. The vast majority of targets were approved in-theater. Some
targets did have to come back to the Pentagon for review and approval. The
military industrial targets, the electric power grids, certain infrastructure, any
targets within Belgrade, and those targets that were assessed to have a high
potential for collateral damage did have to be reviewed by the Pentagon.
When a target came to the Pentagon, and this is a little bit different from
what happened at the European Command, two things happened. The J2,
which is our intelligence division, and the Joint Staff immediately began an in-
dependent assessment of the target. Aside from what the European Command
had done in-theater, the Joint Staff intelligence division started an immediate
assessment of the target. This included what Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery
referred to as the four- tier assessment. That is a refined assessment that tries
to determine as accurately as possible the potential collateral damage that
might be sustained in attacking a target. Slides were then produced for brief-
ing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, if necessary, the secretary of
defense and the president. The contents of the slides showed the objective or
military linkage of the target. Was it command and control, was it integrated
air defense, was it industrial-military, and what was the collateral damage esti-
mate? The assessment might include "high collateral damage," or it might in-
clude a specific number of anticipated unintended civilian casualties. The
slide would also have a casualty estimate which would include sometimes both
the combatants and the noncombatants.
The Joint Staff then produced a matrix, which I don't think they did at Eu-
ropean Command. This matrix rated the military significance of the particular
target, i.e., whether it was so important that it might cause the termination of
hostilities or whether it was a target that merely sustained the military or sus-
tained the Serbian operations in Kosovo. Collateral damage was given a rating
of high, medium, or low.
Next came the risk assessment of outliers—the potential for a bomb or mis-
sile to miss its target and land somewhere else. This assessment was particu-
larly important where we were using bombs or missiles and where there was a
heavily built-up area with large urban structures around the target. There was
a greater risk of outliers in those situations. Finally, the matrix would indicate
whether the recommendation was to approve the target, disapprove the tar-
get, ask for more information, or hold it while we received additional
information.
Based upon this information, and based upon the target folders that were
received by the Joint Staff, the legal counsel would conduct a legal assessment.
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This was a basic law of armed conflict legal assessment: operations may be di-
rected only against military objectives, the civilian population is not to be the
object of attack, there can be no intent to spread terror among the civilian
population, indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, and the damage to civilian
property cannot be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage.
Military objectives were those objectives which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to the military action and
whose destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time offered a definite
military advantage. That was the rule that was employed in terms of what is a
military objective. Take all precautions in means and methods of attack to
avoid and minimize incidental injury and death and damage to civilians. This
in many cases influenced the aim points of the weapons to try to direct the
weapons and the effects of the weapons away from civilians, civilian objects,
civilian places.
A number of targets were sent up for further review by the secretary of de-
fense and, occasionally, the president. The four-tier analysis was part of those
target packages. The four-tier analysis tried to estimate the damage by frag-
mentary blast, skin piercing fragments from the blast, window breakage (be-
cause that could create a lot of damage and incidental injury), building
collapse (the possibility of building collapse or which buildings would be ex-
pected to collapse), and eardrum rupture, which obviously causes civilian in-
juries. Those were the four types of injuries that were modeled and simulated
by computer with each type of weapon that was considered as a possible
weapon to be employed. This made a lot of difference. It was all visualized, dis-
played, and we could actually determine to a reasonable degree the extent of
collateral damage.
This was the type of analysis that was done by the lawyers, the intelligence
community, and the operators. .This is what went to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. There may have been ten targets every four or five days that
were carried to the president. The chairman would brief those targets to the
president, and the president would make the decision to approve, disapprove,
request more information, or hold the target. That was essentially the process
that the chairman's legal counsel was involved in.
Of course the military objective overall was to force the Serbs to withdraw
from Kosovo. NATO in no way unleashed an unlimited war; it was very
tightly controlled. There was always some element of political control at all
times, which was necessary because we had to hold the coalition together. We
did target some of the propaganda capabilities of the Serbs primarily through
information operations—non-lethal type attacks. We hit military industrial,
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dual-use electric power, petroleum because petroleum always supplies the mil-
itary and the military runs on petroleum products, and infrastructure.
Note the comments by Professor Bothe about the type of infrastructure that
can be targeted. In our targeting and in our legal review there were a number
of bridges, roads, infrastructures that had no military value whatsoever. We
had a couple of targets nominated that were two-lane wooden bridges across
drainage ditches. They had no military value whatsoever, and those targets
were not approved. So even though it was hostilities, we did not go after all
military objects. We went after those that counted, or least the ones we
thought counted.
One final comment—I hope you don't get the impression that we are pat-
ting ourselves on the back. We did not come here to talk about the wonderful
job we did. We came to talk about the process that we went through, and the
process that we will hopefully go through and approve each time we employ
the use of force. I do think it is necessary that people are aware of the great
care and the great effort that goes into targeting, including its legal analysis.
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I must congratulate our presenters for their most remarkable contributions;however, congratulation does not mean agreement. This again does not
mean that I'm in complete disagreement with all three of them, rather to say
that my agreement varies. I will not be able to touch upon all the issues ad-
dressed. Hence, I will briefly refer to some details, and then I will close with
some more general remarks on some fundamental issues that I'm afraid are too
often left out of sight. I will not go into the question of the relevance of Hague
Convention IX. I will start with the natural environment.
Professor Bothe is seemingly willing to apply the rules contained in Protocol
I
1 on the natural environment as customary international law. First, it needs
to be emphasized that Articles 35(3) and Article 55 of Protocol I are so-called
"new rules" and, thus, binding only upon States parties to the Protocol. But
even when Protocol I is formally applicable, in an international armed con-
flict, the question remains as to the possible practical impact of these provi-
sions. Remember, they merely prohibit the employment of methods and
means of warfare that do or may inflict damage to the natural environment
that is "widespread, long-term and severe." 2 There is no conventional method
or means of warfare the use of which will clearly be illegal under this prohibi-
tion. Even the sinking of an oil tanker cannot always be subsumed under those
rules. Moreover, I still have not seen a convincing definition of natural envi-
ronment. The often-used term "ecosystem" is not a definition, but merely a
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
2. U, arts. 35(3) and 55.
_____
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substitute and not of much help. Hence, the only fairly secure statement on
the legal status of the natural environment during international armed con-
flict is that which is contained in the United States Navy's Commander's
Handbook. 3 Please note that while the wanton destruction of the natural en-
vironment is illegal because it cannot be justified by reason of military neces-
sity, it is of course never a war crime entailing individual criminal
responsibility.
Secondly, I would like to address the list approach. The combined list ap-
proach suggested by Professor Dinstein seems to be based on quite a condens-
ing logic. Professor Dinstein correctly referred in his paper to the San Remo
process and the very intense discussion on whether it was preferable to merely
have an abstract definition of military objectives or to also have a non-exhaus-
tive and merely illustrative list of objects that would usually qualify as military
objectives. 4 1 believe that the decision of the Round Table to be satisfied with
an abstract definition was correct. Such lists would be counterproductive be-
cause in the eyes of many, the exclusion of certain objects will mean that they
may be attacked in exceptional cases only. All legal methodology will not pre-
vent them from such a misunderstanding. I cannot imagine two or more inter-
national lawyers, not to speak of government officials, who could reach an
agreement on such a list. The papers presented by Professors Bothe and
Dinstein illustrate this point.
Thirdly, let us come to the definition of military objectives. First the ques-
tion of effective contribution to military action. I fully agree with Professor
Dinstein that the concept of war-sustaining capability is much too wide, and
more importantly has no foundation in international law. This follows from
the simple truth that objects such as raw cotton or, to take a more contempo-
rary example, oil, only under exceptional preconditions and circumstances are
subject to military measures, i.e., only if they are used for military purposes. In
naval warfare, to give but one example, oil exports are not subject to capture if
transported on neutral vessels. Only in the case of a breach of a blockade is
there the opportunity to capture it. Capture, however, has to be strictly distin-
guished from targeting even though I must admit that the dividing line is not
always so clear.
3. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on The Law of Naval
OPERATIONS 405 (A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War
College International Law Studies).
4. See Professor Dinstein's paper in this volume.
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Professor Bothe also maintains in his paper that there are no standing or
permanent military objectives.5 1 am unable to agree with such a statement if
made in such an absolute form. It is beyond any doubt that there are quite an
impressive number of objects that always qualify as legitimate military objec-
tives because by their nature, and by their very nature, they effectively con-
tribute to military action. To give but one example, take a warship or a
military airplane. A discussion like that following the sinking of the General
Belgrano in the Falklands War should not be repeated, and that discussion
should not contribute to casting doubt upon this fact of law and life.
Let me shortly refer to the definite military advantage and the circum-
stances ruling at the time. Here as with regard to the effective contribution to
military action, Professors Bothe and Dinstein have presented quite different
positions. I must confess that I'd rather follow the Dinstein approach because
of fundamental considerations. To start with the details and by concentrating
on the broadcasting station, I would like to add and emphasize that we must
admit that under the laws of war, enemy means of communication have al-
ways been and always will be considered legitimate military objectives. It must
also be emphasized that this is true regardless of the overall aim of the war or
of the armed conflict. Professor Bothe maintains that tradition should not be
overestimated, but, in my opinion, tradition has a lot to do with State practice,
which is not only of significance when it comes to the formation of rules of
customary international law.
Let me finally turn to some fundamental issues. Even though Professor
Bothe correctly holds that the jus in hello and the jus ad bellum have to be dis-
tinguished and kept apart from each other, I wonder whether he doesn't pay
just lip service to that distinction. In view of his further thesis, I have some
doubts. In any event, the distinction may not be brushed aside. Moreover, the
overall aim that led one of the parties to an armed conflict to resort to use of
armed force is irrelevant when it comes to the question whether certain ob-
jects effectively contribute to military action of the adversary or whether their
neutralization offers a definite military advantage. Apart from the problem
that such aims will be merely political, the actual or potential tactics and
strategies taken by the adversary or the attacker are decisive. We should not
forget that the law of armed conflict is designed as a order of necessity that comes
into operation if for whatever reasons States are unwilling or unable to refrain
from the use of armed force. It is, so to speak, the ultimate legal yardstick that
customary international law is willing to accept.
5. See Professor Bothe's paper in this volume.
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The law of armed conflict does not ask for motives, political aims, or the le-
gality of the first use offeree. It takes as a fact that the jus ad bellum has failed
to function properly. Thus, it accepts that the parties to an international
armed conflict do apply certain methods and means of warfare in order to
harm the respective enemy and by keeping to a minimum one's own losses.
This means that the law of armed conflict sets up certain limits, but it has
never been designed to prevent armed conflict.
We as international lawyers should never forget that international law is
made by States - that means by those who are bound by it. But if the consen-
sus of States can only be verified, let us say to have reached a certain level, we
are not allowed as international lawyers to ignore this and to replace the miss-
ing basis by pure hermeneutics or to equate what we wish the law to be with
the existing law.
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r<| ocusing on dual-purpose targets, I would like to do two things. First, I
J-L want to do a little bit of abstract worrying, which is inconclusive and re-
ally just a plea for other people to tell me whether there is a real issue here or
not. Secondly, I want to go onto something that is fairly concrete. When Pro-
fessor Dinstein began, he made the traditional point that today we are talking
about discrimination and tomorrow we will talk about proportionality.
Normally that is how we think about things. It seems to me that it is not abso-
lutely clear that proportionality is as separate in the case of dual-purpose tar-
gets as it is in the case of other targets although maybe that is so.
I would just like to raise this question. In the really clear case where you
have an object, and you ask if this thing is civilian or military and the answer
is that this thing is clearly military, so it is eligible to be a legitimate target.
Now we ask if we can destroy this thing without causing collateral damage to
some other objects which are civilian. So there is a military object, there are
other civilian objects located nearby, and so we ask how much damage will
there be to the co-located civilian objects? That is the discussion about pro-
portionality. But the thing about dual-purpose targets is that they are un-
doubtedly military, but they are also undoubtedly civilian. So rather than
having two different objects, we have one object that has two different pur-
poses. Now maybe there is no reason not to treat this in essentially the same
way, but I am sort of bothered by that. That is, you can say just as we first ask
is this object military, and then we go and look at whether the damage to ci-
vilian objects will be disproportionate—why can't we just say okay, here we
have a military purpose.
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Now let's talk about whether the frustration of the civilian purpose, which
this same object also plays, is proportional. But because this is after all only
one object, I wonder whether the proportionality shouldn't come up a bit
sooner. One way of raising the question is to ask something about Professor
Dinstein's list. I do not think I am actually disagreeing with him, but the ques-
tion is what does it mean to say a certain object is, for example, by nature a
military objective. If that just means it's over the first hurdle—that it's now el-
igible for consideration of whether destroying it will cause proportional dam-
age or not—then that's fine. That is, if all we're saying is that everything that's
on the list are military objects about which we now need to ask about propor-
tionality, then that's okay.
It seems to me there's some danger—though maybe this is just an unfair
reading of the list—that when one says that all the main railroad lines are by
nature military objectives, then one may think that the burden of proof lies
especially on proportionality. In order to establish that the civilian damage
will be disproportional, one somehow has to show more than one would have
had to show if this thing was not already on the list. I hope that's just a mis-
reading of what Professor Dinstein is saying. If not, then I would be a bit
worried.
I wonder about the role of proportionality with respect to dual-purpose tar-
gets in particular. Now to get a little more concrete and specific, I ask this be-
cause it does seem to me that in the case of the dual-purpose . targets,
everything really turns on proportionality. Academic theorists tend to think
that proportionality is not much of a task—that it's so vague that it's not going
to really do much work. I want to say two things. The first is that I do take
some comfort from what has been said by Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery,
Ms Judith Miller and Colonel Sorenson. Based on their testimony anyway, it
does appear that in the case of the Kosovo bombing campaign proportionality
really did do serious work. To the extent that this is true, I guess I do disagree
with Professor Dinstein's comment that World War II would still be going on
if the same review had been applied.
I certainly don't think we should take the targeting in World War II as any
kind of example of acceptable targeting. There was a lot of targeting in World
War II that was completely disproportionate. My understanding is that the
war might have ended a lot sooner if we had wasted less stuff trying to break
civilian morale and used it in more militarily useful ways. So whether or not
this whole process, which I don't pretend I actually understood, is needed, I
don't know. That there is some such process seems to me to be actually quite a
good thing.
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Why do we have the jus in bellol We have it because we're trying to avoid
having total war. The point ofjus in hello is that some semblance of normal
civilian life should continue even during the war, even while the fighting is
occurring on the land and the sea and in the air. Babies are to be born. Old
people should be able to finish out their lives. People who need medical atten-
tion should be able to get medical attention. There has to be at least some civil-
ian life that is protected from the war. So one of the questions about propor-
tionality is "would the elimination of a particular target make it impossible for
even elemental civilian processes to continue?" It seems to me that if it would,
the answer is that damage is not proportional unless the military value is of
some extraordinary significance of a kind rarely found. It seems to me that this
is almost always true of the basic energy sources of the society and especially
the electrical grid, the destruction of which makes it impossible to purify the
water so children will get waterborne diseases and hospitals are put out of
business. It is going to be a rare military advantage that is actually proportional
to that.
I am not saying we did the contrary in Kosovo. Maybe not. I worry a little
bit about the change in the way we bombed electrical facilities toward the end
of the war, but I'm not even sure that there's any objection there. It does
sound as if we pretty much made a point of not permanently causing pro-
longed damage.
Just one final point. I have not seen the RAND study Ms. Judith Miller was
talking about this morning that apparently argues that a fear about the extent
of the civilian damage was part of the reason that Milosevic conceded. 1 I am
very impressed with the argument in Robert Pape's Bombing to Win book that I
am sure many of you know. His thesis is basically that strategic bombing has
never succeeded. 2 That is that the attempt to break the will has never suc-
ceeded. Pape's argument mainly being that there is a missing mechanism. The
argument is that if you caused the civilians enough pain, then they will want
to change the government or end the war, so they will. But the "so they will"
part is what is usually not there. In the case ofmany governments if they could
have done that, they might have done it a long time ago. It's especially un-
likely they'll be able to do it under the conditions of a national security
emergency.
So I doubt very much that that was true in the case of Serbia, although ob-
viously I need to look at that report. If so, of course, that is very different from
1. See Ms. Miller's commentary in this volume.
2. Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1996).
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the position that says the civilian damage is unintended but proportional. If
you're hoping for this effect, then you are hoping for the civilian damage. That
then has become strategic bombing of the World War II sort, not an example
of unintentional civilian damage that might then be proportional. That is a
very different matter and, as far as I can see, an unacceptable way to proceed.
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Reasonable Military Commanders and Reasonable Civilians
Charles Dunlap:
I found Professor Bothe's comment about the reasonable military com-
mander and that we ought to have reasonable civilians very interesting. What
kind of training regime would you suggest for the civilians to have the compe-
tence of the reasonable military commander? Because we find it very difficult
to teach even lawyers the art of war sufficiently so that they can render appro-
priate legal advice.
Michael Bothe:
The point with the "training," I think is not well taken. What is required in-
deed is a dialogue. This is a two-way street, of course, but "training" implies
that I know better and I have to teach the others. That's not the point in a
democratic system. We have to have two-way communications and to start a
dialogue on that assumption. "I know better" is just the wrong way. I am quite
well prepared to tell the same story to some of the human rights organizations
who think they know better. This is a lesson I think that both sides should
learn.
Harvey Dalton:
I'm a bit worried about that answer. A military commander knows how to
employ the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) better. I'm going to defer
to his judgment in terms of weaponizing and employing TLAM. I may provide
him my legal advice in respect to targeting, but he knows better in terms of
that weapon.
Leslie Green:
I, too, am worried about this "reasonable civilian"—this idea of the ordi-
nary civilian and the ordinary soldier. It reminds me of the attitude sanctioned
Discussion
by too many war crimes tribunals. What was the thought of a reasonable man?
A reasonable man is the man on a downtown bus; that is not the reasonable
soldier. One of the reasons that I don't like civilian judges trying military of-
fenses is that they don't know the circumstances that were prevailing at the
time that led to the soldier's actions. The question of what is reasonable in
times of conflict depends on what is reasonable in the eyes of the man who is
involved in that conflict. That would only be accepted by those who have sim-
ilar background knowledge, not by one who has been securely moved up in
some Inn of Court.
Michael Bothe:
Maybe I'm too much under the impact of the constitutional development
of my country after the war. One of the lessons that the persons who drafted
the German constitution after the war wanted to draw from historic experi-
ence was to integrate the military into a civilian system of values, not to have
the military as a state within the State. Arguing that military matters are
something which the military knows and the civilian doesn't is utterly a step in
the wrong direction.
Natalino Ronzitti:
Ruth Wedgwood and Admiral Robertson have advocated the wisdom of
having military people sitting on courts that apply international humanitarian
law. I have mixed feelings on this point because you are referring to your
American tradition. You have military people with the necessary knowledge
of international humanitarian law, but I don't know if in other countries there
are military people or military judges who have a good knowledge of interna-
tional humanitarian law.
I guess I'm more concerned because not all wartime crimes are battlefield
crimes. There are courts such as the ICC and ICTY that,are competent to try
not only war crimes, but also crimes against humanity and genocide. Genocide
is very, very hard to establish. It is easy to define, but it is really difficult to
prove that the person, the head of State, has committed genocide. So I believe
that civilian judges can play a role, but you can have special chambers to deal
with battlefield crimes. In those cases it would be best to rely on the opinion of
the experts.
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Legal Advisors and Time*Sensitive Targets
Charles Dunlap:
Kosovo was in many ways a sort of a set-piece operation where you had the
luxury of multilevel reviews of targets and so forth, but we are building tech-
nological systems to try to close the decision loop in the Air Operations Cen-
ter to literally minutes where, at best, we are going to be able to have a JAG at
the table to try to provide some instantaneous advice regarding targets of op-
portunity. I'm not sure how these processes will be able to work except by hav-
ing the JAG being able to make some kind of instantaneous judgment, but this
again reflects back on training and the need to know the operational art.
Harvey Dalton:
The dynamic during Kosovo was that we would get these nominations
maybe two to three days in advance and we had a constant input ofnominated
targets. So what we reviewed and approved would be the targets two days
down the road. Your point is well taken about the timeline and the fact it's go-
ing to get faster. My only suggestion would be that we're going to have to have
a lawyer in the loop twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. It will be a
continuous review process and the lawyer can be there for the targets of op-
portunity. But for the most part this process is a revolving process that may be
two days ahead of when you actually use the weapon.
Tony Montgomery:
For time-sensitive targeting in Kosovo, these issues did not even come up
to the European Command, much less go to the Joint Staff. Time-sensitive
targets or mobile targets were delegated down and the guys on the ground
could address those using the same practices they've always used, which are
basically using their best judgment. There were people in the Combined Air
Operations Center that provided legal advice to General Short.
What the targeting process that everyone and I have been talking about re-
lates to what we think of as strategic targets, not the ones that pop up and we
hit opportunistically. Though I will say that the issue of dealing with the tanks
and artillery in houses and how to deal with that from a political level as op-
posed to just if you see a tank in the house you go and whack it, that did get up
to the higher levels just because of the consequences that would fall from
NATO forces being seen to go in and take down some houses that supposedly
had tanks inside of them.
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Coalition Approval of Targets
Charles Kogan:
It appears that there was a certain dissatisfaction on the part of the Europe-
ans with some aspects of their input into the target approval process. This, I
believe, came out in the French after-action report by their defense ministry
stating that the B- 1 raids from Missouri were conducted outside the NATO
chain-of-command. I wonder if Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery could com-
ment on that?
Tony Montgomery:
As far as I know, and I have to qualify it in that way, there was no target
struck unilaterally by the United States. What I mean is that everything that
was struck had some approval by NATO. Now that does not necessarily mean
that each of the nineteen countries sat down and approved each of the indi-
vidual targets. The Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) had
been delegated certain authority. The NATO Secretary-General had been
delegated certain authority. Since the US European Command (EUCOM)
was not in that chain of command, I have never seen and I have no real idea
just how much authority SACEUR had been delegated. I am aware of the
French after-action report. I have read it. I am just not aware of any instance
where there was a unilateral attack by the United States. I would be surprised
if there had been one.
There was a great deal of effort made to do as much as possible to provide
information, but EUCOM did not work for NATO. All ofmy efforts and all of
the efforts of the EUCOM targeting cell were directed solely towards satisfying
the US desire for information on the targets. We did not provide that target-
ing data directly to NATO. We were never authorized to do that and we did
not take that step. Our data went to the Joint Staff. It went to our political au-
thorities and our military authorities. We were aware that there was some dis-
satisfaction within certain NATO channels concerning the targeting process,
but we could not fix that ourselves.
When Civilian Objects Become Military Objectives
Charles Garraway:
I would like to discuss objects because there has been considerable confu-
sion over the definition of military objective in Article 55(2) of Protocol I. I
think the problem has been slightly expanded by some of the language used
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today such as "traditional military objects" and "dual-use facilities." The
problem with the definition is between military objectives and civilian ob-
jects. Civilian objects are defined as anything that is not a military objective.
Not all military objects are military objectives. I would suggest that the USS
Constitution in Boston Harbor is a military object, but not necessarily a military
objective. Similarly, a civilian house, which may not be being used by the mili-
tary in any way but may be interrupting a tank advance, can by its location be a
military objective. So certainly on the European side of the pond, there is a lot
of confusion about military objects and civilian objects with people saying that
civilian objects cannot ever be attacked, forgetting about the distinction be-
tween civilian objects as defined in Protocol I and civilian objects as used in the
ordinary common sense term. Would the panel have anything to say on that?
Yoram Dinstein:
A few words about defended and undefended localities on the frontline. It
must be understood that in a frontline situation, as a rule, the pertinent issue
is less whether an object constitutes a military objective and more whether it is
part of a defended locality. The term "locality" (introduced in Protocol I) is
narrower than the expression "village, town or city" originally employed by the
Hague Regulations. Whatever language is used, the point is that if a pre-
scribed area is defended, any building within the area (other than an assembly
point for the collection of wounded, marked as such) would be exposed to at-
tack, irrespective of its ostensible status as a civilian object.
This is particularly relevant to scenario of house-to-house fighting epito-
mized by Stalingrad. If house-to-house fighting goes on in a particular city
block, there is no need to evaluate the legal standing of every edifice within
the block. Any such edifice can be shelled, bombed or otherwise attacked not-
withstanding the fact that for the moment it does not serve a military func-
tion. The reason is the underlying expectation that the tide of house-to-house
fighting will ultimately engulf it although, as yet, this has not come to pass.
Obviously, the result can be grave collateral damage to civilians.
The issue of collateral damage to civilians is tied in with that of propor-
tionality. The phrase proportionality is often misunderstood. Protocol I does
not mention proportionality at all. The only expression used there is "exces-
sive." The question is whether the injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects is excessive compared to the military advantage anticipated. Many
people tend to confuse excessive with extensive. However, injury/damage to
non-combatants can be exceedingly extensive without being excessive, simply
because the military advantage anticipated is of paramount importance.
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Consider the rudimentary example of the bombing of a major munitions fac-
tory. The factory may have thousands of civilian employees who are liable to
be injured in an air raid. Notwithstanding the enormous civilian casualties
likely to ensue, the enemy air force is allowed to strike the factory.
A related point is that of shielding combatants with civilians. A belligerent
party shielding a military objective with civilians is acting in breach of the law
of armed conflict, and it bears full responsibility for the civilian blood shed by
an enemy attack against that military objective. Coming back to my Stalin-
grad example, once the Soviets decided to turn the city into a battlefield, it
was their responsibility to remove civilians from the line of fire. A residential
locality on the frontline can be saved from destruction by being declared
non-defended. But a belligerent party cannot eat the cake and have it. Logic
and experience militate against an attempt to defend a place to the hilt and at
the same time expecting the civilian population in situ to be protected from
the ravages of war.
Relating the Permissible Mission to the Military Advantage
Christopher Greenwood:
There is surely a difference between taking into account what a belligerent
is seeking to achieve and trying to determine whether a particular attack will
give it a military advantage. Professor Bothe seemed to suggest that we must
account for what the belligerent is entitled to seek to achieve. Now it seems to
me that an attack does not offer a military advantage ifyou will destroy some-
thing, when its destruction is not going to make the blindest difference to your
own military tactics, or to what you expect the enemy's military tactics to be.
To say that a State must not destroy something that does indeed interfere with
its game plan because that should not have been its game plan in the first
place because, for example, it is acting out of humanitarian motives, that
seems to me to be an entirely different matter. I would be grateful to see some
clarification of the distinction between the two.
Michael Bothe:
This is of course the fundamental issue: how far does the context of the mil-
itary operation have an impact on the notion of military advantage? I think
that the overall context of a military operation has an impact on what can be
considered as advantage in this particular context. What you are suggesting is
that any conflict is like any other conflict. This is also the basis of the objec-
tion of Professor von Heinegg in his Commentary. You say for the purposes of
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the jus in hello, any armed conflict is like the other. There is no distinction. I
recognize that if I try to make distinctions, then I am very close to mixing jus in
hello and jus ad helium. I repeat that is something I do not want to do because it
means foregoing one of the essential bases of the application of the jus in hello,
which is reciprocity. Anything which risks negatively affecting reciprocity, I
think, should be out.
There, I agree with all the objections that have been made. But this being
so, I am still not convinced that you can take the notion of military advantage
out of its context. If the declared purpose of a military operation is limited, as
it was in Kosovo, you cannot divorce the notion of advantage from that pur-
pose. It is not just the subjective intent; it is the objective character of the
entire mission. The Independent Commission on Kosovo comes up with
something similar and even goes a little further. They say there should be a
protocol three on humanitarian intervention, because it is not appropriate to
have the whole spectrum of otherwise lawful means of combat for an exclu-
sively humanitarian intervention. I am not sure whether I would go that far,
but I think that without changing the law, my interpretation of military ad-
vantage is a possible restraint.
This brings me to the more fundamental question which was asked by
Wolff von Heinegg. Is it wishful thinking? Or is it a real development of the
law? This is a distinction that sometimes is hard to make if we are in a situa-
tion of transition. We do not yet know whether Kosovo is transition or not.
Operation Allied Force was for some something novel. It is a part of a process,
as the United Nations Secretary-General put it, of redefining sovereignty and
drawing different conclusions from the requirements of sovereignty than we
did before. I am not so sure whether this is the case, but we are entering the
question of the jus ad helium here, and I refrain from commenting on that. If
new types of military operations are developing, having completely different
purposes from traditional war, then it is not only a matter of the jus ad helium.
It's also a matter of the means how these conflicts are conducted.
This also goes into the question of the ethical considerations which are dis-
cussed in relation to Kosovo. The standard objection from the moral point of
view is from the traditional helium iustum theory (there was a just cause but
not a just means). This is standard in the literature on that subject. So these
things are linked. And the relationship between jus ad helium and jus in hello is
not one watertight compartment. That is wishful thinking. We are at a point
where the law might change, and I think it's absolutely legitimate to think
about the direction in which it changes. My conclusion is formulated farther
in terms of the question than in terms of a statement of lex lata.
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Yoram Dinstein:
I have already tried to underscore in my paper the relativistic nature of a
military advantage. Let me add here that often, whereas you do not know for
sure what's good for you, you clearly perceive what you would like to deny to
the other side. Thus, a military advantage to one belligerent party would sim-
ply be a mirror image of a military disadvantage to the adverse side. This brings
me to my disagreement with Professor Bothe regarding the issue of bridges and
railroads. At a certain juncture in the course of hostilities a bridge may just be
standing there, without anyone appreciating its military value. It is only when
a belligerent party calculates ofwhat value the bridge could be to the enemy at
a later stage that it dawns on military commanders that they'd better do some-
thing to eliminate the risk. The issue is not always destruction or capture: neu-
tralization of a bridge to the enemy is another form of military advantage.
The momentous significance of some bridges should be manifest to all
when it is borne in mind that World War II may have been prolonged by some
six months only because of a British failure to capture a crucial bridge on the
Rhine ("a bridge too far") . And it may as well be added that, had not the US
Army captured intact the rail bridge at Remagen, the issue of the crossing of
the Rhine might possibly have plagued the Allies a lot longer than it did.
What is true of bridges may also be true of railroads. The Panzer divisions in
the Battle of Normandy fought superbly. But since the rail system had been
paralyzed by Allied bombings, the Panzers had to reach the frontline—some-
times from the other side of France—on their own power. This took a long
time (in some cases, up to two weeks), denying the Germans the opportunity
to stop the Allied forces at the beaches. Moreover, by the time that the Ger-
man armored units arrived at the frontline, they were (1) out of fuel, (2) in
dire need of repair ofmany machines (while lacking the facilities to undertake
the repair), and (3) the crews were tired and in some instances expecting de-
feat. In all, the dramatic Allied victory in June 1944 probably owes more to the
systematic bombings of the French railroads than to the actual matching of
tanks against tanks.
"DuaLPurpose" Targets
Yoram Dinstein:
A question was posed to me about "dual purpose" targets. I am not enam-
ored of this phrase and have not used it in my paper. It appears neither in Pro-
tocol I nor in any other LOAC instrument that I am familiar with. I do not
know where "dual use" comes from, and can only surmise that it has
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penetrated the lingo through articles published by human rights (rather than
law of armed conflicts) scholars. To the best of my knowledge, references to
"dual use" started with ill-founded criticisms of coalition bombings of the
electric grid in Iraq in 1991. Since the electric grid in Iraq was totally inte-
grated, attacks against it—and its installations—resulted not only in a tre-
mendous military advantage (shutting down radar stations, military
computers, etc.), but also extensive damage to civilians: hospitals stopped op-
erating, water pumping and filtering facilities came to a standstill, etc. From a
legal viewpoint, a "dual use" of Iraq's electric grid did not alter its singular and
unequivocal status as a military objective. There was, as usual with military
objectives, the question of proportionality where collateral damage to civil-
ians is concerned. But the extensive damage to civilians was not excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated. What was true of Iraq is
equally true of Kosovo.
One has to constantly bear in mind that war is war; not a chess game. There
is always a price-tag in human suffering. Admittedly, Kosovo is not a very ap-
propriate backdrop for such a point to be made, inasmuch as the war was con-
ducted on NATO's part on the assumption of zero casualties (although that
meant zero casualties to NATO). In any event, no serious war can be founded
on such an assumption. Some wars are more unfortunate than others in terms
of actual bloodshed, but in the long run civilian suffering cannot be utterly
avoided.
John Murphy mentioned that in present-day wars it may paradoxically be
safer to be a combatant than a civilian. This shocking truth has become a gov-
erning factor of modern hostilities only since the outbreak of World War II.
Earlier, the situation was entirely different. As late as World War I, in the
Western Front at least, civilian casualties were mild while a whole generation
of young combatants was destroyed in the trenches.
The current disproportion of the civilian/combatant ratio of casualties is
totally unacceptable. Anyone even mildly interested in international humani-
tarian law must strive to bring about a better world in which civilized losses in
war are minimized. Nevertheless, the realistic goal is to minimize civilian casu-
alties, not to eliminate them altogether. There is no way to eliminate civilian
deaths and injuries due to legitimate collateral damage, mistake, accident and
just sheer bad luck.
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Targeting Regime Elites
John Norton Moore:
As we seek to stop aggressive war and to end the all too frequent slaughter
of civilian populations as we saw in Bosnia and had begun to see in Kosovo be-
fore the NATO intervention, there has been increasing theoretical interest in
the focusing of deterrents, including intra-war deterrents, on the regime elites
who were ordering the aggressive war or the genocide in the first place. From
that observation, I have a couple of questions for any member of the panel
who would like to respond. First, did NATO in fact consider that in relation
to targeting Milosevic or his assets or his principal henchmen? Second, did the
laws of war constrain NATO in any way from targeting the regime elites in
Serbia ifNATO had wanted to do so? And third, if there were any such con-
straints, do you believe that it is necessary to modify the law of war to permit
the kinds of targeting of assets of regime elites or at least those that are order-
ing the continuation of such wars? And if so, what kinds of constraints or re-
straints if any would you put on them?
Michael Bothe:
Well, I cannot of course comment on what NATO considerations in this
respect were, as these were not privy to me. As far as the law of war is con-
cerned, targeting the elite is perhaps not the right term in this respect. It mat-
ters whether the persons in question are combatants or military commanders.
If the president happens to be the military commander, as said earlier today,
he or she can be targeted. If not, no. This is of course a certain constraint. I
think it is a healthy constraint ifyou ask me. I would not like to see the laws of
war modified in this respect because that would really open the door to do
away with the distinction which I think is a healthy one.
Robert F. Turner:
We are trying to distinguish jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but the modern
view is (at least when you're dealing within the setting of aggression) that the
prevailing responsibility of States is not to be neutral but to be in opposition to
aggression. You are not obliged to send troops, but you are not supposed to be
in favor of the aggressor. If you are in a setting where international law allows
the use of lethal force in self-defense or collective self-defense in response to
the aggression, then the question becomes not are you assassinating a leader,
which is by definition murder, but rather which target do you use lethal force
against. If one of your choices in your best professional judgment is that we
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can stop this aggression by taking out the head aggressor, the head war crimi-
nal—even if he doesn't wear a uniform, but is the person who made the deci-
sion to commit the aggressive act—are you saying that it is in every instance
preferable to say no, we would rather slaughter twenty or thirty thousand sol-
diers out on the field who may have had nothing to do with the policy and may
have had no chance of going to Canada? Saddam Hussein, for example, was
rough on his deserters. How do you deal with the doctrine of proportionality
when you say it is better to kill thirty thousand innocent soldiers than to en-
danger the key war criminal who started the entire attack? Does that change
anybody's attitude?
Wolff H. von Heinegg:
What you just asked only at first glance seems to be logical, because it does
not matter. What the law of armed conflict has achieved from 1977 and be-
yond is something that we should not underestimate. There is the principle of
distinction not only with regard to targeting, but also with regard to the ques-
tion of distinction between combatants and noncombatants. So if there is a
person that is not a combatant, a noncombatant I must say, then this person
may not be attacked
—
period. It doesn't matter whether this decision will lead
to twenty thousand deaths in the field, because those who are dying in the
field or in the air or in the sea are combatants. They are legitimate military
targets.
Ifwe are trying to modify the existing law by such considerations, then what
we have achieved until now will be destroyed very easily. As soon as you ac-
cept that jus ad bellum considerations play a role when it comes to the question
of applicability of the jus in hello, the jus in hello is lessened. It is being de-
formed. Suddenly it doesn't depend only on the parties to the conflict, but on
somebody else (like Her Majesty's government, for example) to determine
whether certain measures taken during armed conflict by the parties to the
conflict are legal or not under the laws of war. I say we must rather leave the
laws ofwar and leave the law of armed conflict as it is with the principle of dis-
tinction between combatants and noncombatants and not modify it with any
considerations taken from outside the law of armed conflict.
Robert F. Turner:
The concept of the noncombatant was one of innocence. It was that this
person's life has no effect on the outcome of the war, and therefore they
should not be harmed. If you trace the history of the law or the rule that says
you cannot touch the other guy's king, Vattel and Grotius and others point
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out this is not the logical rule of law. This is an agreement that the leaders
made to protect their own safety in an era where waging aggressive war was
the sovereign prerogative of kings. What I am saying is now that we have
moved on to make waging aggressive war a war crime, why do we still decide
that the head war criminal is an innocent party who should be given the same
protection as a Red Cross worker at the expense of all these young kids that
get sent out there and slaughtered?
Harvey Dalton:
The study that Judith Miller cited this morning did conclude that there was
an effort to impose pressure on the elites of Yugoslavia so as to have them im-
pose pressure on Milosevic to terminate the conflict. That was done by target'
ing military-industrial plants and facilities owned or run by these elites and, as
Ms Miller mentioned this morning, the Rand Study found that that was in fact
more effective than the attacks on the military objectives. Now that is a very
disturbing conclusion. I think it is very disturbing, because I do think the laws
of armed conflict still apply. At least from our standpoint in targeting and ap-
proving these targets, there had to be a very clear military link between these
industrial facilities and the war effort. We required that, but the pressure later
on may be otherwise.
John Norton Moore:
I think this does raise some very important questions because all that we
have and all that we do and all that we should do in the law of war, as in any
other area of law, needs to serve a variety of important goals. We are trying to
serve the humanitarian goals of preventing aggressive war, of minimizing casu-
alties and preventing genocide. If, in fact, we discover as a significant body of
newer information such as the Rand study is suggesting that a focus on regime
elites, including the head of the State if necessary, is more effective than a va-
riety of other applications, then it seems to me that is something that deserves
very careful consideration.
222
PART IV
COLLATERAL DAMAGE

Introduction
John Norton Moore
W;e have a distinguished panel of experts addressing issues associatedwith collateral damage. That general rubric would include issues
that are dealt with in Protocol I, referred to as excessive civilian damage in at-
tacks on otherwise lawful targets, and issues regarding feasible precautions in
attacking.
I have three brief points that I would like to put before us before turning to
the panelists. The first is for us to consider just how far we have come in rela-
tion to the systematic inclusion of the laws of war in military operations and to
reflect for a moment on the creation of the field called operational law in the
United States. As I think everyone in this room knows full well, the United
States and particularly the US military had a sorry experience in Vietnam.
When the war was over and we looked back and sought to look at the lessons
learned about Vietnam, a number of things emerged that were very important
in relation to the laws of war. The first of those is that we had not trained as
adequately in the laws of war as we should have. The result was a My Lai
which had enormous cost for the United States in that war. We also found
that one of the problems was a series of areas of advice given and constraints
placed on the United States military ostensibly designed for ethical and law of
war reasons, but in fact uninformed about proper targeting and correct opera-
tion of the law of war. The result was a series of inhibitions that were not re-
quired by the law of war and which dramatically stretched out the war and
perhaps in the end cost the United States the war in Vietnam.
After Vietnam there was a review, led for the most part by the US military,
that said in effect "We're going to have to in the future have a cadre of people
that are extraordinarily well trained in the law of war so that we won't be
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making the mistakes on either side of this equation—either unnecessarily pro-
hibiting targeting that is essential for warfighting, or on the other hand not
controlling activities that are violations of the laws of war." The result has
been an extraordinary input of good legal advice regarding US military activi-
ties. Indeed I think we can say that the first real test of this came during the
Gulf War in which we saw extremely careful vetting of virtually every target
with equal emphasis on both sides of the equation
—
permitting effective
warfighting on the one hand, and on the other hand preventing problems that
could be serious humanitarian violations that would undermine the war effort.
It seems to me that the same thing has happened again in Kosovo. As we
put this in perspective, the real starting point is to notice that there has never
been a military campaign in the history of the world that has had such a care-
ful input and consideration of targeting, proportionality and all of the other is-
sues than in the GulfWar and again in the Kosovo operation under NATO. It
is a sea change.
My second point is that while this colloquium is quite properly focused on
the issue of lessons from the NATO campaign in Kosovo, let us at least re-
mind ourselves that there is
—
quite apart from NATO activities—a very seri-
ous enforcement problem in relation to massive noncompliance with the laws
of war by the opponents that we were facing. We can go all the way back to
Vietnam and the massive violations of the laws of war by North Vietnam, not
unintended by the government as in the case ofMy Lai, which was carried out
by an out-of-control second lieutenant who was poorly trained. We saw the
same problem in Bosnia with the slaughter of people in that conflict. We saw
it in Kosovo, and we saw it in Rwanda. It has not gone away. It is still with us
in the modern world. So one of the jobs for us as academics and members of
the government and those that are interested seriously in humanitarian law is
never to forget that we have a fundamental enforcement problem in relation
to the non-democratic governments that are still committing democide, geno-
cide and other massive insults in relation to the laws of war.
The third and final context point I would like to make is simply to remind
us that as with all law, the laws of war are intended to serve important goals.
They must be judged in the end by their effectiveness in serving those goals. In
this context of the laws of war, all of us know that there is in fact a careful bal-
ance that has to be met. For a variety of ethical, moral and other reasons we
want to make sure that we protect against unnecessary and excessive damage.
All of us are very aware of principles of discrimination, of proportionality, of
avoidance of unnecessary suffering and other important principles of the laws
of war that lead in that direction. Let me just suggest that there is another
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critical reason for democracies to support such laws. That is for democracies it
is essential that they comply with humanitarian objectives in wartime. To fail
to do that has extraordinary cost for the democracies and the entire politi-
cal-military effort. If we learned anything from the Vietnam context, it is the
great importance of democracies fighting wars in strict compliance with hu-
manitarian objectives.
There is another consideration that makes the issue far more complex and
far more difficult because we also learned in the Vietnam context that exces-
sive constraints can be highly costly. If all we had was the one side of the equa-
tion, it would be tempting simply to say that we can always keep placing more
and more constraints on the warfighting effort. Unfortunately we know in the
real world that ifwe place too many constraints on that effort it will have costs
that will undermine the very goals that we seek to support through the laws of
war. We can endanger our own military when we have constraints that are too
great. In addition, we may end up prolonging the war—mitigating the shock
value necessary to promptly end the conflict—and as a consequence end up
with many, many more combatants and civilians killed than if the war had
been properly fought and ended at an early time.
I was the Counselor on International Law to the US Department of State
during the Vietnam War and I witnessed with great interest what happened
in a three-week period when the President of the United States, President
Nixon, suddenly decided to fight the war the proper way—not by violating
the laws of war or engaging in carpet bombing or anything of that sort—but
instead by doing what the Joint Chiefs had suggested that he do many years
before. He simply mined Haiphong Harbor, which as far as I know had zero
casualties on all sides but suddenly prevented 90% to 95% of all the importa-
tion of war supplies into North Vietnam. In addition to that, he carried out
the "Christmas" bombing, which was not an area bombing of Hanoi or
Haiphong, but was instead a careful attack on rail lines in the Hanoi area.
The result was North Vietnam came to the table for the first time in the en-
tire history of the war seriously seeking the end of the war. Within three
weeks, the Paris accords were agreed and the United States decided the war
was over and came home. The point is this could have been done at any point
in the preceding years of the war and casualties on all sides would have been
reduced very dramatically.
There is yet another problem if the constraints are too excessive. At some
point if the cost of war fighting by the democracies in resisting aggression,
genocide and democide is too high, we will in fact discourage the democracies
from undertaking those efforts. That of course in the end is what happened in
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Vietnam when the United States finally came home. The other party then
simply had a regular army invasion of the south and the result was a blood'
bath, which we now know resulted in at least one hundred thousand killed in
the south, a million boat people, with a half million dying at sea, and some-
where between one and three million dying in Cambodia. So what we do in
relation to advice on the laws of war is important in terms of the real world
and real human lives and real effectiveness in preventing aggression, stop-
ping aggression and in fact stopping genocide as well. I simply place these
points in front of you as context as we move forward to our discussion on col-
lateral damage.
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Some Legal (And A Few Ethical)
Dimensions Of The Collateral Damage
Resulting From NATO's Kosovo Campaign
John F. Murphy
Introduction
A ny analysis of the legal dimensions of NATO's Kosovo campaignshould first distinguish between the jus ad helium, the law of resort to
the use of armed force, and the jus in hello, the law regulating the way the armed
force is employed, of that conflict. To be sure, there is no "Chinese wall" sepa-
rating the jus ad helium and jus in hello aspects of the Kosovo campaign. For ex-
ample, assuming arguendo, as some have argued, 1 that international law
recognizes a doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and this doctrine serves as
a justification for NATO's resort to armed force in the Kosovo campaign, it is
arguable that the military action undertaken must be designed to prevent the
humanitarian catastrophe unfolding. 2 Nonetheless, the focus of this paper is
not the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the bombing to prevent or minimize
Serbian "ethnic cleansing" or other war crimes in Kosovo. Rather, it is on the
collateral damage to civilians caused by this bombing.
According to the organizers of this colloquium, this panel is to address in
particular the following issues:
* The author would like to thank Kevin Jarboe, a graduate of Villanova University School of Law
and Andrew Kenis, a third year student at the Law School, for research and assistance on this paper.
1. See, e.g., Michael Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law,
78 Foreign Affairs 2 (May-June 1999).
2. I have so argued in my chapter on Kosovo Agonistes, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (Chi Carmody, Yuji Iwasawa, and Sylvia Rhodes eds., 2002).
Legal and Ethical Dimensions of Collateral Damage
(1) Does the use of precision-guided munitions (so-called "smart bombs")
lead to a duty to use those types of weapons exclusively in future
conflicts?
(2) If so, does it mean that two adversaries may be subjected to differing
legal and ethical regimes, dependent on their relative level of
technological sophistication?
(3) What degree of injury and damage to civilians can be regarded as
excessive, and consequently disproportionate, as compared to the
military advantage gained?
(4) What are the legal and ethical implications of NATO's apparent
efforts to minimize its own combat casualties through high-altitude
bombing and avoidance of a ground campaign, and did this greatly
increase the risk of civilian casualties?
Each of these issues, along with issues related thereto, will be addressed
seriatim in this paper.
Precision-Guided Munitions and International Law
Before turning to the issue of whether international law does or should re-
quire the use of precision-guided munitions in future conflicts, we need to de-
fine a few terms. The US Department of Defense defines precision-guided
munitions as "a weapon that uses a seeker to detect electromagnetic energy
reflected from a target or reference point, and through processing, provides
guidance commands to a control system that guides the weapon to the tar-
get."3 Like Stuart Belt, in his extensive treatment of the subject,4 this paper
does not discuss the use of air-to-air missiles, because they normally do not
produce collateral damage. Rather, the focus of the paper is on air-to-ground
munitions. Again like Belt, this paper does not distinguish between smart, ac-
curate, or precision weapons but instead groups them together as precision-
guided weapons. It does distinguish the precision-guided weapon from an
3. Precision Weapons, available at http://www.dtic.mi1/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/ 04864.html,
last visited Dec. 27, 1999, and quoted in Stuart Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of
a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL LAW
REVIEW 115, 118(2000).
4. Belt, supra note 3, at 118.
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unguided weapon by noting that the former has some type of in-flight guid-
ance system. This in-flight guidance system may or may not be powered. The
so-called Paveway series of weapons, for example, are laser guided. 5 For a de-
tailed discussion of various kinds of precision-guided munitions, the reader
should consult Belt's article.
In his article, Belt notes that US military operations or US-led military op-
erations have seen a dramatic increase in the use of precision-guided muni-
tions from the "opening salvo of Operation Desert Storm" to the "closing shot
of Kosovo"6—a five-fold increase to be precise. Between the Desert Storm
and Kosovo campaigns, Belt points out, there was Operation Desert Fox, an
intensive four-day US bombing campaign against Iraq, with the stated goal
"to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass de-
struction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors." 7 According to
Belt, Operation Desert Fox offered the US military an opportunity to "battle-
test some new smart weapons and reaffirm lessons learned in Desert Storm."8
Belt quotes David Isby, writing for Jane's Missiles and Rockets, who report-
edly stated: "Operation Desert Fox was the largest air offensive to be waged
largely with guided weapons rather than 'dumb' munitions that [had] pre-
dominated in all previous major offensive uses of air power, including the
1991 Gulf War."9
As elaborately detailed by Belt, there seems to be no question that the
United States has made increasingly heavy use of precision-guided munitions
in recent military operations. Whether it now has an obligation under interna-
tional law to do so in future conflicts is the issue to which we now turn.
Does International Law Now Require the Use of Precision~Guided
Munitions in Future Conflicts?
It is clear that there is no requirement under international law that preci-
sion-guided munitions be used exclusively in future conflicts. A strong advo-
cate of the use of precision-guided munitions, Belt admits that they have their
limitations:
5. Id. at 118-19.
6. Id. at 126.
7. Statement by President William Clinton, quoted by Richard Newman, in Bombs over Baghdad,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 28, 1998, at 32, cited in id. at 131 n.108.
8. Belt, supra note 3, at 131.
9. David Isby, Cruise Missiles Flew Half the Desert Fox Strike Missions, JANE'S MISSILES AND
ROCKETS (1999), cited in id. at 132 n.l 10.
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The function of the precision-guided weapon, however, has its limitations.
There are limitations on its efficacy and missions that are clearly better suited
for mass bombing. Large maneuvering units in the field are excellent targets for
unguided, gravity bombs (carpet bombing) and much less so for
precision-guided weapons. Not only does the carpet-bombing produce favorable
psychological impact, but also the number of precision-guided weapons
required to hit the large number of open field targets would be prohibitively
expensive. This idea was confirmed by W. Hays Parks, who concluded that
B-52s were the right platform to use because they were able to drop a large
number of bombs into an area where no protected objects existed and where
Iraqi troops were entrenched in the desert and difficult to attack. In essence, the
use of precision-guided weapons and that of unguided, en masse bombs have a
complementary role. Precision-guided weapons are particularly useful against
strategic targets that often times have a locus near heavily populated civilian
areas whereas en masse bombing is useful for targets where the goal is
widespread damage and the demoralization of troops. This was the practice
during Operation Desert Storm. 10
Accordingly, the issue should be restated as whether there is an obligation
under international law to use precision-guided munitions in attacks on urban
areas. Belt is of the opinion that there is.
At the risk of oversimplification, one may say that treaties and norms of
customary international law are the primary sources of international law, as
reflected in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 11 Both sources
have played a major role in the law of armed conflict. We begin with norms of
customary international law.
10. Id. at 130.
11. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1179, provides:
1 . The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to provisions of article 59 [which states that "The decision of the Court has
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case"],
judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.
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A. Customary International Law
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the basic concept of customary in-
ternational law has recently come under attack, and one commentator has
gone so far as to call for its elimination as a source of international law. 12 Be
that as it may, the law of armed conflict has long recognized the importance of
customary international law through the so-called "Martens Clause," which
appears in the preambles to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on
Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, as well as in Article 1 (2) of the 1977 Pro-
tocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and which
provides in pertinent part: "In cases not included in the Regulations . . . the in-
habitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience." 13 The practical significance of the Martens Clause is that
"it contains a built-in mechanism to fill in the lacunae existing in the law of
war at any particular time." 14 For the United States, the Martens Clause may
take on added importance at the present time, since it is not a party to either
of the 1977 Additional Protocols.
The classic description of the process of creating customary international
law is that ofManley O. Hudson, a Judge on the International Court ofJustice
and an eminent authority on international law. According to Hudson, the es-
sential elements of the customary international law process include:
1. concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations;
2. continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;
3. conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing
international law; and
4. general acquiescence in the practice by other States. 15
12. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
International Law 449 (2000).
13. For a brief discussion of the Martens Clause, see Howard Levie, The Laws of War and
Neutrality, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 307 (John Moore, Frederick Tipson, and Robert
Turner eds., 1990).
14. Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of armed Conflict: Personal and
Material Fields of Application 12 (1992).
15. Manley Hudson, [19501 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/Ser. A/1950/Add.l.
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There is general agreement that the first, third and fourth of Hudson's ele-
ments are the most crucial under modern approaches to the customary inter-
national law process. At the same time, however, each of these three elements
has been subject to critical scrutiny and debate.
There is, for example, no agreement on what constitutes State practice. 16
The US Department of State emphasizes the acts of governments but not UN
resolutions. This approach supports the claims of States, such as the United
States, with strong centralized governments. In contrast, some scholars and
less powerful States would include as State practice normative statements in
drafts of the International Law Commission, resolutions of the United Na-
tions General Assembly, and recitals in international instruments. 17
Hudson's requirements that States engage in a practice with an under-
standing that it is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law
and that there be general acquiescence in the practice by other States raises
the complex issue ofopinio juris, which is the general acceptance of a norm as a
legal obligation by the world community. The concept of opinio juris intro-
duces a subjective element in the customary international law process because
it requires that States when engaging in or refraining from a particular practice
do so under an understanding that they have a legal right to engage in the
practice or a legal obligation to refrain from engaging in the practice.
With respect to the methodological problem of determining opinio juris y
Professor Anthony D'Amato has suggested that, as a requirement for a finding
of opinio juris, an objective claim of legality be articulated in advance of, or
concurrently with, the State practice allegedly required or permitted by cus-
tomary international law. 18 Interestingly, under D'Amato's approach, the artic-
ulation of a claim of legality could be made either by a State, a recognized
writer, or a court. 19 To others, however, this "'claims approach' defines away
the requirement of the normative conviction of the community."20 Moreover,
D'Amato concedes that it is not possible to determine if a majority of States
are conscious of any international obligation. 21
Other commentators would dismiss or at least minimize the importance of
an articulation of a claim of legality on the ground that the "best evidence of
16. See Kelly, supra note 12, at 500-07.
17. Id. at 501.
18. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 85
(1971).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 12, at 479.
21. D'AMATO, supra note 18, at 82-85.
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opinio juris is actual practice consistently and generally followed." 22 According
to this view, a record of consistent and widespread practice raises strong infer-
ences of opinio juris without need of further evidence. Before turning to a con-
sideration of whether customary international law requires the use of
precision-guided munitions in aerial attacks on urban or other highly popu-
lated areas, it may be appropriate to keep in mind a famous statement of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed
in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law
and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
Restrictions on the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. 23
Although the Lotus case has been "strongly criticized for its 'extreme posi-
tivism' and especially for asserting that restrictions on the freedom of states
cannot be presumed,"24 it has never been repudiated by the International
Court of Justice. Moreover, its positivist approach may be particularly well
suited to issues of the law of armed conflict, which, by their very nature, impli-
cate the vital interests of States.
Let us turn then to State practice regarding the use of precision-guided mu-
nitions. As noted previously, the United States has made increasingly heavy
use of precision weapons in aerial attacks on targets in urban or other heavily
populated areas, and this was especially the case in the Kosovo campaign.
What is less clear is the extent to which other States have made use of precision-
guided weapons in armed conflict. Belt reports that more than 34 countries
are using or have access to the Paveway laser guided bomb series and gives
other examples of precision-guided weapons used by various countries. 25 His
study is extremely thin, however, on the extent of actual use by countries of
precision weapons in armed conflict. On the contrary, Belt admits that Russia
has made relatively little use of precision weapons in Chechnya, although he
attempts to explain this away by noting that there has been some Russian use
of such weapons in the conflict and that Russia has never asserted the right to
22. Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF
PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 7 17, 731 (YoramDinsteined., 1989).
23. The S.S. Lotus (Fr v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sep. 7).
24. Louis Henkin et al, International Law 70 ( 3d ed., 1993).
25. Belt, supra note 3, at 125.
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use non-precision bombs indiscriminately near civilian areas. 26 The limited
evidence of use of precision-guided munitions to date would seem to indicate
an absence of any widespread State practice. Significantly, the International
Court of Justice has stated that: "Although the passage of only a short period
of time is not necessarily ... a bar to the formulation of a new rule of custom-
ary international law . . . State practice . . . should have been both extensive
and virtually uniform. . . ," 27
Assuming arguendo the existence of sufficient State practice to support the
existence of a norm of customary international law requiring the use of preci-
sion weapons in attacks on urban or other heavily populated areas, even Belt
admits that the "harder issue" is whether opinio juris is present. 28 In his attempt
to prove the existence of opinio juris, Belt cites statements by US officials or
statements in US government documents that confirm the US desire to con-
duct the GulfWar in a manner consistent with international legal obligations
or that recognize the long-standing customary law of armed conflict principle
of distinction or discrimination that commanders and others planning an at-
tack take all possible feasible steps, consistent with allowable risk to aircraft
and aircrews, to minimize the risk of injury to noncombatants. 29 He fails to
cite any statements by US officials regarding the Gulf War, Desert Fox, or
Kosovo campaigns that in any way recognize a legal obligation to use preci-
sion-guided munitions. To be sure, with respect to the Kosovo campaign, Belt
is able to quote Lord Robertson, who, when serving as NATO Secretary-
General, said that "international law and public opinion" required the use of
precision weapons in the Kosovo campaign. 30 With respect, this appears to be
a weak reed upon which to lean.
26. Id. at 161.
27. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.Den./F.R.G. v.Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20).
28. Belt, supra note 3, at 163.
29. Id. at 163-64. Belt quotes from a study of the GulfWar commissioned by the Department of
Defense that concluded:
Coalition forces took several steps to minimize the risk of injury to noncombatants. To
the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews, aircraft
and munitions were selected so that attacks on targets within populated areas would
provide the greatest possible accuracy and the least risk to civilian objects and the
civilian population.
30. Vago Muradian, Robertson: Europe Must Spend More Wisely to Achieve Gains, DEFENSE
DAILY, Dec. 8, 1999, at 6, quoted and cited in id. at 165 nn.294, 295.
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B. Treaties and Conventions
A major problem one faces in analyzing treaty law to determine whether
the United States has an international obligation to use precision weapons is
that the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, the most recent
major treaty on the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, in the section of his ar-
ticle discussing the relevance of treaty law to precision weapons, Belt focuses
his primary attention on Protocol I. Obviously, for the United States, Protocol I
would be apposite only if its relevant provisions represent a codification of
customary international law. Belt appears to assume sub silentio that they do, a
highly debatable proposition, as we shall see. Before turning to this issue, how-
ever, we need to examine briefly some treaties and conventions that the
United States has ratified.
A primary premise of the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws
and Customs ofWar on Land31 is that "the right ofbelligerents to adopt means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."32 Although the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion is a relatively (for the time) comprehensive codification of laws governing
land warfare, Articles 25 and 27 apply as well to aerial bombardment. 33 Article
25 provides that "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." Article
27 states that
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not being used at the same time for military
purposes.
For its part, Article 2 of Hague Convention IX of 1907 Concerning Bom-
bardment by Naval Forces in Time of War34 built upon and improved the
31. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OFWAR 69 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds.,
3d. ed. 2000).
32. Id., art. 22.
33. Much of this discussion of the 1907 Hague Convention draws from Danielle Infeld,
Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is a Country
Obligated to use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26
George Washington Journal of International Law & Economics 109 (1992). Ms.
Infeld in turn relies heavily on the magisterial examination of applicable law in W. Hays Parks,
Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1 (1990).
34. Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18, 1907, 26 Stat. 2351, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 31, at 122.
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approach taken by Hague Convention IV in that it "identified particular mili-
tary objects that could be attacked, and recognized the inevitability of collat-
eral damage in the execution of such attacks."35 In addition, Article 2
explicitly absolved the attacker of responsibility for "unavoidable" collateral
damage resulting from the attack of such military objects. 36 Also, as Hays
Parks has noted, these and other provisions in the two Hague Conventions
placed primary responsibility for collateral damage on the defender because it
had the superior ability to control the civilian population.37 The civilian popu-
lation itself also had, to the extent possible, to take steps to remove itself from
the conflict. Only if he engaged in an indiscriminate attack would the com-
mander be responsible for collateral damage. In Parks' view, "responsibility for
avoidance of collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects ... is a
shared obligation of the attacker, defender, and the civilian population."38
This "shared obligation" approach continued under subsequent treaty de-
velopments in the law of armed conflict. In particular, the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva
Convention IV) 39 defines a person protected by the Convention as anyone
who, during a conflict or occupation, is "in the hands of a Party to the conflict
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."40 Any person suspected
of, or engaged in, activities hostile to the security of the State will not be af-
forded protection as a civilian. 41 For their part, States are required to take
steps to ensure that their private citizens do not take part in hostilities in a way
that could endanger innocent civilians.42
According to Hays Parks, however, this tradition of shared obligation was
broken with the adoption of Additional Protocol I. In a lengthy exegesis of the
Protocol, especially Articles 48 through 58, the articles most directly relating
to combat operations, Parks demonstrates that these provisions shift the
35. Parks, supra note 33, at 17.
36. The second paragraph of Article 2 of Hague Convention IX provides that the commander
"incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bombardment
under such circumstances."
37. Parks, supra note 33, at 28-29.
38. Id.
39. Convention Relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWar, Geneva, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.NT.S. 287, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 31, at
301.
40. Id., art. 4.
41. Id., art. 5.
42. Parks, supra note 33, at 118.
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responsibility for the protection of the civilian population away from the de-
fender almost exclusively to the attacker.43 He concludes:
Customary international law requires that an attacker exercise ordinary care in
the attack of military objectives located near the civilian population, to
minimize injury to individual civilians or the civilian population as such
incidental to the attack. The defender's responsibility is to exercise an equal
degree of care to separate individual civilians and the civilian population as such
from the vicinity of military objectives. Where a defender purposely places
military objectives in the vicinity of the civilian population or places civilians in
proximity to military objectives, in either case for the purpose of shielding
military objectives from attack, an attacker is not relieved from his obligation to
exercise ordinary care. Responsibility for death or injury resulting from the
illegal action of the defender lies with the defender, however. The language of
Protocol I
—
particularly as it has been interpreted by the ICRC and many of the
nations known in the course of the Diplomatic Conference as the Group of
77—casts doubt upon whether the limited credibility of the law of war relating
to war-fighting per se will survive any serious challenge.44
Interestingly, in his discussion ofrelevant provisions of Protocol I, Belt does not
acknowledge, in text or footnotes, Parks' critique or that dissatisfaction with
Articles 48 to 58 was a primary reason for the US decision not to ratify the Pro-
tocol.45 Nonetheless, he concludes that
The language in Protocol I was not specific enough, either in form or from a
review of travaux preparatories, to mandate the exclusive use of precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) in urban areas. Therefore, even if it were declaratory of
customary international law norms at the time of its signing in 1977, it would
not be dispositive as to use of PGMs.46
Accordingly, Belt and Parks appear to be in agreement that treaty law does
not require the use of precision-guided munitions in future conflicts. They dis-
agree as to whether customary international law requires the use of
43. Id. at 112-202.
44. Id. at 168.
45. Belt, supra note 3, at 145-5 1. For other commentary on why the United States decided not
to ratify Protocol I, see Michael Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation
of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
American University Journal of International Law & Policy 419 (1987); Abraham
Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the
Protections of War Victims, 82 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 784 (1988).
46. Belt, supra note 3, at 167.
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precision-guided weapons in attacks on urban or other highly populated areas.
Belt, as we have seen, believes that it does. Parks has indicated that he agrees
with Danielle Infeld that it does not.47 Previously in this paper, I have ex-
pressed my agreement with the Parks/Infeld position as to the lex lata (existing
law). Still to be considered, however, is whether the Belt position has merit as
a lex ferenda (law in formation) proposition.
C. Should International Law Require the Use of Precision-guided Munitions in
Urban or Other Highly Populated Areas?
There seems to be little disagreement that, as a policy matter, precision-
guided weapons should normally be used in aerial attacks on urban or other
highly populated areas. Under many, perhaps most, circumstances, there is a
happy congruence between the needs of military efficiency and the avoidance
of unnecessary injury to civilian persons or property.48 That is, the use of
precision-guided weapons will more thoroughly destroy the target, while
avoiding or minimizing collateral damage, than will so-called "dumb" bombs.
In such cases, the attack is being conducted in complete accord with Article
57(2) (a) (iii) of Additional Protocol I, which requires commanders and others
planning an attack to "take all feasible precautions in the choice ofmeans and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian ob-
jects." The problem is that in some circumstances this happy congruence is
not present.
Belt admits that precision-guided weapons are not suitable for all circum-
stances, and indeed cites Hays Parks in acknowledging this fact.49 His ac-
knowledgment, however, appears to be limited to attacks on targets far from
heavily populated areas, such as large maneuvering units in the field. In con-
trast, Parks has discussed in detail several circumstances when the use of
precision-guided weapons might not be suitable, even in attacks on highly
populated areas. 50 These circumstances include, in particular, adverse
weather conditions, technological malfunction, human error, or heavy
anti-aircraft fire that requires pilots to zigzag, which decreases the accuracy of
an attack. 51 When such circumstances are present, an attacker might reason-
ably conclude that the use of precision-guided weapons would not be
47. See W. Hays Parks, The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON
Human Rights 65, 85-86 n.57 (1998).
48. For examples, see Belt, supra note 3, at 117-37.
49. Id. at 130.
50. Parks, supra note 33, at 185-202.
51. For further discussion, see Infeld, supra note 33, at 131-33.
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appropriate. A hard and fast "black letter rule" requiring the use of precision-
guided weapons in any attack on an urban area would be dysfunctional under
such circumstances. Better perhaps to rely on the judgment of the commander
in such cases. Hays Parks emphatically states his view:
Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii) [of Protocol I] requires commanders and others
planning an attack to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."
An inevitable question is, "If a commander has a choice between two means for
attacking a target, one less accurate than the other, is he obligated to use the
most precise means?" Common sense, the definition offeasible by many States in
the process of their respective ratification or accession—a definition
subsequently adopted by the community of nations in their drafting of Protocol
III on Incendiary Weapons to the 1980 United Nations Conventional Weapons
Convention—and a reading of the relevant punitive provisions of Additional
Protocol I clearly indicate that not to be the case. A commander's good faith
judgment remains essential to effective implementation of this provision.52
The definitions of feasible referred to by Parks lend substantial support to
his position. In a footnote, he quotes the statement of Italy accompanying its
ratification of Protocol I that it "understands . . . that the word 'feasible' is to
be understood as practicable or practically possible, taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military consid-
erations."53 Similarly, Article 1(3) of Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons to
the 1980 United Nations Conventional Weapons Convention defines "feasi-
ble precautions" as "those precautions which are practicable or practically
possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including
humanitarian and military considerations."54 This recognition that combat
decisions vary depending on the "humanitarian and military considerations"
existing at the time argues in favor of maximizing the discretion of the com-
mander rather than imposing a hard and fast rule. Finally, Article 85(3) (b) of
Protocol I, which classifies an action as a grave breach only if it involves
"launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civil-
ian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life,
52. Parks, supra note 47, at 85-86.
53. Id. at85n.54.
54. Id. at86n.55.
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injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects,"55 lends a measure of support
to this thesis.
To this commentator, Parks and Infeld have the better of the argument. It
appears to be the case that the use of precision-guided weapons is not always
suitable, even with respect to targets in heavily populated areas. Moreover, it
also appears to be impossible to predict in advance of an attack what circum-
stances might arise that would make the use of precision-guided weapons in-
appropriate. If these two propositions are correct, it would make no sense to
have a "black letter" rule requiring the use of precision-guided weapons, since
this would introduce a degree of undesirable rigidity into the law of armed
conflict. The better approach is to leave the decision whether to employ
precision-guided weapons to the individual commander whose decision turns
on the particular circumstances he faces at the time of armed conflict.
Since he contends that present customary international law requires the
use of precision-guided weapons in attacks on urban areas, Belt recognizes
that this raises the second issue the organizers of the colloquium have posed:
whether two adversaries may be subjected to differing legal and ethical re-
gimes, dependent upon their relative level of technological sophistication.
Belt contends that they may.56 He suggests that the problem may be mini-
mized if not eliminated by technology transfer that narrows the gap between
the level of technological sophistication of developed countries and that of
developing countries, quoting one writer who urges that developed countries
provide subsidies to developing countries to enable them to acquire precision
weapons. 57 In Belt's view, however, the "most balanced approach" is:
The one similar to the environmental stance of "common but differentiated
responsibilities." This has been coined in the law of war arena as "normative
relativism." As the divide between countries grows in regard to military prowess
and capability, "there will be subtle stressors that encourage an interpretation of
the law of armed conflict relative to the state to which it is applied." In the end
the same standard applies to both states (developed vs. less developed)—that is
the need to minimize collateral damage—but there will be a higher standard on
the developed state. The theory of normative relativism essentially supports the
conclusion that "belligerents are held to the standards to which they are capable
of reasonably rising."58
55. Id.at86n.56.
56. Belt, supra note 3, at 167-73.
57. R. George Wright, Noncombatant Immunity: A Case Study in the Relation Between International
Law and Morality, 67 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 335, 336-37 (1991), quoted in id. at 172.
58. Belt, supra note 3, at 172-73.
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In sharp contrast, Michael Schmitt has contended, "[i]t is simply beyond
credulity to suggest that the acceptability of striking a particular type of target
or causing a certain amount of collateral damage or incidental injury might
one day depend on the characteristics of the attacking state."59 For his part,
Hays Parks has observed that: "Lawful combat actions are not subject to some
sort of 'fairness doctrine,' and neither the law of war in general nor the con-
cept of proportionality in particular imposes a legal or moral obligation on a
nation to sacrifice manpower, firepower, or technological superiority over an
opponent."60 It might be suggested further that Belt's reliance on "common
but differentiated responsibilities" in the field of international environmental
law seems misplaced. It is one thing to suggest that developed States should be
subjected to more onerous standards than developing countries in protecting
or cleaning up the environment. It is quite another to propose that developed
countries should accept standards that could disadvantage them in armed
conflict. Since many, perhaps most, developing countries would be unable to
comply with a rule requiring the use of precision weapons in attacks on urban
areas, this is a good reason not to have such a rule in the first place.
What Degree of Injury and Damage to Civilians Can be Regarded as
Excessive, and Consequently Disproportionate, as Compared to Military
Advantage Gained?
The question of what degree of injury to civilians is "excessive" and there-
fore "disproportionate" to the military advantage gained by an armed attack
cannot, of course, be answered in the abstract. It raises in sharp relief, how-
ever, the issue of the role the principle of proportionality does or should play in
the law of armed conflict. Judith Gail Gardam has suggested that proportion-
ality is a "fundamental" component of the jus in hello and described it as "the
59. Michael Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21 st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUMAN
Rights & Development Law Journal 143, 176 (1999).
60. Parks, supra note 33, at 169-70. As an egregious example of the misuse of the concept of
proportionality, Parks sets forth the following hypothetical that was presented by an
inexperienced Army instructor at The Judge Advocate General's School of the U.S. Army:
An enemy platoon of forty men is in a defensive position on a hill, armed only with small
arms. You have been assigned the mission of capturing the hill. You have the capability
of attacking the hill with a company of two hundred men, supported by artillery, tanks,
helicopter gunships and close air support fixed-wing aircraft. The "rule"of
proportionality requires you to eschew the use of anything more than an infantry
platoon armed with small arms.
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balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost
in terms of lives."61 Although she acknowledges that some civilian casualties
have always been accepted as the inevitable consequence of a military attack,
she contends that "the concept of proportionality . . . has assumed the pivotal
role in determining the extent to which civilians are entitled to be protected
from the collateral effects of armed conflict."62
Hays Parks is much more skeptical. He reports that the American military
review of Protocol I concluded that the concept of proportionality is not a rule
of customary international law and argues that, judged by US domestic law
standards, "the concept of proportionality as contained in Protocol I would be
constitutionally void for vagueness."63 To support his "void for vagueness" ar-
gument, Parks further contends that
[F]ollowing more than a decade of research [as of 1990] and meetings of
international military experts who are anxious to implement the language
contained in Protocol I to the extent it advances the law of war and the
protection of the civilian population, there remains a substantial lack of
agreement as to the meaning of the provisions in Protocol I relating to
proportionality. This is a rather disconcerting situation given that other lawyers
are claiming that the concept of proportionality is customary international
law.64
For her part, Gardam acknowledges the significant juridical impact the US
position has had on the role the concept of proportionality plays in the law of
armed conflict. She concludes:
In the final analysis, it appears that the interpretation by the United States and
its allies of their legal obligations concerning the prevention of collateral
casualties and the concept of proportionality comprehends only two types of
attacks: first, those that intentionally target civilians; and second, those that
involve negligent behavior in ascertaining the nature of a target or the conduct
of the attack itself, so as to amount to the direct targeting of civilians. The
conduct of hostilities in the Gulf conflict indicates that the concept of
"excessive casualties" was restricted to that context; the military advantage
always outweighed the civilian casualties as long as civilians were not directly
61. Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
International Law 391 (1993).
62. Id. at 398.
63. Parks, supra note 33, at 173.
64. Id. at 175.
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targeted and care was taken in assessing the nature of the target and the carrying
out of the attack itself.
The impact of the practice of states such as the United States and its coalition
partners on the formation of custom is considerable and cannot be overlooked.
It seems inevitable that the concept of proportionality as a customary norm is
currently limited to the situations outlined above. Moreover, it seems likely that
the interpretation of the conventional requirements of Articles 51 and 57 with
respect to "excessive casualties" may be similarly limited.65
Michael Schmitt approaches the problem of "excessive casualties" with a
focus on the principle of discrimination that mandates discrimination be-
tween civilians and their property and legitimate targets.66 He suggests that
the principle of discrimination comprises two primary facets. The first facet
limits or prohibits the use of weapons that are by their nature indiscriminate.
One example he gives is "biological weapons that spread contagious diseases,
for such weapons are incapable of afflicting only combatants and difficult to
control."67 The second facet of the principle prohibits the indiscriminate use
of weapons, regardless of their innate ability to discriminate. As an example,
he cites Iraq's use of SCUD missiles against Israel during the Gulf War. This
second facet of discrimination, he suggests, in turn consists of three compo-
nents: distinction, proportionality, and minimizing collateral damage and in-
cidental injury.
The concept of distinction, which prohibits direct attacks on civilians or ci-
vilian objects, finds its primary expression in Article 48 of Protocol I, which
provides that parties to a conflict must "distinguish between the civilian popu-
lations and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives." Un-
der Article 52(2), military objectives are "those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."
65. Gardam, supra note 61, at 410. In footnote 102 Gardam recognizes that there is
disagreement among scholars as to whether the practice of specially affected States is more
important in the formation of custom from conventional norms than that of other States but
suggests that it "may, however, be more influential in reality by virtue ofbeing more frequent and
better publicized."
66. Schmitt, supra note 59.
67. Id. at 147.
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Seemingly straightforward and unobjectionable as an abstract proposition,
the concept of distinction has given rise to considerable controversy. For ex-
ample, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines the
terms "effective" and "definite" narrowly. In the ICRC's Commentary on Pro-
tocol I, effective contribution includes objects "directly used by the armed
forces" (e.g., weapons and equipment), locations of "special importance for
military operations" (e.g., bridges), and objects intended for use or being used
for military purposes."68 The Commentary also interprets the phrase "definite
military advantage" to exclude those attacks offering only "potential or in-
determinate advantages."69 Under Article 51(3) of Protocol I, civilians are
legally protected from attack unless they take a "direct part in the hostilities."
According to the ICRC Commentary, such participation is limited to "acts of
war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the
personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."70 Under Article 50(1)
of Protocol I doubts as to the character of an individual are resolved in favor of
finding civilian status, and Article 52(3) provides the same presumption for
civilian objects.
The ICRC interpretation has been subject to scathing criticism. 71 In tem-
perate tones, Schmitt has noted:
Others take a less protective approach to the limitations. The United States, for
example, would include economic facilities that "indirectly but effectively
support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability" within the ambit of
appropriate targets. Similarly, some have cited mission-essential civilians
working at a base during hostilities, even though not directly engaging in acts of
war, as legitimate targets. Thus, while there is general agreement that the
Protocol accurately states customary international law principles, notable
disagreement persists over exactly what those standards are. 72
Schmitt goes on to suggest that proportionality differs from distinction in
terms of scienter, i.e, the issue of proportionality arises in situations where the
attacker knows that an attack on a legitimate military target will result in in-
jury to civilians or civilian property. To Schmitt, this
68. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 636 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), cited and quoted in
id. at 148.
69. Id., quoted and cited in Schmitt, supra note 59, at 149.
70. Id. at 619, quoted and cited in Schmitt, supra note 59, at 149.
71. See especially Parks, supra note 33, at 1 13-45.
72. Schmitt, supra note 59, at 150.
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[R]enders the discrimination decision matrix much more complex. With the
first tier of discrimination analysis, the question is: 'May I lawfully target an
object or person?' With proportionality, an additional query must occur: 'Even if
I conclude that targeting the person or object is unlawful, may I nevertheless
knowingly cause him or it injury or damage in my attack on a legitimate
objective?' 73
The difficulty of answering the additional query arises in particular because
[T]he actor must not only struggle with issues of inclusiveness (what are the
concrete and direct consequences?), but he must also conduct a difficult
jurisprudential balancing test. Optimally, balancing tests compare like values.
However, proportionality calculations are heterogeneous, because dissimilar
value genres—military and humanitarian—are being weighed against each
other. 74
To be sure, in some cases the proportionality calculation would be rela-
tively simple. Hays Parks cites as the "classic example" of a disproportionate
action the destruction of a village of 500 persons simply to destroy a single en-
emy sniper or machine gun. 75 But what if the likely cost in civilian lives lost
were five? Would (should) this be regarded as "excessive" and disproportion-
ate to the military advantage gained? In such a case, a clash between the mili-
tary and humanitarian "value genres" referred to by Schmitt might well arise.
Moreover, Parks has suggested three "fundamental" problems with imple-
mentation of the concept of proportionality. 76 The first is the definition of mil-
itary advantage, and the level at which a determination should be made
(tactical or strategic) , the second is who should be responsible for the probable
civilian losses resulting from the attack (the attacker, defender, or the civil-
ians themselves), and the third concerns what Parks calls the "friction of war."
To Parks, this friction is caused in large measure by uncertainty, and he quotes
Clausewitz's observation that "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters
of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or
lesser uncertainty." 77 This uncertainty is based in considerable part on a lack
of information regarding the enemy and greatly complicates the decision mak-
ing process. To Parks, it also counsels against any attempt "to establish an
73. Id.
74. Id. at 151.
75. Parks, supra note 33, at 168.
76. Id. at 175.
77. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 1 19-20 (M.Howard & P. Paret trans., 1976), quoted in id. at 183.
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unrealistic form of accountability for civilian casualties that occur incidental
to legitimate military operations." 78 In his view, this is what Protocol I, espe-
cially as interpreted by the ICRC, attempts to do.
In my view, it is not necessary to decide whether "proportionality" is part of
customary international law or simply a policy consideration or a "principle"
that commanders should take into account during the course of armed con-
flict. The conscientious commander will make every effort to avoid launching
an armed attack when the likely outcome is a clearly disproportionate amount
of collateral damage. Under any other than the easy case scenario, however, as
Parks and especially Schmitt have noted, the calculation ofwhether a particu-
lar attack will result in proportionate or disproportionate collateral damage
becomes exceedingly difficult and problematic. It must also be remembered
that a mistaken calculation of proportionality could result in individual liabil-
ity for a war crime for the commander or in liability for a violation of the law of
armed conflict by the commander's country. Accordingly, it would seem best
to limit such liability to the circumstances summarized by Gardam as the US
position: where civilians are deliberately targeted or there is negligent behav-
ior in ascertaining the nature of a target or the conduct of the attack itself that
amounts to the direct targeting of civilians. Any other standard would pose an
unacceptable dilemma for the commander operating under exceedingly stress-
ful conditions.
To return to the point made at the beginning of this section of the paper,
the question of what degree of injury to civilians is excessive and therefore
disproportionate to the military advantage gained by an armed attack cannot
be answered in the abstract. Accordingly, in the next section we turn to the
legal and ethical implications of NATO's apparent efforts to minimize its
own combat casualties through high-altitude bombing and avoidance of a
ground campaign.
What Are the Legal and Ethical Implications of NATO's Apparent Efforts
to Minimize Its Own Combat Casualties Through High-Altitude Bombing
and Avoidance of a Ground Campaign and Did This Greatly Increase the
Risk of Civilian Casualties?
At the outset of our discussion in this section, it should be noted that there
is a crucial factual issue to be addressed: did NATO's high-altitude bombing
and avoidance of a ground campaign in fact greatly increase the risk of civilian
78. Parks, supra note 33, at 202.
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casualties? Some critics of the Kosovo campaign have so alleged. 79 Charles
Dunlap, however, has challenged this thesis.80 According to Dunlap, lower al-
titude attacks were attempted but did not prove very effective. On the con-
trary^ he contends, the nature of precision-guided munitions is such that they
are often optimally targeted at the altitudes NATO employed. He further sug-
gests that flying at lower altitudes would have increased the chances of suc-
cess for Serbia's antiaircraft and short range missile systems and that "[a]
crippled twenty or thirty-ton airplane loaded with fuel and high explosives
crashing out-of-control into an urban neighborhood can create as much or
more devastation among civilians as any errant bomb."81 Similarly, in his
view, a ground assault would have increased the risk of civilian casualties
because the weapons of land warfare—artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
and machine guns and other small arms—lack the precision quality of high-
altitude bombing, and ground combat in an urban environment is a casualty-
intensive affair for both combatants and civilians. Finally, Dunlap notes that
reportedly, out of the more than 25,000 weapons used in Kosovo, only twenty
resulted in collateral damage incidents, "a phenomenal record in the history
of warfare."82
Let us assume arguendo that the critics are right and the high-altitude
bombing and the avoidance of a ground campaign did increase the risk of
civilian casualties. What, if any, are the legal and ethical implications of these
decisions? We turn to the legal implications first.
A. Legal Implications
There seems to be little question that the decision to engage in high-altitude
bombing did not by itself constitute a violation of the law ofarmed conflict. As
Dunlap points out, although the law of armed conflict seeks to protect non-
combatant civilians from the adverse effects of war, there is "nothing in that
79. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 2
(2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslovia: "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings?, Violations
of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force 17 (2000), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcarn/kosovo/docs/natorep_all.doc; Richard Bilder, Kosovo and
the New lnterventionism: Promise or Peril?, 9JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 153,
171 (1999); Ved Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10 US AIR
Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 1, 9 (1999/2000).
80. Charles Dunlap, Kosovo, Casualty Aversion, and the American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10
US Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 95 (1999/2000).
81. Id. at 97.
82. Id. at 103.
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legal regime [that] expressly requires an assumption of more risk by a combat-
ant than a noncombatant."83 Similarly, the Final Report to the Prosecutor by
the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY Final Report)
concluded "there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying above the height
which can be reached by enemy defenses."84 To be sure, the Committee recog-
nized that the principle of distinction required NATO air commanders to
"take practicable measures to distinguish military objectives from civilians or
civilian objectives," and that the 15,000 feet minimum altitude adopted for
part of the campaign may have meant the target could not be verified by the
naked eye. But it concluded that "with the use of modern technology, the ob-
ligation to distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases
during the bombing campaign."85 Lastly, the Report of the Independent Inter-
national Commission on Kosovo, established at the initiative of the Prime
Minister of Sweden, Mr. Goran Persson, concluded that the "high-altitude
tactic does not seem to have legal significance. . . ."86
The legal issue, then, would seem to be whether the bombing campaign re-
sulted in injury and damage to civilians that can be regarded as excessive and
therefore disproportionate to the military advantage gained—more or less the
same issue we considered in the abstract in the previous section of this paper.
Any determination as to whether injury and damage to civilians is "excessive"
in relation to the military advantage gained by the bombing necessarily in-
cludes a measure of subjectivity that may lead reasonable persons to differ
over the proper conclusion to be reached. It is accordingly noteworthy that
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo was
[I] impressed by the relatively small scale of civilian damage considering the
magnitude of the war and its duration. It is further of the view that NATO
succeeded better than any air war in history in selective targeting that adhered
to principles of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity, with only
relatively minor breaches that were themselves reasonable interpretations of
'military necessity' in the context.87
83. Id. at 99.
84. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS U 55 (2000), reprinted herein as AppendixA [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
85. Id.
86. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report
181 (2000).
87. Id. at 183-84.
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For its part, the ICTY Final Report noted that the NATO bombing campaign
involved 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties, and the release of
23,614 air munitions, yet only approximately 500 civilians were killed during
the campaign. The conclusion of the Report was that "[t]hese figures do not in-
dicate that NATO may have conducted a campaign aimed at causing substan-
tial civilian casualties either directly or incidentally."88
One of the allegations that led to the establishment of the Committee that
issued the ICTY Final Report was that NATO forces "deliberately or reck-
lessly caused excessive civilian casualties in disregard of the rule of propor-
tionality by trying to fight a 'zero casualty war' for their own side."89
Interestingly, in its discussion of the "principle [not rule] of proportionality,"
the Committee expressed some of the same concerns and reservations that
have troubled Hays Parks and the US military in their review of Protocol I.
They are worth quoting at length.
48. The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to
state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. For example, bombing a
refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that
people in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike on an
ammunition dump should not be prohibited merely because a farmer is plowing
a field in the area. Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of
proportionality are not quite so clear-cut. It is much easier to formulate the
principle of proportionality in general terms than it is to apply it to a particular
set of circumstances because the comparison is often between unlike quantities
and values. One cannot easily assess the value of innocent human lives as
opposed to capturing a particular military objective.
49. The questions which remain unresolved once one decides to apply the
principle of proportionality include the following:
(a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained
and the injury to noncombatants and/or the damage to civilian objects?
(b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums?
(c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
88. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 11 54.
89. Id., 11 2.
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(d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own forces
to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?
50. The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the
background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is
unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and
differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would
always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the determination of relative
values must be that of the "reasonable military commander." Although there
will be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where
reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants or
the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military
advantage gained.
51. Much of the material submitted to the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor]
consisted of reports that civilians had been killed, often inviting the conclusion
to be drawn that crimes had therefore been committed. Collateral casualties to
civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects can occur for a variety of
reasons. Despite an obligation to avoid locating military objectives within or
near densely populated areas, to remove civilians from the vicinity of military
objectives, and to protect their civilians from the dangers of military operations,
very little prevention may be feasible in many cases. Today's technological
society has given rise to many dual-use facilities and resources. City planners
rarely pay heed to the possibility of future warfare. Military objectives are often
located in densely populated areas and fighting occasionally occurs in such
areas. Civilians present within or near military objectives must, however, be
taken into account in the proportionality equation even if a party to the conflict
has failed to exercise its obligation to remove them.
52. In the Kupreskic Judgement (Case No: IT-9546-T 14 Jan 2000) the Trial
Chamber addressed the issue of proportionality as follows:
"526. As an example of the way in which the Martens clause may be
utilized, regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative
effect of attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to
civilians. In other words, it may happen that single attacks on military
objectives causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may
raise doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their
face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (or of
the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated
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attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between
indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude
that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not be in
keeping with international law. Indeed, this pattern of military conduct
may turn out to jeopardize excessively the lives and assets of civilians,
contrary to demands of humanity."
This formation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive statement of the
applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians. Its practical
import, however, is somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is
the committee's view that where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military
objectives are concerned, the mere cumulation ofsuch instances, all ofwhich are
deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime. The
committee understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an overall
assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military
campaign.90
One may assume that the Committee's acknowledgment of the ambiguous
and controversial nature of the principle of proportionality contributed to its
conclusion that NATO had not conducted "a campaign aimed at causing sub-
stantial civilian casualties either directly or indirectly."
For its part, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo ac-
cepted "the view of the Final Report of the ICTY that there is no basis in avail-
able evidence for charging specific individuals with criminal violations of the
laws of war during the NATO campaign." It did add, however, rather crypti-
cally, that "some practices do seem vulnerable to the allegation that violations
might have occurred, and depend for final assessment upon the availability of
further evidence."91
Pending the presentation of further evidence, one may safely conclude that
the injury and damage to civilians caused by the NATO bombing campaign
were not excessive but rather proportionate to the military advantage gained.
Hence the bombing did not violate the law of armed conflict merely because it
resulted in collateral damage.
B. Ethical Implications
There remains the issue of the ethical implications of the high-altitude bomb-
ing and the avoidance of a ground campaign. According to the Independent
90. Id., MI 48-52.
91. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, supra note 86, at 184.
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International Commission on Kosovo, although the high-altitude bombing
lacked legal significance, "it does weaken the claim of humanitarianism to the ex-
tent it appears to value the lives of theNATO combatants more than those of the
civilian population in Kosovo and Serbia. . . ."92 If, however, Charles Dunlap's
claim that the high-altitude bombing was more protective of civilians than lower
level bombing would have been is correct, the suggestion of the Commission is
clearly invalid. Moreover, even if he is incorrect and the high-altitude bombing
and the avoidance of a ground war resulted in a higher number of civilian casual-
ties than would have been the case if low level bombing and a ground campaign
had been launched, it does not necessarily follow that such a decision violated
ethical or moral precepts. As Dunlap points out, "Americans do not instinctively
draw a distinction that finds its soldiers' lives less precious than those of the citi-
zens of an enemy state. This is traceable to the American concept of who com-
poses its military: citizens with just as much right to life as enemy citizens."93
Reasonable persons may disagree with Dunlap's reasoning and the values it
reflects. But at a minimum the ethical and moral case against NATO's
high-altitude bombing and avoidance of a ground campaign on the ground that
they caused excessive collateral damage is debatable.
A Few Concluding Thoughts
Regardless of whether they have an international law obligation to do so, it
is likely that the United States, other NATO members, and developed States
in general will make greater and greater use of precision-guided munitions in
future conflicts because as the technology develops—in Michael Schmitt's
words, "the weapons of future wars will be more than smart—they will be 'bril-
liant'"94—the "happy congruence" between the needs of military efficiency
and the avoidance of unnecessary injury to civilian persons or property will in-
creasingly be present. At the same time, however, as also noted by Schmitt,
the protections the law of armed conflict affords to civilian persons and prop-
erty are likely to be less and less effective in practice. This is because the tech-
nologically weaker States, as well as terrorists or other non-governmental
actors, may increasingly conclude that they must attack the civilian
92. Id. at 181.
93. Dunlap, supra note 80, at 100.
94. Schmitt, supra note 59, at 164.
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population of the enemy State to offset the latter's great advantage in fire-
power. As Schmitt puts it,
[I]n many cases, their only hope is not to prevail in combat, but rather to raise
the costs for their opponents to an unacceptable level. The fewer targets the
States with lesser technology are permitted to strike, the less opportunity they
will have to impose costs on their advantaged opponents. By the same token,
the more limits placed upon their opponents, the greater the advantage to these
States.95
This "normative relativism," Schmitt suggests, bodes ill for the principle of dis-
crimination in the future.96
To this observer, it is ironic that so much attention has been devoted to the
issue of whether NATO complied with the jus in hello in its Kosovo campaign.
For when one looks at practices in other armed conflicts around the
world—Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Sudan, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, to
name just a few—one sees not only no effort to comply with the jus in hello but
barbaric practices that flout even the most elementary dictates of humanity.
Accordingly, the most strenuous efforts should be made to induce States and
other combatants to adhere to at least the ethical and moral dimensions of in-
ternational humanitarian law, regardless of the presence or absence of a for-
mal legal obligation to do so. Steps that might be taken to this end are beyond
the scope of this paper.97
95. Id. at 171.
96. Id. at 172.
97. For discussion of some steps that might be taken, see my chapter on Kosovo Agonistes, supra
note 2.
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his presentation will build on the earlier discussion of relevant interna-
tional humanitarian law principles as they relate to what happened in
Kosovo. My approach will be a functional one: did the generally recognized
combat rules of international humanitarian law function during the conflict?
Were they complied with? Did they prove to be adequate for the Kosovo inter-
vention type of armed conflict? Is there a need for a de lege ferenda discussion
on rules protecting the civilian population in interventionist types of conflicts?
These are the issues I would like to address.
The Additional Protocol I of 1977 1 has codified three somewhat overlap-
ping principles of customary law in the field of targeting and the protection of
civilians: the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality and the
principle of feasible precautions. The principle of distinction is closely linked
to the definition of military objectives. In fact, the principle would be mean-
ingless if it were not substantiated by a set of norms clearly indicating where
the line should be drawn between protected civilian lives and objects on the
one hand, and legitimate military objectives on the other. This issue should be
addressed first since much of the criticism directed against NATO's methods
of warfare in Kosovo was based on the perception that many of the attacks
1. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (A. Roberts and R. Guelff eds., 3d. ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Protocol I].
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were directed against people, houses and materiel that were protected under
international humanitarian law.
Another focal point of criticism, both during and after the conflict, was the
extent of damage caused incidentally by attacks against military objec-
tives—the issue of collateral damage. This issue, as an element of the over-
arching principles of proportionality and feasible precautions, will be discussed
later in this paper.
Distinction
The principle that a distinction shall always be made in military operations
between protected and non-protected values is found in Article 48 of Protocol
I. It includes the following language: "In order to ensure respect for and pro-
tection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the con-
flict shall at all times distinguish . . . and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." During the Kosovo air campaign,
NATO complied with this principle in the sense that it attempted to attack
only objectives that it perceived to be of a military nature. In other words,
NATO tried to distinguish.
Basically, a violation of the principle of distinction implies action mala fide,
an intentional disregard for civilian values (e.g., attacks of terror against civil-
ians) or a reckless disregard for such values (e.g., attacks of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians without distinction). The latter aspect—the
prohibition against indiscriminate attacks—is covered by Article 5 1 (4) of Pro-
tocol I. This prohibition flows from the principle of distinction and could in-
clude both intentional violations and reckless behavior. The Gulf War offers
some examples on mala fide behavior in this respect. Saddam Hussein was not
sensitive to the prohibition of Article 51(4), outlawing, inter alia, attacks
"which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective." Iraq fired SCUD missiles into Saudi Arabian and
Israeli territory, well knowing that these missiles could hit military targets only
through sheer luck. Clearly, NATO did not act in this way during the Kosovo
conflict. Nevertheless, the media reporting that came out of Belgrade gave the
impression that NATO was not in compliance with the prohibition against in-
discriminate attacks. The alleged compliance or collateral damage problems
that were at issue were not linked to the principle of distinction as such, but
rather to the definition of military objectives.
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Definition of Military Objectives
As has been stated already, the definition of military objectives is a corol-
lary to the principle of distinction. Article 52(2) of Protocol I states that:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 1
Thus, the requirements of "effective contribution" and "definite military ad-
vantage" are of crucial importance. As the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I
points out: "Whenever these two elements are simultaneously present, there is
a military objective in the sense of the Protocol."3 Together the two elements
seem to produce quite a strict rule. However, the current interpretation of the
rule is not so strict. It includes the right to attack objectives that have a potential
of being militarily useful at some point in the future. This does not explicitly
follow from the text, although the ICRC Commentary has indicated that the
phrase "objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use" should be given
the following interpretation: "The criterion ofpurpose is concerned with the in-
tended future use of an object, while that of use is concerned with its present
function."4 This may be true, but even so the quoted phrase is subordinate to
the proviso that the objects so defined shall "make" (in the present tense) "an
effective contribution to military action," and it is further required that their
destruction "offers" (in the present tense) "a definite military advantage." The
Protocol's definition of military objectives has often been perceived as a codifi-
cation of traditional customary law applied during World War II and earlier.
This perception is probably correct, but it brings with it this flexible and fu-
ture-oriented interpretation of legitimate military targets that does not explic-
itly follow from the text of Article 52(2).
2. Emphasis added.
3. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 635 (Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman eds., 1987)
[hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].
4. Id. at 636, H 2022. See also Anthony Rogers who accepts the ICRC view that "purpose" means
future intended use of an object. He adds, however, "[i]t is hard to think of an example or a case
where 'purpose' will be the deciding factor, especially given the limitation of 'in the
circumstances ruling at the time'." A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 35-36 (1996).
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The future-oriented approach was clearly manifested during the Kosovo
crisis. At a NATO press conference on March 26, 1999, it was said that the
armed attacks were directed against the adversary's "ability to coordinate his
military forces in the field, his ability to attack innocent civilians" and "his abil-
ity to command and control his military forces."5 This liberal view on what
constitutes legitimate military objectives was as typical for the NATO air
campaign as it was typical for World War II. In Kosovo it tended to include a
large number of dual-use targets, i.e., objects which besides their ordinary ci-
vilian use had a military potential. A few of these targets were controversial as
to their military potential and it was sometimes argued that they were not to
be considered as legitimate military objectives.
The requirements of "effective contribution" and "definite military advan-
tage" have to be met no less with regard to attacks against dual-use or
dual-purpose objects. Typical dual-use objects are transportation systems like
roads, bridges and railway lines, oil and other power installations, and commu-
nication installations like radio, television, telephone and telegraph stations.
Although it is clear that broadcasting facilities could have a military function,
NATO's bombing on April 23, 1999 of the Serb Radio and Television Station
(RTS) in Belgrade seems difficult to justify under the circumstances ruling at
the time. The Serb media was hardly—to quote from the Report to the ICTY
Prosecutor
—
"the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus
perpetuates the war effort" nor was it "used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda."6
Any or both of these things could of course have materialized later, but at the
time of the attack on April 23, when 10-17 civilians were killed, the military
nature of the RTS was in some doubt. At a press conference on April 27,
NATO officials justified the attack with the need to disrupt and degrade the
Yugoslav command, control and communications (C3) network The argu-
mentation was partly of a general nature: "everything is wired in through dual
use. Most of the commercial system serves the military and the military system
can be put to use for the commercial system." 7 It was not clear, in concrete
5. Emphasis added. See www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990326a.htm.
6. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS,
11 55 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor]. C/. also the
comment by William Fenrick that it is "highly debatable that the media in the FRY, which was
state-controlled to a degree, constituted a legitimate military objective even if it was re-labeled as
a propaganda source. To be a military objective, it must be more than a symbol of the regime."
William Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against
Yugoslavia, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 497 (2001).
7. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 11 72.
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terms, the degree to which the attack against the RTS was militarily useful.
The ICRC Commentary states with regard to Article 52(2) of Protocol I that
the destruction in question:
[MJust offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.
In other words, it is not legitimate to launch an attack that only offers potential
or indeterminate advantages. Those ordering or executing the attack must have
sufficient information available to take this requirement into account; in case of
doubt, the safety of the civilian population, which is the aim of the Protocol,
must be taken into consideration. 8
Another dual-use discussion during and after the Kosovo bombings focused
on whether or not different bridges in Serbia that were attacked by missiles re-
ally made an effective contribution to military action. NATO spokesmen
have said that bridges and roads were used to send military forces into Kosovo
and that those put on the target lists had been thoroughly screened and found
militarily useful. Some bridges may have been selected because they were con-
duits for communication cables. 9 Nevertheless, in order for the attacks to be
lawful the objects in question had to make—in each instance—an "effective
contribution to military action." Was this really the case in Kosovo? Human
Rights Watch reported in February 2000 that seven of the bridges that were
attacked had no military functions at the time and could not be classified as
military targets. 10
With regard to dual-purpose objects, Article 52(3) of Protocol I adds the
following to the definition of military objectives: "In case of doubt whether an
object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes ... is being used to
make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to
be so used." In other words, in case of doubt there is a presumption of civilian
status. It is more than doubtful whetherNATO always complied with this rule
of doubt or principle of presumption. On the other hand, it is also doubtful
whether this rule of doubt has the status of customary law and thus is binding
for non-parties to the Protocol.
8. ICRC Commentary, supra note 3, at 636.
9. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in The NATO Air Campaign 10-11 (2000),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/.
10. Id. at 1.
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Proportionality and Collateral Damage
A general impression conveyed by the media during the Kosovo crisis was
that there was a lot of collateral damage. Amnesty International's report on
Kosovo ofJune 2000 is titled "Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Viola-
tions of the Laws ofWar by NATO during Operation Allied Force." Amnesty
International believed that in the course of the operation "civilian deaths
could have been significantly reduced if NATO forces had fully adhered to
the laws of war." 11 Some collateral damage—even extensive damage in cer-
tain case—is permitted under the principle of proportionality, but the propor-
tionality issue was not discussed as such in relation to the media coverage at
the time. The impression of unnecessary civilian losses during the spring of
1999 has to be tested against the frequent (but occasionally politically biased)
accusations thatNATO was not acting in compliance with basic international
humanitarian law principles.
The principle of proportionality flows from the prohibition against indis-
criminate attacks. In fact, in Protocol I it is presented as a part of that prohibi-
tion. Article 5 1 (5) (b) prohibits "an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated." Although the term "proportional-
ity" is not used, the text clearly conveys a proportionality message. The princi-
ple expressed here is arguably a codification of traditional customary law. In
this context the concept of "collateral damage" is always referred to, although
that terminology is not used either in the Protocol. The language of Article 5
1
focuses on what may be called "incidental damage," a certain amount ofwhich
is legally accepted as it is unintended and perhaps unavoidable in the circum-
stances at the time.
Another way of describing the principle of proportionality is to start with a
presumption that the attacker is complying with the principle of distinction.
In fact, the principle of proportionality rests on that presumption. So, even
when military planners make sure that an attack is directed against a military
objective, the commanders must avoid an attack where the military advantage
cannot outweigh the civilian damage that can be expected from the attack. In
11. Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "Collateral
Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 29 (2000), available at http://www.amnesty.org/
ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/natorep_all.doc.
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other words, decision-makers should ensure that civilian casualties should not
be disproportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
Although the principle of distinction was complied with during the NATO
campaign over Kosovo, it is submitted that this was perhaps not always the
case with regard to the principle of proportionality. In comparison, the propor-
tionality requirements were not always complied with during the Gulf War,
e.g., when coalition attacks deprived Iraqi hospitals of electricity and gener-
ated adverse cumulative effects on civilians in those hospitals. Proportionality
assessments are difficult to accomplish. To the extent things went wrong in
Kosovo, these things may be easier to grasp and discuss under a heading of
"the principle of feasible precautions," rather than under the principle of
proportionality.
Feasible Precautions
The principle of feasible precautions requires that military commanders
plan their attacks in such a way that constant care is taken to spare the civil-
ian population, civilians and civilian objects. A summary of Article 57(2) of
Protocol I has to focus on the following requirements that were all of special
relevance during the Kosovo operation:
Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(1) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
military objectives;
(2) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life;
(3 refrain from deciding to launch an attack that may be expected to cause
such incidental loss, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated;
(4) suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that it may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated;" and
(5) in addition, "effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit."
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Since there were a number of mistakes in targeting in Kosovo, the principle
of feasible precautions seems to be the one most clearly deviated from during
the air campaign. The mistakes included the two air strikes hitting a train on
the Grdelica bridge in southern Serbia on April 12; an attack on vehicles in a
convoy of refugees near Djakovica in Kosovo on April 14; an attack south of
Belgrade on April 28 hitting a residential area instead of army barracks; an at-
tack against the Lusana Bridge north of Pristina on May 1 hitting a civilian
bus; a cluster bomb attack against the Nis airfield on May 7 hitting a market
place and a hospital; and the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on
May 8. In the case of the Embassy, NATO used inaccurate intelligence infor-
mation and believed that it was attacking the Federal Directorate of Supply
and Procurement for the Yugoslav Army. Further cases where there may have
been a lack of necessary precautions are the bombing of the village of Korisa in
Kosovo on May 13, the attack on the Varvarin bridge in Serbia on May 30,
and the attack against military barracks in Surdulica on May 30 in which a
hospital was struck. In all these attacks there were civilian casualties. 12
When evaluating these and other mistakes in targeting, however, they
must be related not only to the number of civilian casualties, but also to the
total number of air strikes, and to the military efficiency of these strikes. In
that regard, between March 24 and June 9, 1999, 10,484 strike sorties were
flown by NATO aircraft and 23,614 munitions were released. No NATO ca-
sualties were reported arising out of these strikes. The damage caused to the
Yugoslav forces in Kosovo alone was reported to include 181 tanks, 317 ar-
mored personnel carriers, 600 military vehicles and 857 artillery and mortar
pieces. 13
When in February 2000 Human Rights Watch published its report "Civil-
ian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign," it became clear that about 500 civil-
ian lives were lost as a consequence of the campaign, a much higher figure
than NATO had previously admitted. By comparison, the numbers of civilian
deaths given by the authorities in Belgrade varied between 1,200 and 5,000.
Even the lower number of 500 civilian deaths raises questions of efficiency
with regard to precautionary measures. It could also be argued that, even if
500 civilian casualties is not a high figure for an international armed conflict
lasting about three months, it is arguably too high a figure for a military opera-
.
tion with humanitarian motives; for an operation that many would classify as a
"humanitarian intervention."
12. See the case studies in id. at 33-74.
13. NATO Press Conference held on 16 September 1999.
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The Human Rights Watch report claimed that the casualties had occurred
during 90 separate occasions, and that 50% of the victims died in circum-
stances where the identification of targets as military was questionable. Con-
troversial cases included the attacks on the New Belgrade heating plant and
the Serb TV and Radio Station (RTS) in Belgrade. With regard to the latter,
it has already been indicated that no assessments seem to have been made to
clarify to what extent the RTS dual-use facility actually was contributing to
the Yugoslav military effort. An indirect early warning of the attack seems to
have been communicated to the authorities in Belgrade, but since the attack
did not occur shortly thereafter, the warning was not effective. Civilian em-
ployees working the night shift, who had emptied the building at an earlier
point in time, had during the night of the attack returned to the building. 14 In
this case, it seems far from clear that NATO, in accordance with Article
57(2) (c), communicated an "effective advance warning."
The RTS case signifies a mix of intentional damage (the building) and col-
lateral damage (the 10 or more civilian casualties). Like in some of the other
cases that resulted in civilian casualties, it is not clear whether there was com-
pliance with the precautions in attack required by Article 57. There seem to
be enough dubious cases to warrant a conclusion that violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law precautionary standards did in fact take place.
The Moral Dimension: "Ready to Kill But Not to Die"
In London, the Foreign Secretary admitted during the Kosovo conflict that
only a small number of the aircraft available to NATO had a precision-bomb-
ing capability. In Kosovo, as in the Gulf War, events have shown that even
with smart bombs and missiles, air attacks do result in unplanned damage and
loss of civilian life. High-tech developments increase the possibilities for suc-
cessful target discrimination and better protection of the civilian population,
14. According to the committee which prepared the Report to the Prosecutor,
[I] t would . . . appear that some Yugoslav officials may have expected that the building
was about to be struck. . . . Although knowledge on the part ofYugoslav officials of the
impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians under
Article 57(2), it may nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities may be partially
responsible for the civilian casualties resulting from the attack and may suggest that the
advance notice given by NATO may have in fact been sufficient under the
circumstances.
Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 77. The latter part of this statement seems far from
uncontroversial.
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but individual civilians will never know whether this phenomenon will in fact
protect them.
In Kosovo, the risk of unwanted damage increased due to the minimum al-
titude of 15,000 feet at whichNATO aircraft operated most of the time. It has
been argued that by setting this 15,000 feet level NATO politicians managed
to avoid aircrew casualties, but in so doing, were transferring the risks to the
civilian population. However, the British Ministry of Defence has stated that
some aircraft "operated down to 6,000 feet when target identification or a
weapons delivery profile required it." 15 Nevertheless, "the no-body-bags pol-
icy" posed and poses a moral dilemma. It implies that the lives ofyour own pilots
are worth more than the lives of the innocent civilians on the ground, since
the acceptance of some collateral damage relates to the "others", while the
aim of "zero-casualty warfare" only relates to "yourself." The discrepancy is
troublesome and indicates that future humanitarian interventions or
peace-enforcement actions should rely also on low flying aircraft to make pos-
sible genuine target identification—and arguably also ground troops—if that
is necessary in order to protect the civilian population. One expert on the law
of the battlefield has written that in taking care to protect civilians, "soldiers
must accept some element of risk to themselves." 16 He notes that the law is
unclear as to what degree of care is required of a soldier and what degree of
risk he must take—"Everything depends on the target, the urgency of the mo-
ment, the available technology and so on." 17
In the autumn 1999 issue of the Canadian International Journal Mr. Paul
Robinson of Toronto wrote an article with a sensational heading: "Ready to
kill but not to die." 18 The author was of course referring to the NATO strategy
in Kosovo. Robinson made the point that in high-tech, standoff warfare there
is no chivalry, no military honor. In Kosovo NATO pilots did not see the peo-
ple they were fighting. This type of warfare, it was argued, is problematical not
only from a humanitarian but also from a security point of view. Its clinical
character results in a temptation to resort to military force in international
crises. It lowers the threshold for military force as such. Although this conclu-
sion does not seem to be empirically sound, the broader argument raises the
question whether existing international humanitarian law is appropriate for
15. Lord Robertson, Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis (1999).
16. A.P.U. Rogers, Zero-casualty warfare, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 165,
177 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Paul Robinson, 'Ready to kill but not to die: NATO strategy in Kosovo, 54 INTERNATIONAL
Journal 671 (1999).
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dealing with high-tech warfare. An increased use of standoff weapons is not to
the advantage of civilians. The solution is not a prohibition of such weapons,
but rather a reconsideration of the parameters for modern warfare as it affects
civilians.
Did Protocol I Mean Anything in Kosovo?
International humanitarian law as it related to the Kosovo crisis was dis-
cussed in the March 2000 issue of the International Review of the Red Cross.
A perspective de lege ferenda was put forward in an article by Peter Rowe, Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Lancaster. Rowe first put the question of
whether in fact the constraints of modern IHL influenced NATO behavior
during the conflict. The subtitle of his article is: "Have the provisions of Addi-
tional Protocol I withstood the test?" 19 Rowe's position is that Protocol I did
not add anything to the protection of the civilian population beyond the cus-
tomary law protection that was already applicable before 1977. He concludes
that the Protocol had little impact or influence upon the decisions of the air
campaign—that "all the detailed rules so carefully drafted in 1977 were of lit-
tle consequence."20 In his view, the objects that military commanders for mili-
tary reasons wished to attack were attacked. There was nothing more to it.
If this argumentation is intended to imply that modern international law
played no part in the crisis, it should be refuted. International humanitarian
law clearly influenced decision-makers in Kosovo. Moreover, Additional Pro-
tocol I contributed to the role that law played in decision-making. During the
conflict, as during the Gulf War, legal advice was sought and considered. In
both cases it was extremely important, for political and public image reasons,
to be seen as acting in conformity with international law. The opposite would
imply a political cost and setback that had to be avoided at a time when politi-
cal support was essential. During the GulfWar General Schwarzkopf was ada-
mant that "we didn't want any war crimes on our hands." 21 The same feeling
obviously dominated NATO thinking in the spring of 1999. Protocol I, al-
though it has not been ratified by all NATO States (not by the United States,
France and Turkey at the time; France is now a party), has contributed much
to the awareness of IHL standards in military and political circles. The United
19. Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The air campaign, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
Cross 147 (2000).
20. Id. at 159.
21. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero 465 (1992).
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States position is that many of the rules of Protocol I are applicable as custom-
ary law. Moreover, the non-governmental organizations and informed public
opinion are very much aware of the IHL standards. They continuously moni-
tor relevant situations—and the politicians know it. Thus, it was in the
self-interest ofNATO to involve its legal advisers in the planning and target-
ing process.
The US military lawyer James Burger has written in the same March issue
of the International Review of the Red Cross the following: "While there may
be disagreement over the application of the rules by commentators who write
about it after the event, there can be no doubt that full consideration was
given, as required by the laws of armed conflict, to the advice of legal counsel
and the application of the rules." 22 We can probably safely conclude that in
Kosovo there was a greater respect for humanitarian normative restraints than
would have been the case had the adoption of Protocol I never taken place.
The Weakness of Protocol I and the Need for Reform
The Protocol only offers weak protection for civilians. Here one could eas-
ily agree with Peter Rowe, when he argues that the Protocol, when it comes to
the test, is very weak in determining what may and what may not be attacked.
"It is when civilians are most likely to be placed in danger that Protocol I, de-
signed to protect them, shows its faults." 23 One reason for this is that the Pro-
tocol sets the dividing line between legal and illegal attacks on the basis of
military expectations before the attack is commenced. As Rowe states: "At
this stage of military operations those planning the attack are at their most op-
timistic and civilians are at most risk." 24 This criticism mainly relates to the
principle of proportionality and the acceptance of collateral damage. An even
more important flaw with the Protocol, in this writer's view, is the wide inter-
pretations of legitimate military objectives that the Protocol harbors. This in-
terpretation flows only indirectly from the text of Article 52, but rather
through a perception that the Protocol has codified a liberal customary law re-
gime. The effect is an increased risk of extensive collateral damage.
With regard to Kosovo it has already been indicated that collateral damage
was a serious problem, but that the problem was not so much related to
22. James Burger, International humanitarian law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons learned or to be
learned, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129 (2000).
23. Rowe, supra note 19, at 160.
24. Id.
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violations ofIHL standards as it was to the flexible interpretation of the defini-
tion of military objectives. Should a reform of IHL be considered to address
these matters, one point of departure would be that Additional Protocol I
should stand as it is. A revision of the Protocol is neither realistic nor neces-
sary. There is another way to approach the problem.
Suggestions De Lege Ferenda
Rowe suggests a new additional protocol to the 1980 Conventional
Weapons Convention. Such an additional protocol would be adapted to the
use of air-delivered "smart" weapons and it would introduce the same restric-
tions on such weapons as now exist with regard to air-delivered incendiary
weapons. The relevant formulation would then read as follows:
It is prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of
civilians the object of attack, except when such military objective is clearly
separated from the concentration of civilians, and all feasible precautions are
taken with a view to limiting the effects of the attack to the military objective
and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 25
The suggested text almost copies the 1980 restrictions on incendiaries. 26 It
would be a lex specialis for mainly air warfare, overriding the balancing act of
the principle of proportionality, a principle that has its main application in air
warfare. According to such a lex specialis—and rethinking air warfare in his-
tory—no buildings in Berlin, Baghdad or Belgrade could be attacked. It is dif-
ficult to believe that States would be willing to accept an erosion of the
principle of proportionality and give up their military freedom of assessing mil-
itary advantage against civilian damage. Protocol I has established a sort of
balance between military necessity and proportionality and also between pro-
portionality and feasible precautions. It does not seem realistic to expect that
States would be willing to renounce the advantages of that approach.
Another problem with the text suggested by Rowe is that it is envisaged as a
protocol additional to the 1980 Weapons Convention, although the text only
25. Id. at 162.
26. Cf. Article 2(3), Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Weapons, annexed to the Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 1, at 533.
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covers methods and not means of warfare. It does not (like the other Protocols
attached to the Weapons Convention) refer to a specific weapon category, al-
though it may indirectly focus on air-delivered "smart" weapons.
On the other hand, one could imagine another solution. The Independent
International Commission on Kosovo has suggested the drafting of an addi-
tional protocol III to the Geneva Conventions. 27 Such a protocol would not
detract from or compete with Protocol I, because the new protocol would
have another scope of application. It would be limited to conflicts of an inter-
ventionist nature where the intervening side is a coalition enforcing a man-
date against a militarily inferior party to the conflict. The coalition would not
be fighting for its national security, vital interests or political survival, but for
the purpose of limited crisis management. The new protocol would be limited
to peace-enforcement operations conducted on behalf of the international
community, or other interventions within the framework of regional crisis
management, whether they are labeled humanitarian or not. It is important to
state that such a new protocol would not address the jus ad bellum legality of
humanitarian or other interventions (it would not introduce a "Just War"
doctrine) ; it would stick to the traditional IHL method of describing a scope of
application based on factual circumstances. In this case the scope of applica-
tion would be linked to the limited nature of the international armed conflict.
Should the State under attack plead self-defense and respond with coun-
ter-attacks, thus escalating the level of armed conflict, the limited scope of ap-
plication of the new protocol would no longer describe the situation
accurately and Protocol I would become applicable. In line with this thinking
Michael Hoffman, the American Red Cross Officer for International Humani-
tarian Law, has suggested that we may witness emerging rules for
"interventional armed conflict," for example in peace enforcement opera-
tions, whether authorized by the UN Security Council or conducted otherwise
by regional organizations. 28
The UK Secretary of State for Defence said about the Kosovo air campaign
on March 25, 1999 that "This is not a war, it is an operation designed to
prevent what everybody recognizes is about to be a humanitarian catastrophe:
ethnic cleansing, savagery. . . . That is what we are in there to prevent, that
27. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report,
5,31, 165-66(2000).
28. Michael Hoffman, Peace-enforcement actions and humanitarian law. Emerging rules for
"interventional armed conflict," 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 193, 200-203
(2000).
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is not war, it is a humanitarian objective very clearly defined as such." 29
Nevertheless, NATO relied on the traditional law of war developed for
inter-State armed conflict during the air campaign, including the definition of
military objectives and the rules on targeting, proportionality and collateral
damage linked to that definition. The liberal definition of military objectives
and the generous acceptance of collateral damage are part of a legal regime
that envisages a full-scale war. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Pro-
tocol I were drafted against the background of World War II and partly with a
possible clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in mind.
International humanitarian law is built upon a balance between acceptance
of military interests on the one hand and humanitarian concerns on the other.
NATO's "no-body-bag policy" showed that this balance was upset in the
Kosovo conflict's limited type of war. NATO could use the liberal definition
of military objectives—thus benefiting from the rules favorable to the military
interest—while at the same time attacking from such altitudes that humani-
tarian concerns could not be met. This problem could be addressed in a new
protocol for interventional types of conflict, through a sharpening of the defi-
nition of military objectives. One could require that only those objectives be
attacked which are making an effective contribution to military action, or
which imminently are about to make such a contribution. 30 A requirement of
imminence should be added, somewhat along the lines of the famous Caroline
case. This would protect a number of dual-use objects and increase the protec-
tion of the civilian population.
Such a sharpening of the definition of legitimate military objectives would
have its consequences with regard to the implementation of the principles of
proportionality and feasible precautions. A stricter application of these two
principles will follow from a more strict definition of military objectives. A
stricter application of the principle of proportionality would somewhat reduce
the problem of collateral damage flowing from that principle. The concepts of
proportionality and feasible precautions would not themselves need to be
sharpened. They would stand as they are today—in all types of international
armed conflict. However, in interventionist conflicts a better balance with re-
gard to precautionary measures would result from the suggested change; i.e.,
29. Quoted in Hoffman, id. at 195.
30. C/. the ICRC Commentary to Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I that the military
advantage "should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly
perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded." ICRC
Commentary, supra note 3, H 2209.
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precautionary measures would, as intended by the drafters of Protocol I, genu-
inely protect civilians on the ground, and not only the attackers flying high.
Although the above suggestion is the main de lege ferenda thrust of this pa-
per, it should be mentioned that a further additional protocol could be imag-
ined—a protocol attached to the 1980 Weapons Convention that would
explicitly prohibit the use of cluster bombs. This type of multiple sub-muni-
tions affected the civilian population in Kosovo and Serbia on several occa-
sions, often more so than the intended military targets. A protocol on multiple
weapons was in fact debated, in the years 1977 - 1980, as a follow-up to Addi-
tional Protocols I and II for inclusion in the 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention. But time was not ripe for it then, during the Cold War, and the
situation does not seem to have changed that much today. Or has it? During
the Kosovo air campaign, after alarming media reports about civilian casual-
ties caused by cluster bombs, some decision-makers reconsidered things. The
NATO attack targeted on the Nis airfield on May 7 went wrong. The cluster
bomb container opened right away after release from the aircraft, instead of
opening over the airfield. As a consequence it projected the sub-munitions
into the city of Nis. Following the media coverage of this incident there was a
decision by the White House to prohibit the further use of cluster bombs dur-
ing the conflict. However, this was a unilateral US decision. The British com-
mand in London did not follow suit and more cluster bombs were dropped on
targets in Serbia and Kosovo in the spring of 1999.
Whether States in the future may in fact be willing to forgo weapons of the
cluster bomb type in interventionist types of conflicts is not clear. Further
thinking on this issue ofmeans of warfare could perhaps usefully be channeled
into the kind of discussion I have tried to promote in this paper, a discussion
on the possibilities of increased protections for civilians in conflicts of a lim-
ited nature.
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As I have been Director of International Law and Communication at
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) , an institution
which devotes much energy to promote the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their Additional Protocols of 1977, for 16 years and as I am co-editor of the
Commentary to those Protocols, you will not be surprised that I don't share the
negative views expressed by John Murphy, echoing those of Hays Parks, on
both the Additional Protocols and their Commentary, even if they are certainly
far from being perfect.
What can at least be said about the Additional Protocols of 1977 in a few
words is that it is not possible simply to affirm that they are or that they are not
part of international customary law. As stated in the title of the Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-1977, which negotiated and adopted the Protocols, this
Conference had the double ambition to reaffirm and to develop international
humanitarian law (IHL) . That means that in part the Protocols reaffirm and
clarify customary rules of IHL and in part they develop that law. For the first
part their rules bind all States, for the second only the States parties to the
Protocols are bound. But the borderline is not always easy to determine for
two reasons. The first is that the Diplomatic Conference has not clearly de-
clared what was reaffirmation and what was development. The second is that
some rules which were considered as a development in 1977 may be consid-
ered today as part of customary law. But being commentator I will now base
my next points on the very good papers presented by John Murphy and Ove
Bring and enter into discussion on the Protocols and their Commentary only
on the occasion of remarks to those papers.
Commentary
Let me start with some words on international customary law. John Murphy
has quoted an author who went as far as questioning even the existence of in*
ternational customary law. I will not comment on this not very serious decla-
ration, but I would have something to add on the description given by John
Murphy on how to establish that there is customary law, with a particular fo-
cus on the difficulty of establishing State practice.
A reference to the notion of "specially affected States" by the ICJ in the
North Sea Continental Shelf case would be, for example, an important addi-
tional element to mention. I will not go further here and now on that ques-
tion, but I wish to mention that lawyers from the ICRC are finalizing a broad
study on the customary rules of IHL, done with the contribution of legal and
governmental experts, and based on the work of working groups, from all re-
gions of the world. This study will be published next year. Of course, the ques-
tion to know how to establish the practice and the opinio juris of States is
discussed in that study to determine the existence of customary rules and the
criteria taken into account will be explained. That being said and without en-
tering into the substance of this study, I would like to stress three points. First,
the aim of the study is to determine if a rule can or cannot be considered as a
customary rule, but not to give an in-depth interpretation of that rule. For
that reason we cannot expect too much from this study for the clarification of
the exact and practical meaning of existing rules, which is the central problem
debated by this colloquium. Secondly, there will always remain a certain de-
gree of uncertainty as to the customary nature of certain rules, and therefore
customary law is not a substitute to the formal adoption by States of treaties
aiming to be universally accepted, as those of IHL. Thirdly, the problem of the
existence or not of a normative restriction is particularly delicate with the
emergence of new weapons, due to the fact that there cannot be a largely es-
tablished practice during a long period of time in those cases. I will come back
to this last question later.
My next remark will be on the principle of proportionality, to affirm my
strong conviction that this principle does exist in jus ad bellum—a State which
has to use force as a last resort does not have the right to do more than what is
imposed by the situation—as in jus in hello—there is an obligation in military
operations to keep a balance between the military advantages anticipated and
the expected incidental civilian damages. It is even a central principle of those
laws. I was therefore surprised to read in the paper ofJohn Murphy that Hays
Parks has reported that "the American military review of Protocol I concluded
that the concept of proportionality is not a rule of customary international
law." All that I read and even what we heard yesterday from James Baker
274
Yves Sandoz
reinforce my conviction. James Baker reminded us that this principle was at
the center of the discussions on legitimate targets during the Kosovo bomb-
ings, as well for NATO members party to Additional Protocol I as for those,
like the United States, that were not. Therefore I can conclude in quoting Bill
Fenrick, the well-known Senior Legal Adviser of the Office of the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia: "That the principle of pro-
portionality exists is not seriously disputed." The problem we have to address
is the interpretation of the principle, not its existence.
Without entering in-depth into this issue, I would signal that another prob-
lem is the confusion in some military operations between the political objec-
tive and the military objectives stricto sensu. Such confusion took place in the
NATO operations in Kosovo, where the political objective—to oblige
Milosevic to accept conditions previously fixed—was not well distinguished
from military objectives. In fact, the question was not to win the war, but to
put enough pressure on Milosevic to cause him to end the conflict. Therefore
traditional notions of military objective and military advantage were used in
an ambiguous way. This question would need serious consideration for opera-
tions of this nature. But I do not pretend to start a serious discussion here and
now. It would require in-depth analysis of this and other concrete cases.
My next remark is that I cannot agree with the affirmation that the balance
between the obligations of the defenders and those of the attackers has been
broken down in Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the detriment of the attack-
ers. In reality, the obligations of the defenders are very clearly stated in Proto-
col I, as we can read particularly in Article 51(7):
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individuals civilians
shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or
to shield, favor or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall
not direct movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to
attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military
operations.
Article 58 then goes on to provide:
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible; (a) without
prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control
from the vicinity of military objectives; (b) avoid locating military objectives
within or near densely populated areas; (c) take the other necessary precautions
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to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under
their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.
Thus, as we can see, the Protocol is very clear in imposing on a Party to the
conflict a requirement not to use civilians to protect its military objectives.
Nevertheless, it is also true that it requires as well that the attackers take into
consideration the situation as it is in reality. They can't just ignore the fact
that civilians are used as "human shields." But this is common sense. Imagine
your own citizens being used; you cannot pretend you just don't care. And it is
also true if innocent civilians of one party, particularly children, are used for
this purpose. This element has to be taken into account in the balance and the
crime of your enemy does not give you the right to ignore the situation created
by that crime. But the Protocol doesn't prohibit action; it requires that all of
these elements be taken into account in the appreciation of the situation. I
think, as was clearly explained yesterday, that this position was adopted with-
out hesitation by those deciding on the NATO bombings in Kosovo.
Where I am in total agreement with John Murphy is that a real and crucial
problem of clarification remains for the definition of a military advantage, and
ascertaining the level where a decision must be taken or the determination of
responsibilities. These are undoubtedly delicate questions which can only be
clarified through practical examples in order to establish a kind of jurispru-
dence. We could certainly add some other questions to the list, as the one just
mentioned by Ove Bring on the dual-use objects, which precisely has, in my
opinion, a close link with the principle of proportionality—in fact the attack
of a dual-use object can be considered as the attack of a military objective with
collateral damages.
Mentioning again the principle of proportionality I want to stress another
element of this principle, the fact that it has to be observed at different levels.
Some would confine this principle to the strategic level and I cannot agree
with that opinion. There is no doubt, for example, that a soldier cannot blow
up a school full of children under the pretext that an enemy solider has en-
tered the school. Such a restriction is an application of the principle—the mil-
itary advantage being overthrown in such a hypothesis by the expected
collateral damages—even if the enemy soldier has himself committed a viola-
tion of the law in taking children as a shield.
That being said, I don't deny that the appreciation of those rules is complex,
but we cannot totally avoid such complexity. War is complex; life is complex;
and the complexity of a problem is not a good reason to refuse facing it. We
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have to solve those questions because they are at the heart of the necessary
limitations in war.
On the other hand, I am the first to admit that the military must have pre-
cise orders and that the trend to take more seriously the obligation to punish
war crimes renders still more indispensable this clarity, even if I cannot share
the criticisms of the ICRC lawyer's commentary, in particular on the meaning
of military objectives. In reality, the recent German military manual goes ex-
actly in the same direction, as well as the excellent commentary written by
Michael Bothe, who is present with us, and by the late Karl Josef Partsch and
Waldemar Solf, the latter playing, as you know, a very important role in the
American delegation to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference. That being
said, I do agree that this Commentary does not give a precise reply to all those
delicate questions.
Therefore we have to go further and to find the best way to do it. And for
that, I think it is worth reading what Bill Fenrick has written in a recent
article:
If the application of the law applicable to targeting and proportionality is to
become more transparent and, one hopes, more humane, outsiders, including
military experts and legal advisers not directly involved in particular conflicts,
should learn from the military planning process. A vigorous informed discussion
of targeting and proportionality issues based on case studies, both historical and
hypothetical, can contribute substantially to clarification of how the law can
and should be applied.
Then Fenrick draws the conclusion that "[t]he law applicable to targeting
and proportionality must be brought down to earth." I totally agree with this
statement and I think that the Naval War College is precisely the type of place
where the discussion suggested by Fenrick could take place.
I will not really enter into the problem of high-altitude air bombings, as I
have not the basic factual elements to do it seriously. But I think nevertheless
that it is important to reaffirm at this occasion at least one basic principle on
which a certain confusion emerged in the discussion on those bombings: one
cannot affirm that the security of its own soldiers have an absolute priority
over the protection of the civilian population. Both elements have to be put
into the balance and taken into account. If the price to absolute security of
one's own soldiers is heavy casualties among civilians, this price is too high.
Allow me then a further comment on the issue of precision-guided ammu-
nition. I agree with John Murphy that there is no obligation to use it exclu-
sively. In fact there are many interdictions and restrictions on the use of
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weapons in IHL, but no obligation to use a specific weapon. I don't think those
weapons are an exception. But that does not mean the possession of these
weapons is without legal consequence in certain circumstances. It may help,
for example, to keep the military action in conformity with IHL, particularly
in densely populated areas, in changing favorably the balance between the an-
ticipated military advantages and the expected civilian collateral damages.
Another question is the following: if you have the choice between weapons
causing more or less collateral damages to obtain the same military advantage,
have you an obligation to use the second? My reply is yes, and that even if the
principle of proportionality would still be in a favorable balance with the use of
weapons of the first type—i.e., that the anticipated military advantage would
overcome the expected incidental civilian damages. This affirmation is based
on another principle which has been reaffirmed in Protocol I and which is of-
ten confused with the principle of proportionality, the principle of the least
feasible damage, which is clearly stated at Article 57(2) (ii). This provision re-
quires those who plan or decide upon an attack to "take all feasible precau-
tions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians and damage to civilian objects."
Let me now say a few words on the ethical dimension of the question. My
opinion is that the problem has not been correctly posed. To have or not to
have a weapon doesn't change the ethical basis of your action, even if it can
change your behavior, because this one depends on one hand on your ethical
values, which remain constant, but on the other hand on the means you have
at your disposal, which vary. As an example I would take a medical doctor. If
he practices here or in a region of Africa far from any well-equipped medical
center, he will keep the same ethic. But his decision and responsibility will be
different if he has the capacity to test blood before an emergency transfusion
or if he hasn't, with the same objective to best serve the interest of his patient.
It is exactly the same if you have or don't have certain weapons.
Finally I would like to make some comments on the future. I heard with
sympathy the suggestions made by Ove Bring. I agree with him that some spe-
cific rules could be elaborated, or at least that an agreed interpretation of ex-
isting rules should be discussed, about enforcement measures, where there
remain some unsolved questions. That being said, I am not sure that the best
way to do it would be to start the drafting of an additional protocol III to the
Geneva Conventions.
Just recently the Secretary-General of the UN promulgated in a bulletin
the rules of IHL which must be applied by UN forces engaged in enforcement
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operations. This was the result of fruitful informal discussions organized by the
ICRC between senior UN officials, military experts, the ICRC and other legal
experts. This informal and smooth way to deal with such problems could in-
spire us for other necessary clarifications or developments. I am afraid that if
we open formally the procedure to adopt a third additional protocol (or even a
fourth as we know that there are ongoing discussions on the elaboration of a
third additional protocol on the protective emblems) so many obstacles and
oppositions will emerge that it would require very long and tremendous work
for an end result which has a good chance to be very disappointing. My hesita-
tion, therefore, is on the procedure, not on the necessity to clarify the points
mentioned by Ove Bring.
My second remark for the future is to insist again on the importance to dis-
cuss further the practical meaning of some IHL provisions on the conduct of
hostilities and to find the right place to do it. I insist again on the fact that a
place like this prestigious Naval War College would be ideal for such
discussions.
Finally my last remark is the following. There are no doubts for me that the
United States has to play a leading role in further discussions on IHL provi-
sions, particularly those concerning the conduct of hostilities. It is the greatest
military power, with many recent war experiences. But those discussions and
this leading role would be much easier and more credible if everyone accepted
the same basic rules. The crucial problem nowadays is the application of the
rules as we have seen in the discussion on the NATO operations in Kosovo.
But as long as the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, there
will be some hesitations on what rules can be taken as a basis for this
discussion.
I know that there are still many obstacles to United States' ratification of
the 1977 Additional Protocols, but I cannot refrain from affirming again my
conviction that the US could ratify them without endangering its own security
in using, where deemed necessary, the possibility of express reservations, as
many other States did. Over this internal problem, I would stress also my con-
viction that the ratification of the United States would have a decisive effect
on the uniformity of IHL in the whole world, in the universal acceptance of
this law, and on the possibility for United States to play a leading role in the
necessary clarification of some of its provisions. We need the United States in
that role.
I hope you will accept my apology for using this opportunity to reaffirm my
strong conviction on this issue and I thank you very much for your patience.
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It is the role of a commentator to comment on the program offered, the
topic before the panel, or the papers offered before that panel. While my
emphasis will be on the latter, necessarily it will range over all three.
The premise for this conference—lessons learned from Operation Allied
Force, the NATO air campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo—raises
many questions. Allied Force may be a classic example of the adage, "Bad
cases make bad law," with few valid lessons. As NATO's first military opera-
tion, a prime objective was keeping the nineteen-member alliance intact. An-
other was continuation of the Clinton Administration's objective in each of
its peace operations after Somalia of using military force, but with the admoni-
tion to commanders to "do no harm," a flawed philosophy akin to wanting to
make an omelet without breaking any eggs. In Allied Force, uncommon steps
were taken by NATO forces to reduce to an absolute minimum collateral
civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian objects, and in some in-
stances avoiding Serbian military casualties as well. 1 These steps could be
1. This generated considerable criticism in the official Air Force evaluation. See
Headquarters United States air Force, Initial Report: The AirWar over Serbia,
aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force pp. x, 54 (2000). Of particular note is the
following (p. x):
Traditionally, air planners have assumed that political conditions will allow the most
efficient employment of aerospace power, giving planners the latitude to optimize
survivability, target effects, and and collateral damage considerations. During the air
war over Serbia, such latitude did not exist. Not all members of the 19-nation Alliance
would have accepted the intensity and violence required to fight this war if military
planning had followed optimum Air Force doctrine. As long as Serbia was unable to
inflict significant Allied casualties, NATO accepted some operational inefficiencies
associated with those political restraints.
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taken because the United States and one or two of its allies had the capability
to do so, not because they necessarily felt legally obligated to do so. Professor
Murphy's articulation of the essential elements of the customary international
law process would indicate that these voluntary actions offer little, if any, pre-
cedent as to future law of war interpretation. 2
The questions my two colleagues were asked are somewhat troubling, as
they limit the scope of the inquiry. Specifically, they focus entirely on the obli-
gations of the force engaged in offensive operations, to the neglect of the de-
fending ground force. 3 This flows in part from the incorrect, perhaps
intentional, use of the word "attacks" in the 1977 Additional Protocol I4 to re-
fer to actions taken either by an attacker or defender. 5 Use of "attacks" to refer
to acts of defense is etymologically inconsistent with its definition and custom-
ary use in any of the six official languages of Additional Protocol I, a point
conceded in the Official Commentary of the International Committee of the
Red Cross.6 Limiting the definition of attacks to "acts of violence against the
adversary" is inconsistent with the customary law principle of distinction, par-
tially codified in Article 48, 7 and other provisions of Additional Protocol I that
prohibit the use of the civilian population or individual civilians as human
2. See Professor Murphy's paper in this volume.
3. This unfortunate and incorrect effect is demonstrated in articles critiquing Operation Allied
Force. See, for example, Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The air campaign, 82 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147 (2000) and A. Rogers, Zero-casualty warfare, 82
INTERNATIONAl REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 165, 176 (2000). The former examines only the
efforts of the attacker to reduce collateral civilian casualties, while the latter offers only three
sentences on the obligation of the defender.
4. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (A. Roberts and R. Guelff eds., 3d. ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Protocol I].
5. Article 49, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol I states, "'Attacks' means acts of violence
against the adversary, whether in offense or defense."
6. Commentary on the additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 603 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
7. Article 48 states: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Using the term "Parties to the
conflict" rather than "States Parties" (to the Protocol) ignores the customary law obligation of a
government to take reasonable measures to separate military objectives from civilian objects, and
vice versa, in peacetime and war.
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shields. 8 That this definition was the beginning of a slippery slope to erode the
customary law principle of distinction is evident not only in the questions
framed for this session, but also in the answers of the two primary presenta-
tions. Professor Murphy notes this inconsistency. Others, including some of
the sources he cites, have failed to do so.
This second point is offered to emphasize a concluding comment of Profes-
sor Murphy. As he notes, 9 it is ironic that a nation committed to the rule of
law, that has spent billions of dollars—in all likelihood more money than all
other nations combined—to develop the most sophisticated target intelli-
gence systems, weapons systems capable of the most accurate weapons deliv-
ery, precision-guide munitions, that provides the best training for the men
and women who operate them, and employs a multi-level, redundant, disci-
plined target approval process, has its operations placed under a post-conflict
microscope, while the illegal actions of its opponent in using human shields,
and gross violations of the law of war in other conflicts occurring simulta-
neously around the world, are ignored. It is doubtful that others who purport
to follow the rule of law could have conducted the same campaign with fewer
collateral civilian casualties. This "Do as I say, not as I can't do" approach
8. Article 5 1 , paragraph 7 states:
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be
used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts
to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military operations. The
Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military
operations.
Article 58 provides:
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:
(a) . . . endeavor to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual
civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from
military operations.
9. Professor Murphy's paper in this volume.
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also suggests a double standard—a very high standard for the United States
and a limited number of other Western democracies, and a lower standard for
the rest ofthe world. 10 Hence the adage "Be careful what you ask for" is appro-
priate in considering the law related to collateral casualties with respect to the
precedent of Allied Force.
Emphasis on the predominantly airpower focus of Allied Force neglects the
historic lesson that ground force operations cause greater civilian casualties
than air operations. 11 For this reason, historically a distinction was made be-
tween the risks to the civilian population in the "operational zone," that is,
within enemy artillery range, and civilians more distant from the line between
opposing forces. 12 The former were assumed to remain at their own risk. Sev-
eral efforts have been made to define the degree of protection afforded civil-
ians not within the zone of operations, the most recent being Additional
Protocol I. 13 This historic struggle has not been answered satisfactorily to date,
but seems to have been lost in the post-Kosovo debate and in the questions
posed at this conference.
10. This is true within NATO itself. Targeting and collateral damage limitations insisted upon
by some NATO governments during Allied Force, as noted in footnote 1, contrast markedly with
their inability to meet the same standards. As the Air Force report states:
Interoperability achieved many successes in terms of Alliance cooperation, but also fell
short in areas such as precision munitions As the United States military continues to
move toward a 21st century force propelled by the revolution in military affairs, the
resulting gaps in capabilities with its Allied must be addressed. In future conflicts, the
U.S. Air Force must also discover methods to integrate its assets with those of
less-technologically advanced allies . . . without resorting to a "lowest common
denominator" solution. In the face of a more sophisticated threat, this could be an
increasingly significant limitation for those states expecting to participate in a coalition
with the United States.
Initial Report, supra note l, at 47.
Post-conflict reviews of law of war compliance is particularly hypocritical when the criticism
comes from citizens ofor private organizations in a neutral nation, whose government and people
have "opted out" of assuming their share of responsibility for a safer world.
11. See this author's Air War and the law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1 n.l (1990)
providing World War II German casualty figures and Charles J. Dunlap, Kosovo, Casualty
Aversion, and the American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Academy Journal of Legal Studies 95, 103 (1999/2000).
12. See, for example, M. W. Royse, Consultation, in LA PROTECTION DES POPULATIONS
CIVILES CONTRE LES BOMBARDMENTS 72, 88 (1930). This program of contributions by
international law experts was hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
13. This history is summarized and analyzed in Parks, supra note 11.
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To close this portion ofmy remarks, the picture posed by the questions, the
responses thereto, and sources cited therein, offer a clearer picture than the
one seen by the battlefield commander. Appreciating the fog ofwar in which a
commander must operate, the threshold for violation of the law of war is high,
whether in the grave breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, each ofwhich requires mens rea. 1 * In establish-
ing mens rea y a commander's decisions must be based upon information rea-
sonably available to him at the time, and not what may be learned—or
alleged—long after the conflict has ended. 15
14. Article 147, GC, defines a grave breach as ". . . those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment . . . willfully causing great suffering or serious bodily injury to body
or health . . . for] extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" [emphasis supplied].
Article 85, paragraph 3, Additional Protocol I, defines a grave breach (for the circumstances of
this panel) as "(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; [or]
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in
the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2(a) (iii). . . . ."[emphasis added].
15. See, for example, the reservation taken by Switzerland upon ratification of Additional
Protocol I (February 17, 1982), which states, "The provisions of Article 57, paragraph 2, create
obligations only for commanding officers at the battalion or group level and above. The
information available to commanding officers at the time of their decision is determinative."
Similarly, at the time of its ratification (January 28, 1998), the United Kingdom declared that
"Military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks
necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all
sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant time." This approach was taken in
the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor] , with respect
to NATO's mistaken attack of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on July 5, 1999. See id., 1111
80-85, which found no criminal responsibility.
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In considering ways in which to reduce collateral civilian casualties, distinc-
tion must be placed in its historic context. It is a mutual obligation, as seen in
the following:
Distinction 16
Attacker's obligations Defender's obligations
Design/employment of weapon systems Separation of
Training civilian population
Target intelligence military objectives
Target acquisition Air raid precautions
Warning to civilian population 17 shelters
evacuation
civil defense
The United States has done more than its fair share to fulfill its obligations
with respect to improving bombing accuracy: 18
U.S. Bombing Accuracy
War
World War II
Korean War
Viet Nam War
Desert Storm
Modern weapons systems, such as the McDonnell-Douglas F15E Strike Eagle, us-
ing the Global Positioning System (GPS), account for ever-increasing accuracy with
gravity (so-called "dumb") bombs. Today, the circular error probable (CEP) for US
strike aircraft: dropping "dumb" bombs is less than forty feet. I say this to note an error
made in a source of Professor Murphy's that incorrecdy assumed that increased
bombing accuracy has occurred only through use of precision-guided munitions. 21
Circular
Number of Bombs 19 Error Probable20
9,070 3,3000 feet
1,100 1,000 feet
176 400 feet
30 200 feet
16. W. Hays Parks, The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON
Human Rights 65, 88 (1998).
17. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws of Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
Annex, art. 26, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 69, 78; Protocol I, supra
note 5, art. 57(2) (c).
18. R. P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air power and the Gulf War 283 (1992).
19. Table computed for 90% probability of a single bomb striking a 60x100 foot target, dropping
500-lb. unguided bombs. For discussion of the relative accuracy of World War II strategic
bombing, see W. Hays Parks, 'Precision and 'Area Bombing: Who did Which, and When?, 18
Journal of Strategic Studies 147-174 (1995).
20. Circular error probable is "the radius of a circle within which one-half of an aircraft's or
missile's projectiles are expected to fall." U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1994).
21. Professor Murphy's paper in this volume quoting Stuart Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo:
Emergence, Lex Lata, ofa Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas,
47 Naval Law Review 115, 118 (2000).
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Precision-guided munitions were used with great effect during the 1972
Linebacker campaigns over North Viet Nam. They received greater public at-
tention during the 1991 Coalition war to liberate Kuwait, and have been im-
proved since that time. Today the CEP "norm" for a laser-guided precision
munitions (PGM) is three meters, with at least eighty per cent (rather than the
CEP standard of fifty per cent) within that circle. But PGMs are not a panacea
weapon. When a precision-guided munition goes awry, it is considerably less
accurate than gravity bombs. For example, in the April 15, 1986 air strike
against terrorist-related targets in Libya, the Mk-84 2,000-pound precision-
guided bombs of one F-l 1 IF assigned to attack Aziziyah Barracks struck 7,400
feet long and 3,700 feet left of the intended target. 22 PGM accuracy may be af-
fected by weather and/or defeated by simple countermeasures. Obscurants,
such as smoke, may defeat laser-guided bombs, while electro-optical munitions
have similar vulnerabilities. 23 As is true of many aspects of warfare, the simple
answer often masks myriad complexities. Who bears the responsibility for col-
lateral civilian casualties resulting from successful obscurant use to defeat
precision-guided munitions?
Part of the problem in suggesting an obligation to use precision-guided mu-
nitions is neglect of the factors that can result in collateral civilian casualties,
almost all of which were evident to one degree or another in Allied Force:
Factors Affecting Collateral Damage and Collateral Civilian Casualties24
Target intelligence Distance to target Target winds, weather
Planning time Force training, experience Effects of previous strikes
Force integrity Weapon availability Enemy defenses
Target identification Target acquisition Rules of engagement
Enemy intermingling25 Human factor Equipment failure
Fog of war
Not all are within the attacking force's control. As Professor Adam Roberts
noted in a presentation at the US Institute of Peace on March 1, 2001, there is
a "rush to judgment that anything that affects the civilian population is illegal.
22. Brian L. Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on
Libya (1990).
23. Gary S. Ziegler, Weather Problems Affecting Use of Precision Guided Munitions, 32 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REVIEW (May-June 1979), at 95; John P. Bulger, Obscurants: Countermeasures to
Modern Weapons, 62 MILITARY REVIEW (May 1982), at 45.
24. Parks, supra note 11, at 184-202.
25. That is, enemy intermingling of military objectives with civilian objects and the civilian
population, including the use of human shields. Photographic examples are contained in Parks,
supra note 16, at 112-113.
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It is an error to assume that the law ofwar provides absolute protection for ev-
erything that may be civilian." It also is an error to view every civilian casualty
as a war crime, and/or to place the entire responsibility for civilian casualties
on the party to the conflict that has the least control over them.
Offsetting the law of war principle of distinction is the continuing emer-
gence of a 'counter' targeting practice by some governments. In order to re-
duce or defeat an opponent's military superiority, particularly with respect to
airpower, many governments have taken no or limited air raid precautions or
steps to evacuate the civilian population. Some have purposely located objects
of strategic importance in urban areas, in order to use the civilian population
as human shields. This practice became evident in the Korean War. It was ex-
perienced in the Vietnam War, both in the air campaigns over North Vietnam
and in air and ground operations in South Vietnam; in the 1991 Persian Gulf
conflict; and in Allied Force. 26 It is not unique to air operations, as members of
Task Force Ranger discovered in their battle in Mogadishu on October 3,
1993 (relearning a lesson experienced a generation earlier in Vietnam). In
April 1986, just prior to the US air strike against terrorist-related targets in
Libya, Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi threatened to round up all foreign
nationals and place them in and around his most important facilities. In the
last decade, members of United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Balkans
were taken hostage and placed adjacent to military objectives as human
shields. In one nation, one of the first to ratify Additional Protocol I, an entire
downtown city block was razed. A major military command and control cen-
ter was built underground. The structures that existed on that block previ-
ously were meticulously rebuilt, including a school and a mosque. The intent
was clear: to use civilian objects and the civilian population to shield this im-
portant military objective, and to exploit damage to them and civilian casual-
ties should the military objective be attacked. 27
Article 5 1 , paragraph 8 of Additional Protocol I states that even where a
party to a conflict fails to fulfill its obligations to separate military objectives
from the civilian population or, worse, uses the civilian population as human
shields, the opposing party is not released from its legal obligations with respect
to the civilian population and civilians. Although the United States is not a
State Party to Additional Protocol I, this statement is consistent with its
26. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Rolling Thunder and the Law of War, 33 AIR UNIVERSITY
REVIEW (Jan.-Feb. 1982), at 2 (Vietnam War); and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FINAL
Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 608, 614, 615 (1992).
27. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Crossing the Line, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
(Nov. 1986), at 40, 50, and DAVIS, supra note 22, at 15, 18, 19.
288
W. Hays Parks
post-World War II practice. A point this conference might have addressed is:
In light of the increasing, illegal reliance upon human shields by some, to what
extent can it be expected that the other side can assume the responsibility for
minimizing collateral civilian casualties beyond its legal obligation?
Professor Bring suggests a new additional protocol to limit (if not prohibit)
attacks on military objectives in urban areas. 28 Recent State practice suggests
this would merely exacerbate the problem, encouraging many to make in-
creased use of civilian objects and the civilian population to shield military ob-
jectives from attack.
Professor Bring also suggests more effective warnings. I differ from his read-
ing of the Final Report to the ICTY Prosecutor regarding Allied Force regard-
ing NATO's attack on the Serbian Television and Radio Station in Belgrade,
which I see as corroborating General Wesley Clark's statement that as a result
ofNATO warnings that the Serb Television and Radio Station building was
about to be attacked, the Serbs ordered international journalists to report to
the building, using them as human shields. 29
28. Professor Bring's paper in this volume.
29. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War 264 (2001) and Alex Todorovic, Serb TV Chief
Accused Over Air Raid, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 14, 2001, at 19. The ICTY
Prosecutor's report does not support Professor Bring's argument. The report states in part:
[S]ome doubts have been expressed as to the specificity of the warning given to civilians
by NATO of its intended strike, and whether the notice would have constituted
"effective warning ... of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit" as required by Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I.
Evidence on this point is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, NATO officials
in Brussels are alleged to have told Amnesty International that they did not give a
specific warning as it would have endangered the pilots. . . On this view, it is possible
that casualties among civilians working at the [radio and television station] may have
been heightened because of NATO's apparent failure to provide clear advance
warning of the attack, as required by Article 57(2).
On the other hand, foreign media representatives were apparently forewarned of the
attack. ... As Western journalists were reportedly warned by their employers to stay
away from the television station before the attack, it would also appear that some
Yugoslav officials may have expected that the building was about to be struck.
Consequently, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair blamed Yugoslav officials for not
evacuating the building, claiming that "[t]hey could have moved those people out of
the building. They knew it was a target and they didn't [I]t was probably for . . . very
clear propaganda reasons." . . . Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav officials of
the impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians . .
.,
it may nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities may be partially responsible for
the civilian casualties resulting from the attack and may suggest that the advance
warning given by NATO may have been sufficient under the circumstances.
Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 11 77.
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This issue is not new, nor changed by Additional Protocol I. Hugh Tren-
chard, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, identified the problem in 1928:
As regards the question of legality, no authority would contend it is unlawful to
bomb military objectives, wherever situated. Such objectives may be situated in
centers of population in which the destruction from the air will result in
casualties also in the neighboring civilian population. The fact that air attack
may have this result is no reason for regarding the bombing as illegitimate
provided all reasonable care is taken to confine the scope of the bombing to the
military objective. Otherwise a belligerent would be able to secure complete
immunity for his war manufactures and depots merely by locating them in a
large city ... a position which the opposing belligerent would never accept.30
A parallel issue relating to interpretation of Additional Protocol I with re-
spect to precision-guided munition use was raised between World Wars I and
II. Professor M. W. Royse, a World War I Marine Corps aviator, went on to a
long and respected academic career at Harvard. In 1928 he authored what re-
mains the best work on the law of war as it relates to aerial bombardment. 31
Speaking at a 1930 conference of international legal experts hosted by the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, Royse noted "It is possible to gauge
the immunity of civil populations by noting restrictions on 'permissible vio-
lence.' Rules of war restrict the means and methods of warfare only . . . when
the rule does not have the effect of placing one or more States at a disadvan-
tage."32 The increasing conduct of some States in using human shields, and
some interpretations of Additional Protocol I offered in this meeting that
place the entire responsibility for civilian casualty avoidance on nations em-
ploying more advanced weaponry, are likely to erode rather than enhance re-
spect for the law of war and civilian protection.
Comments also are necessary regarding two arguments made by Professor
Bring in his paper. The first concerns counting civilian deaths within a mili-
tary objective as "collateral civilian casualties."33 It is clear that the Pentagon
would be a military objective in war. It should be equally obvious that a
30. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST
GERMANY 1939-1945, Vol. IV, Annexes and Appendices, 73 (1961).
31. M. W. Royse, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of
WARFARE (1928). This comment is made with full and great appreciation and respect for the
many works by James Maloney Spaight, including his three-edition AIR POWER AND WAR
RIGHTS, published in 1924, 1933 and 1947.
32. Royse, supra note 12, at 77.
33. See Professor Bring's paper in this volume.
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civilian working there assumes a certain risk. His or her presence would not
change the nature of the Pentagon as a legitimate target. Civilians killed
within an obvious military objective are not "collateral civilian casualties."
Counting civilians employed within a military objective as "collateral civilian
casualties" would only encourage increased civilian presence in a military ob-
jective in order to make its attack prohibitive in terms of collateral civilian
casualties.
Finally, Professor Bring declares without any documentation or authorita-
tive reference that the proportionality language contained in Article 51, para-
graph 5 (b) of Additional Protocol I is "arguably a codification of traditional
customary law."34 The principle of proportionality has gained importance over
the past thirty-five years, but within the limited audience of Western democ-
racies. The principle of proportionality is important today to the US and its
NATO allies. I do not disagree with its intent. I do disagree with some of the
radical interpretations being offered of it. To suggest that it is customary law is
bad history, as I have shown elsewhere. 35
One question asked by conference planners is: "Does the use of preci-
sion-guided munitions lead to a duty to use those types of weapons exclusively
in future conflicts?" The answer should not be viewed solely through the US
defense budget, which (misguidedly) some see as unlimited. Were I a lawyer
for another government, my advice to that government would be: Don't buy
them. There is no legal obligation to acquire them. But if you do buy them,
you may be required to use them or face criminal prosecution for failure to use
them when some believe you should have. Also, it may encourage an oppo-
nent to use human shields to offset your technological advantage.
Another answer is a question: How far does one take this argument? Two of
the most precise attacks in recent years were the 1983 truck bomb attack on
United States peacekeepers in Beirut, and last year's suicide barge attack on
the USS Cole. Had a State party to an armed conflict carried those out, would
it be legally obligated to continue precision suicide attacks? Similarly, on April
16, 1988, an Israeli special operations team entered the home of Khalil
el-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad, the military commander and chief of
34. See Professor Bring's paper in this volume. Following the colloquium, Professor Bring
advised me that this statement was based upon the argument offered by Hans Blix in his Area
Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1978, at
31-69 (1980). While I hold both Hans Blix and Professor Bring in the highest respect, the
practice of nations offers no evidence to substantiate this claim.
35. Parks, supra note 16, at 90-97.
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operations for the Palestine Liberation Organization, in Sidi Boussaid, Tuni-
sia. Abu Jihad was killed as he reached for his weapon. His wife and two chil-
dren, present in the room, were left unharmed. That is the epitome of
distinction. Is it not a logical and inevitable extension of the question posed to
this panel to suggest that a nation that has such a special operations capability
would be legally obligated to use it against military objectives in urban areas
even before resorting to precision-guided munitions? Such a suggestion is ab-
surd, of course, but no less than the argument some have made with respect to
precision guided munitions.
I will close with one final comment, and that is to suggest that air power
advocates to some degree may be victims of their own hype. Promising de-
grees of accuracy that cannot always be met raises public expectations, and
allows critics to argue that collateral civilian casualties resulting from the fric-
tion of war may have been intentional. Touting technological precision may
lead to expectations that are unrealistic. 36 It is a case of let the advocate or
proponent beware.
36. The official US Air Force analysis of Allied Force, received after this author's comments
were given, agrees: "The benchmark for high bombing accuracy and low collateral damage,
however, may create unrealistic expectations for political leaders and the public at large in future
air operations fought under very different circumstances. . . ." INITIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
54.
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Barry Strauss
I would first like to thank Professors Murphy and Bring for such excellentpapers, and the organizers for having invited me. This is an act of faith on
their part because I am neither a warrior nor a lawyer. I know that most of you
in this room fit one or the other if not both of these categories, so I'll direct my
remarks towards you. In particular, I will try to avail myself with the Socratic
method or as some would put it the 'Jeopardy approach.' That is, I'll pose my
comment in the form of questions.
Let me point out first that I am a historian. And as a historian, it's my duty
to tell you that I represent a guild that has a fundamental skepticism about our
enterprise here because historians are famously cautious about the possibility
of learning from history. Historians would ask can we learn any lessons from
the Kosovo conflict? Some of you will know the anecdote about the historian
who was asked, 'What do you think of the French Revolution?' And he re-
plied, 'It's too soon to tell.' Well, it may or may not be too soon to tell about
Kosovo, but we need to ask about the Kosovo conflict—what can we learn
from it?
We begin by asking what can we learn about the role of lawyers? Professor
Moore has told us that lawyers played a unique role in the Kosovo conflict in
the history of modern warfare or indeed the history of warfare, in the role they
played in advising on the tactics of this conflict. We need to ask is Kosovo the
wave of the future? Will lawyers play a similar role in future wars? Or was
Kosovo unique? Was it an abrogation? To what extent do the unique charac-
teristics of the Kosovo warfare shape what happened there? In particular let
me pose a question—what would have happened during the Kosovo war if
groups of Serb terrorists had bombed hospitals in NATO countries? Would
Commentary
this have affected NATO's tactics in this war? Would lawyers have been able
to convince commanders and indeed to convince politicians to be similarly re-
strained in their response in Serbia? More generally—and this is my second
question—when we think about the Kosovo war, should we think of it as fun-
damentally a humanitarian intervention, or should we think of it as a political
conflict whose aim was to stabilize NATO's volatile southeastern flank? I
think we have to ask this question when we look more broadly at the strategy
of the Kosovo conflict.
Some of the questions and comments that arose yesterday I think would
cause us to ask whether NATO's strategy in Kosovo was strictly military or
was it rather following a political and psychological strategy? Did NATO plan
to win the war by destroying Serbia's military potential for action in Kosovo, or
was NATO rather aiming at delivering a message to Mr Milosevic and other
members of the Serb elite that if the war were to continue, that eventually
NATO would flatten the economic infrastructure of Serbia? I think we need
to ask that as a factual question. We also need to ask it as an ethical question.
What about the ethics ofNATO's strategy in this war? In particular we need
to ask it about the question of dual-use targets. NATO did target a number of
dual-use facilities that had military use and so was legally proper to target, but
they also were very important for the Serb economy. The question is to what
extent were they targeted because of their military use? To what extent were
they targeted because of their economic and therefore their political use? If
this targeting was legal, was it also ethical?
To turn the question around, to ask it in a somewhat different way, we've
heard that the strategy in this war was not to strike a quick devastating knock-
out blow, but rather it was a strategy of slow escalation. The war lasted sev-
enty-eight days when it could possibly have ended much sooner. We need to
ask the ethics of this strategy and in particular how many additional Kosovars
suffered or died as a result of the prolongation of the war? How would we bal-
ance that number against the number of civilians who were perhaps spared in
Serbia because of the particular strategy that NATO followed?
Now let's turn from strategy to tactics and look more specifically at collat-
eral damage. On the subject of collateral damage, let me be forgiven for just
stating the obvious. The term collateral damage is a euphemism—if not in-
deed Orwellian. We're asking of course how many civilian casualties, how
many deaths, how many injuries, how much civilian suffering is permitted in
the conduct of war? The figure of five hundred civilian deaths in Serbia is be-
fore us. We need to ask the question, was this an excessive number of deaths
in this conflict? Or does it reflect restraint? Does it reflect admirable restraint?
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From this we need to ask about NATO commanders. In their behavior in this
war were there significant deviations from the rules of proportionality and fea-
sible precautions..7 Was there to a significant degree too liberal an interpreta-
tion of what a military objective was in Serbia and Kosovo?
From this we need to go to a factual question. It's one that's been raised be-
fore, but I think we need to raise it again and ask for clarification from the ex-
perts. It's a factual question regarding high-altitude bombing. That is, by
bombing at 15,000 feet rather than going lower as a general rule, did NATO
increase the possibility of civilian casualties? Did it increase the number of ci-
vilian casualties? Depending on what our answer to that question is, I think
we come up with a serious ethical question. That is, how do we weigh in the
balance concern for the safety of soldiers' lives as opposed to concern for civil-
ian lives? To ask the question in a different way, just what risks can we ethi-
cally ask soldiers to undertake? Can we for example ask soldiers to expose
themselves to hostile fire from other soldiers in order to minimize the number
of civilian casualties? Is that a fair and ethical thing for us to demand? To go a
step further, is it a democratic thing for us to demand?
Now I raise the question of whether it's a democratic thing to demand be-
cause the question of chivalry has come up—the question of chivalry and mili-
tary honor. To my ears, these strike me as rather unusual terms to hear in
talking about modern warfare. When I hear about chivalry and military honor,
I have to ask myself whether these are appropriate terms or whether they are
not instead aristocratic hangovers from an age of gentlemen warriors. We can
certainly ask soldiers never to deliberately target civilians. We certainly must
ask soldiers never to deliberately target civilians. We must ask commanders to
follow the laws of armed conflict in choosing their targets. But again, can we
ask soldiers to knowingly risk their own lives in order to minimize civilian
casualties?
Moving on from this, I wanted to ask some questions about Professor
Bring's proposal for defining military objectives more tightly in future multina-
tional humanitarian interventions. In particular I wanted to ask the following
questions. What would the effect of his proposal be on the safety of soldiers
following this much more restricted definition of military objectives? What
would its effect have been in the Kosovo campaign? What would its effect
have been on Kosovars in prolonging the campaign? And what would its effect
have been on enemy power?
Turning to Professor Murphy's discussion of the role of precision-guided
munitions in urban and highly populated areas, it may indeed be the case that
we ought not to employ any black letter rule in demanding that precision-
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guided munitions be used. But would it not make sense to say that depending
upon feasibility—the feasibility of using them and upon the discretion of the
commanders—that indeed precision-guided munitions should be used in ur-
ban and highly populated areas whenever possible. So not a black letter rule,
but something that should be striven for in the interest of minimizing civilian
casualties. A follow-up question on that for the experts would be to what ex-
tent would finances make this possible or impossible?
The question of finances brings me to my final question. That is one about
the differences of the different kinds of States that fight war, the differences in
ethics might be expected between technologically poor States and technologi-
cally rich and sophisticated States. In particular, should we expect democratic
countries to fight their wars by democratic principles? Should we expect dem-
ocratic countries particularly when they are engaging in humanitarian inter-
ventions to fight wars by humanitarian principles? Or rather, should we say
that it's simply impossible to expect that of democratic countries and unfair to
expect that of democratic countries? Should we say that war is not a humani-
tarian business and that the proper role of democratic principles in the con-
duct of war is making democratic political decisions about the nature of war,
the aims of war, the purpose of war and having made those decisions to fight
war cleanly and fairly and according to the laws of armed conflict, but fighting
the war using all force at a country's disposal in order to win the war as quickly
as possible, to achieve a political goal that is in and of itself humanitarian and
humane? I'll leave that as my final question. I'm sure the discussion will take it
further.
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Modern Technology: Is There An Obligation to Use It?
Brian O'Donnell: 1
We had some discussion on the precision-guided munitions issue and I'd
like to turn that to the targeting analysis issue for collateral damage purposes.
Colonel Montgomery's presentation yesterday discussed the highly technical
nature of some of the new technology that weVe used to determine the blast
patterns of buildings whether it's going to be walls falling in, walls falling out
and so forth. Are we establishing in the panel's opinion
—
probably Hays Parks
would be the best person to answer this—a new standard that ifwe don't take
advantage of that new technology in future operations, then we have failed to
utilize all reasonable means to minimize collateral damage?
W. Hays Parks:
I don't know enough about the formulas for determining how many civil-
ians are likely to be inside an objective or how many collateral civilian casual-
ties there may be. I will note that years ago I looked at the Top Secret original
target package for North Vietnam. It was written in August of 1964 and gave
an estimate that there were 2.7 persons living in each structure. I feel sorry for
that .7 person whoever that may be. I'll let Tony Montgomery really respond
more to that, but I feel that we know what munitions can do. The JDAM that
we have is very well developed, quite sophisticated. So I feel fairly good about
that side of it provided you have accurate delivery. I have not seen the formu-
lations for how we determine that there's going to be X number of civilians in
a particular structure or how likely it is we'll have X amount of collateral civil-
ian casualties. I do think that we may be again creating expectations there
1. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; International Law Advisor, Naval Warfare
Development Command.
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that when these formula do not work, people will look at them in the most
negative fashion.
Mike Newton: 2
In fulfilling the obligation of the law to take all feasible measures, it's easy to
jump to precision-guided munitions which I think is what the media and
much of the public has done. But in point of fact, I think the targeteers and
our Air Force colleagues would agree that what really is done is an assessment
of how to weaponeer a target, how to attack it, when to attack it in the way
most likely to minimize collateral damage. I would give you just one exam-
pie—the MUP [Yugoslav Ministry of Internal Affairs police forces] police sta-
tion in Jackavitza. Ifyou attacked it on an east-west axis, there were four-story
civilian apartment buildings on either side. They didn't do that. They at-
tacked it with five hundred pound dumb bombs on a north-south access.
There's a big bomb crater in the road in front of the building. The building is
devastated. There's a big bomb crater in the parking lot behind the building.
Beautiful weaponeering, and the civilians on either side weren't affected—the
windows weren't even broken. I think that's an example of the kinds of things
that US militaries do precisely to minimize collateral damage which lead into a
question really for the panel as a whole.
Human Shields: Can Abuse of the Law of War Be a Force Multiplier?
Mike Newton:
There was press reporting on the attack on the RTS station where, when
you look at what happened, the US military took steps to minimize collateral
damage. It was press reporting that in fact Slobodan Milosevic had advance
notice of the attack on the RTS station and the casualties that were caused
were caused by the fact that he took people, rounded them up and locked
them in the station—literally locked them into the station—as a propaganda
vehicle to then exploit to the world media, which he did successfully. I mean
the very fact that people perceive of that as an unlawful attack; the very fact
that we're still discussing it is, I think, an indicator of Milosevic's success.
If you do go down the road of pursuing future legal developments, how do
you envision using the law? I mean it's pretty clear to me that people are using
the laws as a force multiplier to actually assist an unethical defendant. How
2. Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army; Office ofWar Crimes Issues, Department of State.
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would you guard against that because very clearly that's what we're seeing in
the practicality on the ground—an unethical defender is using the law as a
way to limit and constrain the attacker even when the attacker is making a
huge effort to comply with the law? So how would you address that as a matter
of law if you do try to come up with an additional protocol or further targeting
restrictions?
W. Hays Parks:
I think the one thing that I would look at if we were rewriting additional
Protocol I, I would make it a grave breach to use human shields. I think that's
not in there. You could perhaps interpret that from using the grave breach
provision of the Civilians' Convention if you're on occupied territory. But if
you're not, I think the dilemma you have is that some nations felt then and
feel now that if I can draft my men and women into my military and have them
die in my defense, I can use my civilians the same way. If those are civilians of
another country—as happened both I think in Yugoslavia and also happened
in Iraq in 1990 when hostages were taken and used as human shields—then
you have a grave breach of Article 147. 1 think, however, we still have the un-
resolved dilemma that existed at the time of negotiation of Additional Proto-
col I as to what extent can the leadership of an enemy nation use its own
population as human shields.
John Murphy:
The only comment I'll make on the situation that's been posed here is that
it illustrates the difficulty of getting the facts straight in an armed conflict.
Part of the problem in the situation you pose is that Mr Milosevic was success-
ful in getting a certain element of the press to believe the story and that if all
the facts had come out, then there really would have been no valid charge
that the United States forces had violated the law of armed conflict. In fact,
quite the contrary would have been charged. But of course getting the facts
straight during any crisis, certainly during armed conflict, continues to be a
major
—
perhaps irresolvable
—
problem.
Yves Sandoz:
The problem is not so much a need to change the law but to implement it.
There are too many violations; but it's not drafting new laws that will change
this. We have to find better ways to react to violations of the law. That is the
key issue.
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Michael Bothe:
I must admit, I have not quite seen where this problem of human shields
comes in. This is in violation of the laws of war certainly. In Yugoslavia, this is
a subject for the jurisdiction of the ICTY. As it is a violation of the laws of
war, it comes under the definition of the crimes which are subject to the
jurisdiction of that Court under Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY. Having
said that, I entirely agree that much more attention should be paid to this cur-
rent practice.
Do We Need An Additional Protocol For Humanitarian Intervention?
Christopher Greenwood:
This question is for Ove Bring regarding his proposal for drafting an addi-
tional protocol for humanitarian interventions. Which body of law would ap-
ply to States toward which the intervention is directed? In a Kosovo type of
case if the coalition which is carrying out the intervention is governed by a
new protocol as envisioned on interventions because they are acting in a hu-
manitarian capacity and not self-defense, which body of law would apply to
the country in which the intervention is being carried out? Will it be subject
to the same body of rules about intervention because it is the intervenee, or
will it be able to say that in it's own view that it is acting in self-defense indeed
for it's own national survival and thus subject only to the more lenient stan-
dards that are the general rule in Protocol I?
Ove Bring:
First, I would like to say that if we could imagine an additional protocol III
in this context, it needs to be a balanced protocol relating to what we've just
talked about—the need to get rid of human shields as a way of defense during
international conflicts. That issue has to be addressed in the same kind of pro-
tocol. But I'm not married to the idea that it must be a negotiated text. It
could also be some common statement on how operations should be con-
ducted. That kind of document would not compete with international hu-
manitarian law proper. It would only be something in addition to it with very
specific messages being signaled to the parties to that conflict.
I agree that you have a very good point there with regard to who is gov-
erned by what body of law. How would Yugoslavia in this case consider the sit-
uation in legal terms? They would probably look upon this as a right of
self-defense. Although this protocol I'm talking about is not relating to aggres-
sion or self-defense for humanitarian intervention or the opposite, they would
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certainly find themselves having the right to conduct warfare under the nor-
mal standards of self-defense. I agree with you that that is a problem that has
to be looked into further.
If you have a kind of new protocol trying to limit the situation to a certain
kind of intervention, that will presume that the armed conflict will stay within
the confines of the scope of application that has been drafted in that protocol.
If the Yugoslav authorities start to upgrade and escalate the fighting under the
principle of self-defense, then that scope of application will fall. You will not
find yourself within those parameters any more. You will go back to the ordi-
nary law of armed conflict.
John Murphy:
The briefest of comments regarding this interesting proposal. I have prob-
lems with it just as others have expressed problems. One thing I think hasn't
been noticed is it seems to be that in the case of where the motivation for the
intervention is primarily humanitarian, to change the rules to make it more
difficult for there to be military efficiency would obstruct bringing the humani-
tarian violations to an end quickly. That it seems to me would be dysfunc-
tional and unfortunate. It does seem to me that Professor Bring's proposal
brings with it a little bit of the just war concept with all of the difficulties that
raises.
Ove Bring:
There have been a lot of points of view put forward with regard to the pro-
posed additional protocol III. Perhaps that suggestion should be looked upon
in perspective. Probably the main focus on my paper was the definition of mili-
tary objectives. At the end of the paper, I wanted to address the ethical lessons
of the Kosovo conflicts since that is part of our agenda here. During such an
assessment of the ethical dimension of the Kosovo conflict, I think it's appro-
priate to bring up the idea that is already floating around in the international
community about such an additional protocol III. I have taken the many res-
ervations and critical points with regard to it—it might be totally unrealistic
and it might be counterproductive in certain respects. Still, I think it addresses
the matter of improper balance with regard to the rights of attackers against
the hazards that the civilians on the ground are experiencing. But in order to
address that problem, if you admit it is a problem in these situations, we don't
have to be stuck to a certain legal solution. Additional protocol III that we've
been discussing would be a treaty. Another way would be, as I said, perhaps to
have a code of conduct which perhaps could get rid of some of the more
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technical devaluating effects that a treaty text would have on international
humanitarian law as a whole. Or one could imagine having the Secretary-
General of the United Nations issue another bulletin on observance by UN
forces on international humanitarian law principles in armed conflict. That
kind of bulletin could refer exactly to these enforcement operations and it
could be a sort of a guideline for other kinds of similar interventions. That was
in the general perspective.
Reciprocity in War and the Law of War
Leslie Green:
In any future conflict, particularly one with a coalition character, we've got
to carry the public with us. From this point of view I want to raise a question.
I'm thinking of the issue of these "clever," or, to use Mike Schmitt's term,
"brilliant" bombs. We've got them. By way of contrast, if we are involved in a
conflict against an enemy that doesn't have them, are we under an obligation
to use only deliberative resources that are available to him? This is reciprocity
par excellence! It's merely a modern application of the old Asian idea that ele-
phants should only be used against elephants and men against men. Where do
we stand from our propaganda point of view in persuading the public when we
have the means to wipe them out, but they only have the means to kick us?
W. Hays Parks:
Leslie, I don't recall where that was. I've seen various versions of that. One
of them of course was the proposal during the negotiation ofAdditional Proto-
col I that was made by Togo, which argued that if two nations were in a war
and one of them had an air force and the other did not, the one that had the
air force could not use it—nice try!
There's a rather famous quote by Churchill about a disarmament confer-
ence where the lion wanted another animal to give up its teeth. And the bear
said we all just ought to hug each other—this kind of thing. So, there's a great
deal of that. I think the dilemma we have is that unfortunately our opponents
do not always follow our doctrine. They don't play to our strong suit. Mr
Milosevic would have loved to have neutralized our airpower capabilities to
force us into a ground campaign. That's the dilemma you have. However we
feel about the obligation to use precision-guided munitions in every case; I
think all of us would agree that we are not going to say we'll not use them be-
cause we do want to hold down the collateral casualties as much as we can.
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Yves Sandoz:
I have two points. First, the question of determining how a poor country,
without important military means, could defend itself without violating IHL
was at the heart of negotiations which took place during the 1974-1977 Dip-
lomatic Conference. The result of those negotiations was the introduction in
Additional Protocol I of 1977 of rules accepting guerilla warfare as a legitimate
means of warfare. The principles remain the same, as I mentioned before, but
they have to be implemented in relation to the means available. Quite clearly,
if the fighting is unbalanced, there is a great risk, as I think John Murphy men-
tioned too, that respect for the law will decrease and that we will enter into an
era of terrorist attacks.
The second point is the following: the NATO action in Kosovo will proba-
bly remain a special case. I do not think we will have many cases in which this
emergency humanitarian intervention doctrine will be applied. Basically, it is
an intervention to ensure the application of the law in stopping a violation of
it. This type of intervention is unbalanced by nature. There is no comparison
between NATO and Yugoslavian forces. But the fundamental questions for
the credibility of such interventions in world public opinion are clarity and im-
partiality. Clarity in setting forth the threshold over which a State may not
step without encountering such enforcement actions and establishing who has
the right to decide those actions. And impartiality in taking measures corre-
sponding only to the gravity of the situation and not to the economic or politi-
cal interest of those deciding and undertaking the action.
John Norton Moore:
When we look at imbalance, we need, for example, to talk about the imbal-
ance of the Iraq Army invading Kuwait. If we talk about the imbalance, talk
about the imbalance of the massive human rights violations in Bosnia with
200,000 killed in disregard of the law of war. If we talk about the imbalance,
we might talk about the imbalance of a regular army police force directed to-
ward killing civilians in Kosovo in a massive way that we're trying to stop. It
seems to me that the real key is to look at what the goals of the democracies
are in trying to stop democide and genocide, trying to stop aggressive war. The
reality is we want to win those as rapidly as we possibly can at the lowest cost
to all involved.
Michael Bothe:
The question of differentiated or equal obligations has been with us all the
time because although legally speaking, parties to a conflict are equal, militarily
303
Discussion
speaking they never are. We've had that in different prospects and different re-
spects. For instance the question whether poor countries can afford to provide
adequate standards of treatment for prisoners of war if they cannot nourish
their own armies. That is one version of that. There is a tension between reci-
procity and the fundamental principle of no reciprocity which is also inherent
in the laws of war. You do not mete out bad treatment to the other guy as a re-
action to bad treatment ifyou can do better. I think this is all very well covered
by Article 57 of Protocol I which says in relation to the attacks that all feasible
precautions have to be taken in order to minimize civilian casualties. Now
what is feasible for one party is not necessarily feasible for the other party, but
this does not lower the standard for the party for which this is feasible.
Target Priority and Collateral Damage
Michael Glennon:
Assume that a list of lawfully vetted targets is assembled. Assume further
that some of the targets on the list are known to carry a substantially greater
risk of collateral damage and civilian deaths. Can those targets be assigned a
higher priority? Can they be moved up on the list and hit sooner rather than
later because the belief is the war will therefore be ended sooner saving ulti-
mately a greater number of military and civilian lives.
Yves Sandoz:
If I understood the question, you have a reply in Article 57(3) of Protocol I,
which states that "when a choice is possible between several military objec-
tives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected
shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to
civilian lives and to civilian objects." I think that answers your question,
"No Body Bags" War and the Value of Human Lives
Adam Roberts:
I want to raise the question of whether this really was a "no body bags" war
as Ove Bring stated it in his paper. Of course it was in the sense that we know
that allied forces did not suffer any combat casualties, but whether it was a
clear policy from the beginning that it was a "no body bags" war is a much
more debatable proposition. Those embarking on the decision to engage in
war knew that they were taking a risk with their own servicemen's lives. I
think I'm right in recalling that that was stated in some of the speeches at the
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beginning of the war including I think in President Clinton's. So one has to be
very careful before one adopts the ex post facto wisdom which assumes that
this was clearly understood to be a "no body bag" war at the time. I do not
think that it was. On the other hand, the desire to protect the servicemen and
women of allied countries was in my view entirely understandable. Again, I
don't think it's self-evident, and I'd like the opinions of the panel on this, but
just because there was a desire to protect their lives doesn't mean they were
being viewed superior in value to the lives of others. And it's far from self-
evident that keeping airmen in a position of relative safety increases the risk
to the population below. It is possible that in a position of relative safety
aircrews could make decisions that were calm and informed as distinct from
being made in haste, I come from a country with a tradition of low-level
bombing and the risks associated with that low-level bombing are well known.
They include risks to those on the ground as well as those performing it.
Ove Bring:
Professor Barry Strauss asked me ifyou have this kind of solution, what will
be the safety of the soldiers, the safety of the Kosovars? Will there be a prolon-
gation of the conflict, etcetera? Well, these are all issues that need to be dis-
cussed from this ethical perspective. With regard to the safety of soldiers, I
quoted Tony Rogers who said that under international humanitarian law, we
have to realize that certain risks will have to be taken. I'm arguing here for a
solution that would increase the risk to soldiers and pilots. That is clear. It's a
political problem of course for those States as to whether they will or not em-
bark in the beginning on a "no body bags" policy or something close to that.
They will have terrific problems in democratic States to accept these in-
creased risks for pilots and soldiers. Still, I think what we need in this interna-
tional community of today is more political leadership—more political
willingness to take risks in order to secure common values of the international
community. So that is something which I would like to see more of and I think
that many individuals would be prepared to take risks personally in order to
achieve things like saving people from genocide or whatever. The safety of the
Kosovars in this kind of situation could have been much better with my sug-
gestion, but of course the Kosovo conflict as Yves Sandoz said was unique. It
probably will not repeat itself again. I mean there was almost a gigantic hu-
manitarian catastrophe with regard to the refugees in the beginning due to the
fact that there were no ground troops. My argument goes in the direction that
political leadership has to consider ground troops in situations like this. That
could actually shorten the conflict and it could give much better protection. It
305
Discussion
would signal something to the Milosevic regime in this case that would deter
them from going further on the track of ethic cleansing. All these are
possibilities.
Chuck Kogan:
Listening to the discussions this morning and particularly the remarks of
Mr. Strauss and Mr. Parks, I'd like to make the following observation. The
Kosovo war was fought on the basis that coalition lives are more valuable than
lives on the other side. This is what war is all about.
W. Hays Parks:
I have to disagree with that. The Kosovo campaign was conducted to save
lives. Although it may have cost 500, it probably saved many thousands more
than that. I think that's something that's been neglected in these discussions.
Does Kosovo Provide Lessons For The Future?
Barry Strauss:
I'd like to return to my point that the lessons of this war must be very lim-
ited because Serbia's inability to respond massively toNATO attacks leaves us
with one dimension unknown. We don't know how NATO would respond if
it was provoked in ways that Serbia couldn't provoke it. So from the point of
view of what we've learned for the future, the answer is we don't know about
that yet.
Cluster Bombs and Long-Term Collateral Damage
Adam Roberts:
I just wanted to raise an issue about this discussion and the focus here on
collateral damage and the way in which the discussion has gone. One dimen-
sion of damage got largely but not entirely excluded: that is the long-term
damage that may flow from use of certain types of weapons and may have an
impact long after the conflict. Ove Bring mentioned in his paper the effect of
cluster bombs. The principal problem with regard to cluster bombs is not the
immediate collateral damage, but rather the long-term effect. That is one is-
sue that I think does arise very clearly from the Kosovo war. So there are other
aspects to unintended damage besides the immediate collateral damage that
certainly require attention.
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W. Hays Parks:
The answer to the question of cluster munitions is threefold: it's historical, it's
technical, and it's ongoing diplomatic initiatives. Unexploded ordnance—what
we are calling now, explosive remnants ofwar—are of course part of everyone's
history. I think the French have been clearing something like a half million
rounds of unexploded ordnance from their own territory for the last fifty some
odd years. We recognized it more after Kosovo for the very simple reason that
many of the people who lived in Kosovo were allowed to go back to their homes
before the areas were cleared thus placing themselves at risk.
I just finished reading Anthony Beevor's book on the battle of Stalingrad. 3
Even in the dead ofwinter when that battle was over, the Soviet Army did not
let the civilians return to their homes until the unexploded ordnance was
cleared. That of course is a responsibility of a sovereign nation to do that. We
have the gap in Kosovo because there was no sovereign there to prevent people
from returning. The United Nations and others, however, have noted the ac-
tivities of the United States and a number of other nations in going in to clear
not only antipersonnel landmines but to assist in clearance of all unexploded
ordnance, and they've been praised for that effort.
Lastly, the diplomatic part. Last September the International Committee of
the Red Cross hosted a meeting in Leone that was chaired by Yves Sandoz.
While its original focus was on cluster munitions, the issue eventually evolved
to explosive remnants of war. We are in the middle of the second review
conference to the UN Conventional Weapons Convention now where this is-
sue is under consideration. One of the things that we're looking at—and it
will be a long-term solution—is requiring some sort of a self-destruct or self-
neutralization device on all ordnance. That could be very expensive, but in
the long run it will save lives and save money. It costs roughly $500 to clear
one piece of unexploded ordnance whereas something like this would be less
than $50 a round. We're looking at it very seriously. We have not only a hu-
manitarian and technological interest in doing it, but also a military interest.
No commanding officer likes to have his own troops advance through their
own unexploded ordnance. So this may be one of those places where all of
this will come together. It may take some time because obviously some people
will say we can't afford that. It may take twenty years to do it. It's an issue be-
ing focused on. It is certainly not related just to cluster munitions.
3. ANTONY BEEVOR, STALINGRAD: THE FATEFUL SIEGE, 1942-1943, at 407 (1998).
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The Principle of Proportionality
John Murphy:
I want to clarify a point with respect to Yves Sandoz' comments. I'm an ag-
nostic as to the debate that you have with Hays Parks on whether there is or is
not a rule of customary international law called the rule of proportionality. I'll
leave it up to you folks to continue to do battle on that. I am similarly an ag-
nostic because I think it's really beyond my technical competence to get into
the question of whether Protocol I strikes an improper balance between the
obligations of the attackers and the obligations of the defenders. I did note
that in my paper. I will say this in respect to the rule of proportionality. It does
seem to me that it is applied, whatever its status, in terms of a question of
whether the collateral damage is excessive compared to the military advan-
tage. I think it is a very difficult rule to interpret and apply and I think that's
been brought out in the course of our discussions not only this morning but at
other times and no doubt it will arise again.
Henry Shue:
I would like to say a bit more about the role that the considerations of pro-
portionality play in target selection. A lot of us were fairly skeptical about how
important proportionality can be because it is so vague. But you all say that
proportionality absolutely did come into consideration. There's kind of two
ways it can work. One, effective proportionality can be that you decide that
rather than hitting a particular target the way you would like to, you hit it
some other way—at night instead of in the day, or with a precision weapon in-
stead of a non-precise one—but you still go ahead and hit it. Were there very
many cases in which you said of a dual-purpose target, "Yes, it has military
value, but its civilian value is so great that we shouldn't hit it at all with con-
sideration to proportionality?" Were any targets ever totally ruled out rather
than just hit some other way? It sounds as if for example the electrical grid was
treated that way until the end of the bombing campaign.
Judith Miller:
Proportionality was key in respect to any targeting decision that I am aware
of in Kosovo or in any other context in which military force was used by the
United States in conjunction with its allies while I was at DoD. And while it
may sound vague, I think we all have very much in mind that it is a principle
that needs to be applied. You can't say, "Well, there are X human lives at
stake or civilians versus an enormous military value." There's no way to boil
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that down to a formula. But our intelligence people, the people who put to-
gether target folders and background information, and the modeling that
we've done have allowed us to actually think in specifics not just generalities.
We knew that there were housing developments close to something that we
cared about attacking and there were a number of occasions where targets
were rejected.
I'm confident there were a number of targets rejected before they ever got
to my level because we had so many other good lawyers and target people
working in the field, which is the first line of the appraisal. But there were
some targets that came through from the field that we asked questions about,
looked at, and ultimately concluded that they were not appropriate targets to
take on. So while it's not a science, I think certainly everyone I worked with
on the operational side and the Joint Staff, in the policy world of DoD, and the
legal community felt that that was the guiding principle of really paramount
importance.
Richard Sorenson:
We closely scrutinized each and every target. That of course started out
fundamentally with military necessity, but then would go down to the number
of military casualties that would happen and the number of civilians that po-
tentially would die. We were really looking at "effects based targeting." We're
not looking at simply blowing up a particular building or whatever. If we can
achieve the desired effect with some other means that minimizes the unneces-
sary suffering, then that was also considered- So ifwe could go with alternative
means to achieve the same effect that's required by military necessity. And
that was considered throughout the campaign. The bottom line is we had a lot
of data.
Flying At 15,000 Feet
Susan Fink:4
As a military pilot who's been in academia for about a year now, I've been
struck by the number of times I've heard that one of the things that we need to
really think about in humanitarian intervention is how we can put our pilots
at 15,000 feet and knowingly kill hundreds of people when the reason for this
is humanitarian intervention, not just a regular international war, but
4. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
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humanitarian in purpose. When I dig a little deeper, I find that the argument
is two-fold. First, it's a moral and ethical one that must be taken into account
when decision makers at the highest level entertain a thought of humanitar-
ian intervention. And then deeper it is that the altitude at which pilots fly ac-
tually increases the number of civilians killed. Pressing this a little further,
there is some ambiguity about whether there were precision-guided munitions
available or whether we'd run out of those at this point and were reverting to
other weapons, etcetera. But my question is this—it's probably more appropri-
ate to ask this of a moral and ethical panel—but I would like to ask the legal
experts whether you entertain this from a legal standpoint. Secondly, what ad-
vice would you give to those who live in the land of the doable—those who
live in the land of the political who have to make these decisions—what ad-
vice you would give them to either rebut, entertain or take this into account
when making a decision to go in to humanitarian intervention?
Richard Sorenson:
Let me start out by saying that I don't think there are facts to support that
in reality in particular with Kosovo. The problems with hitting the convoys
from fifteen thousand feet occurred when Milosevic intentionally intermin-
gled combatants with noncombatants—it was difficult to discriminate. I think
there were relatively few civilians killed as a result of those strikes from fifteen
thousand. And in fact, the pilots did go down to six thousand. They had bin-
oculars. They were in fact complying with their obligations under the law of
armed conflict to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. So I
don't think the facts are out there. It makes great newspaper copy, sells news-
papers, airtime and interviews, but the facts just simply aren't there to suggest
that by keeping our pilots at 15,000 feet to protect them we were engaging in
basically carpet bombing. I understand what carpet bombing is and that did
not happen. The A- 10 pilots did not pickle off their general-purpose bombs
anywhere. They had specific targets that they had spotted and were releasing
their ordnance against those military targets that they had identified. Some-
times there was misidentification and that goes with the fog of war. The mili-
tary commanders that are in command of military forces, and the pilots that
are flying planes and releasing ordnance, use their best military judgment at
the time, assessing all the facts, knowing that they cannot intentionally target
civilians due to the training they have received on the law of armed conflict.
Plus targeting reviews happened at all levels, including during the operations
going after field forces in Kosovo proper, to ensure we were distinguishing be-
tween military and civilian targets.
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COALITION OPERATIONS

Introduction
Nicholas Rostow
O ur topic is coalition warfare. We will examine such issues as what rulesto follow when different members of the coalition have different inter-
national legal obligations. A particular focus will be Protocol I since some
NATO members are parties, while others are not. We will also examine the ex-
tent to which Protocol I is customary international law.
This whole issue of coalition warfare of course is an old one. There have
been coalitions since I suppose the beginning of recorded military history.
They always raise very interesting political-military issues. Commanders
always complain bitterly about political interference. One need only read
Winston Churchill's book on the life of Marlborough to learn what real politi-
cal interference was. I would just offer Churchill's comment that the only
thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them—that is on
your side.

Coalition Warfare and Differing Legal
Obligations of Coalition Members Under
International Humanitarian Law
Torsten Stein
Wars were fought by alliances or "coalitions," both before and atWaterloo. Indeed, coalition warfare has been a dominant theme of
armed conflict in the 19th and 20th centuries and is represented at the end of
the last millennium in Operation Allied Force. It is, however, a more recent de-
velopment that coalition partners do not necessarily operate separately and in
clearly distinct segments of the theater or battlefield. Today's coalitions
"inter-operate" so closely that it may be difficult, ifnot impossible, for adversar-
ies and outsiders, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) that seek to monitor the observance of obligations under international
humanitarian law, to identify who did what and to whom.
Admittedly, the coalition partners have (almost) a clear understanding of
such matters. Moreover a participating State would, due to the pressure from
a public at home which demands answers, either admit to its own wrongdoing,
deny responsibility and point out the responsible party, or make a plausible de-
nial of responsibility without putting the blame on any specific State or actor.
If the coalition consists of democracies, that process should make it easier to
place the blame within a relatively short period of time. Theoretically, how-
ever, one cannot leave out the possibility that the coalition may manage to
build a wall of denial or silence.
Increasing the problems further, the various members of a coalition waging
war might have differing legal obligations under the law of armed conflict;
Coalition Warfare and Differing Legal Obligations
obligations which are treaty'based. Some coalitions might be more homoge-
neous in this respect, others less so. The coalition conducting Operation
Allied Force was certainly more homogenous, even if not all participating
members were contracting parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I the 1949
Geneva Conventions, than the coalition which is currently providing troops
for the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR)
.
At the end of the day Protocol I may not be the biggest problem. What
about the 1980 UN Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols? Or
the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines? The diversity of re-
spective obligations arising from these conventions might be much greater in a
coalition of over 30 States than with regard to Protocol I.
Can there be differing legal standards for various members of a given coali-
tion? Could the commander-in-chief (CINC) of such a coalition ask (or even
order) those force-providing States not parties to the restricting treaties to un-
dertake actions which violate those treaties, while all the others live up to
their treaty obligations? Does it make a difference if the coalition is a "UN
force" or at least authorized by the Security Council to use force? Are there
other reasons why the strictest legal standard should govern a coalition war
because the coalition derives the legality of its use of force from being a re-
gional arrangement, or from its humanitarian purpose? Or because reprisals of
the other side would be indiscriminate? And to whom would possible interna-
tionally wrongful acts be attributed? To the coalition if it is an international
organization, to all members of the coalition or only to the flag State?
This paper will discuss all these questions using NATO's Kosovo campaign
as an example, which includes the air campaign of Operation Allied Force, as
well as KFOR, the ground force authorized by the UN Security Council to use
force, if necessary. There can be no doubt that the whole of the law of armed
conflicts applies to the air campaign, although NATO spokesmen avoided
calling it a "war" and insisted that it was a "humanitarian action." I will at-
tempt to treat the questions under a somewhat broader perspective, because
there will be other (and different) coalitions in the future, and the same rules
will probably apply to all of them; as would, by the way, customary interna-
tional law rules emerging out of Operation Allied Force.
The Factual Setting
Examples of the diversity of obligations during the Kosovo campaign in-
clude: France, the United States and Turkey were not parties to Protocol I;
Turkey is not a party to the UN Conventional Weapons Convention or any of
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its Protocols; Russia (as was the former Soviet Union) is not a party to Proto-
cols II and IV, nor is Poland; Yugoslavia and all its former Republics are not
parties to Protocols II and V with the exception of Bosnia, which is a party to
Protocol II; and the United States is not a party to Protocol IV. One could go
on naming other force-providing States among the over 30 contributing to
KFOR and the various choices they have made with respect to ratifying the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols.
It is also a fact that for probably different reasons foreign offices and defense
ministries carefully compared armed forces manuals. However, as the second
KFOR Commander confirmed, 1 while rules of engagement contained numer-
ous restrictions premised on grounds of domestic law, none expressly refer to
obligations under international humanitarian law. General Clark, who served
as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, reports that while there was resis-
tance among NATO States when he tried to get additional targets approved,
the rationale did not include "we can't do it because some of us are bound by
Protocol I."2 Nonetheless, the legal restraints of Protocol I were observed,
even if they found no expression at the CINC-level.
Has Protocol 1 Become Customary International Law?
Differing treaty obligations of members of a coalition would not pose a prob-
lem if a treaty such as Protocol I has become customary international law. No
one, however, has thus far maintained that the UN Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols, or the 1997 Ottawa Convention, have become
binding upon non-parties.3 It is widely accepted in international law that, as
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties confirms, treaty
obligations and customary law obligations may coincide, because the treaty
codifies already existing customary law, or because new customary interna-
tional law is generated in the aftermath of a treaty.
It is appropriate to dwell for a moment on the process of creating customary
international law. As stated in Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute for the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice (ICJ), such law requires both custom and the subjective
element of following this custom because one is so obliged by law
—
opinio iuris.
In this respect, it is interesting to note the practice of the same court in the
1. Personal interview; cf. also GENERAL KLAUS REINHARDT, KFOR - STREITKRAFTE FUR
denfrieden (2001).
2. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War 201 (2001).
3. The dubious process of instant customary international law will thus not be investigated
here.
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"de-emphasising of material practice as a constitutive element combined with
the tendency to "count" the articulation of a rule twice, so to speak, not only
as an expression opinio juris but also as State practice itself."4
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) disregarded
the view of some lawyers5 as to the non-relevance of General Assembly reso-
lutions in the process of evolving customary international law, when it re-
ferred to non-binding resolutions as evidence of this kind of law.6 The
question of who's practice is relevant in the formation of customary law is
central in this process. The ICJ stated in its North Sea Continental Shelf case 7
that the practice of non-parties is essential in the development of this law.
With treaties of universal acceptance like the 1949 Geneva Conventions,8
and to a lesser extent the Additional Protocols of 1977, 9 there are only a few
States left to create this kind of custom and opinio iuris. This Baxter paradox 10
has, however, not been seen as blocking the evolution of customary law, as
exemplified by the above-mentioned decisions of the Court. The focus has in-
stead shifted to the activities of both the parties and the non-parties, consid-
ering a wide range of sources as evidence for both custom and opinio iuris.
With a distinct unwillingness to focus solely on what the belligerents actually
do, which is probably bound up with a policy of enhancing the protection of
noncombatants and combatants alike, the ICJ, and lately as well the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 11 have decided to
direct their focus at other sources of "evidence" for the necessary custom and
opinio iuris. Amongst these, the number of ratifications to international trea-
ties and the dictates of military manuals have been referred to in order to
4. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and
General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82, 96 (1992).
5. E.g, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations
and the Development of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES COURS 431 (1972).
6. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 99-100 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua case]. Though, as stated by Wolfke,"[t]he evaluation of the sufficiency of such
evidence must, however, always be carried out 'with all due caution,' especially as far as the
evidentiary value ofnon-binding resolutions is concerned." Karol Wolfke, CUSTOM IN PRESENT
International Law 152 (2ded. 1993).
7. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 20).
8. According to a search of the official ICRC website (http://www.icrc.org) on October 18
2001, there are 189 Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
9. There are 159 Parties to Additional Protocol I and 151 Parties to Additional Protocol II. Id.
10. Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 27, 73 (1970).
11. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995),
reprinted in 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 32, 55 (1996).
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ascertain what States consider to be binding on themselves. 12
Customary international law may also emerge from treaties because a great
number of identical bilateral treaties establish a widespread opinio iuris, or be-
cause a multilateral treaty has been ratified by the overwhelming majority of
States. Thus, quite a number of authors conclude from the fact that the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by more States than virtually
any other convention (the Convention on the Right of the Child being one of
the rare exceptions 13) that a great number of their rules have become recog-
nized as customary rules, even as ius cogens. In some instances this might be
the result of occasional confusion provoked by renaming the "law of war" or
"law of armed conflict" as "international humanitarian law," thus blurring the
distinction between "humanitarian" and "human rights" law. 14 Common Arti-
cle 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, which does constitute a kind ofhuman
rights provision, might have contributed to that confusion, since, as the ICJ
held in the Nicaragua case, it reflects "elementary considerations of human-
ity" 15 and constitutes "the minimum yardstick" 16 for armed conflict. And again
in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ pronounced that:
[A] great many rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict are so fundamental
to the respect of the human person . . . that . . . these fundamental rules are to be
observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that
contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law. 17
12. ld. } and Report on the follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of War
Victims, 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Commission I, Item
2, Doc 95/c.I/2/2, at 7^8 (1995).
13. Mention should as well be made of the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union and the
Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, both of which have 189 parties, as
stated on their homepages http://www.itu.int and http://www.upu.int, respectively.
14. Dietrich Schindler, Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the Contemporary World, 81
International Review of the Red Cross 717 (1999). The process is well described by
Meron, who states that "the recognition of nonns based in international human rights as
customary may affect the intepretation and even the status of the parallel norms in instruments
of international humanitarian law through a sort of osmosis or application by analogy."
Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary
International Law 68, (1989).
15. Nicaragua case, supra note 6, at 104.
16. Id.
17. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 257, H 99
0uly8).
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The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia joined the ICJ in this
view in the Tadic case. 18 The question remains, however, whether this is of
much help in determining whether all the provisions of Protocol I, and in par-
ticular those that might not have been properly observed in Operation Allied
Force, are intransgressible principles of customary international law.
The gap between those coalition partners who have ratified Protocol I, and
those who have not, might not be as wide as it seems, since, for example, the
US Air Force's Intelligence Targeting Guide has incorporated almost verba-
tim many relevant articles from the Protocol. 19 It is of interest here to note
that its Attachment 4.2.2 on military objects is—almost to the letter—a re-
statement of Protocol I, Article 52(2). Attachment 4.3.1.2 on precautions and
proportionality does not mention the trinity of "excessive," "concrete," and
"direct," though these are mentioned in US Army Judge Advocate General's
School's Operational Law Handbook 2002, 20 as well as in the US Army's Field
Manual 27- 10. 21 The Handbook states that "[t]he U.S. considers these provi-
sions customary international law." Admittedly, this statement indicates only
that the US recognizes its own interpretation of these principles/rules as part
of customary international law. 22
As mentioned above, the pronouncement of a rule in a national manual of
a non-party to a treaty has special relevance in the process of establishing cus-
tomary international law, notwithstanding the assertion in United States v. List
et a\P The fact that the entries are motivated by more than just legal consider-
ations does not seem to limit their legal significance. 24
18. Tadic case, supra note 11, 1111 96-137.
19. Targeting Division, Headquarters 497 Intelligence Group, Air Intelligence
Agency, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide (Air Force Pamphlet 14-210), Feb 1, 1998,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpaml4-210/.
20. International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate
General's School, Operational Law Handbook 9 (2002), available at http://www.
jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO-Public.
21. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare
(Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10) para. 41 (1956), available at
http://www.adtdl.anny.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-10/Chl.htm.
22. Operational Law Handbook, supra note 20, at 9.
23. U.S. v List et al. [The Hostage case] (1948), Trials ofWar Criminals before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 1 1 (1950), 1230 at 1237. See as well
Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
International Law 361 (1987).
24- Compare this with the ICJ's accceptance of statements made by State representatives in
international fora as constitutive of opinio iuris, although these statements are motived by a wide
range of different reasons, I.C.J. Report 1986 at 98-108, Ml 187-205.
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But even if national military manuals may increasingly be looked at as im-
portant evidence of customary international law, this will only be of limited
help such as, for example, regarding the status of collateral damage.
The problem here is whether those provisions of Protocol I that came into
focus during Operation Allied Force are eligible for consideration as custom-
ary law, given that terms like "military significance," "definite military advan-
tage," and "effective contribution to military action" are not defined, not even
by non-exhaustive examples as for "indiscriminate attacks?" If one takes only
the declaration made by Germany and the United Kingdom, according to
which "the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer
to the advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole and not only from iso-
lated or particular parts of the attack," 25 what then is the meaning or interpre-
tation that could become customary law for non-parties? Could it be that
non-parties have to observe stricter obligations than those who have ratified
Protocol I, but with admissible and accepted reservations or declarations? As
stated by Baxter, "[i]t would be paradoxical in the extreme if a non-party were
to be regarded as bound unqualifiedly by the obligations of the conventions,
while a party might limit its duties by the entry of reservations."26
It could be argued that there would not be any significant problems binding
non-parties to the same extent as far as the States having made reservations
are bound. The understanding that collateral casualties are both legal and un-
avoidable, as long as they are below a certain threshold, would thus stand. Ad-
mittedly, only a few of the parties to Protocol I have made the
above-mentioned reservations. A case could thus be made for binding the
non-parties to a stricter code, i.e., what the parties without a reservation are
bound by, as long as customary international law can be established.
Both alternatives, however, incorporate a degree of uncertainty as regards
the precise limits of the obligations, as the proportionality principle "creates
serious difficulties in practice, since it necessarily remains loosely defined and
is subject to subjective assessment and balancing. In the framework of the re-
quired evaluation, the actors enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation."27 It
may be correct to say that the fundamental principles repeatedly mentioned
25. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 505 and 511, respectively (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). Similar statements were made by Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Spain. Id. at 500-509.
26. Richard Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRITISH
Yearbook of International Law 285 (1965-66).
27. Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means ofCombat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN ARMED CONFLICTS 178-9 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). See id. for further references.
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by the ICJ, the basic distinction between civilians and combatants, the prohi-
bition against directly attacking civilians, and the rule of proportionality, are
customary international law. But it is very doubtful whether the same can be
said about all the other provisions of Protocol I—in particular those dealing
with collateral damage. 28
If Protocol I is not, at least not as a whole, customary international law, dif-
fering legal standards for various members of a given coalition remain—even
leaving aside other restrictions on weapons and means of warfare. But there
might be other reasons why the same standard of legal obligations should ap-
ply to such a coalition.
Does "same standard" always mean "maximum standard" in the sense of a
"most favored nation clause?" The answer probably depends upon if and to
what extent the reciprocity principle is (still) applicable to the international
humanitarian law as it certainly was to the traditional law of war. Article 96
of Protocol I provides that parties to a conflict which are bound by the Proto-
col remain so bound vis-a-vis adverse parties also bound thereby, even if one
or more allied or adverse parties are not party to the Protocol. Consequently,
States bound by the Protocol participating in a coalition which includes
States not party thereto, are not relieved of their Protocol I obligations. But it
has been said that, because Iraq has not accepted Protocol I, those States in
the opposition coalition during the Gulf War which were bound by that
Protocol, were not directly obliged to apply it, whatever "directly" means
in that context. 29 1 will come back to the reciprocity problem later with re-
spect to reprisals.
A Single (Maximum) Standard for "UN Forces"?
For quite some time it has been debated whether UN forces were not only
morally, but legally bound to respect the existing humanitarian law, even if
some or all of the force-providing States were not. But before addressing that
issue, a few words should be devoted to the differentiation of forces operating
under a United Nations mandate. Since no standing UN force has been estab-
lished under UN Charter Articles 43 and 45, the UN has had to rely on
28. For a comprehensive analysis of the customary status of the Additional Protocols, see
Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols, in
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Challenges ahead 93 (Astrid J.M. Delissen &
Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
29. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Developments and Legal Basis, in HANDBOOK OF
Humanitarian Law, supra note 27, at 26.
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coalitions of the willing whenever it decided armed force was needed. 30 In
only one instance did such a coalition of the willing operate under anything
resembling UN command and control. 31 These Chapter VII actions have in
general been carried out under UN authority—through the mandate it-
self—but under no tangible UN control. Such was the case with Operation
Desert Storm in 1991. State practice seemed to be founded on the idea that
armed forces acting under Chapter VII are not bound by the Geneva Conven-
tions or other treaty-based international humanitarian law, as they act for the
UN rather than as State actors bound by those rules. 32
The doctrine has, on the other hand, often claimed binding effect of inter-
national humanitarian law in these situations. 33 This claim is often based on
the obligation of parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to ensure obser-
vance of these rules in all situations. 34 It can also be said to be presumed by the
adoption of the 1994 Convention on the Safety ofUnited Nations and Associ-
ated Personnel, which in its Article 2(2) excludes its application to missions
authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are
engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the laws
of international armed conflicts applies"35
30. The regime regulating UN authorized peace-keeping forces will not be examined here.
31. The US-led coalition forces in Korea during 1950-53.
32. Michael Hoffman, Peace-enforcement actions and humanitarian law: Emerging rules for
"interventional armed conflict", 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 193 (2000).
33. E.g., Leslie Green, The contemporary law of armed conflict 319 (1993).
Seyersted stated that "[n]one of the States participationg in the United Nations action in Korea
maintained during that action that it was not governed by the general laws of war, on the
contrary, they acted on the assumption that it was." FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS
FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 204 (1966). The binding effect of international
customary law seems furthermore to follow from UN Charter Article 103, which seems to allow
the UN obligations to supersede other obligations only when these other obligations result from
treaties. But see Paul Szasz, UN Forces and International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL
Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green
on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday 513 (Michael Schmitt ed., 2000) (Vol. 75,
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). This in itself leaves open the question of
how the UN can be bound by the treaty obligations of international humanitarian law that do not
(yet) have a customary status.
34. Common Article 1 to all four Conventions. See e.g., Greenwood, supra note 29, at 46.
35. Emphasis provided by the present author. The main problem with respect to the determination of
which law is to apply to UN missions is considered by Greenwood to relate to those situations where
the mission is neither an enforcement mission which undertakes military actions resembling an
armed conflict, nor a peacekeeping mission which strives to act neutrally. Christopher Greenwood,
International Law and the Conduct of Military Operation: Stocktaking at the Start of a New Millennium,
in International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict, supra note 33, at 192.
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The UN Secretary-General's Bulletin on the "Observance by United Na-
tions forces of international humanitarian law" of August 6, 1999, 36 provides
only partial answers. First of all, the Bulletin is restricted to forces conducting
operations under UN command and control,37 which is, as stated above, the
exception rather than the rule. What about forces under national or NATO
command, authorized, as KFOR, "to monitor and ensure compliance with
this [the Military Technical] Agreement and to respond promptly to any vio-
lations and restore compliance, using military force if required"? 38 Secondly,
the Bulletin is said not to replace the national laws by which military person-
nel remain bound throughout the operation. 39 What if the army, air force,
navy or marine corps manuals of States which are not a party to some or most
of the treaties on humanitarian law allow for actions and operations prohib-
ited under those treaties? Are the manuals to prevail? Because this Section
seems to be included in order to ensure that obligations resting on parties that
are more far reaching than those flowing from the Bulletin's provisions will
not be abrogated from, the object thus being the application of as much in-
ternational humanitarian law as possible to the relevant force, it is therefore
submitted that such manuals cannot validly derogate from the obligations
under the Bulletin.
The substantive Sections 5 to 9 of the Bulletin combine fundamental prin-
ciples that might be classified as customary law with rules prohibiting or re-
stricting the use of certain weapons, rules which are hardly customary law.40
This raises the question as to whether the Secretary-General can issue rules
and regulations for the conduct of State-deployed forces on UN missions if
some of the provisions rely on treaties that have not been ratified by all States
participating in Chapter VII or peacekeeping operations? 41 Some authors
36. 38 International Legal Materials 1659 (1999) [hereinafter Bulletin].
37. Id., Section 1.
38. The Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force ("KFOR")
and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia,
Appendix B(4), available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/mta.htm.
39. Bulletin, supra note 36, Section 2.
40. See especially Bulletin, id., Section 6.
41. Hoffman, supra note 32, at 201.
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seem to claim so when focusing on the Secretary-General's function as "com-
mander-in-chief ' of operations carried out under UN authority and com-
mand—which currently includes only peacekeeping operations.42 It should be
pointed out here that in those situations where a coalition has been autho-
rized by the UN, but has not been obliged to operate under its control/com-
mand, a right for the Secretary-General to instruct the force does not exist,
which is presumed by the exclusion of missions outside "United Nations com-
mand and control" from the Bulletin's applicability.43
A solution could be seen in the status-of-forces agreements mentioned in
Section 3, which are treaties by themselves and which are designed to ensure
that the force will conduct its operations with full respect for the principles
and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military per-
sonnel. But then, also under Section 3, the obligation to respect such princi-
ples and rules is applicable even in the absence of a status-of-forces
agreement. And, finally, the Guidance has serious lacunae, not least because
it is silent on military occupation and KFOR is an occupation force par
excellence.
One obvious way to bind the forces operating under a UN mandate to the
highest level of international humanitarian law would be to mandate such
compliance in the Security Council resolutions which authorize the use of
force in the first place. This way, contributing States which are non-parties to
the relevant treaties would be obliged to act in accordance with these treaties
for the purpose of the specific mission. On the other hand, such a policy could
effectively undermine the interest of these States in participating in UN mis-
sions, thus leading to a shortage of voluntary forces.44
It remains more or less a gut feeling that UN or UN-authorized forces
should abide by all existing principles and rules of international humanitarian
law. The legal foundation of such an obligation—as well as the legal status of
the Secretary-General's Bulletin—is still open to debate.
42. Szasz, supra note 33, at 519. As UN Force Protection (UNPROFOR) I and II in the former
Yugoslavia have shown, enforcement actions can become necessary even in the course of
peacekeeping operations.
43. Bulletin, supra note 36, Preamble.
44- The Security Council could as well decide to relieve the participating members of their
humanitarian treaty obligations through UN Charter Article 103, though it is submitted here
that this is only a theoretical possibility.
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A Single (Maximum) Standard for "Coalitions"?
There are, as we have witnessed in Operation Allied Force, coalitions that
have no UN authorization whatsoever. The legality of such operations will
not be the subject of this paper. Rather, the focus here is whether the fact
alone that States form a coalition for the joint use of force oblige them to ap-
ply a single maximum standard in humanitarian law? In general, a State does
not lose or gain rights and obligations when it operates together with other
States as opposed to undertaking operations alone. Some arguments in favor
of such an obligation are, however, conceivable. NATO drew some legitimacy
(if not legality) for Allied Force from the fact that the UN Security Council
was veto-blocked, unable to do what common sense and the humanitarian
agenda of present day politics and law expected, 45 and that the regional ar-
rangement (NATO) had to step in; that this was not the use of force by a sin-
gle State for selfish purposes, but the use of force by a coalition of
like-minded, democratic, law-abiding States for a good purpose, a "small UN."
This might, or might not, overcome the missing UN mandate and might end
up setting a problematic precedent, but since it is at least not entirely clear
whether even UN forces have to apply a maximum standard of humanitarian
law, being a coalition alone does not seem to be a convincing argument in
that respect.
More compelling could be the argument that the coalition used force for
humanitarian purposes, that its very purpose was to end gross violations of hu-
man rights.46 The fact that NATO was intervening in the name of human
rights implied a perhaps heavier moral burden to respect the rules of humani-
tarian law, but did it also imply a legal obligation to do so? Would the same
reasoning apply if a coalition is not intervening in the name of human rights,
but participating in collective self-defense?
In the specific case ofNATO's Operation Allied Force, one motive for re-
specting a high standard of humanitarian law was certainly to avoid the loss of
the support of even a single ally, and NATO's unanimity rule in targeting de-
cisions also guaranteed that the concerns of each member were taken seri-
ously. It also has been reported from the Gulf War that the Royal Air Force
45. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL
of International Law l (1999).
46. V. Kroning, Kosovo and International Humanitarian Law, in Forum: HUMANITARES
VOLKERRECHT - INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN HEFTl/2000, at 45 (2000).
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refused at least twice to bomb targets given it by American commanders be-
cause the risk of collateral damage was too high.47
A policy argument that would still have some importance is the need to
streamline the planning structure of a coalition of forces. Thus, it is preferable
to have only one set of rules upon which to formulate plans, and since the par-
ties with the most comprehensive legal bindings cannot derogate from their
obligations, unless these bindings are dependent upon reciprocity and the
other party is not bound, the maximum level should be chosen.
But the strongest incentive for a coalition to apply the maximum standard,
if it is also the one applied by the other side, is, I believe, still "positive reci-
procity" and the risk of reprisals. Quite a few argue that since the law of war
has been transformed into a human rights oriented law, belligerent reprisals
are prohibited and reciprocity has therefore lost its relevance.48 This may be
correct to a certain extent for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, which
expressly prohibit reprisals against civilians, wounded, prisoners of war, indis-
pensable objects, the natural environment and installations containing dan-
gerous objects, etc.49 Hostile forces, however, still may become the object of
reprisals. But beyond "Geneva Law," there is the UN Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols. An adversary might not want, or might not be
able, to distinguish between coalition partners if it decides to respond to the
use of a prohibited weapon in the same manner.
Responsibility
Another reason, finally, for applying a single (maximum) standard of in-
ternational humanitarian law in a given coalition might be responsibility for
possible internationally wrongful acts. To whom will non-compliance with hu-
manitarian law rules, which bind some but not all in a coalition, be attributed?
47. H.LDebs, Vol. 600, col. 907, May 6, 1999, as mentioned in Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The
Air Campaign—Have the Provisions of Additional Protocol I Withstood the Test?, 82
International Review of the Red Cross 158 n.4l (2000). It should here be mentioned
that one of the reasons for the US to limit the amount of States participating in the attacks on the
Taliban regime in Afganistan in the fall of 2001 seems to be "the lesson US military planners took
from Nato's bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 [which] was that a large alliance complicates
and delays the choice of objectives" as stated in the FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sep. 22/23,
2001, at 1.
48. Schindler, supra note 14, at 725.
49. Articles 46, 47, 13 and 33 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV, respectively, and
Articles 20 and 41-56 of Protocol I.
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To the "coalition" if it is, as in the case ofNATO, an international organiza-
tion? To all members of the coalition or only to the respective flag State?
A. Responsibility of international organizations in general
It seems to be widely accepted today that the rules of State responsibility
can be applied mutatis mutandis to intergovernmental organizations having a
legal capacity of their own in international law. One relevant principle that
applies here is that nobody should be able to evade liability or responsibility by
transferring activities to a separate legal entity which he has co-founded and
which operates in pursuit of his own goals and under his influence in the or-
gans of that entity. This, again in principle, entails that an international orga-
nization is responsible for its internationally wrongful acts in the same way as
would be its member States had they acted individually instead as of members
of the organization. 50
The attribution of responsibility to international organizations has been
justified on several grounds. With the major role of international organiza-
tions in contemporary international relations, the international community
could not tolerate a situation in which such active actors in the global system
could violate binding international norms without bearing the consequences;
otherwise the basic aims of international responsibility (i.e., deterrence and
provision of remedies) would be undermined. 51 Others base their reasoning for
attributing responsibility to international organizations on their international
legal personality, which entails rights and obligations, one of the obligations
being international responsibility in certain cases. 52 Again others hold that the
same "general principles of law" that are the basis of State responsibility apply
also to international organizations which, being subjects of international law,
are governed by identical principles.53 Since treaties or agreements which ex-
plicitly establish the responsibility of international organizations are scarce, 54
50. See Werner Meng, Internationale Organisationen im volkerrechtlichen Deliktsrecht 45, 324-57
ZIETSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 324 et seq
(1985) and MOSHE HlRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles passim (1995).
51. See HlRSCH, supra note 50, at 8.
52. See Konrad Ginther, International Organizations, Responsibility, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1336 et seq (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995).
53. See Mahnoush Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations, 7 YALE JOURNAL OF
World Public Order 131 (1981).
54. See Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects, Jan. 29,
1972, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/122, reprinted in 21
International Legal Materials 1261-1354 (1982).
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the principle that international organizations may be held internationally re-
sponsible for their acts is mostly classified as being part of international cus-
tomary law. But practice in this field is also rare and, furthermore, not
consistent, since "responsibility" and "liability" are not always clearly distin-
guished. 55
A number of preconditions seem to be unanimously required for the respon-
sibility of international organizations, the first one being that the organization
has legal personality, i.e., a legal capacity of its own. There is little doubt that
the member States of an international organization in most cases have ac-
cepted that legal status by either founding the organization or by joining it later
on. But what about third States? The majority opinion still appears to be that
international organizations have legal capacity with respect to third States
only if those third States have recognized the organization, either explicitly or
implicitly through establishing diplomatic relations or entering into treaties
with the organization. 56 One might add that an implicit recognition could also
be found if a third State raises claims against an international organization.
Another precondition is that the act that caused damage is attributable57 to
the international organization. Likewise, in this respect, it does not seem to be
decisive whether the act was within the power, function or mandate of the or-
ganization, or rather constituted an ultra vires act;58 rather, it is necessary that
the international organization had "effective control" over the act. One of the
notable shortcomings of international organizations, in comparison with
States, lies in their limited resources. 59 Most international organizations lack
personnel, means, and in particular troops to administer large-scale opera-
tions. The practical solution that has been found is that the organization "bor-
rows" the necessary resources from its member States. 60 The question that
then arises is who shall bear international responsibility, i.e., who has com-
mand and control, the organization or the "sending State?"
55. The International Law Commission makes a distinction, using "responsibility" for cases
involving a breach of obligations and "liability" in connection with activities which have caused
damage, but are otherwise lawful. See HlRSCH, supra note 50, at 7 n.34.
56. But see IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN & GERHARD LOIBL, RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN 90 et seq. (2000).
57. KNUT IPSEN, VOLKERRECHT 573 (1999).
58. See HlRSCH, supra note 50, at 88 et seq.
59. See Torsten Stein, Decentralized International Law Enforcement: The Changing Role of the State
as Law Enforcement Agent, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE
International System 107 et seq. Gost Delbmck ed., 1995).
60. See HlRSCH, supra note 50, at 66 et seq.
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A slightly different question is who will bear responsibility if the organiza-
tion directs or "orders" its members to implement a decision of the organiza-
tion. The crucial factor for the determination of responsibility for the
implementing act is the measure of discretion left to the members.61
B. Is NATO responsible?
If a precondition for the responsibility of international organizations is that
they have legal personality with regard to the claimant third party, the fulfill-
ment of that condition vis-a-vis Yugoslavia can by no means be taken for
granted. There is no evidence that Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned State, ever for-
mally recognized NATO as a subject of international law. And Yugoslavia re-
mained excluded from the vast and rapidly developing net of NATO's
cooperation agreements with Central and Eastern European countries (North
Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace). 62 Yugoslavia has
not, in any event not yet, raised claims arising out of Operation Allied Force
against NATO, but instead—before the ICJ—against NATO's member
States.63 This is certainly also due to the fact that NATO is neither a possible
respondent before the ICJ, nor a possible defendant before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) . Only States can be parties
to a legal dispute before the ICJ, and the Yugoslavia Tribunal' s jurisdiction is
limited to the individual criminal responsibility of those who have committed
grave breaches against international humanitarian law.64 Proceedings have
also been introduced before the European Court of Human Rights.65
61. See id. at 82.
62. For details, see NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, NATO HANDBOOK 43 et seq.
(1995).
63. For details, see Peter Bekker, International Decisions, Legality of Use of Force - International
Court ofJustice, June 2, 1999, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 928 (1999).
64. Nevertheless, in May 1999, the chiefprosecutor for the ICTY established a committee to examine
and assess charges that NATO's conduct ofthe air campaign violated the laws ofwar. OnJune 2, 2000,
the ICTY prosecutor reported to the UN Security Council that, based on the committee's report, she
found that there was no basis to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of the NATO campaign.
Although NATO had made some mistakes, the prosecutor determined that NATO had not
deliberately targeted civilians. For details, see Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, NATO Air Campaign Against Serbia and the Laws of War, 94
American Journal of International Law 690 (2000).
65. Application No. 5220/99 (Bankovic and others—Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Gemany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom). The applicants alleged violations of Articles 1, 2,
10 and 13 of the Convention. The application has been communicated to the respondent States
and transferred to the Grand Chamber of the Court (see Information Note No. 24 on the case-law
of the Court, November 2000). The Court held hearings on the admissibility on October 25, 2001.
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Another question would be whether NATO acted within the framework of
its functions and powers, both defined and fixed in the North Atlantic
Treaty,66 since some writers maintain that an international organization's re-
sponsibility presupposes that the organization has acted according to its stat-
ute. Here, again, the answer is not that easy. The main purpose of the North
Atlantic Treaty is "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization
of their (the parties) peoples. . . ."67 There is nothing in the NATO Treaty to
suggest that another of NATO's purposes is to protect human rights through
the use of force "out of area," as was the case with Operation Allied Force. To
be able to say that this too is one ofNATO's purposes, one will have to add the
"New Strategic Concept"68 adopted during the Washington summit in April
1999, to the existing Treaty, although it is not a formal amendment of the
Treaty, duly ratified in each member State. In its "New Strategic Concept"
NATO pledges to fulfill "non-Article 5 missions" in case of a crisis outside the
NATO Treaty area. Although the new concept is a political, not a legal com-
mitment, one could not say that Operation Allied Force has been an ultra vires
act of one ofNATO's organs. All NATO member States agreed, otherwise the
operation would not have taken place. But NATO looked more like an instru-
ment than the author of or the driving force behind the operation.
Be that as it may, the next question is whether the alleged violations of in-
ternational law would be attributable to NATO, because the relevant rules of
international law are binding also on NATO, and because NATO had "effec-
tive control" over the act that could subsequently be qualified as internation-
ally wrongful. Is NATO bound by the 1977 Additional Protocols even though
not all of its members are? The relevant question here is "targeting." NATO
has been accused of having selected targets for air strikes that were not, or at
least not strictly, military targets (bridges, power stations, radio and TV
66. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
67. See paragraph 2 of the preambula. Id.
68. Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung Nr. 24 vom 3.5. 1999, 222
et seq. See also Eckart Klein & Stefanie Schmahl, Die neue NATO-Strategie und ihre
volkerrechdichen und verfassungsrechdichen Implikationen, 35 RECHT UND POLITIK 198 (1999).
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stations). Most of these targets certainly served both military and civilian uses,
and attacking dual-use objects is not necessarily unlawful, provided that they
meet the definition of military objectives in Article 52, paragraph 2 of Proto-
col I, that the principle of proportionality is observed, and that collateral dam-
age is minimized.69 But did the television studios make an effective
contribution to Serbian military action and did the attacks offer a definite mil-
itary advantage? If they were targeted merely because they were spreading
propaganda to the civilian population, it appears at least doubtful whether
their destruction offered a definite military advantage. 70
If these attacks were in breach of Protocol I, did NATO have "effective
control?" The targeting procedure was as follows: NATO's military planners
identified and requested specific targets. These targets were or were not ap-
proved by the permanent representatives of the member States, sometimes af-
ter consulting with their respective governments. If only one Representative
cast a negative vote, the target was not attacked. If the target was approved,
the task force received an order to attack. Every air force contingent had its
own "national commander in theater" and the pilots received their mission or-
ders from him. The national commander could, in theory, decide not to attack
a specific target because he was of the opinion that it was not a military objec-
tive. Does this discretion of member States' authorities to implement or not a
decision of the organization remove the organization's responsibility? In real-
ity the commander gave the order, because he knew that his government had
approved the target and because the target could be classified as a dual-use ob-
ject. So the decision was in fact taken at the NATO level, and NATO, pro-
vided that all other preconditions were fulfilled, could be responsible for
"illegal" targeting.
The last category of possible internationally wrongful acts are what one
might call "pilot errors." A number ofsuch errors were reported and some had
to do with the fact that for reasons of "force protection" NATO had decided
to execute the missions from a very high altitude. One pilot attacked what he
thought was a Serbian military convoy; it turned out to be a convoy of refu-
gees. Another pilot attacked a bridge (certainly a dual-use object) at the very
moment at which a civilian train entered the bridge. Both bridge and train
were destroyed. It is not clear whether the pilot had the possibility to break off
69. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 276 (2000).
70. See George Aldrich, Yugoslavia's Television Studios as Military Objectives, 1 INTERNATIONAL
Law Forum 149-50 (1999).
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the attack. If these and other attacks constituted violations of the humanitar-
ian law applicable in armed conflicts, did NATO
—
given the chain of com-
mand—have "effective control?" Even if this should be so, NATO does not
possess one mode of reparation that might be required in such a case: 71 disci-
plinary and penal jurisdiction remain with the force-providing State.
C. The responsibility of NATO's member States
Responsibility of member States for "their" international organizations ac-
tions can be direct, if it turns out that the organization itself is for one or an-
other reason not responsible in a situation in which the members acted
through the organization. Responsibility can also be concurrent, with the con-
sequence that a third party which is the victim of an internationally wrongful
act can choose whether to seek redress from the organization or its members.
Responsibility of the member States can be secondary in cases in which the or-
ganization is primarily responsible, but, for example, lacks the necessary funds
to pay compensation.
This is not the place to discuss in detail the distribution of responsibility be-
tween international organizations and its member States. 72 It is, however, be-
yond doubt that member States would be responsible if, for general reasons,
NATO should not be responsible at all. A so-called "negative conflict" would
not be acceptable, i.e., that both sides, the organization and its members, point
fingers at one another. It seems equally beyond doubt that, should it be their
turn, all NATO member States are responsible for the decision to use force
against Yugoslavia; it was a unanimous decision of all member States. The
same is true for "targeting" decisions, which also, as has been shown above, re-
quired unanimity. But not all member States took part in Operation Allied
Force. Iceland, for example, does not maintain armed forces at all. 73 And not
all of the NATO member States who do maintain an air force participated.
The situation becomes even more complicated by the fact that not all
member States have accepted the same treaty obligations. The United States,
whose air force flew most of the missions, has not ratified Protocol I under
71. See Protocol I, art. 87(3).
72. See in this respect MATTHIAS HARTWIG, DIE HAFTUNG DER MlTGLIEDSTAATEN FOR
INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN passim (1993), and HIRSCH, supra note 50, at 96 et seq.
See also C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to Third Parties ofMember States of International Organizations:
Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
259-280 (1991).
73. Iceland is a respondent in the application pending before the European Court of Human
Rights (see supra note 65).
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which targeting decisions, as well as decisions taken by pilots during their mis'
sion, appear to be at least problematic. The same was true for France and Tur-
key. Are those member States who approved the targets and are bound by
Protocol I, responsible, but not the nation that eventually attacked these tar-
gets because it is not a party to the Protocol? Does NATO have to disclose
who attacked which target? 74 Can, at the end of the day, only those States
carry responsibility that have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ and could,
therefore, be sued there? 75
The only reasonable solution seems to be that all NATO member States
are responsible for any internationally wrongful acts committed during Opera-
tion Allied Force. NATO as such is not recognized by the possible claimant
(Yugoslavia) . NATO is not an organization that has been created "to do busi-
ness" with third States and which third States have accepted as such. NATO
is not the "international tin council." 76 Therefore, the concept that has been
developed in international law for the sole responsibility of international orga-
nizations, and which has borrowed much from national commercial law, 77
does not really fit NATO. NATO's budget could certainly not accommodate
all claims for pecuniary compensation. 78 If it comes to individual wrongful de-
cisions made by pilots, other NATO States could, of course, invoke the
flag-State principle, but they should consider that NATO will also in the fu-
ture have to rely on a few actors for common operations. If those who agree
"to do the job" will afterwards be left alone to face responsibility on account of
possible internationally wrongful acts, their readiness will disappear. Al-
though, for these reasons, joint responsibility advocates strongly for a common
standard, the concept of responsibility under international law as such does
74. Amnesty International concluded that NATO's command structure appears to contribute
to confusion over legal responsibility and recommended that NATO clarify its chain of
command so that there are clear lines of responsibility, known within and outside the
organization, for each State and each individual involved in military operations conducted under
its aegis (c/. Murphy, supra note 64, at 692)
.
75. The ICJ has dismissed, inter alia, Yugoslavia's claims against the United States for lack of
jurisdiction (see Bekker, supra note 63). See also Nicholas Alexander, Airstrikes and
Environmental Damage: Can the United States Be Held Liable for Operation Allied Force?, 11
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 471 (2000).
76. See HARTWIG, supra note 72, at 307 et seq. and Amerasinghe, supra note 72.
77. See MENG, supra note 50.
78. Financing 85% of the costs for making the Danube again navigable has been estimated
by the European Union as requiring 22 Million Euro (Agence Europe No. 7724 of 25 May 2000,
at 11).
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not legally mandate a single (maximum) legal standard for all members of a
coalition in case of differing individual legal obligations. 79
Conclusion
It is, for practical as well as legal purposes, preferable that the same (maxi-
mum) legal standard of obligations under international humanitarian law ap-
ply to all members of a given coalition, provided that the other side is bound to
obey the same rules. To the extent that treaty-based rules of humanitarian law
are at the same time regarded as declaratory of custom, the uniformity of the
legal standard is guaranteed, but it is doubtful whether this would reach much
beyond the most fundamental principles. In those instances when humanitar-
ian law obligations arise only from treaties, other possible reasons for why a co-
alition should apply the same (maximum) standard do not individually seem
to be compelling, although perhaps taken together, they may be.
A solution for future coalitions could be found in the idea which underlies
Article 96(2) and also 96(3) of Protocol I: status-of-forces agreements as well
as rules of engagement should provide that the maximum standard of obliga-
tions of one or more members of a coalition applies to all its members during a
given conflict. Members of a coalition who so wish may make it clear that they
do not intend, by accepting the maximum standard, to contribute to the
emergence of additional customary law, but that they accept and apply the rel-
evant rules only for coalition purposes. Such an ad hoc solution might be more
helpful than a possible "third protocol" to the Geneva conventions on rules
applicable to coalition warfare. Such a protocol would be only another treaty,
with few ratifications at the beginning and probably not in force for a long
time, and would give rise later to the old question whether and when it might
become part of customary law.
79. For more on this topic by the present author, see Torsten Stein, Kosovo and the International
Community. The Attribution of Possible Internationally Wrongful Acts: Responsibility ofNATO or of
its Member States, in KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 181 et seq (C.
Tomuschat ed., 2002).
* I am very much indebted to Magne Frostad, a doctoral student who served in the
Norwegian Judge Advocate's Corps, for his great support in finalizing this paper.
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I o what extent does Protocol I
1
reflect customary international law,
such that it may be regarded as binding on non-party States? The ques-
tion has been discussed since the early days following the entry into force of
Protocol I, when the number of ratifying States was still rather thin. 2 Indeed the
frequent involvement of non-ratifying States in international armed conflicts
made an answer to that question urgent, in order to establish the scope of appli-
cation of the principles that the Protocol enshrines in a given situation. Not-
withstanding the increase in the number of States parties, 3 the problem
continues to be topical, in particular because the countries that have not yet
ratified the instrument, including some major actors in international relations,
maintain serious reservations as to the binding force of one or more principles
expressed and regulated therein.4 In this context, it has to be pointed out that
attention has mainly focused on Part III (Articles 35 to 47) of Protocol I, deal-
ing with methods and means ofwarfare and with the status ofcombatants and
prisoners of war, as well as on Part IV (Articles 48 to 79), concerned with the
1. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OFWAR 422 (A. Roberts &R. Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
2. Protocol I entered into force on December 7, 1978. By 1980 only 16 States had become
parties to Protocol I; they were Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Niger, Sweden, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.
3. 59 States were parties to Protocol I as of August 21, 2001.
4. India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Turkey and the United States are some of
the States which have not ratified Protocol I so far.
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protection to be afforded to civilian populations; these two parts of the Proto-
col being in many respects linked to each other.
It is undisputed that Protocol I is aimed both at codifying existing interna-
tional law relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts
and at developing such law in order to increase their protection. As the Pre-
amble clearly states, the instrument is based on the necessity "to reaffirm and
develop the provisions protecting the victims of armed conflicts." 5 Thus, Proto-
col I itself explains that not all of its provisions simply codify existing law,
though it declares at the same time that a number of them do so.
One is therefore confronted with a problem common to the interpretation
of all so-called codification conventions, i.e., the problem of identifying the
treaty provisions that reflect customary international law, as opposed to those
that make innovations or contain additional elements, thus developing the
law's scope and content. 6 The former will have general value in that they re-
produce customary rules, while the binding force of the latter will be limited to
the States having ratified or acceded to the convention. This is in accordance
with the general rule that treaties do not create either obligations or rights for
a third State without its consent and that their effects are limited to State par-
ties (pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt). 1
In making this assertion, however, some points must be borne in mind.
First, the abovementioned status of a treaty provision as reproducing or devel-
oping customary international law may change according to the time at which
its status is assessed. A provision that did not reflect customary law when it
was drafted may subsequently become a customary rule through its general ap-
plication by States. Similarly, although less frequently, a provision which codi-
fied principles forming part of customary law when it was drafted may not
reflect them at a later stage due to changes in general State practice. In deal-
ing with this issue, reference should therefore be made to the point in time at
which the question of the binding force of a specific treaty provision for
non-contracting States arises.
5. Emphasis added.
6. See Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 36 ft* (1970); Karl
Zemanek, Die Bedeutung der Kodifizierung des Volkerrechts fur seine Anwendung, in FESTSCHRIFT
VERDROSS 565 (1971); Roberto Ago, Nouvelles reflexions sur la codification du droit international,
92 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 539 (1988).
7. According to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331), "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State
without its consent."
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Secondly, even when a treaty provision can be considered as codifying a
norm of customary law, it is the latter that finds application as regards
non-party States and not the treaty provision as such. As the International
Court of Justice clarified in the Nicaragua case,8 the two norms derive from
distinct sources of law and each continues to belong to a separate body of
rules. Indeed, the Court stated:
Even if the customary norm and the treaty norm were to have exactly the same
content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation
of the customary norm into treaty-law must deprive the customary norm of its
applicability as distinct from that of the treaty norm [T]here are no grounds
for holding that when customary international law is comprised of rules
identical to those of treaty law, the latter 'supervenes' the former, so that the
customary international law has no further existence of its own.9
Thus, their interpretation and application may be subject to different princi-
ples, although the treaty provision will have an impact in this context in that it
constitutes an assessment of the relevant rule or principle made by the States
which have entered into the treaty.
Thirdly, as the codification process necessarily requires an assessment of
the customary rule or principle concerned as well as a written definition
thereof, the resulting written text may be regarded as affecting its scope and
content. Consequently, any precision or new element that may have been
added—as is normally the case—by the treaty provision to the principle of
customary law which it codifies must be checked carefully in order to establish
whether it has come to be accepted as generally applicable. However, the ad-
dition ofnew elements by a treaty provision to a customary principle should be
distinguished from specifications deriving by necessary implication from the
accepted general customary principle. As it has been pointed out, 10 such spec-
ifications could not be regarded as requiring acceptance of the treaty in order
to become applicable to a State. A different conclusion would result in allow-
ing a limitation of the already accepted general principle that derives from
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94-5 Oune 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua casej.
9. Id. at 95.
10. See Georges Abi-Saab, The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some
Preliminary Reflections, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS: CHALLENGES AHEAD,
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 120 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds.,
1991), who mentions in this regard the rules concerning the protection of civilians against aerial
bombardments in Protocol I.
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customary law. The inclusion of such necessary implications in a treaty provi-
sion cannot reduce in any way for non-party States the obligations they would
have under the general principles from which those implications derive.
The elements and factors to be taken into consideration in assessing State
practice for the purposes of establishing the existence of customary rules and
principles have been widely discussed in international legal doctrine and case
law. This paper does not aim at revisiting all the features and implications of
the problems arising in this area, including the issue of defining State practice.
The main principles governing the matter have been already laid down by the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf case 11 and in
the Nicaragua case, 12 whereby the Court has stressed the respective role of the
practice of States and opinio juris as factors for identifying a customary rule of
international law, as well as the place of treaty provisions codifying customary
law in this regard. Following these judgments, there is no doubt that for a rule
to exist as a norm of customary international law both its recognition as a legal
obligation by States and the latter's conduct which is consistent with the rule
are required. 13
Some issues deserve special consideration as far as the relationship between
codified and customary rules is concerned. In this context, it has been dis-
cussed whether the practice of all States, including those which are parties to
the treaty (in our case Protocol I) , should be taken into account for the pur-
poses of establishing the existence of a customary norm. A negative answer
would diminish the number of States whose practice is relevant to this end
and would make it more difficult to determine the status of customary law, as
1 1. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb.
20).
12. See Nicaragua case, supra note 8, at 97-8.
13. In particular, the Court in the Nicaragua case stated:
The mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for
the court to consider these as being part of customary international law, and as
applicable as such to those States. Bound as it is by Article 38 of its Statute to apply,
inter alia, international custom 'as evidence of a general practice accepted as law', the
Court may not disregard the essential role played by general practice. . . . The Court
must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed
by practice. ... In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules,
and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.
Nicaragua case, supra note 8, at 97-8.
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the acceptance of the treaty increases. However, such a conclusion (the
so-called Baxter paradox 14) would disregard both the fact that the treaty itself
is an important piece of State practice for the determination of customary
law, although its role in this regard must be carefully assessed, 15 and the im-
pact that any subsequent practice of the contracting States in the application
of the treaty which establishes their agreement or disagreement regarding its
interpretation16 may bear on the development of a customary norm. There-
fore, it is submitted that customary international humanitarian law should not
be determined on the sole basis of the practice of the States that have not rati-
fied Protocol I.
In addition to the practice of State parties in their application of Protocol I
and the behavior of other States vis-a-vis the Protocol itself, any other ele-
ment being evidence of State practice may come into play. Special importance
should however be attached to the case law, although limited, of international
courts, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
14. According to the Baxter paradox, "[A]s the number of parties to a treaty increases, it
becomes more difficult to demonstrate what is the state of customary international law dehors
the treaty." In addition, "[a]s the express acceptance of the treaty increases, the number of states
not parties whose practice is relevant diminishes. There will be less scope for the development of
international law dehors the treaty. . . ." See Baxter, supra note 6, at 64, 73.
15. See Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (1987), which points out that although acts concordant with a
treaty obviously are indistinguishable from acts in the application of the treaty, the
demonstration that an act by State parties is regarded by them as required not only by their
conventional obligations but also by general international law would show the existence of an
opinio juris, which should be given probative weight for the formation of customary law.
16. C/. Article 3 1 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (supra note 7),
concerning general rules of interpretation, which states: "There shall be taken into account,
together with the context . . . [a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." See on this provision
Francesco Capotorti, Sul valore della prassi applicativa dei trattati secondo la convenzione di
Vienna, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION. ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF ROBERTO AGO 197 ff. (A. Giuffre ed., 1987); Fausto Pocar, Codification of Human Rights
Law by the United Nations, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1995).
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(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 17 As has
been pointed out, the assessment of the customary nature of treaty provisions
made by international courts has frequently proved to be regarded as determi-
native in subsequent debates. 18 However, even in respect of case law, it has to
be stressed that previous decisions of international courts cannot be relied on
as having the authority of precedents in order to establish a principle of law.
The current structure of the international community, which clearly lacks a
hierarchical judicial system, does not allow consideration of judicial precedent
as a distinct source of law. Therefore, prior case law may only constitute evi-
dence of a customary rule in that it may reflect the existence of opinio juris and
international practice, but cannot be regarded per se as having precedential
authority in international criminal adjudication. As has been pointed out, in-
ternational criminal courts must always carefully appraise decisions of other
17. The limited number of ICTY decisions dealing with the issue considered in this paper, i.e.,
whether Protocol I reflects customary law, depend on the consideration that the Protocol was
referred to by the ICTY as conventional law rather than as evidence of customary international
law. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14-T, Mar. 3, 2000, 11 172
[hereinafter BlaSkic case], where it is stated that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina ratified
Protocol I and Protocol II (which is applicable to non-international armed conflicts) in 1992 and
that "consequently, as ofJanuary 1993, the two parties were bound by the provisions of the two
Protocols, whatever their status within customary international law." See also Prosecutor v.
Kordic and Cerkez, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Portions of the Amended Indictment Alleging "Failure to Punish" Liability, I.C.T.Y. No.
IT-95-14/2-PT, Mar. 2, 1999, 11 13, where it is stated that "both the Republic of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are bound by Additional Protocol I as successor States of the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia, which had ratified the Protocol on 11 June 1979." In this context see
also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Appeal Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-96-21-A, Feb. 20, 2001, Ml
111-113, where it is stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have in any event succeeded to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (to which Yugoslavia was a party) irrespective of any findings
as to formal succession. The Appeals Chamber considered that "in international law there is
automatic State succession to multilateral humanitarian treaties in the broad sense, i.e., treaties
of universal character which express fundamental human rights" and that "in light of the object
and purpose of the Geneva Conventions, which is to guarantee the protection of certain
fundamental values common to mankind in times of armed conflict, . . . the Appeals Chamber is
in no doubt that State succession has no impact on obligations arising out from these
fundamental humanitarian conventions."
18. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1989). See also Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the
1977 Geneva Protocols, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 99,
where it is noted that no decisions of the ICJ or of other authoritative international tribunals
existed regarding Protocol I and points out that international decisions are rare in respect to any
of the humanitarian law treaties, except for the decisions on war crimes cases issued after World
War II. Later on, as mentioned in the text, the international criminal tribunals established by the
Security Council have sometimes dealt with the Protocols.
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courts before relying on their persuasive authority as to existing law. 19 Conse-
quently, although judicial decisions of international courts may have a special
weight, they must be regarded as one of the elements that have to be taken
into account in the assessment of the existence of a customary rule.
Looking at the provisions of Protocol I from the perspective of existing cus-
tomary international humanitarian law, it is certainly possible to identify dif-
ferent groups of norms. The first and largest group encompasses the rules
whose customary nature is undisputed. It is widely recognized that much of
the Protocol is a codification of general international law. Even States that
hesitate to accept the instrument or have decided not to ratify it, such as the
United States, 20 have expressed the view that many of its provisions are either
settled customary international law or eligible for their ultimate recognition as
customary international law. 21
A customary status should clearly be accorded, in the first place, to the
provisions that echo or restate the Hague Regulations annexed to the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, which are generally regarded as reflecting
19. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan. 14, 2000, H 542
[hereinafter Kupreskic case].
20. See Letter of Transmittal of Protocol II by President Reagan to the Senate, dated January 29,
1987, reprinted in 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 910 (1987), and
Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 912 (1987). See also George Aldrich, Prospects for United States
Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1991), where the difficulties encountered by the United States are
discussed with a view to overcoming them by means of reservations.
21. Indeed, it has been noted that statements of United States officials following the
announcement that the United States would not ratify Protocol I are evidence that "the United
States regards Articles 37 (perfidy), 40 (refusal of quarter), 42 (on persons parachuting from a
disabled aircraft), 59 (non-defended localities), 60 (demilitarised zones), 73 (refugees), 75
(fundamental guarantees) and 79 (journalists) as declaratory of custom." See Greenwood, supra
note 18, at 103. See also EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
conflict: personal and material fields of application 26 (1992); theodor
Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age 179-80 (1998).
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customary law. 22 This applies, for example, to the basic rules that concern
methods and means of warfare, such as those contained in Article 35(1),
which declares that the right of the parties to a conflict to choose methods or
means of warfare is not unlimited, and to Article 35(2), which prohibits the
employment of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare that
are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. These
provisions basically follow Articles 22 and 23(e) of the Hague Regulations,
which excluded the unlimited use of means of warfare and contained the pro-
hibition on employing arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnec-
essary suffering. It is true that Protocol I uses, additionally, the term
"methods of warfare" in order to define the scope of the prohibition and that
the addition could be regarded as introducing a new element, which would
only have the status of a treaty rule. 23 It is submitted, however, that the addi-
tion is a mere clarification of the already existing customary rule reflected in
the Hague Regulations rather than a new rule aiming at its development. In-
deed, the prohibition against employing certain means of warfare appears to
include both the choice of weapons and the way in which weapons are em-
ployed. 24
22. It has to be noted that a Trial Chamber of the ICTY has considered that:
[I]t is the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (hereinafter "the Regulations of The Hague"), as interpreted and applied by the
Nuremberg Tribunal, which is the basis for Article 3 of the Statute. Hence, although
Article 3 of the Statute subsumes Common Article 3, it nevertheless remains a broader
provision inasmuch as it is also based on the Regulations of The Hague which, in the
opinion ofthe Trial Chamber, also undoubtedly form part ofcustomary international law.
See Blaskic case, supra note 17, 11 168.
23. See Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering: From the
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol I of 1977, 299 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 98 (1994), where it is stated that "while this rule derives from the
principle expressed in HR, Article 23(e), international legislation was required to make it
positive law."
24. See Greenwood, supra note 18, at 104. It has to be noted in this context that Article 35 was
adopted by consensus at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference and that some participating States
made declarations that confirm the customary nature of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 35. In
particular, the Federal Republic of Germany joined the consensus with the "understanding that
paragraphs 1 and 2 reaffirm customary international law" and that paragraph 3 constitutes a new
conventional rule. It should also be noted that the addition of the term "superfluous injury" to
the term "unnecessary suffering" is to be regarded as simply aiming at rendering in English the
expression "maux superflus" contained in the French text of Article 23(e). See Meyrowitz, supra
note 23, at 104-5.
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Similar considerations apply in this context to the provisions prohibiting
acts that go beyond ruses ofwar and amount to perfidy (Article 37) or declara-
tions that no quarter will be given (Article 40), and others that clearly follow
the corresponding provisions of the Hague Regulations. Equally, most of the
provisions concerning combatant and prisoner-of-war status (Articles 43 to
47) restate rules already expressed in the Hague Regulations or in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which are largely considered as reflecting customary in-
ternational law25 even though the customary nature of some additions have
been questioned in legal doctrine. This is the case, in particular, of the provi-
sion of Article 44(3) concerning the requirement that combatants distinguish
themselves from the civilian population. While this requirement clearly re-
flects an existing principle, the provision differs from customary international
law especially as regards the situation in which combatants are unable to dis-
tinguish themselves; therefore, the criteria set forth in Protocol I have to be
regarded as new conventional rules. 26
As regards the protection of civilians and the civilian population against
the effects of hostilities, there is no doubt that the principle of distinction as
set forth in Article 48 of Protocol I, both as regards the distinction between
combatants and noncombatants and between civilian objects and non-civil-
ian objects, reaffirms a general rule of international law that has never been
questioned despite being frequently disregarded in State practice. The same
applies in this context, at least in general terms, to the definition of civilians
and the civilian population (Article 50) and to the general protection they
shall enjoy against dangers arising from military operations (Article 51), in
particular through the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, as well as to the
general rule on protection of civilian objects (Article 52). The specificity of
these provisions appear mainly to be detailed clarifications of existing recog-
nized rules rather than additions aimed at their development. 27
25. See e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian
Law: Purpose, Coverage and Methodology, 81 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 660
(1999).
26. See in particular L. Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some
Provisions, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED
Cross Principles, in Honour of Jean Pictet 214-5 (Chnstophe Swinarski ed., 1984); and
Greenwood, supra note 18, at 107, where it is also noted that Article 44(3) was one of the most
controversial provisions inserted in Protocol I, and has been identified by the United States as a
major reason for its decision not to ratify the Protocol.
27. As to the role of Protocol I in clarifying pre-existing customary law, see Hans-Peter Gasser,
Negotiating the 1977 Additional Protocols: Was it a Waste of Time?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 85-6.
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It has to be noted in this regard that a Trial Chamber of the ICTY has, with
respect to Articles 51(2) and 52(1) of the Protocol, expressed the view that
these provisions "are based on Hague law relating to the conduct of warfare,
which is considered as part ofcustomary law." The Chamber concluded that:
[T]o the extent that these provisions . . . echo the Hague Regulations, they can
be considered as reflecting customary law. It is indisputable that the general
prohibition of attacks against the civilian population and the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks or attacks on civilian objects are generally accepted
obligations. As a consequence, there is no possible doubt as to the customary
status of these specific provisions as they reflect core principles of humanitarian
law that can be considered as applying to all armed conflicts, whether intended
to be international or non-international conflicts. 28
A similar consideration can be made as concerns the principle of propor-
tionality as set forth in Article 51(5)(b), according to which an attack on a
military objective is prohibited when it would cause excessive injury to civil-
ians or damage to civilian objects in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated. 29 Admittedly, the extent to which these
provisions correspond to customary law has been questioned, because the for-
mulation adopted appears to contain a number of specifications that can not
be found in previous declarations of the same principles. However, it has also
been pointed out that such specifications are aimed at clarifying the scope of
the principles rather than at adding new elements that would lead to the mod-
ification of their content or effects. 30 While it is possible that the interpreta-
tion of certain expressions used in Protocol I may lead to improvements that
could result in a departure from existing customary law principles, it is certain
that such improvements would be considered as forming part of the natural
development of customary law rather than as constituting mere treaty
provisions.
In the same line of reasoning, it may be assumed that the provisions of Arti-
cles 57 and 58, prescribing that precautionary measures should be taken in
conducting an attack, as well as against the effects of attacks, are mere qualifi-
cations of the general principles of distinction and proportionality, although
28. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of
Articles 2 and 3, 1.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Mar. 2, 1999, 1 31.
29. See Greenwood, supra note 18, at 109; Penna, supra note 26, at 220.
30. As to the specifications contained in Article 51(5)(b), see, e.g., MERON, supra note 18, at
65.
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they may be seen as going beyond customary law. 31 It is interesting to note that
the customary nature of these provisions has been recently affirmed by a Trial
Chamber of the ICTY, not only because they specify pre-existing norms, but
also because they appear to be uncontested by States, even non-ratifying
States. The Chamber went on to state that when a rule of international hu-
manitarian law is somewhat imprecise, it must be defined with reference to the
laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience espoused in the celebrated
"Martens clause,"32 which constitutes customary law. As a result, the Cham-
ber concluded that the prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58, and of the corre-
sponding customary rules, must be interpreted "so as to construe as narrowly
as possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, by the same to-
ken, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians."33
While most of Protocol I can undoubtedly be regarded as essentially reflect-
ing customary international law, there are areas where this conclusion is sub-
ject to debate for two reasons. First, Protocol I clearly sets forth some new
rules. Secondly, the specificity of Protocol Ps provisions add new elements to
principles that, while well established in customary law, leave margins of dis-
cretion to belligerent States. Belligerent States are then free to argue that
such specifications will limit or may limit discretion if they are given certain
interpretations. The scope and impact of these additions is therefore contro-
versial and may be the basis for the hesitations of some States to ratify Proto-
col I. Indeed, Protocol Ps ratification would require that the interpretation of
its principles should be conducted according to the relevant criteria of the law
of treaties, which are not applicable to the corresponding rules as recognized
in customary international law.
Some areas appear to be especially significant in this respect, in particular
those relating to the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects.
For instance, the presumption expressed in Article 50(1) that in case of doubt
as to whether a person is a civilian, that person should be considered as having
31. See Greenwood, supra note 18, at 111.
32. The Martens clause first appeared in the preamble to the Hague Convention (II) of 1899. It
states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised
nations, from the law of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.
33. Kupreskic case, supra note 19, 1JH 521-25. The issue was not considered on appeal. See
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Appeal Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-A, Oct. 23, 2001.
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such status, and the provision of Article 52(3) that an object normally dedi-
cated to civilian purposes shall, in case of doubt as to its being used to contrib-
ute to military action, be presumed not to be so used. These provisions do not
seem to derive automatically—although it would certainly be
desirable34—from the principle of distinction as settled in customary interna-
tional law, which appears to leave it to the attacker to decide how to deter-
mine the status of the military objective.
There seems to be no doubt that the definition of military objectives con-
tained in Article 52(2) corresponds to existing principles as reflected in cus-
tomary international law and simply clarifies them. However, if the
clarifications of the definition are considered as being open to different inter-
pretations of the scope of the obligations imposed on the attacker, then that
would be incompatible with a consideration of the provision as fully reflecting
customary law. Expressions such as "effective contribution to military action"
or "definite military advantage" may not be sufficiently precise for the purpose
of establishing a safe basis for a rule of customary international law. 35 On the
other hand, it has also been submitted that the definition enshrined in the sec-
ond sentence of Article 52(2) is such that it should be deemed to include not
only civilians, but combatants as well. If, indeed, the implicit ratio legis for such
provision is the same that underlies the principle that superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering should be avoided, there is no reason why the provision
should not apply to attacks against members of armed forces as well. 36
Similarly, the obligation to protect the natural environment against wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage, which includes the prohibition of the
use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to
34. See in particular Frits Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Laws
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 9 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 112
(1978).
35. The possibility of a wide interpretation of legitimate objectives under Protocol I is
underlined, among others, by Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1 999: The Air Campaign: Have the provisions of
Additional Protocol I withstood the test?, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147
(2000). See also Penna, supra note 26, at 219, who points out that Article 52(2) may be regarded
as customary law, but recognizes that the definition of military objectives contained therein is far
from being precise and that "customary international law at present allows belligerents to regard
legitimate civilian objects serving directly or indirectly the enemy war effort as 'military
objectives'."
36. For this approach see Meyrowitz, supra note 23, at 115, who states that "strictly speaking,
the extension of the rule stated in Article 52(2) to combatants would not have the purpose of
protecting them, but of excluding them, under certain circumstances, from the definition of
military objectives that may lawfully be attacked."
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cause such damage (Article 35(3)), in particular when the health or survival
of the population may be prejudiced (Article 55), finds no clear precedent in
existing customary law, as was acknowledged by some States who participated
in the drafting of Protocol I.37 Although subsequent development of a custom-
ary principle of respect for the environment in warfare may be in progress,38 its
scope is certainly far from being assessed and recognized. It may be also noted,
in this connection, that the said provisions appear to affirm a principle of pro-
tection in absolute terms, applicable irrespective of a reference both to the
principles of proportionality and of distinction. It must be noted, in this re-
spect, that Article 55 refers to population without the qualification "civilian."
A final area that may deserve special attention, since it is subject to debate,
concerns the prohibition of reprisals against civilians and protected objects,
which are referred to in Articles 51 to 56 of Protocol I. It is well known that
the controversy on this matter has been and still is important, and different
views have been expressed both at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference where
Protocol I was negotiated and subsequently. The dominant view is probably
that the provisions of Protocol I neither reflect pre-existing customary law nor
have subsequently reached that nature, but contain significant developments
in this regard. 39
Interestingly, the issue was considered by a Trial Chamber of the ICTY,40
which discussed whether the Protocol's provisions on reprisals against
37. See Greenwood, supra note 18, at 101, where it is stated:
Article 35(3) ... is more contentious and, unlike the rest of Article 35, was not based
upon the provisions of earlier treaties. Nor could it be said that State practice prior to
1977 provided much support for the existence of such a rule. Although the Article was
adopted by consensus, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it participated in
that consensus on the understanding that Article 35(3) introduced a new rule.
Subsequent United States statements regarding Article 35(3) take the same
position. . . . Article 55 is closely linked to Article 35(3) and should be regarded as
having the same status.
38. See NATALINO RONZITTI, DlRITTO INTERNAZIONALE DEI CONFLITTI ARMATI 161 (2d ed.
2001).
39. For the state of international customary law before Protocol I, see FRITS KALSHOVEN,
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 375 (1971), who concludes, after a thorough consideration of State
practice, that belligerent reprisals have not so far come under a total prohibition, and further
notes that "the power of belligerents to resort to belligerent reprisals can only be effectively
abolished to the extent that other adequate means take over their function of law enforcement."
For a recent consideration of the issue, see RONZITTI, supra note 38, at 180.
40. Kupreskic case, supra note 19, HH 527-36. The issue has not been raised on appeal. See the
Appeal Judgment, supra note 33.
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civilians in combat zones (Article 51(6)) and reprisals against civilian objects
(Article 52(1)) have been subsequently transformed into general rules of in-
ternational law. Assuming that the mentioned provisions were not declara-
tory of customary law, the Chamber expressed the view that the universal
revulsion towards reprisals, as well as their trampling on the most fundamental
principles of human rights, have contributed to the emergence of customary
law on the matter. The Chamber also recalled the requirements of humanity
and dictates of public conscience espoused in the Martens clause, stating that
the pressure stemming therefrom has resulted in the formation of customary
law on reprisals. It further maintained that opinio juris existed to support the
view that these rules have become a part of customary law. It pointed to cir-
cumscriptions on reprisals in modern warfare contained in the military manu-
als of States, including the United States; the adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly of a resolution in 1970 stating that civilian populations
should not be the object of reprisals; and the ratification of Protocol I by a
large number of States. It further pointed out that another Trial Chamber
also held the view that reprisals against civilians must always be prohibited. 41
In addition, it stated that in the armed conflicts of the last fifty years, States
have normally not asserted the right to undertake reprisals against enemy ci-
vilians in the combat area. Whatever consideration be given to this judg-
ment,42 it is undeniable that it may play an important role in assessing the
legitimacy of reprisals against civilians and protected objects, and in develop-
ing customary international law that reflects the provisions of Protocol I in
this area.
Other examples could be cited in examining the extent to which Protocol I
reflects pre-existing customary international law and its contributions to clari-
fying the content and scope of customary law. However, at this stage it seems
that some conclusions can be drawn in light of the present practice. A slow
but continuous trend towards recognizing the general value of the provisions
contained in Protocol I, especially as far as they are intended to set forth
well established customary principles or improve their definitions, is largely
41. See Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, I.C.T.Y. No.
IT9541-R61, Mar. 8, 1996, 1111 10-18.
42. For the position that the invocation of the Martens clause can hardly justify the conclusion
that the combined effect of the clause and opinio juris can transform the prohibition on reprisals
against civilian objects into customary law binding on States that have not ratified Protocol I or
have dissented from the prohibition of reprisals, see Theodor Meron, The Humanization of
Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (2000).
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discernible in international practice and legal doctrine.43 The increasing num-
ber of State ratifications is corroborative of this growing trend, together with
the emerging case law of international judicial bodies, which tends to more fre-
quently underline human values in assessing the content ofcustomary interna-
tional law.
Except perhaps in some cases where it is clear that no customary rule ex-
ists, the areas in which Protocol I has encountered the most difficulty in de-
veloping into customary law appear to be the areas where the Protocol itself,
because its provisions and the definitions contained therein are not suffi-
ciently clear and well shaped, is subject to different interpretations. In other
words, the diverging approach to such provisions lies in their interpretation.
In this regard, it has to be noted that the resistance to ratify Protocol I may
also lie in the different rules of interpretation that would apply in establishing
the scope of the principles enshrined in the Protocol, should the latter be
regarded as treaty provisions instead of principles of customary interna-
tional law.
In light of these conclusions drawn twenty-five years after Protocol I was
adopted, one can doubt whether it was drafted in a way intended to help the
development of customary law. Unclear treaty rules can hardly develop into
customary law and may frequently be opposed by States which may fear being
bound by interpretations they would not be in the position to accept. By way
of example, a list of military objectives would have helped the formation of
customary law, at least as far as the list is concerned, even though it would
have been necessary to recognize that the list was not exhaustive. The lack of
such a list, due to only partially different views of States as to its scope, does
not provide any help in this regard. 44 Although it cannot be denied that Pro-
tocol I has had an impact on pre-existing customary law,45 it may be submitted
that Protocol I could have made a far greater contribution to its development.
43. In this connection, the potential impact of Protocol I on the state ofcustomary law has been
stressed by Gasser, supra note 27, at 87.
44. For a different view, see FRITS KALSHOVEN AND LlESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON
the Waging of War 101 (2001).
45. For a discussion of this issue, see Yoram Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward
or Backwards?, 33 YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 269 (1979); and, with regard to reprisals
against civilians, Commentaires au sujet du Protocole I, 79 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA
Croix Rouge 553 (1997).
351

Commentary
Rudolf Dolzer
As I agree with most points made by Professor Stein and Judge Pocar, I
shall limit my comments to two points. The first one concerns the
methodology and sources of international humanitarian law in general. The
second one relates more specifically to the evolving diversity of goals and func-
tions of humanitarian law and the necessity to understand and apply the exist-
ing rules in the current policy context.
The first point on the sources of humanitarian law starts out from the basic
premise that no special rules exist, or should be recognized, in this area which
would in principle depart in any way from those recognized for public interna-
tional law in general. In other words, the canon of principles laid down in Ar-
ticle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice will apply to
humanitarian law as well. The jurisprudence of the ICJ has been consistent
with this postulate. As to the relationship between treaty law and customary
law in particular, the rulings in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, 1 the Nica-
ragua case 2 and the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion3 do not point to any di-
vergence in the Court's approach between humanitarian law and other areas
of public international law. The nuances of these three decisions may not be
always identical. It has been noticed rightly that the North Sea Continental
Shelf decision, for instance, seems to require a more comprehensive and de-
tailed examination of State practice than the Nicaragua decision. All three
1. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua case].
3. Legality of the Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 78 (July 8).
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decisions converge inasmuch as they are based on the same view that "it
should not lightly be assumed that treaty law evolves into customary law."4
Widespread practice and corresponding opinio iuris will be required for the for-
mation of customary law, with or without parallel treaty law. This maxim has
to be adapted to the circumstances of the context in regard to the number and
characteristics of relevant States, and the practice of the major States will
have to be given considerable weight.
At the same time, it is appropriate to assume that the rules on the persistent
objector will also be operative in the context of humanitarian law. While we
all agree that the strengthening and expansion of the rules protecting the vic-
tims and the innocents deserve our support, it is also clear that behind these
rules lie carefully balanced compromises which take into account the nature
of warfare. Against this background, it should not be generally presumed that
States are inclined to interpret those rules in favoram humanitatem at the cost
of their freedom in the means and methods of warfare.
Special issues may arise in those areas of customary law and treaty law
which are frequently disregarded in State practice. In such a setting it will be
necessary to examine carefully to the extent possible whether States assume
that the relevant rule is valid in principle, and point to special justifications
for their departure from the rule, or clarify whether it must be concluded that
States do not consider themselves to be bound in general. Of course, the first
alternative describes the setting of considerable State practice regarding the
prohibition of the use of force. Many governments act contrary to a rule, but
nonetheless accept it in principle by way of pointing to one of the justifica-
tions that allow them, or would allow them if the relevant facts existed, to
act contrary to the rule. The issue will become more complex if no attempt
to justify the conduct is made. In case a considerable number of States fall
into this category, it will have to be assumed that the rule has been eroded.
Such a process of derogation may take different forms, depending on the
precise circumstances.
In the extreme setting, it is possible that the rule as such can no longer be
considered to be valid and that States are no longer bound by any norm in the
relevant context. Another version of a process of this kind will exist where
States do not flatly disregard the rule but apply it frequently in a generally re-
stricting manner; under such circumstances, the understanding of the rule
will have to be adapted to the practice. This will also be the case if State prac-
tice disregards the rule in a specific area of application. Evidence of such
4. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 1, at 41, No. 71.
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different types of derogation can be found in various areas of humanitarian
law. The common denominator of all such developments lies in the require-
ment to take into account State practice in identifying and interpreting the
rules of humanitarian law. In the context of treaty law, Article 3 1 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties5 points in the same direction.
The second part of my remarks concerns the diversity of goals, functions
and faces of humanitarian law. The essential point which I wish to make is
that the various branches of humanitarian law resulting from this diversity
need to be viewed in an integrated context so that the development of the law
as a whole will be kept and tied together.
The diversity and the branches to which I refer essentially consists of the
following three parts:
(1) The protection of potential victims, being the primary goal of
humanitarian law as it has evolved historically, remains the key
concern.
(2) The necessity to leave room to fight a war for a good cause in an
efficient manner must be preserved. This concerns Professor
Dinstein's point that we do not want a war to last forever, and John
Norton Moore's emphasis on the need to fight effective wars in our
contemporary world.
(3) Following the developments in the past decade, we need to view
humanitarian law increasingly through the lenses of international
criminal law, as the two areas are increasingly linked together.
Why is it necessary to point to the distinctness of these diverse goals and
branches? The concern here is a fragmentation in the outlook on humanitar-
ian law that may occur when the three segments noted above are seen in isola-
tion without regard to the necessity to fashion and design the rules so as to
reflect the existence and the special needs of all three branches. In practice,
the three perspectives have their own "constituencies" which may or may not
be prepared in practice to accept that their own concerns need to be merged
with the policies and considerations underlying the two other concerns. As to
the protective dimension of humanitarian law, it is widely known that its
causes are championed especially in scholarly circles, but also by a number of
5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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governments. Perhaps it is fair to say that the favorite clause of this part of the
international humanitarian law community is the Martens Clause drafted in
1899 for the first time and phrased in Article 1 (2) of Protocol I6 as follows: "In
cases not covered by this Protocol, civilians and combatants enjoy the protec-
tion of the principles of international law derived from the established custom,
from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."7
This emphasis on humanity and the public conscience as the overarching goal
of humanitarian law echoes the fundamental purpose of humanitarian law,
and from an abstract point of view no one will disagree with the noble cause
expressed by the Martens Clause.
Nevertheless, it will not be denied that another part of the community con-
cerned with humanitarian law may have priorities in practice which highlight
factors additional to those reflected in the Martens Clause. I refer to the mili-
tary sector and to the actors on the ground. Any realistic consideration will
have to conclude that it is not surprising that this community is often less con-
cerned with the principles of the Martens Clause than with the interpretation
of the law in a manner which allows flexibility, military advantage and ulti-
mately the operation and conclusion of a successful military operation ended
within an appropriate timeframe.
The third branch of the contemporary humanitarian law relates, of course,
to the enforcement community, charged with the application of the modern
rules of international criminal law. It appears that the application and inter-
pretation of this dimension of international humanitarian law may present the
most difficult challenge for the entire body of rules in the coming years. The
universe of criminal law as generally accepted in most parts of the world is
characterized by distinct principles such as the prohibition of ex post facto laws,
the presumption of innocence, the prohibition of vagueness of criminal rules
and an emphasis on the subjective perception of the individual concerned.
Should the rules of international criminal law based on the laws of war be
6. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OFWAR 422 (A. Roberts &R. Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
7. The Martens clause first appeared in the preamble to the Hague Convention (II) of 1899. It
states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised
nations, from the law of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.
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fashioned so as to be as transparent and predictable as possible? Should these
rules be construed so as to allow a wide margin of appreciation and an empha-
sis ex ante for the actor on the ground? 8 Should the main emphasis in the inter-
pretation concern the broad protection of the victim, even though this would
be at the expense of the special guarantees characteristic of criminal law and
also at the expense of chilling the enthusiasm of those States willing to wage a
just war?
These three modes of interpreting international criminal law are empha-
sized here only for the sake of separating and isolating the potential perspec-
tives. In reality, these approaches will be blended in one way or another in the
application of the law. What is remarkable, however, is that the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has come fairly close to
emphasising the third, the "humanitarian approach" in the context of apply-
ing Articles 57 and 58 of Protocol I dealing with the necessity of feasible pre-
cautions for the civilian population. Generally speaking, the Tribunal was
faced in this context with an unusually generally worded, imprecise rule, un-
characteristic for language typical of criminal law. The court would have had
the opportunity to narrow down the meaning of the two articles by way of a
narrow construction. It would have been possible to interpret the rules taking
into account the necessity of military efficiency, and an approach respecting
the rule of the margin of appreciation would also have been conceivable.
In the Kupreskic case referred to by Judge Pocar, the ICTY chose to inter-
pret Articles 57 and 58 in the specific light of the Martens Clause laid down in
Article 2 of Protocol I.9 In effect, this reading of the rules led to a very broad
understanding and to an emphasis on the protective dimension of Protocol I,
with no special regard for the first and second branch of international humani-
tarian law in the sense mentioned above. The ICTY found that these rules
must be interpreted "so as to construe as narrowly as possible the discretionary
power to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand the pro-
tection accorded to civilians." 10 Clearly, for purposes of enforcement, the
ICTY thus has underlined a distinctly humanitarian approach to the interpre-
tation of the Protocol I. The ruling shows no apparent regard for the classical
8. The concept of the margin of appreciation has been widely used by the European Court of
Human Rights in the context of the application ofhuman rights norms which, in the view of the
court, must be interpreted to take into account the special situation of the member States as they
apply the law.
9. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan. 14, 2000, 11
525.
10. Id.
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requirements of criminal law, nor was any attention paid, it appears, to any ap-
proach favoring a margin of appreciation for those who have to render deci-
sions during times of war. As to the wording of the Martens Clause in the
modern sense, as reflected in Protocol I, the literal reading leaves no doubt
that the clause will only be applied in cases "not covered by this Protocol." 11
Thus it has to be assumed that the Martens Clause must be applied only in ar-
eas not addressed by the written rules. This is quite different from assuming, as
the ICTY did, that the Martens Clause must serve as a rule of interpretation
for the written rules which are written in a manner so as to be in need of inter-
pretation. The implication of the ICTY's approach is indeed then to broaden
the protective dimension of the humanitarian rules in a general manner, with-
out attention to the other branches of this body of rules. It is more than doubt-
ful whether such an approach is consistent with the original intention of the
Martens Clause and with the contemporary need to integrate all concerns em-
bodied in humanitarian law.
When we speak about the lessons of the Kosovo, the humanitarian ap-
proach adopted by this decision of the ICTY reflects our general hope that this
decision has taught former President Milosevic and his disciples a lesson
which future warmongers and warlords and dictators will eventually remem-
ber. The urgent question, however, remains whether this approach satisfies all
goals and functions present in humanitarian law. What about the chilling ef-
fect for those who are willing to fight a war with a just cause? What are the
consequences of such a chilling effect? Does such an approach in an unin-
tended way protect a dictator from those who may be called upon to fight him?
And, more generally, what is the effect of such an approach to humanitarian
law doctrine on the acceptance by governments of an international criminal
system?
There are no clear-cut answers to these questions, but they need to be ad-
dressed because they concern serious questions. We are living through a pe-
riod of fundamental changes in the laws of armed conflict, and it is important
that the implication of all these changes are thought through in a broad de-
bate where the requirements of criminal law guarantees are discussed, where
the realities of military conduct are taken into account and where not only the
noble humanitarian aspirations in an isolated sense are highlighted. Possibly,
the international community will decide to adopt the humanitarian approach
favored by the ICTY, but we must do so in a manner which is responsive to all
elements and dimensions of the laws of war as they will operate in practice. I
11. Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
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submit that our reflections on the choices to be made in the future are still at
an early stage. Whoever wishes to take the moral high ground for the develop-
ment of humanitarian law is also under moral pressure to consider the implica-
tions in all their various facets on international relations. This requires, in
particular, both a focus on the impact of any change of law on those national
leaders who are most likely to start an illegal war and to cause unnecessary suf-
fering, and also on the conduct of those leaders and nations who are most
likely to defend potential victims against an illegal war and thus to end unnec-
essary suffering.
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A s had been forewarned, the immediate effect of Operation AlliedForce, which was in fact directed against targets in Serbia as well as
Kosovo province, was an increase in the terror directed against the Muslim Al-
banian population. While NATO claimed that only military targets were being
attacked, it soon became clear that civilians and civilian objects were suffering
damage—sometimes because of "clever" bombs going astray but also, it seems,
from NATO's desire to avoid casualties among its own personnel, which led to
aircraft flying beyond anti-aircraft range resulting in mistakes in targeting.
Cluster bombs, the range of which is difficult or impossible to control, were
among the ordinance dropped rendering civilian casualties virtually inevitable.
While it was claimed that bridges over the Danube, television studios and elec-
tricity-generating establishments were legitimate military objectives, questions
regarding the rule of proportionality in relation to collateral damage, both un-
der customary law and Protocols I and II, have to be examined.
The Economist Intelligence Unit reported, perhaps in the light of more
recent developments with some exaggeration, that the NATO bombing
"inflicted enormous damage on Yugoslavia's economy and infrastruc-
ture. . . . Yugoslavia will sink below Albania and become the poorest country
in Europe." 1 The Secretary General of the United Nations stated in a press re-
lease of April 28, 1999:
The civilian death toll is rising, as is the number ofdisplaced. There is increasing
devastation to the country's infrastructure, and huge damage to [its] economy.
For example, Mr. Sommarugua [President of the International Committee of
1. Globe and Mail (Toronto), 23 August 1999.
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the Red Cross after visiting Yugoslavia] told me that the destruction of the three
bridges in Novi Sad also cut off the fresh water supply to half of that city's
population of 90,000 people. 2
No fewer than 350 cluster bomb attacks were launched against Serb forces
(it was later discovered that NATO claims of destruction of Serb tanks and
other military installations were unrealistic) and:
[Officially it is acknowledged that between five and ten per cent of the bombs
would have failed to detonate, although unofficial estimates put it
higher. . . . Although the civilian casualty toll from incidents involving
unexploded munitions has dropped from five a day in the first month after the
air campaign ended to the present one or two a day Lt. Col. Flanagan
[Australian program manager of the United Nations mine action coordinate
center in Pristina] said he needed NATO's help to meet the challenge of
making Kosovo safe for the population, especially in rural areas, Any help we
could get from NATO would be appreciated, but at the moment KFOR
[Kosovo Protection Force] is not addressing the problem unless there is an
emergency humanitarian or operational reason'. He said 'children were being
maimed because the cluster bombs looked like toys and were extremely
sensitive. Ifyou pick up a cluster bomb it will explode, it is even more dangerous
than a mine. Anything can detonate a cluster bomb'. Colonel Flanagan said
NATO had supplied the coordinates for the cluster bomb attacks which had
helped his teams to trace some of the unexploded bomblets. However, not all
the coordinates had proved accurate. 3
Given the nature of this statement, one is inclined to enquire whether it did
not embarrass those participants in the NATO campaign which were parties
to Protocol II as amended4 of the 1990 Conventional Weapons Convention. 5
2. Statement by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Kosovo Crisis, Press Release SG/SM/6972,
Apr. 28, 1999, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/Kosovo334.htm. For a
breakdown of the damage done to Yugoslavia's economy, see Ved Nanda, Legal Implications of
NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF
CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR L.C. GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 313, 319 (M. Schmitt ed., 2000) (Vol. 75, US Naval War College
International Law Studies).
3. Michael Evans, NATO Bombs Still Killing Kosovars, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 16, 1999.
4. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices, adopted May 3, 1996, 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1206, 1209 (1996).
5. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excesively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 179 (D.
Schindler and J. Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988). The unamended Protocol II is at 185.
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While NATO certainly did not use booby-traps, Colonel Flanagan's descrip-
tion of cluster bombs as "toy-like and attractive to children" brings them very
close to the definition of such weapons: "any device or material which is de-
signed, constructed, or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unex-
pectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object
or performs an apparently safe act."6
Colonel Flanagan also expressed some criticism of NATO's unwillingness
to assist in clearing these weapons which again draws attention to the Proto-
col and its obligation to give notice of a minefield and arrange for its
clearance:
1
.
Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined
areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be cleared, removed,
destroyed. . .
.
2. High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility
with respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices in areas under their control.
3. With respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices laid by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control,
such party shall provide to the party in control of the area ... to the extent
permitted by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to
fulfill such responsibility. 7
For the main part, KFOR and those members ofNATO contributing thereto
remained in control of most of Kosovo and would appear, at least at the time of
Colonel Flanagan's remarks, as not being as cooperative as some ofthem are obli-
gated to be. Finally, it may be asked whether by using weapons coated in depleted
uranium there has not been a breach of the basic principle of customary law that
weapons likely to cause unnecessary suffering may not be used, while for parties to
Protocol I8 there would appear to have been also a breach of Article 35, which
forbids "methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment" (emphasis
added) as such usage must have envisaged.
As has been pointed out, the bombing campaign was not as successful as
NATO might have hoped. It extended over seventy-eight days and at no time
6. Id., art. 2(4).
7. Id., art. 10.
8. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16
International Legal Materials 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
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was there any contact between ground troops and no fatalities were suffered
by NATO air personnel. Since the aerial campaign was affected by weather
conditions as well as the accuracy of the crews, observation of targets was
sometimes difficult.9 While the United States was not a party to Protocol I,
both Canada and the United Kingdom were. It is therefore necessary as re-
gards these participants to refer to the relevant Articles of that instrument. It
should also be noted that in so far as the United States was concerned it was
under the customary law obligation to confine its offensive activities to mili-
tary and not civilian targets. In accordance with Protocol I:
Article 48 - Basic rule
[T] he Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
Article 51 - Protection of the civilian population
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations.
3. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threat ofviolence the primary purpose ofwhich
is to spread terror among the civilian population is prohibited.
There has never been any suggestion that NATO operations were in any way
directed at causing terror, butNATO never concealed that there was inherent
in its policy an intention to create a situation in which the Yugoslav population
would be so discomforted as to rise up and overthrow the government seated in
Belgrade. This eventually occurred but not as a direct consequence of the
bombing campaign.
Article 51 continues:
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
9. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 2, at 319.
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(c) those which are employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each case, are of a nature to strike military objectives
and civilian objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive 10 in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
Article 52 - General protection of civilian objects
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes ... is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
In the case of the bombing campaign undertaken by NATO, it would often ap-
pear, prima facie, that the question may also be asked whether the distinction
demanded by Protocol I of those States which were parties to it was always
respected.
Perhaps one of the clearest instances of acceptance of ethical principles in
modern international law is that which governs the punishment of those
guilty of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. To the extent
that Serbian or Kosovar Albanians committed any of these offenses, they must
answer at a trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
10. See, e.g., William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare,
98 Military Law Review 91 (1982).
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) established by the United Nations. The ICTY has no dies
ad quern and so enjoys jurisdiction until it is declared functus officio or there is a
clear statement that conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia has
come to an end. Prima facie, members of the NATO forces who may have
committed offenses against the law of armed conflict are as amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal as are any other offenders. In fact, the ICTY estab-
lished a committee to investigate this issue, which, concluded that no further
investigation was necessary and no attempt has been made to indict any
NATO personnel. 11
Since the operation was essentially aerial, the ambit subject to the law of
armed conflict was somewhat limited. The provision of Protocol I defining
grave breaches is almost certainly an expression of the customary law with re-
gard to protection of civilians and so is not confined solely to parties to the
Protocol. However, that instrument's language is specific:
3. [T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol,
when committed willfully . . . and causing death or serious injury to body or
health:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of
attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or
civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive
loss of life, injury to civilians or danger to civilian objects. . . . 12
One English newspaper report lends support to the argument that such
breaches did occur: "So wild was the bombing that ministers found themselves
having to call journalists, make-up girls, hospital staff and even whole villages
'legitimate targets of war', blithely rewriting the Geneva Convention to suit
themselves." 13
There can be no doubt that if the rule of law or ethical standards are to
prevail in the future, it is essential that the law concerning war crimes, geno-
cide and crimes against humanity be attached to all individuals, military, po-
litical or civilian, and not merely to those against whom "we" are taking
action. As has been mentioned a committee established by the ICTY Office of
11. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reprinted in 39
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (2000), and reprinted herein as Appendix A
[hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
12. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 85 (3) (a) and (b).
13. Simon Jenkins, A Victory for Cowards , THE TIMES (London), June 1 1, 1999.
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the Prosecutor (OTP) in accordance with Article 18 of its Statute 14 did inves-
tigate allegations lodged against NATO. Some of its comments bear repro-
duction. As regards the legality of the NATO recourse to force without
United Nations sanction, the Report states
[T] he jus ad bellum regulates when states may use force and is, for the most part,
enshrined in the UN Charter. In general, states may use force in self defence
(individual or collective) and for very few other purposes. In particular, the
legitimacy of the presumed basis for the NATO bombing campaign,
humanitarian intervention, without prior Security Council authorization, is
hotly debated. That being said . . . the crime related to an unlawful decision to
use force is the crime against peace or aggression. While a person convicted of a
crime against peace may, potentially, be held criminally responsible for all of the
activities causing death, injury or destruction during a conflict, the ICTY does
not have jurisdiction over crimes against peace. 15
Consequently, the Report was confined to examining only allegations that
NATO might have committed acts contrary to the jus in hello.
In so far as it was alleged that the use of depleted uranium (DU) constituted
a breach of the law of armed conflict, the Report stated:
There is no specific treaty ban on the use of DU projectiles. There is a
developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding the impact of the
use of such projectiles and it is possible that, in future, there will be a consensus
view in international legal circles that use of such projectiles violate general
principles of the law applicable to use of weapons in armed conflict. No such
consensus exists at present It is acknowledged that the underlying principles
of the law of armed conflict such as proportionality are applicable in this
context; however it is the committee's view . . . based on information available
at present, that the OTP should not commence an investigation into use of
depleted uranium projectiles by NATO. 16
A similar hesitancy to condemn the use of cluster bombs is to be found in
the Report.
14. "The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained
from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or
obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed." S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36-40 (1993), reprinted in 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1 165,
1192(1993).
15. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 11 30.
16. Id., U 26.
367
Commentary
There is no specific treaty provision which prohibits or restricts the use of cluster
bombs, although, of course, cluster bombs must be in compliance with the
general principles applicable to the use of all weapons. Human Rights Watch
[which had submitted documentary evidence concerning alleged NATO
offences] has condemned the use of cluster bombs alleging that the high 'dud' or
failure rate of the submunitions (bomblets) contained inside cluster bombs
converts these submunitions into antipersonnel landmines which it asserts, are
now prohibited under customary international law. Whether antipersonnel
landmines are prohibited under current customary international law is
debatable, although there is a strong trend in that direction. There is, however,
no general legal consensus that cluster bombs are, in legal terms, equivalent to
antipersonnel landmines .... It is the opinion of the committee, based on
information presently available, that the OTP should not commence an
investigation into use of cluster bombs as such by NATO. 17
While it was hesitant to condemn the use of particular weaponry, the com-
mittee did make some general comments concerning legal issues relating to
target selection. Here we may detect some hints of a commander's responsibil-
ity to have concern for ethical principles.
[I]n combat, military commanders are required a) to direct their operations
against military objectives, and b) when directing their operations against
military objectives, to ensure that the losses to the civilian population and the
damage to civilian property are not disproportionate to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. Attacks which are not directed against military
objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian population) and
attacks which cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property
damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence under Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute. 18 The mens rea for the offence is intention or recklessness, not simple
negligence. In determining whether or not the mens rea requirement has been
met, it should be borne in mind that commanders deciding on an attack have
duties:
(a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are military objectives,
(b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means
of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing
incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage, and
17. Id., 11 27.
18. Concerning violations of the laws or customs of war.
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(c) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause
disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
One of the principles underlying international humanitarian law, constituting
an expression of high ethical standards, is the principle of distinction, which
obligates military commanders to distinguish between military objectives and
civilian persons or objects. The practical application of this principle is
effectively encapsulated in Article 57 of Protocol I which, in part, obligates
those who plan or decide upon an attack to 'do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.' The
obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also
direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets
during operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in
operations must have some range of discretion to determine which available
resources shall be used and how they shall be used. Further, a determination
that inadequate efforts have been made to distinguish between military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects should not necessarily focus
exclusively on a specific incident. If precautionary measures have worked
adequately in a very high percentage of cases then the fact they have not worked
well in a small number of cases does not necessarily mean they are generally
inadequate. 19
Once again, it would seem that the committee was unwilling to find that
NATO might in fact have breached the law, even though it might be argued
that the decision not to suffer casualties and to fly beyond the range of
anti-aircraft artillery militated towards ineffective targeting, especially in
cloudy weather. Moreover, the number of incidents listed in the Report to the
prosecutor20 involving civilian casualties, some of which were quite heavy,
might suggest that the accuracy of targeting was inadequate in quite a large
number of cases. 21
19. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, UH 28-9.
20. See id., n 9 and 53.
21. See for example, id.
y
UU 58-70, dealing with attacks on a civilian train and a convoy of
Albanian refugees.
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The Report to the Prosecutor went into some detail as to what might be de-
fined as a military objective, 22 but once again fails to be dogmatic as to the pol-
icy adopted by NATO. Perhaps more important in so far as the future is
concerned is its comments on proportionality, a concept that owes its origins
to ethical standards:
48. The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to
state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effect. For example, bombing a
refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that
people in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers. [Is the same true if they are
collecting aluminum pots to be converted into aircraft or munitions?]
Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition dump should not be prohibited
merely because a farmer is ploughing a field in the area. Unfortunately, most of
the applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut. It is
much easier to formulate the principle ofproportionality in general terms than it
is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is often
between unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess the value of
innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular military objective.
49. The questions which remains unsolved once one decides to apply the
principle of proportionality include the following:
(a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage
gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to civilian
objects?
(b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums?
(c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
(d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own
forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to
civilian objects? [Once again, an ethical question for said commander]
50. The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the
background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is
unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and
22. See id., 1111 35-47.
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differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would
always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the determination of relative
values must be that of the 'reasonable military commander'.13 Although there will
be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where reasonable
military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants or the damage
to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military advantage
gained. 24
Despite the somewhat confident expression to be found in this last sen-
tence, the entire approach adopted in the Report to the Prosecutor empha-
sizes how difficult it will always be to reach an acceptable common
understanding of what constitutes ethical standards of behavior.
City planners rarely pay heed to the possibility of future warfare. Military
objectives are often located in intensely populated areas and fighting
occasionally occurs in such areas, Civilians present within or near military
objectives must, however, be taken into account in the proportionality equation
even if a party to the conflict has failed to exercise its obligation to remove
them. 25
In the Kupreskic case the ICTY addressed the issue of proportionality as follows:
526. As an example of the way in which the Martens clause26 may be utilised,
regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative effect of attacks
on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians. In other words,
it may happen that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental
damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their lawfulness,
nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul per se of the loose
prescriptions of Articles 57 and 5827 (or of the corresponding customary
rules). However, in case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within
the grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be
warranted to conclude that they may not be in keeping with international
law. Indeed, this pattern of military conduct may turn out to jeopardise
23. Emphasis added.
24. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A.
25. Id., H 51
26. "[I]n cases not included in the Regulation . . . the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 70 (emphasis added).
27. Protocol I, supra note 8, regarding "Precautionary Measures."
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excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary to the demands of
humanity.' 28
This formulation . . . can be regarded as a progressive statement of the applicable
law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians. Its practical import, is
somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is the committee's
view where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are
concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all of which are deemed to
have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime. The committee
understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an overall assessment of
the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign
54. During the bombing campaign, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties,
including 10,484 strike sorties. During these sorties 23,614 munitions were
released .... [and] it appears that approximately 500 civilians were killed
during the campaign. These figures do not indicate that NATO may have
conducted a campaign aimed at causing substantial civilian casualties either
directly or incidentally.
55. The choice of targets by NATO includes some loosely defined categories
such as military-industrial infrastructure and government ministries and some
potential problem categories such as media and refineries. All targets must meet
the criteria for military objectives. If they do not do so, they are unlawful. A
general label is insufficient. The targeted components of the military-industrial
infrastructure and of government ministries must make an effective
contribution to military action and their total or partial destruction must offer a
definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Refineries
are certainly traditional military objectives but tradition is not enough and due
regard must be paid to environmental damage if they are attacked. The media as
such is not a traditional target category. ... As a bottom line, civilians, civilian
objects and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The
media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster
support for the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. If the
media is sued to incite crimes ... it can become a legitimate military objective. If
the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus
perpetuates the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate
military objective. As a general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed
by the committee, it is the view of the committee thatNATO was attempting to
attack objects it perceived to be legitimate military objectives.
28. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan. 14, 2000, H 542.
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56. The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying
above the height which can be reached by enemy air defences. However,
NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish
military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives. The 15,000 feet
minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have meant the target
could not be verified with the naked eye. However, it appears that with the use
of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out
in the vast majority of cases during the bombing campaign.
57. In the course of its review, the committee did not come across any incident
which, in its opinion, required investigation by the OTP. . .
.
The committee examined five specific incidents of attacks the legality of
which might have been doubtful, but in each case came to the conclusion that
there was no reason to refer the matter to the Prosecutor. One is left with a
somewhat uncomfortable feeling with the committee's statement in its penul-
timate paragraph:
[T]he committee has not assessed any particular incidents as justifying the
commencement of an investigation by the OTP. NATO has admitted that
mistakes did occur during the bombing campaign; errors of judgment may also
have occurred. Selection of certain objectives for attack may be subject to legal
debate. On the basis of the information received, however, the committee is of
the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing
campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified.
In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely
to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against
high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offences. 29
It may well be that, noting all the efforts to define proportionality and to assess
the role ofethical considerations, one comes to the conclusion that the findings
of the committee might be correct. However, it is submitted that one cannot but
feel that the report might have contributed more to vindicating the rule of law
and recognizing the significance of ethical standards as equally operative for all
parties, had it recommended to the Prosecutor the possibility of referring to the
ICTY some of the issues it examined. The Tribunal might not in all cases have
agreed with individual recommendations, particularly in view of the fact in
some instances the Report to the Prosecutor itself refers to a "trend
29. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 90.
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developing," or to particular cases being controversial or—clearly an issue for
judicial determination—that in some instances "the law is not sufficiently
clear."
The Serbs, particularly as a result of pressure from Russia, its traditional ally,
and in face of the threat by NATO that a land offensive would be launched, fi-
nally accepted terms almost identical with those rejected at Rambouillet prior
to the commencement of the bombing campaign. Among the terms accepted
was an arrangement for Kosovo to be temporarily administered by an interna-
tional body supported by some military and police personnel brought in from
Yugoslavia, thus preserving that State's concern with its national sovereignty.
Kosovo was divided into areas of administration with civil affairs to some ex-
tent controlled by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since it
was recognized that returning Kosovar Albanians, supported by the KLA,
might pursue a policy of revenge against the remaining Serb population, it was
agreed that the KLA would be disarmed and that KFOR would ensure the
safety of the Serbs. It was not long before it became clear that the KLA was not
going to be overly cooperative regarding the surrender of arms and KFOR not
excessively effective in preventing attacks on the Serbs.
Further, KLA leaders made it clear that they intended to regard themselves
as an interim government determined on secession, whatever the view of
NATO or KFOR. The French defense minister commented on this state of
affairs:
[T] here's an unseemly scramble for power, influence and wealth within the
KLA. . . . The Kosovars don't understand that we're here not to support them
but to support human rights for all and ensure political power is held to account.
On the other hand, to expect the KLA to willingly disband when they see a
continued threat from paramilitaries under effective protection by French and
Russian troops [in their respective administrative areas], and to refuse to
recognize provisional mayors when UNMIK hasn't assigned a single municipal
administrator, is just farcical.30
This seems to overlook that, officially at least, it was never part ofNATO's pol-
icy to assist the Kosovars in doing anything to question or endanger Yugosla-
via's sovereignty over the area. As the occupation by KFOR continued, it
became clear that, on paper at least, the KLA and its soi disant political leader-
ship were proving a little more cooperative, although KFOR's protective activi-
ties became more and more essential for the Serb population.
30. THE TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 1999.
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The growing willingness to allow the KLA—originally denounced as a gang
of terrorists—to push its political aims and failure to prevent attacks upon the
local Serbs raise questions as to the extent to which NATO was sustaining its
contention that its intervention was ethical based on the needs to protect hu-
manitarian principles. In fact, the ethical and humanitarian character of
NATO's policy became even more questionable when it reneged somewhat
on its promises to assist in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of Yugoslavia, un-
less the then government was replaced by one that was more "democratic." It
is true that this has now ensued, but this fact does not lend support to the ide-
alistic grounds on which NATO claims to have acted originally.
In assessing the validity of the NATO bombing campaign from both legal
and ethical standpoints, it becomes necessary to ask whether the campaign
achieved its purpose. That is to say, whatever its legality might have been, was
the action justified because of what was ultimately achieved? It is clear from
the above comments, and in the light of the continuing trouble in Kosovo and
the threats of conflict spreading in the area, that the writer is not happy with
either the legal or ethical grounds on which NATO claimed to be acting.
Since similar situations denying human rights in the most obscene manner
might recur, it is clearly necessary to consider what, if any, process can be in-
troduced to prevent similar unilateral and questionable punitive or enforce-
ment action in the future. Perhaps this might be achieved by adopting a policy
somewhat like the following:
When a government is unwilling or unable to protect, or persistently infringes
the human rights of large segments of its population, or the government
structure has so disintegrated that law and order have virtually ceased to exist, it
may then well be time for the United Nations to take over the administration
until such time as normal conditions have been restored To some extent this
is already happening in Bosnia and Kosovo. . . . However it would perhaps be
more desirable that this be done not on an ad hoc basis—nor by a group of states
assuming such authority unto itself—but on the basis of a permanent United
Nations body made up of trained personnel from a variety of countries. . . . The
members of such administrative or governing commissions should not be drawn
from nationals of the great powers among whom, despite the end of the cold
war, political rivalries and maneuvering is still likely to take place. 31
31. See Leslie Green, 23 rd Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law,
1994 Canadian Council on International Law Proceedings 6, 26; 26th Annual
Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, 1997 CANADIAN COUNCIL ON
International Law Proceedings 31,37.
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If such a policy were adopted, there might be less doubt as to the legal or
ethical basis for the intervention and a more substantial foundation for con-
tending that it is in accordance with the rule of law and the maintenance of
ethical principles.
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David Graham
Professor Stein and Judge Pocar have done well in addressing the issue of
coalition warfare and the effect that Protocol I has had on the ability of
coalition partners to engage in effective operations. Central to this discussion,
of course, has been the fact that the United States—a principal participant in
essentially every major coalition enterprise undertaken since the coming into
force of Protocol I—is not a party to the Protocol. I would hasten to add that
there is no indication that the United States intends to become a party to this
instrument at any time in the foreseeable future. Given this fact, I would like to
offer my own thoughts concerning three specific questions and in so doing also
comment on a number of the observations that have been made.
Let us turn to the first question. Since certain members ofNATO are con-
tracting parties to Protocol I, whereas the United States and some others are
not, what does this signify in terms of the interoperability of coalition forces
like NATO's? Upon the coming into force of Protocol I and the concomitant
decision of the United States not to become a party, I can well remember the
substantial hand-wringing that occurred. This action on the part of the
United States sounded the death knell of the NATO Alliance, it was said.
Others believed this US decision, for all intents and purposes, served to ne-
gate its Article V collective defense commitment under the North Atlantic
Treaty. Why? Because, how would it be possible for the United States to en-
gage in combat operations with its NATO allies absent an obligation to com-
ply fully with the provisions of Protocol I? It would be impossible to mount
effective NATO coalition operations when the participating States were
bound by different law of armed conflict standards. The means and methods
by which warfare could be conducted would vary too substantially. It would be
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impossible to achieve consensus even upon a set ofcommand rules of engage-
ment (ROE). In brief, the coalition sky was falling and it was all the result of
the US decision to reject Protocol I.
What has become of these dire predictions? Time and experience have
shown these concerns to have fallen into the category of "much ado about
nothing." The fact that the United States is not a party to Protocol I has had
no adverse effect on the ability of the United States and its coalition partners
to engage in numerous effective military operations. There are three principal
reasons for this. First, shortly after the United States announced its decision
not to become a party to Protocol I—and prior to the time that a number of
other NATO States did so—law of armed conflict experts from the United
States and several NATO countries conducted a series of meetings to discuss
various provisions of the Protocol. As a result of these meetings, a common
understanding was reached regarding the manner in which certain of the
more vague, subjective, and ill-defined articles would be interpreted and ap-
plied. (A number of these agreed interpretations were later reflected in several
of the statements of understanding and reservations made by NATO mem-
bers when they eventually became parties to Protocol I.) These common un-
derstandings have assisted the United States and its NATO partners in
achieving a broad consensus regarding the law of armed conflict requirements
applicable to coalition operations.
Coupled with these earlier meetings between US and NATO law of armed
conflict experts is the fact that there has been extensive cooperation between
the United States, key NATO allies, and several other countries in the updat-
ing of their respective law of war manuals. These countries have included, at
various times, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Den-
mark, and Israel. Again, numerous provisions of Protocol I have been dis-
cussed, in detail, and common approaches toward the manner in which these
provisions would be applied during military operations have been developed.
This process has served to foster a growing consensus among the States con-
cerned that no substantive differences regarding the law of armed conflict ap-
plicable to coalition operations currently exist.
The third and perhaps most basic reason why the US decision not to be-
come a party to Protocol I has not adversely affected its ability to engage in
effective coalition operations revolves around the process through which co-
alition ROE are drafted, disseminated, and trained. Of primary importance is
the fact that coalition military activities are conducted in accordance with
mutually agreed ROE, which are largely unaffected by academic/diplomatic
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disagreements over nuanced interpretations of various provisions of Protocol
I.
This is not to say that the drafting of coalition ROE is not often a time con-
suming, frustrating process. This was certainly true in the cases of SFOR (the
Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and KFOR (the Kosovo Interna-
tional Secutity Force), and was true as well during Operation Allied Force. Of
note, however, is the fact that the major ROE issues that arose in the context
of these operations—such as those related to targeting—did not result from
differing interpretations regarding the law of armed conflict. Invariably, any
delay in achieving ROE consensus resulted largely from a highly politicized
decision making process driven by a desire on the part of the participating gov-
ernments to minimize casualties—both military and civilian. This was not a
desire mandated by law of armed conflict considerations, but by the perceived
need to retain the very thin veneer of public and political support for the oper-
ation itself. In a similar vein, Professor Stein has noted that, though KFOR
ROE were unquestionably restrictive in nature, these restrictions were the re-
sult of domestic law, rather than law of armed conflict concerns. In brief, co-
alition ROE are the product of a negotiated consensus that reflects a common
understanding of coalition law of armed conflict requirements, and then dis-
seminated to and trained on by coalition forces.
It is for these reasons that the US decision not to become a party to
Protocol I has had no adverse effect on the interoperability capabilities of co-
alition forces. Again, experience has shown that when concerns that might af-
fect interoperability do surface, these are driven by political or domestic law
considerations, rather than disagreements over the meaning or requirements
of specific international law requirements. In such cases, the coalition ROE
are drafted and the forces of the participating countries deployed in such a
way that such concerns are resolved and the operational capabilities of the co-
alition are not diminished.
Can there be differing legal standards for various members of a given coali-
tion? This is a question that Professor Stein and Judge Pocar appeared to
struggle with, for good reason, in order to arrive at a workable answer. A text-
book treaty law response would most likely render effective coalition warfare
exceptionally difficult to wage. Allow me to explain what I mean by this state-
ment. The question posed immediately begs another. To what does the term
"legal standards" refer in this context? That is, does there exist an interna-
tional consensus as to the nature of the "legal standards" applicable to a coali-
tion as a whole, or to individual member States of a coalition, when those
States are engaged in military operations?
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This question might be answered in one of two ways. First, the textbook ap-
proach: within a coalition, the actions ofeach member State must be dictated
by the various international conventions to which it is a party, as well as by the
statements of understanding and reservations made by this State to each of
these conventions. Under this approach it would seem to follow that a coali-
tion as a whole, when developing its operations plan, must take into account
each convention to which any of its members are parties, as well as the state-
ments of understanding and reservations made by these individual members.
There is little doubt that such an approach would prove to be exceptionally
difficult to apply in a real-world environment. Rather than establishing
clear-cut "legal standards" for a coalition as a whole, it would subject the co-
alition to a potentially vast array of varying interpretations ofwhat these stan-
dards should be. Individual coalition members would be forced to function
under diverse standards, a fact that would be certain to adversely affect the
operational capabilities of the coalition.
In view of these inherent difficulties, might this issue be approached in a
more practical way? I would submit that if there are to be uniform legal stan-
dards to which a coalition as a whole is to be held, these must be customary
law of armed conflict standards. This is a workable approach—a 90% solution,
if you will. Adherence to the customary law of armed conflict, of which the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions are an integral part, would ensure a disci-
plined, effective, and lawful coalition operation. Coalition ROE could be
drafted accordingly. If within a coalition there arise those situations in which
individual members feel as if they are restrained from employing certain means
or methods of warfare, these could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. How-
ever, experience has shown that these situations would be few in number, and
"work-arounds" could be effected. This is a common sense, legally sustainable
approach toward ensuring that all coalition members, as well as the interna-
tional community, fully understand the law of armed conflict applicable to co-
alition operations.
There are also other elements of this issue that merit comment. Professor
Stein has suggested in seeking to formulate a workable response to this ques-
tion that perhaps the law of armed conflict standards applicable to coalition
operations may be found, in part, in the UN Secretary-General's 6 August
1999 guidance on the "Observance by United Nations forces of international
humanitarian law." 1 He notes a number of problems associated with this ap-
proach, but fails to speak to the principal shortcomings of this document. It is
poorly drafted and incomplete, and in a number of instances misleading and
inaccurate. It does nothing to advance the development and effective
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implementation of the law of armed conflict. If one is searching for coalition
standards, they will not be found in this guidance.
On another matter raised by Professor Stein in connection with his discus-
sion of coalition standards, I find myself in complete agreement. He points out
the potential for confusion that has resulted from what he refers to as "the
re-naming" of the law of war, which has generally been referred to in the
post-Charter era as the law of armed conflict. By referring to the law of armed
conflict as international humanitarian law, he notes that the distinction be-
tween "humanitarian" and "human rights" law has been blurred. I would go
further. The apparent attempt to make the law of armed conflict a kinder,
more gentle form of jurisprudence has generated a significant degree of confu-
sion in the minds of many.
What does the term "international humanitarian law" actually mean? Even
a cursory review of this issue clearly reflects the fact that the term means dif-
ferent things to different people. In discussions with articulate, well-informed
individuals who insist upon using this term, I have listened to sometimes pas-
sionate explanations of the term and the necessity for its use. Disturbingly,
however, these explanations often differ and there appears to be no consensus
as to the norms and principles embraced under this terminological umbrella.
To some, it is just another "updated" name for the law of armed conflict, in-
dicative of the "humanitarian" emphasis now placed on the regulation of
armed conflict. To others it reflects the fact that the body of law applicable to
armed conflict now contains many, but not all, of the elements of human
rights law. There are also those who view international humanitarian law as
the single embodiment of all of the law of armed conflict and human rights
law.
How did we reach this point? When was the vote taken as to whether such
a name change should occur? I cannot think of a single individual charged
with the responsibility of giving real-world advice to military commanders on
law of armed conflict issues that would have cast an affirmative vote for em-
bracing a term that would result in blurring the legal obligations for which a
commander and his staff would be held accountable in an operational envi-
ronment. The use of a term that confuses and carries with it such imprecision
in an area of the law that imposes so many responsibilities and often calls for
life and death decisions, does a disservice to those who constantly strive to
comply with this law. I'll continue to provide advice on the law of armed con-
flict. I know what it is and, even more importantly, what it is not.
To what extent is Protocol I customary international law, such that it may
be binding on non-parties? Perhaps this question might be more accurately
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articulated: "can't we simply declare Protocol I, in its entirety, to be reflective
of customary international law and thus declare its provisions to be binding on
the United States, despite the fact that the United States has chosen not to
become a party to the Protocol?" To this question, Professor Stein has pro-
vided an answer. He has expressed substantial doubt as to whether all of the
provisions of Protocol I have become "intransgressible" principles of custom-
ary international law. He notes specifically that it is "very doubtful" whether
many of the undefined provisions of Protocol I can be declared to be of such a
nature, specifically those that were of principal concern during the conduct of
Operation Allied Force.
In illustrating this point, Professor Stein refers to terms such as "military
significance," "definite military advantage," "effective contribution to military
action," and "indiscriminate attacks" and notes that they are not defined even
by way of non-exhaustive examples. Moreover, he observes, even among
those States that have become parties to Protocol I, a number have issued
varying statements of understanding regarding their individual interpretations
of the meaning of these terms. Given these facts, he concludes that it may be
correct to state that the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict
contained within Protocol I and repeatedly referenced by the International
Court of Justice—that is, the basic distinction between civilians and combat-
ants, the prohibition against directly attacking civilians, and the rule of pro-
portionality—are customary law of armed conflict concepts. However, he
notes, "[i]t is very doubtful whether the same can be said about all of the other
provisions of Protocol I. ..." I am in complete agreement with Professor Stein
on that point.
Judge Pocar, on the other hand, would appear to be much more supportive
of the view that Protocol I, as a whole, is making steady progress toward be-
coming customary international law. He observes that in looking at the fac-
tors to be considered in making customary law determinations, "customary
international humanitarian law should not be determined on the sole basis of
the practice of the States that have not ratified the Protocol." 2 In making this
statement, Judge Pocar acknowledges, in essence, the primary role played by
State practice in the formulation of customary international law. Of this,
there can be no doubt. Every criterion set forth for the purpose of making cus-
tomary law determinations has, at its core, the concept of State practice. The
primacy of this concept has been reaffirmed repeatedly by various interna-
tional tribunals. To this Judge Pocar would seem to say that he agrees that
2. See Judge Pocar's paper in this volume (emphasis added).
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State practice is the key component of any customary law determination, but
that in applying this principle one must not look exclusively at the practice of
those States that have chosen to challenge the customary law nature of nu-
merous provisions of Protocol I. Fair enough. Let us take a look at those States
that are parties to Protocol I.
I have never been impressed by the number of States that have, over the
years, become parties to Protocol I. It is my view that the long list of signato-
ries of this document has very little to do with State practice in the area of the
law of armed conflict. The vast majority of the signatories of Protocol I are at
best interested observers—bystanders, if you will—when it comes to the ac-
tual application of the law of armed conflict in combat situations. These
States have not applied the provisions of Protocol I on the battlefield or, for
the most part, during any form of military operation. In sum, they have not
"practiced" the various provisions of Protocol I. (The same is true of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a host of other non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs).) As a result, the fact that these States are
parties to Protocol I means very little when one examines the practice of such
States in the context of determining whether the Protocol constitutes custom-
ary international law.
In terms of tangible State practice that substantively affects the evolution
of Protocol I as customary law, I have but one thing to say: "show me the play-
ers." Not the signatories; not the observers; not the ICRC or the NGOs; but
rather "show me the players." Which States in the international community
actually practice or apply law of armed conflict principles on an ongoing basis
in a real-world environment? The answer is very few—of which the United
States is one. And the United States as a consistent law of armed conflict
practitioner has just as consistently expressed the view that Protocol I, as a
whole, does not reflect customary international law.
One might ask "what about those States, though relatively few in number,
that have signed Protocol I and have practiced or applied the law of armed
conflict in a series of military operations since the times of their signatures?
Surely their status as parties to Protocol I evidences a growing acceptance of
its provisions as customary law?" Again, another fair observation. However,
such a premise fails to hold up under scrutiny. Examine, if you will, the States
in issue. Essentially each of these States has qualified its ratification of Proto-
col I with a series of both reservations and statements of understanding deal-
ing with various articles of the Protocol. Search as you may, you will find no
concordant and continuous State practice regarding the application of
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numerous provisions of Protocol I—even among that limited number of States
that are both parties and players.
Judge Pocar also notes that special importance should be attached to the
case law of international tribunals, in terms of evaluating the assessment of
such courts as to whether certain treaty provisions have become customary in-
ternational law. Leaving aside the fact, however, that customary law is not the
primary source of international law upon which international tribunals base
their decisions, what have such courts looked for when they turn to an exami-
nation of whether a particular concept has become a binding principle of cus-
tomary international law? Once again, these courts have sought to find the
existence of concordant and continuous State practice associated with the
concept in issue, and the acceptance of or acquiescence in the concept by the
State (s) to which the court is being asked to apply this principle. As I have in-
dicated previously, there exists no concordant and continuous State practice
with respect to the applicability of Protocol I—and the United States has nei-
ther accepted or acquiesced in the view that the Protocol, as a whole, reflects
customary international law. I do not believe that any international tribunal
would find the more controversial and ill-defined articles of Protocol I to be
binding customary law.
Let me speak, very briefly, as well, to Judge Pocar's summary of an opinion
of a Trial Chamber of the ICTY that was dealing with law of armed conflict
obligations under Articles 57 and 58 of Protocol I. The Court found that
"when a rule of international humanitarian law is somewhat imprecise, it must
be defined with reference to the laws of humanity and dictates of public con-
science espoused in the celebrated 'Martens Clause', which is, itself, custom-
ary law." Here, I would simply call your attention to the fact that the "laws of
humanity" and "the dictates of public conscience" are but the second and
third components of the Martens Clause. The first, omitted component refers
to the "usages established among civilized peoples", that is, customary law as
established by State practice. The omission of any reference to this aspect of
the Martens Clause, even if inadvertent, is certainly a significant one when
the Martens Clause has been invoked to "define" the "imprecision" of certain
Protocol I provisions.
I'll conclude my comments by leaving you with a quote from Judge Pocar's
excellent paper, a quote that very cogently summarizes the issue of whether
Protocol I, as a whole, might rightly be viewed as customary international law.
Judge Pocar states:
384
David Graham
While most of Protocol I can undoubtedly be regarded as essentially reflecting
customary international lav/, there are areas where this conclusion is subject to
debate for two reasons. First, Protocol I clearly sets forth new rules. Second, the
specificity of Protocol Ps provisions add new elements to principles that, while
they are well established in customary law, leave margins of discretion to
belligerent States. Belligerent States are then free to argue that such provisions
will limit or may limit discretion if they are given certain interpretations. The
scope and impact of these additions is therefore controversial and may be the
basis of the hesitations of some States to ratify Protocol I.3
To this, I can add only, "Well said."
3. See Judge Pocar's paper, supra, at 347.
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Discussion
Can a Coalition Member Be Held Responsible for the Actions of
Other Members?
Ruth Wedgwood:
I have a question for Professor Stein on your approach to the problem of the
potential responsibility of one coalition member for the actions of other coali-
tion members. This is probably a statement against interest because I'm not
sure this is a good line of argument for the United States. Given the manner in
which the idea of command responsibility has now been liberalized to include
not only direct commanders in a wiring diagram but also responsibility for ac-
tors who may be under the effective control of a commander (I have in mind
here the Blaskic case 1 where the fact that actions may have been taken by a
paramilitary was not enough to exculpate Blaskic and indeed the extension of
command responsibility to a broad range of civilian officials), don't you think
there is some potential liability (I suppose we shall see in the International
Court of Justice) by individual coalition members for the actions of others
which they might indeed have been able to stop politically?
Torsten Stein:
Well, there might be. I take a three-stage approach. Where you have an in-
ternational organization, States cannot hide behind the organization and say
"we will not be responsible because it's the organization that's acting, not us."
The organization has no penny to pay. You cannot say "well, this was some-
thing where the organization as such acted ultra vires, so we are not responsi-
ble." But if you have a situation like Operation Allied Force where you say
NATO is not the "international tin council," then you can't use all those rules
and say NATO is responsible. You have a group of individual nations. They
agree to do something together, and now they are responsible. It would make
1. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95T4-T, Mar. 3, 2000.
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sense. Also, for political reasons, let not the one who did it stand alone in the
rain because the others were not in a position to do it. I don't see a clear rule in
international law that says because you are all acting together, we can just
choose one out of the coalition. There are little examples for that I think.
That would not be a bad rule.
Ruth Wedgwood:
I would simply issue a note of caution. There are even arguments being
made that UN peacekeepers should be responsible for not having prevented
the Serbs from acting out. So the command responsibility may be going hori-
zontal as well as vertical and therefore one should be careful.
Wolff H. von Heinegg:
When it comes to NATO operations there are a variety of different instru-
ments in force for the member States of the coalition, but it's never NATO to
whom it can be attributed. It's always the national States to whom a possible
violation can be attributed. Politically there may be a problem. So what the
NATO countries should do, rather than having a variety of rules of engage-
ment (even though they are standardized), they should at least try to find a
common denominator as regards their different legal obligations.
Torsten Stein:
We agree that in any given coalition there can be different legal standards,
and if there was no pre-existing legal obligation then one will not be held lia-
ble even for the actions of coalition partners. But it would be an awkward case
indeed if one asked a State to be in the coalition primarily because that State
had not ratified certain conventions, such as the one on blinding laser
weapons.
The United States and Protocol I
Yves Sandoz:
Has the United States de facto recognized Protocol I? If not, are there con-
cerns remaining that prevent the United States from ratifying Protocol I?
David Graham:
I'll answer your second question first. Yes, I think there are still concerns
that we have with specific provisions to Protocol I, and I won't go through
those specific concerns. I think those have appeared in the public domain on a
388
Discussion
__
number of different occasions. Those concerns are essentially of an opera-
tional nature.
I think there are inartfully drafted and very subjective provisions of Proto-
col I. Provisions that lend themselves to subjective judgments and would place
commanders in a very tenuous position on the battlefield and subject to sec-
ond-guessing. Just as various parties of Protocol I have expressed various in-
terpretations of what those provisions mean in the form of statements of
understanding and reservations, we have reservations with respect to whether
they could ever be applied in an objective manner. I think that includes much
of Protocol I given the fact that it was based on compromise and was very
inartfully drafted. Those are the types of provisions that we still have reserva-
tions about because we think that it places commanders in situations that sub-
ject those commanders to subjective judgments. We can't give them clear
guidance with respect to what those provisions mean.
As I said, we have met with coalition partners. We have agreed as to how
we would interpret those provisions (in terms of developing consensus rules of
engagement), how we would apply the use of force, and how we would not ap-
ply the use of force. But that doesn't mean that we still do not have serious res-
ervations about some of the provisions of Protocol I.
Now with respect to your first question, I do not think that we are going to
be the position of violating Protocol I because the rules ofengagement that we
come up with in a coalition environment will essentially reflect the interpreta-
tions that our coalition partners have with respect to the law of armed con-
flict. I don't see any commander that would knowingly force a coalition
partner into a violation of Protocol I; knowing what governmental limitations
might have been placed on that coalition partner by their capitals. I don't see
that situation as occurring.
The Status of Protocol 1 As Customary International Law
Fausto Pocar:
I would like to clarify my remarks regarding the status of Protocol I as cus-
tomary international law. I didn't say that as a whole the Protocol is becoming
or is customary law. I said that there is a trend towards recognition of the gen-
eral value of Protocol I as evidenced by the increasing number of ratifications
and some case law in international tribunals. However, I also said that the
State practice is still showing areas in which this is not true, and I referred to
major actors in international relations. I maintain one should take into ac-
count also the State practice of the States that have ratified the Protocol and
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not only the non-ratifying States. Neither did I say that the practice of the
ICTY is determinative. I only referred to arguments made by many schol-
ars—including scholars in this room like Professor Greenwood—that referred
to international case law as having been seen later on as determinative in de-
bates, but this is not necessarily always the case. When I referred to the in-
crease in number of State parties, I had in mind major actors as well because
one of the States that has ratified Protocol I as recently as 1998 is the United
Kingdom.
Leslie Green:
I only want to touch on the point of the number of ratifications. True, from
the point of view of classical doctrine, there would have been a general atti-
tude that perhaps 159 ratifications amounts to at least general international
law. But when I look at those 159 ratifications, I'm not very concerned as to
what Nepal thinks about the law of armed conflict nor what Iceland thinks.
(I'm fascinated by the thought that Iceland recently signed a treaty of non-ag-
gression and peace with Nepal. Somehow or another it doesn't sound very
practical.) I'm much more concerned with the fact, not that the United King-
dom has ratified, but that the United States, China, and Israel have not rati-
fied. What we have to count are those who are the contributors. If I'm looking
at the law this evening, I don't care whether Switzerland has ratified a law of
the sea convention. The same thing applies here. Who are the actors? If a
number ofsenior actors don't play, then we can't call it general or universal in-
ternational law.
Reprisals
Adam Roberts:
This is a question particularly directed at Judge Pocar and Colonel Graham.
It touches on whether there may be a difference of emphasis between them re-
garding the issue of reprisals. In his paper, Judge Pocar referred to the problem
of reprisals very briefly. Colonel Graham was quite right to suggest that the
reservations that a number of States—and not only NATO member States
but at least one other State—have made to Protocol I suggest that there is un-
ease on this issue of reprisal and a desire to leave some room open for reprisals
as a means of enforcing observance of the laws of armed conflict. This is an is-
sue which can certainly arise in coalition warfare as evidenced in the 1991
Gulf operations where the senior partner in the operation was the United
States. The United States felt an obligation to make clear that it would do
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something if the other side violated fundamental norms, as Secretary of State
James Baker communicated to Tariq Aziz on 9 January in Geneva with respect
to the use of weapons of mass destruction. My question is very simply, what
scope do you think is left within the law of armed conflict for reprisals and is
that a problem in coalition operations?
David Graham:
The concept of reprisals—even if you restricted it to belligerent repri-
sals—is an extremely difficult concept. I think I can tell you without divulging
confidential information that we have debated the issue ofbelligerent reprisals
within the Department of Defense and between Defense and the Department
of State extensively. I wish I could give you an easy answer with respect to
what the position is on belligerent reprisals. I will tell you that I do not think
the United States has renounced the right to engage in belligerent reprisals
(apart from those categories of persons and property protected in the 1949
Geneva Conventions) given certain circumstances, but that's as far as I'm pre-
pared to go. It's a difficult issue.
Fausto Pocar:
Unfortunately I am not able to fully answer this question. I touched upon it
in my paper only to show that this is an area in which the debate is open.
When I referred to the decision of the Trial Chamber in Kupreskic, 2 1 was quite
prudent to say that whatever consideration is given to this judgment it may
play a role in developing the law. I won't say more because this question is now
before the Appeals Chamber of which I am a member.
The Martens Clause and the Margin of Appreciation
Rudolf Dolzer:
Allow me to make a brief point regarding the Kupreskic case. The ICTY had
to interpret Protocol I, Article 57's "feasible precautions" provision. (I think
this is a very broad statute with a very broad wording). What the ICTY did was
interpret "feasible precautions" in the light of the Martens Clause. In other
words, you interpret a very broadly worded statute in the light of a very, very
broad general clause.
2. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan. 14, 2000.
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The Martens Clause is reworded in the Protocol I. It says u [i]n cases not
covered."3 Now I'm not quite sure what it means, "in cases not covered," but I
would be very careful to apply the Martens Clause in areas that are more or
less specifically addressed in the Protocol. Otherwise I would probably not ap-
ply the Martens Clause. But even if I would in principle think it might be ap-
plicable in terms of applying Article 57 in the context ofcriminal justice, ifyou
add the Martens Clause, you would come into a sphere of vagueness that in
most domestic constitutional systems would probably be quite near to the bor-
ders that probably constitutional lawyers would find acceptable.
My remark as to margin of appreciation was meant as follows: those who
have to apply Protocol I or customary law have to apply it under specific cir-
cumstances—sometimes very short-term, sometimes without very specific
knowledge. I think the ICTY should do more. I would be happier if the ICTY
had not supplemented Article 57 with the Martens Clause, but with a sense
and spirit of the margin of appreciation approach. In other words giving some
benefit of doubt to those who act under the circumstances in which they have
to act. Now why do I say so again? I say so mainly not because I am sympa-
thetic to those who are before the ICTY at the moment as very few of us are,
but I think we have to keep in mind that those rules will have to be accepted. I
take the ICTY very seriously. I think there is a very good chance that the juris-
prudence of the Tribunal in the long-term will have a considerable influence
depending upon its persuasiveness. What I'm concerned about is if the Tribu-
nal for very good or excellent reasons comes down with an interpretation of
the law that will make it difficult next time for those who are on the different
side and in similar circumstances, then I think indeed those very hard cases
would make very bad law.
The Relationship Between Human Rights Law and the
Law of Armed Conflict
Natalino Ronzitti:
The International Court of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion
has said that humanitarian law is lex specialis vis-a-vis human rights law, so in
some cases you have to apply human rights law. This is a problem for Euro-
.
pean countries; it's not a problem for the United States. For European coun-
tries it's a real problem because we have a European Convention on Human
Rights. There is a case before the European Court of Human Rights for
3. Protocol I, Article 1(2).
392
Discussion
_^____
violation of the Convention on Human Rights during Operation Allied Force.
This is important also for an occupying army or also for peacekeeping opera-
tions. We cannot say that we will not apply the European Convention be-
cause in this case individuals are under the jurisdiction of the State that is
occupying its territory or having its troops on their territory. So for the Euro-
pean States it's a very important issue. How is it possible to address this issue
in a coalition?
David Graham:
I appreciate that comment Professor. I understand that you're subject to
the European Convention on Human Rights and I understand that the Euro-
pean Court is now making a determination as to whether or not it will assume
jurisdiction of the case against NATO countries for Operation Allied Force.
If the European Court assumes jurisdiction, my question becomes does it
apply human rights law? Does it apply the law of armed conflict? Does it apply
a combination of the two? Is, in fact, the European Court on Human Rights
going to make rulings with respect to the law of armed conflict and interpret
the law of armed conflict? To me that's a fairly scary proposition.
My concern also is that when you combine elements of human rights law
and the law of armed conflict, it makes my job of advising military command-
ers a very difficult job. I know what the law of armed conflict is. When I ask
very, very bright people to tell me what international humanitarian law is, I
get some very good answers. The problem is that they're all diffe?ent. Every-
body has his or her own idea with respect to what international humanitarian
law is. Professor Stein has said that we have seen the transformation of the law
of armed conflict into simply an element of humanitarian law. Well, that's an
uncomfortable proposition for me as well because it makes my job in advising
commanders a very difficult job in terms of understanding what their obliga-
tions are. That's something that continues to trouble me. I think it's some-
thing that we need to take a long hard careful look at.
Torsten Stein:
I just want to comment on one point of Colonel Graham's statement. It's
absolutely clear that the Strasbourg Court will apply the European Conven-
tion and nothing else if they take up the case.4
4. See Professor Greenwood's paper in this volume.
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Fausto Pocar:
The European Court has managed to apply the European Convention on
Human Rights and nothing more than that. But of course the problem—the
relationship with the law of war—arises in any case because the Convention
says that the state of war does not exclude the application of the Convention.
So the problem ofcombining the Geneva conventions and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights does exist for States that are parties to both.
Leslie Green:
I find myself very much in agreement with Colonel Graham, because from
my point of view international humanitarian law is the Geneva conventions.
This is treaty armed conflict law. We also have customary armed conflict law.
Armed conflict law is lex specialis. It has been created to deal specifically with
armed conflicts. If I look at the European Convention on Human Rights, it re-
lates to a peace situation. It relates to a situation of a country dealing with its
own subjects or perhaps those who are present within its territory. That was
the basic view that the Convention originally took. The fact that the Court
has perhaps extended it, in the same way that the Canadian Supreme Court
has extended our own Charter of Rights, does not change the law. It is not the
role of the European Court of Human Rights to deal with issues that are out-
side the field of human rights. The issue of the law of armed conflict is lex
specialis, which applies even if the Convention on Human Rights is lex
generalis, which I don't think it is.
Michael Bothe:
It comes as a surprise to me that we are back to this old issue of humanitar-
ian law and human rights. Professor Green, you know what you said was
wrong. We made every effort from 1974 to 1977 to have a good mix ofhuman
rights and humanitarian law. Article 75 of Protocol I and the human rights
provisions of Protocol II are human rights provisions. They are drafted accord-
ing to the international covenants. Their purpose is to a certain extent to ex-
clude the suspension of the guarantee which is possible according to the
European Convention on Human Rights; to reintroduce those guarantees and
to make them in a certain sense immune against this type of suspension. This
double guarantee or double protection of victims by humanitarian law and by
human rights law was always with us. This is not new.
There is nothing like a lex specialis. These are two overlapping areas of in-
ternational law. Now when you have overlapping areas of international law,
you will get into difficult situations at some point. I think the case which is
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pending before the European Court of Human Rights is one of those difficult
situations where you have also as a matter of fact a very old question. The rela-
tionship between the right to life and the right to kill in warfare. It's a very fun-
damental issue. It pops up from time to time at places where you might not
have expected, but there is nothing shocking and nothing new about it. Per-
haps it's an opportunity to rethink the issue. This is the fundamental side of it.
The Court has to decide the issue on a technical level because the Court
will have to apply the European Convention. There the problem is whether
actual fighting is something that is meant to be "subject to the jurisdiction" of
a party to the Convention, or whether the scope of protection of the Conven-
tion as it is formulated really covers actual fighting. It covers action in the con-
text of an occupation, but actual fighting is different. This would be my
problem if I were a judge there. Is this really something which is within the
scope of protection of the European Convention?
Leslie Green:
Professor Bothe, I know you were Rapporteur of that Committee. I sat in on
that Committee. But I would remind you that what we did in that Committee
was to take certain human rights and make them part of armed conflict law.
They were taken out of the generality of human rights law from the point of
view of military operations and made part of Geneva law because they appear
not in a human rights document but in a Protocol attached to the Geneva
conventions. They are now part of armed conflict law. They are to be consid-
ered from the point of view of the operation of the law of armed conflict, not
in the light ofhuman rights law. They may be in Pictet's definition of interna-
tional humanitarian law, which he said was the Geneva conventions, but from
that point of view I think you go too far in retaining it as a separate concept
when it has become part of the lex specialis of the law of armed conflict.
Rudolf Dolzer:
To me the issue of the law of armed conflict or humanitarian law is to some
extent a semantic issue in terms of interpreting the law. It is a matter of strict
interpretation of the relevant treaties. The European Court will interpret the
case before it in terms of its law, not more and not less.
Professor Bothe indicated that there is a serious question whether the Euro-
pean Convention was meant in the first place to address war or war-like situa-
tions. I would think that is not the case. The universal human rights
conventions will have to interpret human rights laws in their own light. I
think that we will come to the general issue of which is the more specific law.
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The law ofarmed conflict is probably more specific, but there may be instances
where the two bodies of law have to be interpreted in the light of each other.
That would be a very specific issue to be determined in the light of the very
specific case, but in principle one would have to assume that the law of armed
conflict is much more specific than human rights law.
Fausto Pocar:
I would like to make a simple point on the relationship between human
rights law and humanitarian law. We are discussing the question of the Euro-
pean States, but the question is not only European. We should not forget that
many countries in the world—about 150 now—are parties to the UN Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant's provisions on these mat-
ters are more or less going in the same direction as the European Convention.
So the problem of combining the treaty obligation that was mentioned by Pro-
fessor Bothe still exists and exists also for the United States because the
United States is a party to the Covenant. So it's a point that should be
stressed.
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PART VI
THE ROAD AHEAD

oIntroduction
Joel Rosenthal
ur topic is entitled "The Road Ahead." Now I suppose if Yogi Berra
were in my place he would just say, when you get to the fork in the
road, take it. Say what you will about Yogi, but he's right to imagine that the
road ahead is one with many forks. Legal and ethical dilemmas necessarily im-
ply that choices must be made. I hope that this colloquium and this particular
panel can help us to see these choices clearly and help us articulate the princi-
ples upon which we make our decisions.
The organizers of this colloquium sensed that the Kosovo campaign
brought to the surface several inconclusive legal and ethical issues stemming
primarily from rapid geopolitical and technological changes. This point has
been made throughout proceedings. For example Professor Dinstein points
out in his paper that the jus in hello cannot afford to lag behind the changing
conditions of combat. Colonel Graham asked us when did we change our per-
spective from the law of armed conflict to international human rights law?
We have seen some new language and new concepts, and we've seen some old
concepts put under new strain. We are all here because we know that these
changes affect our thinking about the road ahead.
The organizers also understand that in order to investigate the world be-
tween law and ethics, we would need to call upon an eclectic group. So that is
why in this colloquium are included judges, philosophers, military officers, his-
torians and even lawyers. We hope we've created a stimulating and fruitful
discussion that has been interdisciplinary, inter-professional and interna-
tional. Yesterday historian Barry Strauss cautioned whether we can or should
even try to learn lessons from history. The organizers take that admonition se-
riously, but we're also confident that we can profitably reflect on the Kosovo
experience in ways that might not amount strictly to lessons learned but might
nevertheless shed some light on the road ahead.

TThe Laws ofWar After Kosovo
Adam Roberts
he 1999 Kosovo War between NATO members and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia confirmed the importance of issues relating to
the laws of war in contemporary conflicts, especially in coalition operations. It
also exposed some problems in that body of law. A central issue in the war was
the minimizing of civilian casualties. The NATO leadership recognized from
the start that this was of major importance, for two main reasons: because the
war was being fought with a stated purpose of protecting the inhabitants of
Kosovo and also because international opinion would not have tolerated a
war on civilians. 1 An underlying question raised by the war is thus the extent
to which international legal considerations and institutions can assist in pro-
tecting the civilian.
The title of this paper calls for explanation. The terms "the laws ofwar" (jus
in hello) and "international humanitarian law" are for most purposes inter-
changeable. They refer to the same body of law. Both terms are used in this pa-
per. For most purposes I prefer the first of these terms, "laws of war" being
older and simpler, and recognizing as it does that war is the central area of
concern. However, the second term, "international humanitarian law," some-
times with the suffix "applicable in armed conflicts," is increasingly used in in-
ternational diplomacy. In some usages, this term can also encompass relevant
parts of the international law of human rights. The term may be particularly
appropriate in reference to a situation (such as applied in Kosovo before
March 24, 1999) in which there is no international armed conflict and only a
1. The importance of minimizing civilian casualties is stressed in the memoirs of the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe during the period of the Kosovo War. See WESLEY CLARK, WAGING
Modern War 438^0 (2001).
The Laws of War After Kosovo
small-scale civil war, but there is systematic government repression of part of
its own population. Whichever term one uses, the fact remains that the scope
of this body of law has significantly expanded in the past sixty years to encom-
pass the law on crimes against humanity and on genocide as well as the laws
and customs of international armed conflict; and that in the past decade this
body of law has been increasingly viewed as at least partially applicable in con-
flicts which are partly or completely non-international in character.
Eight questions
This survey concentrates on the following eight questions which (a) arose
in connection with the Kosovo War, and (b) also touch on matters which are
likely to affect the way in which the law is viewed, influences events, and de-
velops further in the future:
1. How did developments in the written laws of war which occurred in the
1990s, and the increasing international concern with implementation of the
law, affect the framework within which international responses to civil wars,
including in Kosovo, took place?
2. Is there now a stronger link than before between jus in hello and jus ad
helium 1. In particular, what are the implications of the fact that sometimes, as
in Kosovo, violations of international humanitarian norms by a belligerent in
an internal conflict provide part of the rationale for external military
intervention?
3. If military action is embarked upon for proclaimed humanitarian pur-
poses by a large alliance or coalition, is there a logic whereby it is carried out by
low-risk, remote control methods? In particular, is the oxymoron, humanitar-
ian war, particularly likely to take the form of bombing; and what jus in hello
problems arise from reliance on air power?
4. Is there tension between (a) the NATO/US strategic doctrine which
aims at putting pressure on the adversary's government, and not just its armed
forces, and (b) the implicit assumption of the laws of war that the adversary's
armed forces are the main legitimate object of attack? If so, how can this ten-
sion be addressed?
5. What lessons are to be learned from the fact that the NATO operations
were subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)? In particular, does the consideration of the
NATO bombing campaign that was conducted under the auspices of the
ICTY Prosecutor suggest that the NATO campaign was conducted largely in
accord with member States' obligations under the laws of war?
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6. Did the war confirm that there can be many forms of non-belligerence
which differ significantly from neutrality as traditionally conceived in the laws
of war?
7. Did the war expose deficiencies or omissions in the existing codifications
of the laws of war? In particular, is there a need for further codification? And
what are the main subject-areas that might require such codification?
8. What, if anything, might need to be done about the paradox that the
United States is simultaneously a principal upholder of the obligation of States
to observe the laws ofwar and a non-party to several important agreements on
the subject?
These questions are certainly not the only important jus in hello ones to
arise. A number of specific issues and controversies, such as the naval opera-
tions in the Adriatic and the bombing of the TV station in Belgrade, cannot
be covered here in the detail they deserve.
These eight questions have to be seen against a larger background of
changes in the conduct of international politics in the 1990s, and increasing
international preoccupation with the problem of civil wars and with the im-
plementation of the laws of war. These changes had a significant effect on the
fact, and the form, ofNATO involvement in Kosovo.
Changes in the conduct of international politics
In the 1990s four factors, none of them entirely new, reinforced the ten-
dency of international bodies and foreign powers to get involved in wars, in-
cluding particularly civil wars, and also to apply pressure for implementation
of the laws of war by belligerents.
Firstly, most conflict since the end of the Cold War has had the character of
civil wars, though often with international involvements on one or more sides.
Since such wars cause appalling and often highly visible suffering, as well as
threatening international stability in the regions in which they occur, there has
been an evident need to ensure the application of certain rules of restraint in
such wars.
Secondly, many contemporary wars have a particular tendency to engage
the interests of outside powers because they threaten to create huge refugee
flows with which our not-very-liberal societies are unwilling to cope. Whether
it is northern Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo or East Timor, an unholy alliance of hu-
manitarianism and illiberalism makes intervention within the State undergo-
ing conflict a possible, even imperiously necessary, option.
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Thirdly
y
there has been a growing awareness that crimes committed by
States have been among the most serious of the twentieth century. The inter-
national preoccupation with restitution for a wide range of State misdeeds is
evidence of this.
Fourthly
,
it is widely accepted that the post-Cold War international order
has to be based on values other than, or additional to, mutual respect among
sovereign States. Human rights and humanitarian norms are core parts of any
such system ofvalues. It is thus very difficult for States to ignore massive viola-
tions of fundamental norms.
The challenge of implementation
The main challenge facing the laws of war today is not devising new
rules—though some are needed. It is implementation of the rules that exist,
and of the underlying idea ofmoderation in the conduct of armed conflict. Un-
questionably, the preoccupation with implementation is widely shared among
those who have worked in the field of the laws of war; it has had a profound ef-
fect on policy and on treaty-making in this field; and it has been reflected in a
number ofUN reports and in certain actions of the UN Security Council.
"Implementation" is taken to encompass (]) the normal measures taken by
States, and by international bodies including the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations, to ensure that populations
and armed forces are aware of the laws of war and carry out their terms; (2)
the actions taken by outside bodies, including States and international organi-
zations, in response to systematic violations of the laws of war. My focus is
mainly on this second and more difficult category, which encompasses the en-
forcement of the laws of war, but is not limited to coercive measures.
The concern with implementation should not be taken to imply support for
the commonly expressed view that existing implementation is lamentable or
even non-existent. In the 1999 Kosovo War there was much effective imple-
mentation. This was not only on the NATO side, but also in some instances
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) side. For example, in the talks at
404
Adam Roberts
the conclusion of the war the FRY military provided extensive and accurate
information about the location of minefields. 2 The central challenge is both to
improve patterns of implementation, and to further develop means of coping
with gross violations.
Changes in the Laws of War in the 1990s
In the decade before the war on Kosovo, there had been two striking devel-
opments in the laws of war: a tendency to make more explicit and detailed the
application of the laws of war to conflicts with a partly or wholly non-interna-
tional character; and a range of specific measures to improve mechanisms of
implementation. Both of these developments affected the United States and
NATO response to the events in Kosovo. Up to March 24, 1999 the Kosovo
problem had largely the character of State repression by the Yugoslav authori-
ties and civil war. It might thus have been perceived as a largely internal prob-
lem, about which the rest of the world should not worry. The fact that Kosovo
did not escape the attention of outside powers and bodies owes something to
the development of the law.
Changes in the written law
In the laws of war, as they developed from the mid-nineteenth century to
the Second World War, implementation was traditionally not treated as a ma-
jor topic in its own right. The general assumption, reflected in certain early
agreements on the laws of war (e.g., the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions)
was that civilized States could be relied on to ensure that their own armed
forces would act in a disciplined, restrained and professional manner. That
idea was called into question by the events of the twentieth century. When
the State that was supposed to take action was the very one whose armed
forces had committed the alleged offenses, the idea of purely national jurisdic-
tion seemed optimistic; and when the State itself was committed to a criminal
2. Information from General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, June
25-27, 1999. See also the UN Mine Action Programme website, www.mineaction.org. Its report
on Kosovo of September 2001 (available at the Mine Action website) showed that the Yugoslav
Army handed over 620 records of minefields in Kosovo, principally but not exclusively on the
Albanian and Macedonian borders. According to the final annual report on the UN Interim
Administration in Kosovo Mine Action Programme, covering the period to December 15, 2001,
the 620 records did not include mines laid by Ministry of Interior Police Units, or paramilitary
groups. UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report - 2001 (December 2001) H 10 (available
at the Mine Action website).
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policy, it was absurd. That is why since 1945 there has been a definite move-
ment towards a system of international criminal law affecting the activities of
States and armed forces.
As far as treaties are concerned, the old pattern of treating implementation
casually began to change significantly after the Second World War. The 1948
Genocide Convention authorized and indeed exhorted parties to take action
against offenders, including rulers and public officials; and it authorized action
through the UN. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions called for: (1) universal
jurisdiction as regards grave breaches, and (2) "Protecting Powers" to ensure
implementation of certain parts of the agreements in wartime. However, the
implementation systems specified in these treaties concluded in 1948 and
1949 have not been used much in the intervening years.
The 1977 Geneva Protocol I3 included some provisions attempting to break
the impasse. In particular, in accordance with the terms of its Article 90, the
"International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission" was set up in 1991.
Yet this too has not worked. Not a single one of the numerous problems in the
decade of its existence has been referred to it. In this, as in many other ways,
the actual forms of implementation that have been developed have been dif-
ferent from what was envisaged in treaties.
In short, the law developed before the 1990s had relatively few provisions
regarding implementation, and those that existed were not effective. This
does not mean that there was no implementation—many States did a capable
job of developing a culture of law observance within their own armed forces.
However, the war crimes and crimes against humanity of the 1990s exposed
the weakness of the implementation "system."
Similarly, laws ofwar agreements concluded before the 1990s said relatively
little about civil war. The treaty provisions explicitly applicable in civil wars
were notoriously modest (being essentially Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and 1977 Geneva Protocol II), and were especially weak
on matters of implementation.
In the 1990s, States and international bodies made further attempts to ad-
dress questions ofimplementation and enforcement. Eight new legally binding
international documents in the area of the laws of war broadly defined were
adopted by the UN Security Council or by States at international conferences.
Only one of these new agreements (the 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser
3. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAW OFWAR 422 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelffeds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I]
.
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Weapons) does not deal extensively with implementation and enforcement,
or with the problem of civil war.4 The other seven new international instru-
ments, all of which do address these issues, are:
1. The 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. Adopted by the UN Security Council in 1993.
2. The 1994 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Adopted by the UN Security Council in 1994.
3. The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.
This is not part of the laws of war as such, but closely related. It
contains extensive provision for prosecution or extradition of
offenders.
4. The 1996 Amended Protocol 11 on Landmines to the 1980 UN
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. This requires each party
to take legislative and other measures against violations "by persons
or on territory under its jurisdiction or control."
5. The 1997 Ottawa Landmines Convention. This contains extensive
provisions on transparency, compliance and dispute settlement.
6. The 1 998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered
into force July 1, 2002).
7. The 1 999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property
in Armed Conflict (not yet in force) . This was concluded and opened
for signature during the Kosovo War, but had been negotiated and
agreed well before. It contains numerous provisions regarding
implementation and enforcement not just of the Second Protocol
itself, but also of the Convention and the first Protocol (both ofwhich
had been concluded in 1954).
4. I exclude from this total documents of an essentially advisory character, such as the 1994
ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, included in the UN Secretary-General's report of 19
August 1994 to the UN General Assembly. See U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994).
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All seven documents have two critically important features in common.
First, they contain some provisions that go beyond the old idea of essentially
national implementation by the authorities of individual States. Second, they
have formal application in wholly or partly non-international armed conflicts.
An unresolved problem: internationalized civil war
Most wars are much more confused in character than the simple dichoto-
mous definition of war, as being either international or non-international,
would suggest. Frequently, as in past eras, the civil wars of our time have had
international dimensions: troops and command structures from outside pow-
ers have often played major roles on one or more sides. In many cases a more
accurate short description of the conflict would be "internationalized civil
war", although this is not a recognized category in the laws of war.
As far as the laws ofwar are concerned, one unhappy result ofhaving largely
separate bodies oflaw applying to different aspects of the conflict is that courts,
especially ICTY , have had to devote enormous efforts to determining the char-
acter of the conflict in Bosnia as it arose in particular times, places and events.
The wars in Bosnia and Croatia were among many which have had partly in-
ternational and partly internal aspects. There must in principle be a case for
applying the whole of the body of the laws of war even to armed conflicts that
are substantially non-international in character, and some recent develop-
ments in the law do point in that direction. However, as far as Kosovo is con-
cerned, the question of the character of the conflict is not especially difficult.
Before March 24, 1999 it was mainly or entirely a non-international armed
conflict, occurring within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
After that date there was, superimposed on that conflict, an international
armed conflict between the NATO powers and the FRY.
The UN Security Council's involvement
In the 1990s the UN Security Council assumed a major role in attempting
to ensure implementation of the laws of war, including investigation and pun-
ishment of certain violations. This role was not entirely new. For example, al-
ready during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) the Security Council had
authorized the main official investigation into the use of chemical weapons.
In the conflicts of the 1990s the UN Security Council addressed issues re-
lating to the implementation of international humanitarian law in at least five
cases: Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-5); Somalia (1992); Rwanda (1994);
Sierra Leone (1997-2000); and Kosovo (1998-9). In addition to attacks on
civilians and other similar violations, a major issue at stake in some of these
408
Adam Roberts
cases was the refusal of parties to permit delivery of humanitarian aid—which
is certainly a problem relating to the laws of war, but could also be considered
a violation of other norms and agreements.
In all these cases in the 1990s the Security Council went beyond appeals to
observe norms, and called for action. There were always several different
stated purposes for UN-authorized action or the threat thereof, but obser-
vance of humanitarian law was one of them. The actions taken by the Council
included not only the establishment of the international criminal tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also action of a more direct kind. Some of the
cases of UN-authorized military action, and some cases of UN-imposed eco-
nomic sanctions, were partly based on claims that the target State had vio-
lated fundamental norms of humanitarian law.
These forms of action under UN Security Council auspices posed problems.
As regards military action, in most of these five crises a principal problem for
the UN was the difficulty of finding outside forces willing to act in situations
perceived to be dangerous. The failures of the UN, and of States, to act in time
in respect of the crises in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995 are clear ex-
amples. The enthusiasm for implementing humanitarian norms ran into the
rock of national interests. In respect of Kosovo the problem was different: the
main difficulty was in getting agreement in principle in the Security Council
that force should be used at all in response to the unfolding crisis. This was be-
cause, more than in any of the other five cases, any military action to stop on-
going atrocities in Kosovo involved violating the sovereignty of a functioning
sovereign State, Yugoslavia.
Links Between Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum
One consequence of the developments of the 1990s has been the strength-
ening of the idea that a systematic pattern of violations of the basic humani-
tarian norms of international humanitarian law may justify acts of military
intervention. Although there were many pre-echoes of this in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the apparent strengthening of this link between jus
ad bellum and jus in bello represents a momentous and controversial change in
the terms of international debate.
The long-standing and important principle that the law relating to resort to
war (jus ad bellum) is a separate and distinct subject from the law relating to
conduct in war (jus in bello) remains valid and important. However, there have
always been causal links between these distinct bodies of law. One such link is
that aspect of the idea of proportionality that deals with the proportionality of
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a military response to the original grievance. The developing practice of mili-
tary action as a response to violations of the law of war is another important
link. Quite simply, massive violations ofjus in hello by a belligerent can help to
legitimize certain threats and uses of force by outside powers intervening to
stop the violations.
In an effort to get an offending State to observe rules of restraint, the first
response of outside powers may be the threat, rather than the actuality, of
force. The use of pressure against States, for example in order to make them
accept an intervention force, as was attempted in Kosovo and done in East
Timor in 1999, raises a problem. Traditionally, international law and interna-
tional lawyers have been suspicious of agreements negotiated under duress. If
the host government has only given consent under extreme pressure, is its
consent valid? The experience of the post- 1990 period shows how necessary
pressure can be to achieve international objectives, and how hard it is to elim-
inate certain aspects of power politics.
The change in the landscape, whereby humanitarian outrages serve in
practice as a basis for threatening or using force, has not been universally rec-
ognized. This is not surprising, particularly as the whole issue poses difficult di-
lemmas for humanitarian workers and organizations. In some cases in the
1990s, the violations ofjus in hello that contributed to decisions to intervene
included assaults on aid workers and convoys. Any suggestion that humani-
tarian workers and organizations may play some part in triggering military ac-
tions challenges their deep (and in some cases legally based) commitment to
impartiality and neutrality. Almost all humanitarian workers and organiza-
tions are in a state of denial about the extent to which they, and the principles
and laws for which they stand, have played a part in initiating military action.
Where, following a pattern of violations, military action has been with the
authorization of the UN Security Council, and/or has had the consent (how-
ever reluctant) of the host State, there has not generally been a strong objec-
tion to it in principle. These conditions were present, for example, in Bosnia in
1995 and in East Timor in September 1999. However, where these conditions
were not present, as in Kosovo in March-June 1999, military intervention has
been strongly contested by major and minor powers.
In respect of Kosovo, before the NATO military action there had been sev-
eral UN resolutions which, in addition to many other elements, noted the vio-
lations of international humanitarian law there. For example, a long
resolution on Kosovo passed by the General Assembly in December 1998 crit-
icized the Yugoslav authorities for a variety of unacceptable practices, includ-
ing violations ofCommon Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
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1977 Protocol II; deplored the killing of humanitarian aid workers; and re-
quired the Yugoslav authorities to allow investigators from the International
Criminal Tribunal access to examine alleged atrocities against civilians.5 The
Security Council resolutions on Kosovo also addressed these issues. A resolu-
tion in March 1998 condemned "the use of excessive force by Serbian police
forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators."6 In September 1998 the
Council expressed concern at "the excessive and indiscriminate use of force
by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army," and at "reports of increas-
ing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law," going
on to call for a cessation of such acts. 7 This resolution, notably tough in tone,
followed a first-hand presentation made to the UN Security Council by a se-
nior representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) on September 11, 1998. The next resolution, passed in October
1998, also referred repeatedly to humanitarian issues.8 The failure of the Yu-
goslav authorities to comply with these resolutions was a key consideration in
the decisions ofNATO countries to resort to the use of military force, as they
did on March 24, 1999. When President Clinton addressed the nation on that
day, in a key link in his argument he asked Americans: "Imagine what would
happen ifwe and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these
people were massacred on NATO's doorstep."9
To draw attention to the connection between issues related to violations of
the laws of war, and the decisions of outside countries to intervene, is not to
say that there is a simple and clear doctrinal or legal link. There is not now,
nor is there likely to be, a generally recognized "right" of humanitarian inter-
vention. Such interventions may occasionally be necessary, but to suggest
that they are a general "right" implies that it is possible to adjudicate in a gen-
eral way between the undoubted and still important non-intervention rule on
the one hand, and the demands of humanitarian considerations on the other.
Any decision on forcible intervention must involve a balancing of consider-
ations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances, not the assertion of a
general right.
To suggest that there is no general right ofhumanitarian intervention is not
to say that certain uses of force for humanitarian ends are necessarily illegal
5. G.A. Res. 53/164 (Dec. 8, 1998), U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/164 (1998).
6. S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).
7. S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).
8. S.C. Res. 1203 (Oct. 24, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
9. The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical
DOCUMENTATION 1974-1999, at 416 (Heike Krieger ed., 2001).
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under international law; nor is it to assert that certain uses of force are simply
beyond the scope of international law. Rather, it is to suggest that in respect
of each intervention there are important, relevant but alas competing legal
principles which have to be balanced against each other; and a great deal de-
pends on the particular facts and legal considerations that relate to that par-
ticular case.
Since the Kosovo War there have been attempts to develop a "right" of
humanitarian intervention by such figures as UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
in his speech in Chicago on April 22, 1999; UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in his UN report of September 8, 1999; a number of speakers in the
UN General Assembly in 1999; the then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy in a lecture in New York on February 10, 2000; and the then UK
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in a speech in London on July 19, 2000. Yet
there is absolutely no sign of international agreement on their propositions.
Moreover, the US government has never wanted a doctrine in this area that
might tie its hands.
The attempt to develop a general doctrine could actually do harm to the
cause of humanitarian intervention: such an attempt can imply that the legiti-
macy of each case of intervention is dependent on the existence of a general
right. Since that right does not exist, the legitimacy of individual actions may,
if anything, be reduced. Because pursuit of a defined legal right is doomed to
fail, and the conditions giving rise to humanitarian intervention will not dis-
appear, the situation is likely to remain untidy. It probably ought to do so.
The recognition of a link between jus in hello and jus ad bellum falls far short
of any general recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention. 10 What has
emerged from the experiences of the 1990s is a pattern of acquiescence by sig-
nificant numbers of States in respect of some interventions with stated hu-
manitarian purposes. However, there has also been strong opposition by
States to particular interventions, and even stronger opposition to the grant-
ing of a general right. The distinctly uneven pattern of acquiescence is not the
same thing as the recognition of a right.
The fact that an intervention may be motivated by humanitarian consider-
ations, including a concern to stop violations of human rights and humanitar-
ian norms, does not in any way affect the equal application of the laws of war
in any resulting hostilities. During the Kosovo war there was no suggestion
from any party that the United States and its allies were entitled to ignore any
10. See Adam Roberts, The So-Called "Right" Of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 YEARBOOK OF
International Humanitarian Law 3-51 (2002).
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aspects of jus in hello because they were engaged in what they saw as a high
moral cause. 11 If anything, the logic was rather that the humanitarian ele-
ments in the stated reasons for resort to war particularly obliged the NATO
members to observe the rules of war.
The Kosovo War confirmed another connection between jus in hello and jus
ad helium. In the Kosovo War, as in a number of other recent conflicts, the
public's perception of the legitimacy of the operation as a whole appeared to
depend in significant measure on a public understanding that the war was be-
ing fought in a disciplined and restrained manner, and in accordance with in-
ternational norms. Some of the worst moments for NATO in the entire
campaign were when NATO appeared to be falling short of this standard.
Support for the war could easily have evaporated if there had been more inci-
dents such as the bombing of refugee convoys.
Bombing as a Default Form of Humanitarian War
Bombing from the air formed a key part of the Western response to at least
three humanitarian crises of the 1990s: (I) in northern and southern Iraq
since 1991, as a means of maintaining "no-fly-zones," enabling refugees to re-
turn home, and limiting the activities of the Iraqi armed forces; (2) in Bosnia
in 1995, especially in the form of NATO's Operation Deliberate Force, fol-
lowing the Bosnian Serbs' brutal massacre at Srebrenica and their renewed as-
sault on Sarajevo; and (3) in 1999, in the war over Kosovo.
One underlying reason for reliance on air power in such cases is the reluc-
tance of the populations and governments of Western democracies to take
substantial risks, for example by using ground forces in a combat role, in what
were perceived to be distant humanitarian causes. This reluctance is under-
standable but may at times jeopardize the effectiveness of operations. In the
1999 war it was disadvantageous to NATO, and to the inhabitants of Kosovo,
that Milosevic was not confronted with a more convincing threat of land op-
erations in the province.
Bombing as such has never been, and is not now, violative of the laws of
war, but in practice it has frequently risked violating norms requiring force to
1 1. This was confirmed in the discussion of the committee established by the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to review NATO actions in
Yugoslavia. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1111 30-4, 39
International Legal Materials 1257, 1265-6 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A
{hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
413
The Laws of War After Kosovo
be directed at military targets and to be used discriminately. The increased ac-
curacy of certain air-delivered weapons in several recent conflicts, including
the 1991 Gulf War, has indicated that certain uses of air power may be, or
have the capacity to become, compatible with the existing rules about target-
ing and discrimination. This was one conclusion of the detailed UK House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Kosovo. It noted that this was
the first armed conflict in which the United Kingdom had engaged since it rat-
ified Protocol I in 1998; and after considering the main areas of controversy
surrounding the bombing it concluded: "On the evidence available to us, we
believe that NATO showed considerable care to comply with the 1977 Proto-
col and avoid civilian casualties." 12
However, the use of air power in this war posed certain problems. Some of
these were more political than legal: the controlled use of air power is an op-
tion available to very few States, and it naturally causes both fear and resent-
ment. Some of the problems were technical, but have a major impact on
evaluations of the lawfulness of particular uses of air power. As the Kosovo war
demonstrated, even in the electronic age air power suffers from certain striking
limitations, and it has a natural tendency to lead to unintended damage.
The 1999 Kosovo War began in an atmosphere of arrogant and ignorant il-
lusions among Western decision-makers about the capacity of bombing to
protect the inhabitants of Kosovo and/or to bring about a change in Serbian
policy in a matter of days. In the end, the bombing could only succeed as a
campaign of long-drawn-out coercive pressure, in which other elements were
also involved.
The Kosovo War exposed certain limitations in the capacity ofbombing to
achieve results. Most notably, bombing was not at all effective in providing
protection or relief from Serb attacks, for the hard-pressed Kosovars. The ini-
tiation of the bombing campaign was followed by an intensification of those
attacks, leading to huge numbers of people fleeing from their homes. In his ad-
dress on March 24 President Clinton did warn that Yugoslavia "could decide
to intensify its assault on Kosovo." 13 However, the apparent belief of many
Western policy-makers that NATO military action would deter Milosevic
from further atrocities against the Kosovars was one of the most shocking
12. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, Kosovo, vol. I, Report and
Proceedings of the Committee, HC 28-1, May 2000, 1IH 145, 157.
13. President Clinton, Address to the Nation, March 24, 1999. Text in THE KOSOVO
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 415-6 (Heike Krieger, ed.) (Cambridge International
Documents Series, Volume 11).
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lapses of the crisis. 14 One reason why the bombing failed to stop the ethnic
cleansing is that it had very limited effects on movable military targets. A sup-
pressed USAF investigation is reported to have showed that NATO forces
veriftably destroyed just fourteen Serb tanks in Kosovo, eighteen armored per-
sonnel carriers, and twenty artillery pieces. As Tim Garton Ash has com-
mented: "Even if the real figures are higher than that, it is an indisputable fact
that ethnic cleansing increased under the bombing." 15 It is probably true that
bombing did inhibit the mobility of Serb armor, but that is a modest achieve-
ment especially in a context in which heavy armor was not necessary for the
effective pursuit of ethnic cleansing.
Partly because of its stated humanitarian purpose, the Kosovo air campaign
involved many elements of restraint, including in target selection, in efforts to
ensure the accuracy of bombing, and in the evident willingness to abandon
sorties because of concerns about potential civilian casualties. Yet the case
confirms that such bombing can cause direct damage to civilians and to
non-military installations and activities in several distinct ways.
• Unintended damage caused by bombing from high altitude. It has been
frequently asserted that the problems of damage to civilians and civilian
property were made worse by NATO aircraft generally flying at a safe
altitude. The potentially disastrous consequences of flying at altitude are
obvious: in attacks on railway bridges, the time an air-to-ground guided
weapon takes to get to the target may also be the time a passenger train
takes to get onto the bridge; and in attacks on road convoys, it may be
impossible at 15,000 feet to be sure that the convoy does not contain, or
even consist largely of, the very civilians who are supposedly being
protected. Both of these things happened in the Kosovo War, and many
died as a result. Yet there may also be certain advantages in attack
aircraft operating from relative safety: not just that the aircrew are safer,
but also that they have more time in which to acquire targets and make
decisions, can afford to make a second pass over a target if they are in
doubt, and may feel less urgency about getting rid ofwhatever explosives
they are carrying so that they can rush back to safety.
14. At a press conference on March 25, 1999, despite her recognition that there could be "a
flood of new refugees," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was notably optimistic on the
capacity of air strikes to deter or prevent Milosevic from inflicting further horrors on the Kosovar
people. See THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, id., at 416 and 418.
15. Timothy Garton Ash, Kosovo: Was it Worth It?, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Sept. 21,
2000, at 58-9. The US Air Force report he cites was publicized in NEWSWEEK, May 15, 2000.
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• Pressure to attack fixed targets. A major problem in Kosovo was that,
because it proved relatively easy to conceal military units and movable
equipment from attacks from the air, and to fabricate dummies, there was
especially strong pressure on the NATO alliance to attack large fixed
targets. In many cases (bridges, power stations, buildings ofvarious types,
the broadcasting station in Belgrade) these were dual-use targets which
had major civilian as well as military functions.
• Changing functions of buildings. Even if targets are believed to be purely
military and are hit accurately, as with the Amariya bunker in Baghdad in
1991 or the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, their function proved
in the event to be different from what the targeteers had believed.
• Long-term, effects of certain weapons on the civilian population. Trying to
inhibit the adversary's military movements by the use of cluster bombs
and similar weapons can have a long-term adverse effect on the civilian
population and on international military personnel who may be present
in the territory following the end of hostilities. (The question of cluster
bombs is considered further below.)
In some cases the damage to civilians or civilian objects may be completely
unintended. However, in other cases (especially against certain dual-use tar-
gets) the damage may be seen by military planners as contributing to the over-
all goal of wearing down the adversary's will to carry on with the struggle.
Behind these problems lay a deeper and more intractable one. If the prime
function of a bombing campaign is to bring about a capitulation by the govern-
ment of the country, what happens when the bombing starts to run out of mili-
tary targets, and seems unable to force a change of policy on the part of the
target government? In such circumstances, there is bound to be heavy pres-
sure to continue with the bombing and to direct it at targets which are doubt-
ful or plainly illegal under the laws of war.
A particular challenge posed by the development ofprecision-guided muni-
tions is that it is harder than in earlier eras to deny that there was a specific in-
tention to hit whatever object was hit. As a result, armed forces and
individuals may be more likely than before to be held responsible for specific
acts of destruction. This development could have a considerable effect on how
destruction is viewed by the public in allied, neutral or adversary States. It
could also, at least potentially, create additional grounds for conducting inqui-
ries, investigations and prosecutions, whether by the internal disciplinary
mechanisms of States and armed forces, or by international criminal tribunals.
The exact combination of factors that led Milosevic to back down on June
3, 1999 is not yet known with any certainty. There are three obvious factors:
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the bombing; the prospect of invasion of Kosovo by NATO land forces; and
the isolation of Yugoslavia, especially with the abandonment of Milosevic by
his last significant potential ally, Russia. General Clark considers that it was
the combination of these three factors that led to the Milosevic surrender. 16
The indictment of Milosevic by ICTY announced on May 27, 1999, discussed
further below, may also have contributed to the ending of the war. How these
and other factors are evaluated will heavily influence any overall verdict on
the lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo War, and on the importance, or the
limitations, of the laws ofwar. As to the effect ofbombing, my own provisional
evaluation is that even though certain initial assumptions about how quickly a
bombing campaign might achieve results were mistaken, that does not prove
that the actual bombing, and the threat of more, were not important. They
were. The most difficult question this raises so far as the laws of war are con-
cerned is the following: did attacks on dual-use targets, and/or a perceived
threat of further attacks directed at civilians and civilian objects, play a major
part in the Yugoslav decision ofJune 3? 17
In conclusion, a lesson of the bombing in the Kosovo War is that, while air
power undoubtedly achieved significant results, its use involved serious prob-
lems. It did not perform particularly well against what might have been con-
sidered a relatively straightforward target, namely an army which was reliant
on heavy armor and operated on at least partly conventional lines. 18 It was
slow to achieve results even against a State debilitated by years of war and
poor economic performance. It would be hazardous to assume that a similar
air campaign would necessarily be the appropriate course in the context of an-
other urgent humanitarian or other crisis. It appears that a systematic cam-
paign ofbombing was not a serious option when the East Timor crisis was at its
gravest in September 1999.
NATO Strategic Doctrine
NATO's conduct in the 1999 Kosovo War confirms that there is continu-
ing tension between certain contemporary strategic doctrines and the implicit
vision of war contained in the laws of war. Over recent decades the United
16. CLARK, supra note 1, at 410-1 1.
17. For a challenging argument that the NATO bombing was a key factor in leading to the
decision to back down, and that one element was a belief that the bombing would become less
discriminate if Milosevic did not settle, see Stephen Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why
Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, RAND Report MR-1351-AF, at 91-107 (2001).
18. See Clark's lugubrious comment on this in CLARK, supra note 1, at 412.
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States and NATO have developed a conception of how force can be applied
which involves putting military pressure not just on the armed forces of the
adversary State, but on its government. Such an approach was evident in
some official thinking about nuclear deterrence and strategic doctrine gener-
ally vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It has also been evident in the conduct of cer-
tain operations in which NATO members have been involved, including
aspects of the bombing campaign against Iraq in early 1991 as well as the
Kosovo War eight years later.
The NATO approach is in tension with one underlying principle of the
laws of war, as famously expressed in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,
"that the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." Actually the laws of
war as they have developed in the intervening years are not so restrictive as
the words of the St. Petersburg Declaration might imply. In particular, they by
no means exclude the application of military force against aspects of the ad-
versary's war-making capacity and system of government. In the Kosovo cam-
paign, the targets of operations clearly had to encompass all those taking an
active part in ethnic cleansing, even if they were only police.
There is much to be said in favor of attacks against government targets.
Such attacks may reach the individuals most directly responsible for the situa-
tion which has led to war. They may save lives among the adversary's armed
forces, many of who will be essentially innocent individuals conscripted into
the front line. They may shorten the duration of hostilities. However, there
are also problems with attacks aimed at government targets. The very govern-
ment whose actions caused a war may also be the only body that can end it, in
which case its continued existence is vital. Attacks against government tar-
gets may have severe effects on the civilian population, and may indeed in-
volve attacks on people or objects that are non-military in character. There is
much scope for debate as to whether, for example, the homes and families of
government ministers are legitimate military targets.
The key question ofwhat is a military objective, addressed most extensively
in certain provisions of Protocol I, may merit re-examination. Numerous
States, including many NATO members, had already long before the Kosovo
War made declarations or reservations regarding some of these provisions.
NATO members, including non-parties to Protocol I such as the United
States, may now need to address the question of how their conceptions of war
relate to the limits on targeting that are specified in the laws of war. It may be
doubted whether such an exercise would lead to specific revisions to the writ-
ten laws of war, or to the reservations to Protocol I made byNATO States, but
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it might suggest some criteria for handling the tensions between NATO doo
trine and the laws of war.
International Tribunals: ICTY
The conduct of hostilities by NATO in the Kosovo War became the sub-
ject of consideration by no less than three international courts and tribunals:
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). Although the ICJ case, brought by Yugoslavia, revolved mainly
around matters ofjus ad bellum, it did also involve claims concerning breaches
of international humanitarian law. This ICJ case is ongoing, and demon-
strates, sadly, that legal processes sometimes proceed at a pace far slower than
war. The ECHR case was brought against all seventeen European NATO
states by six Yugoslav citizens complaining about the bombing of the TV sta-
tion in Belgrade by NATO forces on April 23, 1999, in which sixteen people
were killed and another sixteen seriously injured. In its decision of December
12, 2001 the ECHR ruled that there was no jurisdictional link between the
persons who were victims of the bombing and the seventeen NATO states,
and therefore the application was inadmissible.
In contrast to the limited part played by ICJ and ECHR, ICTY had a num-
ber of important roles in connection with the Kosovo War. It played a signifi-
cant part during the build-up of the crisis, principally through its entirely
proper and widely supported insistence on recording details of atrocities in
Kosovo. In March 1998 the Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, affirmed that ICTY's
jurisdiction "is ongoing and covers the recent violence in Kosovo." 19 A defin-
ing moment occurred on January 18, 1999, when the Prosecutor applied for
entry to Kosovo in order to "investigate the reported atrocities at Racak," but
was refused. This hardened views in NATO member States that no political
settlement would work unless it allowed for the deployment of a substantial
NATO-led force. Even during the hostilities, ICTY investigators were active
outside Kosovo in collecting evidence of crimes by the Yugoslav forces in the
province. 20
19. Text of ICTY Prosecutor's statement of March 10, 1998 is in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND
International Law, supra note 13, at 515.
20. For a useful account, see particularly David Gowan (formerly UK War Crimes Coordinator
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London) , Kosovo: The British Government and ICTY,
13 Leiden Journal of International Law 913-29 (2000).
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The announcement on May 24, 1999 of the indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and four col-
leagues further illustrated the way in which ICTY's role was unavoidably
caught up in political and military events. 21 Milosevic was indicted in respect
of the conduct ofYugoslav forces in Kosovo during the war there in 1998-9. In
this particular case, despite speculation to the contrary, the indictment may
have contributed to the willingness of Milosevic to make the concessions nec-
essary for a settlement, as he did early in June 1999. The ICTY indictment, as
General Clark has argued, may have hardened European resolve to continue
with the struggle. 22 It is also possible that it compelled Milosevic to focus on
reaching a settlement while he still had a functioning State around him which
could protect him from arrest and trial; and it may also have shocked him into
an erroneous belief that he could escape from the threat of trial by cutting a
deal with NATO. 23 If he did entertain any such hope, he was to be disap-
pointed. On June 28, 2001 Milosevic, by this time the former President, was
extradited to The Hague to face trial, which began on February 12, 2002. This
first-ever extradition of a former head of State to face trial before an interna-
tional criminal tribunal is an important precedent.
The ICTY's most unusual role, its consideration of NATO actions, was
particularly controversial in the United States. In 1999 the United States,
having been campaigning diplomatically against the projected International
Criminal Court for the previous six months on the grounds that the actions of
US forces should not be subject to a foreign prosecutor and tribunal, chose to
wage war in the one part of the world where ongoing war was subject to such a
tribunal. The ICTY, the establishment of which the United States had ac-
tively promoted in 1993, has much stronger powers of independent investiga-
tion and prosecution than are provided for the projected International
Criminal Court under the terms of the 1998 Rome Statute. 24
21. For texts of the key documents relating to the indictment of Milosevic, see THE KOSOVO
Conflict and International Law, supra note 13, at 516-29.
22. CLARK, supra note 1, at 327-8, where it is confirmed that the Pentagon and White House
were not happy with the ICTY Prosecutor's decision to issue the indictment.
23. This is argued by James Gow of King's College, London in THE SERBIAN PROJECT AND ITS
ADVERSARIES: A STRATEGY OF WAR CRIMES (2002).
24. Compare the uncomplicated provisions on jurisdiction, investigation and prosecution in
Articles 1 and 18 of the 1993 ICTY Statute, U.N. Doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm, with the much more heavily qualified
provisions on the same subjects in the 1998 Rome Statute, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9, July 17,
1998 available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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On May 14, 1999, while hostilities in the Kosovo War were ongoing, the
ICTY Prosecutor established a committee to assess the numerous allegations
made against the NATO bombing campaign and the material accompanying
them. It prepared an interim report which was presented to the Prosecutor on
December 6, 1999. On February 1, 2000 the Prosecutor stated that there was
no evidence that NATO's bombing campaign had violated international trea-
ties on the conduct ofwar. The committee investigating the NATO campaign
then prepared a detailed final report, published in June 2000, discussing the
numerous facts and issues involved. It provided evidence for the conclusion
that as a result of the NATO bombing approximately 495 civilians were killed
and 820 wounded in documented instances. It recommended that "neither an
in-depth investigation related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor inves-
tigations related to specific incidents are justified. In all cases, either the law is
not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition
of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or
against lower accused for particularly heinous offences." The Report's final
recommendation was that "no investigation be commenced by the OTP [Of-
fice of the Prosecutor] in relation to the NATO bombing campaign or inci-
dents occurring during the campaign." 25 On June 2, 2000 the ICTY
Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, stated in her address to the UN Security Council
that she would not open a criminal investigation into any aspect of NATO's
bombing campaign, and this was confirmed eleven days later in a statement is-
sued by the Office of the Prosecutor. 26
The Report to the Prosecutor had many limitations, and the reactions to it
showed how difficult it is to get justice done, and seen to be done, when con-
troversial issues ofwar, peace and national pride are at stake. ICTY's consider-
ation of the bombing campaign ran into two depressingly predictable lines of
political criticism. First, some initial US reactions suggested a sense of outrage
that any prosecutor anywhere would even contemplate the possibility of in-
vestigating a US-led military action. Because of this outrage, there was little
sign that ICTY's decision not to launch any criminal investigation caused any
easing ofUS concerns about the proposed International Criminal Court. Sec-
ondly, some reactions by countries and individuals critical of the NATO cam-
paign suggested that the ICTY was hardly impartial, not least because NATO
member States had played a significant part in creating it, financing it, and
25. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1111 53, 90, 91.
26. ICTY Press Release PR/PIS/510e ofJune 13, 2000.
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arresting indicted individuals. In this view, ICTY could not realistically have
embarked on prosecutions ofNATO personnel.
In addition to such political criticisms, the Report to the Prosecutor was
vulnerable on other grounds. It was criticized by some international lawyers as
being insufficiently rigorous in its consideration ofNATO actions and deci-
sion-making, especially as regards the balancing of military advantage and
civilian damage. 27 Even to those, like myself, who do not quarrel with its
overall recommendation, some parts of its analysis call for comment. On the
question of damage to the environment it makes the common mistake of as-
suming that the only relevant provisions in treaty law are those provisions of
Protocol I, namely Articles 35(3) and 55, which specifically mention the
word "environment."28 On the question of what is a military objective, it
states (probably correctly) that Protocol I, Article 52, is "generally accepted as
part of customary law," but nowhere mentions the declarations made in re-
spect of that article by many States, including NATO members. 29 On the
question of the scale and gravity of offence that brings an action within
ICTY's remit, the Report says remarkably little. Indeed, the Report implies, in
the concluding passage quoted above, that the reasons for not pursuing any
investigation were a lack of clarity of the law, or a lack of sufficient evidence.
The fundamental reason why ICTY could not act in this matter, not fully ex-
pressed in the conclusions, was that the alleged NATO offenses, because of
considerations of scale, gravity and absence of criminal intent, did not pass
the threshold that would have brought them into the court's remit. Despite
such flaws, the committee performed a service by openly addressing a number
of difficult issues raised by the NATO bombing campaign, and demonstrating
that, although NATO decisions and actions were within ICTY's jurisdiction,
there were serious grounds for doubt as to whether any of them was such as to
merit further investigation and possible prosecution.
Ultimately ICTY's most important role in relation to Kosovo, as well as to
other parts of the former Yugoslavia, may be by holding particular individuals
27. See particularly Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing
on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 1-5 (2001) and Natalino Ronzitti, Is the Non Liquet of the Final Report
by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia Acceptable?, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1017-28 (2000).
28. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1111 14-25. For discussion of the other parts of the
laws of war that bear on damage to the environment, see my chapters in the two works on the
environment mentioned in note 34 infra.
29. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1iH 35-47. On the declarations re Protocol I, Article
42, see Documents on the Laws of War, supra note 3, at 500-1 1.
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guilty of some of the terrible crimes associated with ethnic cleansing. Only by
establishing individual guilt in this way can the idea of collective guilt be effec-
tively challenged. 30
Variety of Forms of Non-belligerence and Neutrality
The campaign confirmed the lesson ofnumerous wars of the twentieth cen-
tury that non-participation in war can assume many forms much more subtle
and complex than the impartial neutrality spelled out in certain laws of war
agreements. Two developments of the Kosovo crisis and war stand out—one
typical, the other exceptional. First, in this war various non-belligerent States
took part in the ongoing UN economic sanctions against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and some offered some other elements of support for the
NATO operations. These events thus confirmed the lesson of many other
conflicts in the twentieth century, that the traditional law of neutrality, with
its emphasis on impartiality, is far from covering all circumstances and cases.
Secondly, one part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely
Montenegro, pursued a policy close to neutrality during the NATO bombing
campaign. From the outset of hostilities NATO policy-makers recognized this
remarkable, perhaps even unprecedented, state of affairs, and acted accord-
ingly. 31 This is further evidence that the law's neat classification of States into
belligerents and neutrals can be confounded by messy realities; and that the
reasons for moderation in war extend far beyond jus in hello.
These developments show that life (in the form of conduct during war) is
richer than art (in the form of legal agreements) . However, they do not show
that there is an urgent need to modify art to reflect the complexities of life.
Neither of these developments threw up serious practical problems—certainly
not those of the kind that could attract a general legal answer. In particular, it
would be a brave person who dared to assert, as a matter of general right, that
the component parts of a federal State should be free to declare their neutral-
ity, especially in a war in which the parent State is under direct assault from
outside. What these developments do show is that law can only provide a
30. A point made forcefully by Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Affairs, in a
speech to the International Crisis Group, Brussels, July 10, 2001. He credited the idea to
President Stipe Mesic of Croatia.
31. See the passages praising Montenegro's independent stance and warning Serbia not to
change it, which were made in US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's press conference on
Kosovo, Washington DC, March 25, 1999 in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 13, at 417, 419.
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partial framework for the conduct of States and individuals during war:
unique situations which defy tidy legal categorization frequently occur.
New Codifications
Certain issues raised in recent wars, including the Kosovo War, have been
perceived by some as pointing to lacunae in the existing law. Three major con-
troversies arising from the Kosovo War, and which might point to the need for
new codification, concerned the environmental effects of war generally, and
two related issues, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. 32
Environmental effects of war
This is a complex area, on which existing treaty law offers general principles
as well as a number of relevant rules. The best available short summary of the
legal framework on this subject is the 1994 ICRC/UN General Assembly doc-
ument "Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of
the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict."33 In studies of the subject
there has been a broad consensus against the idea of trying to negotiate a new
treaty on the protection of the environment in war.34
Many NATO actions in the Kosovo War led to expressions of concern on
environmental grounds. The actions that were most questioned included the
destruction of bridges causing blockage of major rivers; attacks on power sta-
tions having serious knock-on effects on water supplies, etc.; other attacks on
the infrastructure of Serbia; and the use of depleted uranium and cluster
bombs, discussed separately below.
There were prompt and careful investigations of certain key issues. A study
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Environment
Programme in 1999 concluded a key part of its study: "There is no evidence of
an ecological catastrophe for the Danube as a result of the air strikes during
the Kosovo conflict." It went on to say, however, that there were "some
32. All three issues were discussed in the Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, UH 14-27.
33. U.N. Doc. A/49/323 of 19 August 1994, at 49-53. Text in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 3, at 609-14.
34. See especially the two main general works on the subject: PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT (Richard Grunawalt, John King and Ronald
McClain eds., 1996) (Vol. 69, US Naval War College, International Law Studies) and THE
Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic and Scientific
PERSPECTIVES (Jay Austin and Carl Bruch eds., 2000). In the latter, see especially Carl Bruch
and Jay Austin, Epilogue: The Kosovo Conflict: A Case Study of Unresolved Issues, at 647-64. This
lays out certain general issues usefully.
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serious hot spots where contamination by hazardous substances released dur-
ing the air strikes poses risks for human health and the aquatic environment."
It also stressed that there was long-term chronic pollution of the Danube due
to factors other than the war. 35 The report was overwhelmingly concerned
with describing the situation and proposing remedial action: it did not discuss
existing or possible future international legal regimes governing environmen-
tal destruction in war. The Chairman of the Task Force that prepared the re-
port stated that the exercise "marked the first time that an environmental
impact assessment had been made of any war, though the UN did look at the
effects of oil well fires after the Gulf War with Iraq."36
For the future, while no grand general treaty on the environmental effects
of war is remotely probable, it seems likely that the practice of evaluating ac-
tual cases, coupled with demands for remedial action, will continue.
Depleted uranium
The military value of depleted uranium (DU) shells in piercing heavy ar-
mor is proven. At the same time the very mention of the word "uranium"
arouses considerable public anxiety. The use of DU in the Kosovo War, and
the various issues that it raised, was not well handled byNATO spokespersons
either during or after the war. 37
The greatest controversy in NATO member States concerned fears that
exposure to DU might have been a cause of subsequent cases of cancer among
their own troops. In this connection there were criticisms of official policy to-
wards NATO/KFOR troops involved in operations in Kosovo after the end of
the bombing campaign. This is not strictly speaking a laws ofwar issue, as it in-
volves relations between governments and their own troops. Some member
States, including the UK, were inconsistent in the briefings given to their own
35. UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for
the Environment and Human Settlements 60-1 (1999), available at http://www.grid.
unep.ch/btf/final/index.html.
36. Pekka Haavisto, former Finnish Environment and Development Cooperation Minister and
Chair of the UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, presenting the report at a press conference in
Stockholm on October 14, 1999. Frances Williams, Christopher Brown-Humes and Neil
Buckley, NATO "hindered" Kosovo inquiry, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 1999, at 30.
37. After the war, NATO spokesmen were reluctant to say anything about DU, and even cast
doubt on whether it had been used at all. The UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, in its 1999
report, commented on the lack of information from NATO. See THE KOSOVO CONFLICT, supra
note 35, at 61-2. The task force chairman, in his presentation on October 14, 1999, elaborated
on these complaints. See NATO "hindered" Kosovo inquiry, supra note 36, at 30.
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troops serving in Kosovo about possible hazards, and also about subsequent
health screening.38
As far as jus in hello is concerned, the main issues raised are the possible ef-
fects of DU on adversary troops and third parties, both during and after an
armed conflict. In particular, the use ofDU involves a matter with which the
laws ofwar have long dealt: the adverse effect that remnants ofwar may have,
including on innocent civilians, long after hostilities are over. The scientific
evidence about possible health effects of DU is still inconclusive, and the
ICRC has been notably cautious in its statements on the matter. In view of
DU's exceptionally slow rate of radioactive decay it is far from certain whether
any worry should focus on its radioactivity. Grounds for concern which seem
more likely to have a strong scientific basis are (a) evidence of impurities in-
eluding much more highly radioactive isotopes of uranium; and (b) the possi-
ble toxicity of DU, though this is far from established. Such concerns will be
increased by reports of pollution of groundwater in Kosovo. Careful scientific
investigation of the effects of DU must be the first priority. Since there is at
present no international consensus on its effects or on the desirability of put-
ting legal controls on it, DU will not be a promising subject for negotiation un-
til there has been a fuller scientific investigation.
Cluster bombs
The explosive remnants of war, a problem of long standing which has tradi-
tionally been a subject of concern in the laws of war, proved to be a serious
problem in the aftermath of the Kosovo War. Cluster bombs formed one part
of that problem. These weapons, which are meant to explode on impact
and/or to deactivate themselves after a specific period, can cause particularly
severe problems when they fail to do so. In the year after the NATO bombing
campaign ended in June 1999, at least 50 people in Kosovo were killed and
101 injured by unexploded bomblets. Over 15,000 unexploded bomblets were
left in Kosovo, and NATO was criticized for failing to provide sufficient infor-
mation on where cluster bombs were dropped. Cluster bombs killed or
maimed five times more Kosovar children than landmines. Peter Herby, head
of the Red Cross anti-mines unit, said: "Anti-personnel landmines were doing
what they were meant to do, but were not being used properly. Cluster bombs
are causing this problem because they're not doing what they were designed to
38. Michael Smith and Nigel Bunyan, Soldiers will be screened for uranium exposure, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 9, 2001; Nicholas Watt and Richard Norton-Taylor, Troops not told
of shells' toxic risk, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 8, 2001, at 8.
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do, so it's a bit more difficult to argue on humanitarian grounds."39 Despite
this difficulty, the use of cluster bombs could usefully be addressed within a
laws of war framework: the harm they can do to innocents is hardly in dispute,
and although complete prohibition is unlikely, means to reduce the threat
they pose to civilians and others should be investigated.
The United States and Certain Laws of War Agreements
US non-participation in key treaties
Despite its conspicuous role in certain acts of enforcement of the laws of
war, the United States is not a party to several important treaties on the laws
of war. Its notorious difficulties in accepting international treaties produced
the strange result that it took the United States forty years to ratify the 1948
Genocide Convention. The United States is still not formally a party to the
following agreements.
• The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention. Parties: 103. (The United
States signed in 1954, but it has not been ratified.)
• The 1 977 Geneva Protocols 1 & 11 on International and Non-international
Armed Conflicts. Parties: 159 and 152 respectively. (The United States
signed both on December 12, 1977, but has not ratified either one.)
• The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons. Parties: 81.
• The 1995 Protocol TV on Blinding Laser Weapons. Parties: 63.
• The 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Land-mines. Parties: 124.
• The 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court. Parties: 75. (The
United States signed on December 31, 2000, but has not ratified it. In
May 2002 the United States informed the Depositary that it did not
39. Peter Capella, Nato bombs "still killing" in Kosovo, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 6, 2000,
at 14, commenting on a Red Cross report first issued in September 2000. A revised version of this
report is INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CLUSTER BOMBS AND
Landmines in Kosovo: Explosive Remnants of War (2001). I have also relied here on
the annual reports of the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in Pristina, available at
www.mineaction.org. The final annual report on the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
Mine Action Programme, covering the period to December 15, 2001, stated that it "has
successfully completed its objectives, and the problems associated with land mines, cluster
munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have virtually been eliminated."
(11 4.) Over 47,000 devices were cleared. (11 9.) Nonetheless, there continued to be concerns
about a remaining threat from unexploded cluster bomblets in Kosovo, with further finds being
reported, e.g., by Richard Lloyd, Director of Landmine Action, London.
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intend to become a party to the treaty and accordingly has no legal
obligations arising from its signature.) 40
It would be wrong to view the US's or any other State's non-participation in
a treaty as in itself a failure. There are some questionable provisions in some
treaties in this area. Although a non-party, the United States takes at least
some of these accords more seriously than some States that are parties. The
reasons for US non-participation go far beyond the obduracy of one single el-
derly Senator, and call for careful analysis rather than uncomprehending con-
demnation. In some cases they are based on serious arguments.
Indeed, there may be a price for like-minded States taking the lead in nego-
tiation of particular treaties, as happened in the case of the Ottawa
land-mines convention. The price is that States which are partially or wholly
outside the consensus, and have particular problems which need to be ad-
dressed, feel sidelined. This also happened at the Rome conference in 1998.
Add a prohibition on reservations—as was done with the Ottawa and Rome
treaties—and there is a recipe for non-participation even by States, such as
the United States, which have a serious record of supporting the general
thrust of these projects.
Of the above agreements, the one most directly relevant to the NATO op-
erations in the Kosovo War was the Protocol I. At the time of the Kosovo
War, all NATO States were parties except the United States, Turkey and
France. 41 Although the Protocol was in force between many NATO members
and the FRY (which, too, was a party to Protocol I) , in formal legal terms the
United States was not so bound. This unevenness in the formal participation
in a key treaty could in principle have posed many problems in the conduct of
the Kosovo operations. In practice the fact that three NATO members were
not at that time parties to Protocol I does not appear to have been a problem.
This was mainly because the United States had long accepted that it would
observe a high proportion of the Protocol's provisions, either because they
40. Information as of July 1, 2002 from ICRC, UN and UNESCO websites, available at
www.icrc.org, www.un.org, and www.unesco.org, respectively.
41. France acceded to Protocol I on April 1 1, 2001.
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represented customary law, or because it had been decided to apply them as a
matter of policy, especially in view of the reality of coalition warfare.42
Of the treaties to which the United States is not a party, probably the most
politically neuralgic is not the Protocol I (sensitive as that issue continues to
be) but the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The op-
position of the United States to this treaty, marking a reversal of its earlier
support for the general idea of such a court, reflects the fundamental Ameri-
can concern that US forces deployed in a wide range of situations globally
might face unfounded or politically motivated prosecutions, over which the
United States would have no control. The detailed terms of the Rome Statute
contain certain safeguards against such an eventuality.43 Because of these pro-
visions, I am tempted to say that the United States is suffering from a case of
"prosecution mania." However, in Washington DC the fear of such prosecu-
tions was and is real. One ofmany US areas of concern is that in its conduct of
military operations the United States might decide to attack "dual-use" tar-
gets in a country, as it did in the Kosovo War, and then face an enthusiastic
prosecutor who might view this as an illegal attack on civilian objects.
Certain political and military hazards may flow from US non-participation
in the Rome Statute. The US voice on certain key issues may well be muffled.
In the future, US complaints about violations of the laws of war by its adver-
saries, and demands for the arrest of certain war criminals, may be weakened
by the US refusal to accept even the potential application of international ju-
dicial procedures under the ICC to any US forces. However, the most serious
consequence of US non-participation will be for the power of the court itself.
Without US participation, there are bound to be questions about whether the
ICC will have sufficient power to operate effectively.
42. A succinct exposition of US policy on the application of Protocols I and II is in the US
Army's Judge Advocate General's School's OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2002, at ch. 2, pp.
4-5, and ch. 11, pp. 13-15 (Jeanne Meyer and Brian Bill eds., 2002), available at the Judge
Advocate General's School's website at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/
Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
43. Among the provisions of the Rome Statute offering safeguards: Article 8 on war crimes,
which requires that they be "committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes." Certain safeguards in the case of "second track jurisdiction" (i.e.,
where the matter has not come to the ICC from the UN Security Council): Article 16, enabling
the Security Council to require the ICC to defer an investigation or prosecution; Article 17,
providing that a case is inadmissible where a State is genuinely carrying out investigation or
prosecution itself; and Article 18, enabling a State party to request the ICC to defer an investigation if
such State is pursuing the same matter, although such deferral is left to the ICC's decision.
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This pattern of US non-participation in existing treaties is, at least for this
observer, worrying. Other States which have a record of foreign military activ-
ity, including the United Kingdom, manage to be parties to many more of
these agreements, and have been less nervous about the possibility, remote as
it may be, ofseeing the actions of their forces being actually or potentially sub-
mitted to the not always tender mercies of foreign prosecutors and courts. 44
When a State such as the United States that on occasion acts as a principal
guarantor of implementation of humanitarian norms itself avoids being sub-
ject to many of those norms through the regular mechanism of treaty ratifica-
tion, it invites criticism.
Impact of legal norms in US-led combat operations
Whatever the US fears, the actual impact of international legal norms on
US conduct of operations has often been positive. Commitment to the laws of
war has contributed to the post-Vietnam rehabilitation of the US armed forces.
In both the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 war over Kosovo, the United States,
though not a party to Protocol I, observed many of its provisions—whether be-
cause of their customary law status, because it was policy to support them any-
way, or because of a need to harmonize targeting and other matters with allies.
The experience of these wars suggested that most of these provisions repre-
sented a useful set of guidelines for professional conduct.
Conclusions
After a war, there is a need to evaluate how well belligerents observe the
rules of war; and there is also a need to evaluate how appropriate or otherwise
the law is to the ever-changing circumstances and forms of armed conflict.
The NATO role in the 1999 Kosovo War was in some respects remarkably
successful, and did enable the overwhelming majority of people who had fled
from their homes to return. However, before too many lessons are drawn from
this success, it must be emphasized that it had many exceptional features, as
well as some that are more typical of the new types of conflict. There is proba-
bly a danger, as Mark Twain would have put it, of seeing more wisdom in it
than is there. A war in which one side had no casualties is exceptional, and
hardly likely to be repeated. Equally, it is hardly typical of modern conflict for
44. The United Kingdom completed a key pan: of the Rome Statute ratification process on May
10, 2001, when the House of Commons passed the ICC Bill. Its ratification was registered with
the depositary on October 4, 2001.
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Western armed forces to find themselves in combat against a disciplined
armed force under an organized State. With these caveats, the following con-
clusions are offered.
1
.
To a large extent NATO did succeed in the aim of avoiding damage to
civilians, and the events of the war largely confirm the value and viability of
the soldier/civilian distinction that is so central in the laws of war.
2. However, the war caused the death of about 495 civilians, had a huge im-
pact on civilians in both Kosovo and Serbia, and involved extensive destruc-
tion of "dual-use" targets. It is possible that the threat of further societal
destruction in Serbia played some part in the Serbian decision to capitulate: if
this is correct, then it follows that the requirement of victory, and the need to
observe the laws of war, could have been in considerable tension with each
other. NATO strategic doctrine, in so far as it concentrates on attacking the
adversary's governmental structure, can involve problems in relation to the
laws of war. The question of what is a legitimate objective, addressed princi-
pally in Article 52 of 1977 Geneva Protocol I, remains a difficult one, and a
subject of contestation.
3. Reliance on air power as a means of implementing an action for funda-
mentally humanitarian purposes raised difficult moral questions. It also
proved to be something of a gamble, both because it could not protect the vic-
tims in the short term, and because many other factors were required to bring
about the Milosevic capitulation. The sense that the campaign had been a
close-run thing, and the product of a unique set of circumstances, contributed
to a feeling in many countries that it was unlikely to be repeated.
4. Implementation of the laws of war, and humanitarian norms more gener-
ally, had a particularly high profile not only in the course of this war, but also
in its beginnings and its ending. The importance of ensuring observance of in-
ternational humanitarian norms contributed to the factors leading up to the
initiation of the NATO military campaign. The indictment of Milosevic on
May 27, 1999 may have played some part in the Yugoslav leader's decision to
accept the eventual settlement.
5. Whether this war will prove to have some deterrent function in respect
of potential future violations of fundamental humanitarian norms remains to
be seen. It did not stop Indonesian forces from engaging in mass killings in
East Timor in September 1999; though it may have given credibility to the ef-
forts subsequently made under UN auspices to stop the killings.
6. Among the many difficult laws of war issues raised by the war, perhaps
the most urgent is the explosive remnants of war, and in particular cluster
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bombs. On depleted uranium, more knowledge of its impact on health is
needed before that issue can be usefully addressed in the laws of war.
7. It remains an odd although not completely inexplicable paradox that the
United States, which has played the key part in developing a use of air warfare
that is reasonably consistent with key principles and provisions of the laws of
war, is outside so many parts of the treaty regime of the laws of war. This situa-
tion calls for careful analysis, not shrill condemnation. After the experience of
Kosovo, the US government could usefully re-examine the treaties to which it
is not party, to see if it can bring itself more into line with a treaty regime
which it has, in large measure, not merely observed but also found useful, not
least in the 1999 Kosovo War. Unfortunately there has been a tendency in the
United States to react negatively and defensively to the reasonably judicious
ICTY review of the NATO bombing campaign; and this tendency has rein-
forced the US government's resistance to becoming a party to certain laws of
war treaties, including the ICC Statute.
8. The Kosovo War, and the role of the laws of war in it, evoked different
perceptions in different parts of the world. Some perceived the war favorably
as a case ofNATO coming to the aid of an oppressed population which hap-
pened to be predominantly Muslim, and maintaining certain limits in its con-
duct of military operations. However others viewed these events much more
critically, as one further proof that the armed forces of northern countries, es-
pecially of course the United States, have established such a monopoly on the
battlefield that the only effective response to their presumed dominance be-
comes an asymmetric one, including terrorist attacks. In this view, to the ex-
tent that the laws of war are considered at all, they are deemed to suit the
north more than the south. Such a perception may be rooted in a naive and
probably incorrect view of the results that are presumed to flow from terrorist
attacks and other unlawful acts, but it appears to be held by many. Partly be-
cause of such perceptions, the effective US/NATO conduct of operations in
the Kosovo War, in a manner deeply influenced by laws ofwar considerations,
may paradoxically fail to discourage certain groups from conduct in which
such considerations are alien.
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Propositions on the Law ofWar
after the Kosovo Campaign
Ruth Wedgwood
Jus Ad Bellum and the Personal Factor in History
A,fter Kosovo, any purely proceduralist account of the international
JL. j\.community's use of force must be found wanting. Belgrade's sovereign
claim to Kosovo, even including the right to police the activities of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), did not plausibly include the right to deport the
majority of its own ethnic Albanian citizens. After the failed negotiations at
Rambouillet and the beginning of the bombing campaign, Belgrade's troops
and police deliberately forced 740,000 Albanian Kosovars to flee their villages
and cross the borders into Albania and Macedonia
—
providing a casus belli for a
continued allied campaign even if any was disputed before. Belgrade commit-
ted its clumsy acts of violence and coercion in the full sight of international
officials and CNN television cameras. The tactics bore witness to Milosevic's
political madness and ethical hedonism. Yet many public international lawyers
have felt great difficulty in admitting any legal justification for the NATO in-
tervention in the absence offormal endorsement by the UN Security Council.
This pure proceduralism is odd in the extreme, for even the Security Coun-
cil's endorsement could not have stilled questions about the outer limits of the
post-Cold War Charter of the United Nations. Council decisions may not
resolve all issues of international law and ultra vires action, if one is to believe
the International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie jurisdictional decision.
Thus, even with Council endorsement, one would have to resort to the teleol-
ogy of the Charter, including its strengthened embrace of human rights, to
indulge the new limits of Chapter VII.
Propositions on the Law of War after the Kosovo Campaign
Rather than resting upon a mechanistic decision rule, legitimacy for the use
of force may also be strengthened by a resort to history—in the appropriate in-
ferences about intention, shown by an adversary's past behavior. The allied
response in Kosovo has to be taken in the context of a decade's disorder.
Milosevic was the excessive personality who lit the tinder for the wars in
Croatia and Bosnia, and beguiled the West with a false promise of cooperation
at Dayton. Though he rose to power on the back of Serbian nationalism, he
sharpened its talons and started three wars. Just as Napoleon was ultimately
found to be a threat to the peace of Europe, and Hitler was irrepressibly ag-
gressive, so in this smaller neighborhood, Milosevic showed himself to be the
indefatigable author of conflict. To understand the interpretive context of
a legal principle, such as an emerging right of humanitarian intervention,
requires some attention to history and its actors. Milosevic violated the "one-
bite" rule, showing no inhibition against repeating his bouleversement of deli-
cate ethnic balances, savaging local populations, and ignoring NATO's ulti-
mate commitment to the area evidenced in the Bosnian air campaign in 1995.
One may not wish to endorse a principle of humanitarian intervention or re-
gional stabilization for the ordinary case, and yet may admit its validity where
the antagonist has shown a hearty and unsated appetite for trouble. After the
frustration of the "dual key" use of force in Bosnia, it is hardly surprising that
the Security Council was not given the controlling key in yet another war.
The Consanguinity of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello
It is commonly believed that the tactics of war must be judged independ-
ently of the purpose of a war. The divorce of purpose and tactics is designed to
allow agreement on humanitarian limits even where there is no consensus on
the merits of the underlying dispute. But this asserted independence of the
two regimes may be no more than a fiction. Defeating Nazism, for example,
required measures that are now seen as harsh and even punitive. Even where
their legality is conceded under the earlier standards of air war, it is commonly
taught in American military curricula that their repetition would now be ille-
gal. It may be that our real judgment of their contemporaneous legality is af-
fected by the radical evil represented by Nazism—an ideology posing an ulti-
mate threat to human welfare. Kosovo, in its smaller venue, may be another
illustration of that same quiet linkage. This was not a war to settle a commer-
cial dispute, or remap the location of a boundary valued because of mineral
deposits, but rather a war to prevent ethnic expulsions. As such, its speedy
conclusion was necessary. A gradual war of attrition that might defeat
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Belgrade in slow motion was unacceptable in light of the human survival at
stake in the conflict itself. Whether one's framework is utilitarian or pure
principle, it is possible to admit that the merits of a war make a difference in
our tolerance for methods of warfighting. This teleological view can be incor-
porated, albeit awkwardly, in the metric for "military advantage" in judging
proportionality, for surely we do not value military objectives for their own
sake. But it may be better to be forthright, even at the cost of questioning
homilies. The latitude allowed to a victor in a conflict is commonly dismissed
as self-indulgence—supposing that the law of war is mere victor's justice,
might making right. An alternative explanation is possible. Democratic lead-
ers and publics may believe there is an important link between the legitimate
purpose of a war and its allowable tactics—at least within the limits of basic
humanity and the protection of civilian lives.
The Contentious Role of Civilian Tribunals
The enforcement of the law of war has traditionally been left to military
judges. This was so in the proposed trial of the Kaiser after World War One.
The Nuremberg and Far East trials after World War Two were conducted be-
fore military tribunals, designated as such. (Indeed, Nuremberg's limitation of
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity to the period of the world war re-
flected the extent to which the proceeding was conceived as a military trial.)
The latter-day invention of the field of "international humanitarian law" has
obscured the extent to which implementation of many aspects of the law of
war depend on battlefield judgments and knowledge ofcampaign strategy, and
therefore may be suitable to military tribunals. For example, the destruction of
the bridges over the Danube in the Kosovo campaign may be understood as a
stratagem to force Milosevic to gamble between theatres for the placement of
his armor. (He could head north to meet a possible NATO invasion from
Hungary, or south to meet a NATO invasion from Albania while continuing
his ethnic cleansing operations. With the severance of bridges across the Dan-
ube, he had one vulnerable flank). The dependence of the prosecutor at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on a committee of
experts in evaluating allegations against NATO and in attempting to judge
the legitimacy of Kosovo targeting choices shows the extent to which the law
of war depends on judgments that may lie outside the experience of lay judges
or prosecutors. We have overlooked that the law of war contains both bright-
line rules and open-textured principles, and that only the former are so easily
applied. This is a serious potential defect in the new International Criminal
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Court as well, where judges are to be chosen on the basis of experience in
criminal law or international humanitarian law, but not for familiarity with
military operations. The dangers of professional back-scratching in evaluating
battlefield events should weigh in, of course, but is limited by the commit-
ments of the military in a democratic society.
One-Trick Ponies and Specialized Armies
To a surprising extent, military equipment is designed for specialized war
fighting tasks and this, too, was shown in Kosovo. We learned the same lesson
in the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission. NATO's weaponry was planned
for a very different conflict, in which allied forces would face off against
massed enemy troops on the plains of Central Europe.
Much of the academic critique of NATO's operational plans and deci-
sion-making in Kosovo ignores the unique and unexpected nature of the
Kosovo tasking. This was pick-up ball, redeploying weapons systems in a con-
text far different from their original planned use. If the West is serious about
humanitarian intervention as a vocation, it will need to rethink decisions
about force structure and equipment. For example, to optimize target discrim-
ination, especially for delicate distinctions between army vehicles and civilian
convoys, one would like to have more JSTARS Qoint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar Systems). So, too, the ability to react against mobile targets in a moun-
tainous and frequently cloudy terrain would be enhanced by fully integrated
data systems among services and allies. The real intention of the international
community to implement a new ethic of humanitarian intervention may be
judged (as wanting) by the extent to which most traditional powers are cut-
ting back on military spending and force structure. The recent decisions of
European countries such as France, Italy, and Germany to reduce military
budgets, cut manpower, and shorten conscription periods, do not give much
credence to any claimed doctrine of humanitarian police. A lightly-armed
European rapid reaction corps will not, by itself, win humanitarian wars.
Surrogate Ground Forces and Conflict Containment
In an unhappy reminiscence of Afghanistan during the Russian occupa-
tion, the Kosovo experience shows the difficulties of controlling surrogate
ground forces. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, for example, the KLA ex-
tended its "defense" of Albanian communities to northern Macedonia as well
as the Presevo valley in Serbia, threatening to regionalize the war. Evaluation
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of the efficacy ofNATO's Kosovo air strategy in any "lessons learned" must be
tempered by the realization that building-up local insurgents will be costly
when their long-term political agenda is vastly differ from our own.
Picking Winners
The dilemma of a post-conflict breakdown in law and order (politely
termed a mid-level security gap) is familiar to veterans of most peacekeeping
missions. Ambassador Bob Oakley has written a troubling survey of the prob-
lem for the National Defense University, 1 and Timor-veteran Graham Day
has named "policekeeping" as the major problem in post-conflict transi-
tions. Wherever a long-standing government has been displaced, whether
in Panama, Haiti, East Timor, or Kosovo, there is a raw edge in the after-
math because basic gendarme functions are lacking. In the absence of an effec-
tive international police presence, with language skills and the capacity to
build a network of local cooperation, it is unlikely that one can control the
violent "to-and-fro" between ethnic communities except by measures such as
Dayton's de facto segregation.
Acknowledging this incapacity to fine-tune factional disputes with an in-
ternational peacekeeping force, one must be realistic about the available set of
outcomes to the conflict. The only real choice, regrettably, may be to "pick a
winner"—while realizing that the side favored by the international commu-
nity will share many of the illiberal qualities of its antagonist. In Kosovo,
NATO succeeded in stopping Belgrade's ethnic cleansing of Muslims, but the
U.N. follow-on force has predictably been unable to control violent attacks
against Kosovar Serbs by the KLA.
The ideal of a multi-ethnic democracy, which was so attractively packaged
for media export by the Sarajevo government in the Bosnian war, is hardly
characteristic of the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention. One can see some-
thing of the same problem in East Timor, where violence against the returning
West Timorese and ethnic Chinese continues to be a problem, and, of course,
in Rwanda. A decision to intervene must depend not on the pretense of a
future multi-ethnic democracy, for that end state will often not be available. It
must be on some rougher calculus ofwhich outcome minimizes overall abuse.
1. Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (R.B.
Oakley, E.M. Goldberg, M. J. Dziedzic, eds. 2002).
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Precision-Guided Munitions and the Transparency of Intention
In the past, technological limits have often obscured the more difficult is-
sues of target discrimination. In the air campaigns ofWorld War Two and the
Korean conflict, the radius of uncertainty for ordnance delivery against indus-
trial targets and transportation nodes often mooted the question whether
other objects would qualify as military or civilian assets. Gravity bombs and a
limited ability to see through weather left a five-mile radius for probable point
of impact, and finer gradations would have seemed an intellectual construct.
But the extraordinary precision of guided munitions used in the Yugoslav
campaign brings front and center the most contentious questions of targeting.
Aim points are made utterly clear to potential critics, and the legal categoriza-
tion of cigarette factories, television stations, urban bridges, and train depots
will be mooted by skeptical observers. With a targeteer's intention made plain
for the world to see, the indeterminate language of humanitarian law becomes
a potential hazard for warfighters. If munitions are precise, the law is vague.
The hazard is increased by the active campaign to juridicalize the law of war
in international fora—including the International Criminal Court and the
International Court of Justice, not to mention national courts exercising uni-
versal jurisdiction. The loose-jointed language of treaty texts provides little
comfort against roving legal patrols. Additional Geneva Protocol I of 1977
describes permissible military targets as those making "an effective contribu-
tion to military action," but it is hard to know what a civilian judgment of the
matter will bring.
The difficulty with attempting clarification of treaty language, or venturing
a clearer restatement of customary law, is two-fold. First, the right to restate
humanitarian law has lately been claimed by non-governmental organizations
and a subset of States proposing a "human security" agenda that may pay little
heed to active military security problems. One saw the evidence of this at Ot-
tawa and Rome, in the debates over land mines and the international criminal
court. Second, the United States' unique capabilities in air warfare and other
advanced methods of war-fighting may lessen the number of supporting allies
in law formation. For example, we may have few interlocuters who understand
the practical problems of using air power in limited wars. In the Kosovo and
Iraq campaigns, the United States flew the majority of air sorties due to the re-
quirements of targeting and the capabilities of advanced avionics. In a world
skeptical of hyperpuissance, few other countries may admit a shared interest in
effective American warfighting, including how to secure a safe air space. Only
Washington and a few other capitals will be called upon to think through the
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problems of linkage between an adversary's anti-aircraft capability and dual-
use electrical grids. To retain a necessary operational flexibility, the United
States may be cast in the role of the legal Luddite, seeking to avoid the usurpa-
tion of military law by non-military actors and by States unfamiliar with strate-
gic security challenges.
A second concern is the general collapse of State consent as a basis for
norm-setting. In recent negotiations, we have seen a "vanguard" theory of law
creation—a low number of ratifications needed for treaties to come into force,
a prohibition on reservations so that a package must be taken on an all-
or-nothing basis, the bald assertion of third party jurisdiction, and the view
that soft law can become hard law on a quick timetable. The doctrine of the
persistent objector is itself under challenge if the subject matter concerns
human rights, and the once narrow category of jus cogens (the peremptory
norms binding regardless of State consent) may become a cornucopia. At the
Ottawa landmines negotiation and the Rome international criminal court
conference, the chairmen abandoned the view that treatymaking should pro-
ceed by consensus, or even that treaty texts should have the support of major
effective actors. An attempt to restate customary law is likely to leave the
United States as a prime target of rhetorical bombardment.
Timing is another problem. It is dangerous to codify the law before one
knows what the practical problems will be. International armed force has
lately been asked to achieve some difficult ends in limited wars—including
coercing local governments to end the mistreatment of ethnic minorities and
persuading host States to withdraw support from terrorist groups. In these
conflicts, the likely end-state will not be unconditional surrender and long-
term occupation. It's not clear that we know how to gain this new type of
partial compliance, through a "tariff theory of warfare. In traditional warfare
as well, an adversary's threatened misuse of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) will present new problems in strategy. In some states, civilian facili-
ties have been lamentably misused to shield WMD manufacture. Pesticide
plants convert quickly to chemical weapons manufacture, and biological labo-
ratories can turn from diagnostics and vaccines to preparing biological patho-
gens for weaponization. This dual-use imperils the traditional attempt to
separate civilian and military objects. We also have little knowledge of con-
flict termination strategies. The radius of clear-cutting destruction in prior
world wars gives us little basis for judging whether narrow targeting against a
limited set of assets will dissuade an adversary from acting badly. One devoutly
wishes to protect civilian populations on both sides from the hardships of war.
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Yet leadership morale and regime stability are also linked to the general condi-
tion of a country's infrastructure.
Indeed, if law is to be based on accepted State practice, we should be honest
about the possible mismatch between the humanitarian purposes of well-
intended States in using armed force and the facts of the battlefield. Strategists
of air power argue that the pinprick bombing of purely military materiel may
not suffice to cause regime collapse. Targeting tanks on the battlefield may be
effective in a desert war or on the plains of Europe, but it can be wholly ineffec-
tive as a strategy where the adversary's illicit behavior is carried out by uncon-
ventional means or even where the adversary happens to enjoy mountainous
terrain and cloudy weather. The prudential view of choosing a fight in the
most advantageous circumstances—whether against an ideological antagonist
or an aggressor bent on regional or global domination—is not available if one
is undertaking intervention for humanitarian ends within a civil conflict.
Lacking a choice of the field of engagement, humanitarian intervention may
be forced to resort to bluntly coercive methods.
Proportionality and Repair
In humanitarian intervention, the "incidental" damage to civilians will
include both wartime casualties and damage to the infrastructure. (Indeed, it
was anticipation of the latter that persuaded Milosevic to surrender, if we
credit Belgrade's new ambassador to the United Nations and former Finnish
president Martti Ahtisaari.) The hardship to civilians from infrastructure
damage is likely to deepen over time, as supplies run short, weather gets
colder, and civilians become exhausted in jerry-rigging alternatives. Unspent
munitions also can pose a continuing danger, as we see in the case of cluster
bombs.
We may wish to think of proportionality as possessing the element of
time—and as a dynamic requirement. If the victorious country and its allies
assist in rapid repair of the infrastructure and economy, the effective penalty
of "incidental damage" will be far less harsh. The post-war clearance of un-
exploded munitions, though not a legal requirement as such, can also limit
direct civilian damage (though continued local fighting may make it hard to
do this safely or expeditiously) . Proportionality in warfighting should be seen
as a joint responsibility of the civilian and military sectors together, extending
into the post-conflict period.
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Conclusion
In a post-Kosovo world, the international community must be prepared to
look at humanitarian intervention with clear eyes, in determining when it is
legitimate to intervene and in thinking through the applicable standards. We
must also recognize the complexity of the tasks we give our military forces in
hazardous and remote environments. Any post-conflict evaluations must
appreciate the difficulties inherent in the application of the rules of conven-
tional warfare in the intricate tasks of limited war, coercive diplomacy, and
humanitarian protection.
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I find the presentations of Professor Roberts and Professor Wedgwood verystimulating indeed. There are observations with which I am in complete
agreement and it only remains to me to emphasize their significance. At the
same time, there are also some points in both papers that, in my opinion, call for
clarification or dispute.
First, about the relationship, discussed here by various speakers, between
jus ad bellum and jus in hello. These branches of international law are separate
in the sense that notwithstanding the status of parties of an armed conflict in
the light ofjus ad bellum (i.e., notwithstanding whether one is an aggressor or a
victim of aggression) , they are equal in the light ofjus in hello. In that respect,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the advisory opinion on Nuclear
Weapons created a novelty distinguishing between "an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake" 1 and
other circumstances. Only in the former circumstances, as the Court said, it
"cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful." 2 Paragraph 105 (2) E of the advisory opinion
seems to indicate, on the one hand, that in all other circumstances the use of
(or threat to use) nuclear weapons is unlawful, i.e., contrary to international
humanitarian law. On the other hand, such a formula seems to make what
would otherwise be unlawful under jus in hello lawful (or at least not necessar-
ily unlawful) because of different status of parties in the light oijus ad helium.
1. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 78, 11
105 (2) E (July 8) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons].
2. Id.
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In jus ad bellum the concept of survival of a State may be expressed through
the right to self-defense. Obviously, only a victim of an armed attack, and not
its perpetrator, has such a right. A State that has committed an armed attack
does not have the right to self-defense even if its survival is at stake as a result
of measures taken in self-defense. 3 In jus in hello the victim's right to survival
may be expressed through the concept of military necessity. As Judge Higgins,
dealing with possible use of nuclear weapons, wrote in her Dissenting
Opinion:
It must be that, in order to meet the legal requirement that a military target may
not be attacked if collateral civilian casualties would be excessive in relation to
military advantage, the 'military advantage' must indeed be one related to the
very survival of a State or the avoidance of infliction (whether by nuclear or
other weapons of mass destruction) of vast and severe suffering on its own
population: and that no other method of eliminating this military target be
available.4
This carefully formulated passage does not, however, explain why only a State
acting in self-defense may use nuclear weapons as a last resort when its sur-
vival is at stake. Assuming that even a victim of an armed attack has to ob-
serve requirements of jus in hello, the only explanation seems to be that by
committing an armed attack the aggressor has forfeited its right to survival ex-
pressed through the concept of self-defense. In that way, a wrong done in the
light ofjus ad helium has an impact on jus in hello since the concept of survival
crosses both branches of international law. The victim's right to survival raises
the bar against which military advantage resulting, for example, from the use
of nuclear weapons has to be measured. In such circumstances even signifi-
cant civilian casualties may not be excessive in relation to the military advan-
tage achieved.
3. The requirements of necessity and proportionality may nevertheless protect the survival even
of an aggressor State. A small-scale armed attack does not give the victim the right to respond by
destroying the attacker. Although Professor Dinstein writes that "once the war is raging, the
exercise of self-defence may bring about 'the destruction of the enemy's army,' regardless of the
condition of proportionality," he correctly points out that "it would be utterly incongruous to
permit an all-out war whenever a State absorbs an isolated armed attack, however marginal. . .
.
Proportionality has to be a major consideration in pondering the legitimacy of a defensive war."
(Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 208-209 (3d ed. 2001)).
4. Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Higgins, 11
21.
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Be that as it may with extreme circumstances of self-defense, it remains cer-
tain that all parties have to equally abide by the requirements ofjus in hello. 5 In
that sense these branches of international law are separate. However, this
does not mean that there are no points of contact between jus ad bellum and
jus in hello. For example, I find the link between jus ad helium and jus in hello
discussed in Professor Roberts's paper quite new and interesting. Indeed, ex-
treme cases of violation ofjus in hello, like massive violations of human rights,
as he writes, "can help to legitimize certain uses of force."
Adam Roberts's conclusion is rather cautious; I would say a lawyerly one
even though he is the Montegue Burton Professor of International Relations
at Oxford University. He says that massive violations of jus in hello can help
(emphasis added) to legitimize certain uses of force. This seems to suppose
that other conditions (say, threats to international peace and security) have to
be, if not overwhelming, then at least playing a significant role in triggering
such uses of force. However, even more importantly, Roberts uses the word
"legitimize" instead of, for example, "making it lawful." This seems to indicate
that his views on this issue are, if not identical, then and least close to those of
Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley who wrote in the aftermath of the Indian
intervention in Eastern Pakistan:
[U]ndeniably, there are circumstances in which the unilateral use of force to
overthrow injustice begins to seem less wrong than to turn aside. Like civil
disobedience, however, this sense of superior 'necessity' belongs in the realm of
not law but of moral choice, which nations, like individuals, must sometimes
make weighing the costs and benefits of to their cause, to social fabric, and to
themselves.6
Professor Franck made a similar comment more than a quarter of a century
later observing that "NATO's action in Kosovo is not the first time illegal steps
have been taken to prevent something palpably worse." 7 Bruno Simma, analyz-
ing the Kosovo conflict, believes in the same vein that sometimes "imperative
5. Here I have to express my reservations to Professor Wedgwood's comment that "most leaders
and publics may in fact believe there is an important link between the legitimate purpose of a war
and its allowable tactics." It may be true that many people believe indeed in the existence ofsuch
a link. Osama bin Laden and his ilk seem to be convinced of the existence of such a link.
However, the acceptance of such an approach would lead to the erosion of the very foundations
of jus in bello.
6. Thomas Franck & Nigel Rodley, After Bangladesh: the Law of Humanitarian Intervention by
Military Force, 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1973).
7. Thomas Franck, Break It, Do Not Fake It, 78 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 18 (1999).
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political and moral considerations may appear to leave no choice but to act
outside law" since "legal issues presented by the Kosovo crisis are particularly
impressive proof that hard cases make bad law."8
My comment on the last point is short. I am sure, only hard cases can
make law for hard cases. If hard cases (and uses of military force are all hard
cases) were to make only bad law or no law at all then there would be no jus ad
bellum or jus in hello, for that matter, at all. Maritime delimitation cases or pre-
cedents on diplomatic privileges and immunities do not make law for jus ad
bellum or jus in hello. Only practice involving use of force may make or change
law governing use of force.
I would like to argue with Adam Roberts when he writes that "it is doubt-
ful whether there is, or is likely to be a 'right' of humanitarian intervention"
and that "the recognition of a link between jus in hello and jus ad helium falls far
short of any general recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention."
Taking into account what Professors Franck, Rodley and Simma have said on
the issue and Roberts's point that "massive violations ofjus in hello can help to
legitimize (emphasis added) certain uses of force," one may conclude either
that (1) certain uses of force are not suitable (amenable) for legal regulation,
i.e., they have to be considered as being beyond the realm of international law
or (2) though such uses of force are contrary to international law (i.e., they are
unlawful), they are nevertheless legitimate since they are morally justifiable or
in some instances even necessary from the moral point of view. Such an ap-
proach also presumes that some international practice is so unique, so excep-
tional, that it does not, cannot, or should not contribute to changes in law.
I cannot agree with that kind of reasoning both for practical and doctrinal
reasons. First, speaking from the doctrinal point of view, I do not think that
there can be or there should be such a gap between legitimacy and legal-
ity—between international law and morality. In most sensitive areas (use of
force, human rights, etc.) international law is heavily value-loaded. If it is gen-
erally true that in international relations practice has a tendency to become
law (ex facto jus oritur), morally justifiable practice, even if rare and unique,
should be accepted sooner rather that later. In practical terms, if there were
such a gap between law and morality it would be damaging for both of them.
It seems difficult indeed to conclude that Operation Provide Comfort in
Northern Iraq, ECOWAS (Economic Community ofWest African States) in-
terventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Operation Allied Force in the
8. Bruno Simma, Nato, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
International Law 3 (1999).
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Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, together with some earlier cases of use of force
where humanitarian considerations played at least some role, have led to the
crystallization of a right of humanitarian intervention in international law. At
the same time, these cases (and some even more ambiguous earlier examples)
show that there is considerable tolerance towards interventions when human-
itarian catastrophes are genuine and interventions can and do realistically al-
leviate the sufferings of thousands if not millions of people. Such tolerance is
called in the language of international law "acquiescence" and it may contrib-
ute to changes in customary international law (or even treaty law)
.
If this practice and the reaction to it by the majority of States do not testify
conclusively that there is a right to intervene militarily for humanitarian pur-
poses, it means not only that at least some humanitarian interventions are le-
gitimate (or as Roberts says, "massive violations of jus in hello can help to
legitimize certain uses of force") but also that such interventions are not un-
questionably contrary to international law. A customary norm prohibiting any
humanitarian intervention could not have crystallized in such circumstances.
Therefore, I find that the purpose of Operation Allied Force, if not all the mo-
dalities of its execution, was not only morally justifiable, it was also not unlaw-
ful in the light of international law. Using the wording of Nguen Quoc Dinh,
Patrick Dailler and Alan Pellet, "Vintervention d'humanite ne beneficie pas d'une
habilitation expresse, mais sa condamnation ne fait pas non plus Vobjet d'un consen-
sus suffisant pour que ce soit degagee une opinio juris qui permaitrait d!affirmer
rUliceite de cette forme d'intervention"9
Today even this cautious formula seems too restrictive. I believe that State
practice, especially in the 1990s, has shown that in the case of a clash between
two fundamental principles of international law—non-use of force and re-
spect for basic human rights—it is not always the non-use of force principle
that has necessarily to prevail. Massive violations of human rights or humani-
tarian law may justify proportionate and adequate measures involving use of
military force. Here one has to balance two conflicting principles by consider-
ing all concrete circumstances that necessarily are unique and urgent.
My next comment, and related to the previous one, concerns Professor
Roberts's point that "any decision of forcible intervention must involve a bal-
ancing of considerations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances, not
9. "Though there is no express permission of humanitarian intervention neither is there
consensus concerning the condemnation of such interventions that would amount to the opinio
juris on the illegality of this form of intervention." NGUEN QUOC DlNH, PATRICK DAILLER
and Alan Pellet, Droit international publique 892 (5th ed. 1994).
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the assertion of a general right." I believe that there is not necessarily a contra-
diction between the existence of a right and the need to balance various con-
siderations "in the face of unique and urgent circumstances." In sensitive
domains of international law and politics (and practically all issues involving
use of force belong to this category) the need to balance not only various pol-
icy considerations but also different principles of international law, often indi-
cating in opposite directions, is rather a rule than an exception. If there were
no right to intervene for humanitarian purposes, then however much one bal-
anced various considerations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances,
any intervention would be unlawful.
The NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over
Kosovo was the first collective intervention where humanitarian consider-
ations were overwhelming. As it was not authorized by the Security Council,
concerns for peace and stability in Europe (though they certainly played an
important role) alone would not have justified this use of force. Therefore, the
justifiable cause of the intervention was humanitarian. However, as humani-
tarian intervention has been and still is a highly contested concept, doctrinal
works have so far been concentrated only on the issue of the legitimacy or le-
gality (illegality) of the use of force for humanitarian purposes (jus ad bellum
aspect). No attention has been paid to the legitimacy or legality of modalities
of use of force for these purposes (which includes both jus ad bellum and jus in
hello aspect). As Roberts has remarked, "in the long history of legal debates
about humanitarian intervention, there has been a consistent failure to ad-
dress directly the question of methods used in such interventions." 10
It goes without saying that the laws of armed conflict must apply in the case
of humanitarian intervention. What interests us here is whether (and if yes,
then to what extent) the objective of such intervention
—
protection of hu-
man rights—has any impact on the modalities of the use of force?
Ifwe compare the modalities of the use of force as a collective security mea-
sure authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
with the modalities of the use of force in self-defense, we see that there may be
substantial differences depending on the purpose of the use of force. Let us
take as an example the response of the Coalition to the Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait. In this response, there were elements of both collective
10. Adam Roberts, Nato's "Humanitarian War" over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL, Autumn 1999, at
110.
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self-defense and collective security. 11 The right to self-defense gave the Coali-
tion the right (even without the Security Council authorization) to use force
to liberate Kuwait, to put an end to the armed aggression and to restore the
status quo ante. But only Security Council resolutions, as a measure of collec-
tive security under Chapter VII, created an adequate legal basis for the actions
(including military) aimed at forcing the regime ofSaddam Hussein to destroy
its programs of production ofweapons of mass destruction and missiles. These
measures went beyond what a State (or States) can do in self-defense, but Se-
curity Council resolutions provided the basis for measures necessary for the
restoration and maintenance of peace and security in the region.
In the area of self-defense, it is the Caroline formula that reflects customary
international law. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to Mr Fox, the
British Minister to Washington, that it had to be demonstrated that there was
the necessity to use force in self-defense that was "instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" and that the act
"justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it." 12 There is no reason to believe that these requirements
apply only in the case of self-defense or that this formula has in mind only
so-called anticipatory self-defense. It seems to be possible to generalize all
these criteria by the term of adequacy which, depending on the circum-
stances, includes necessity, proportionality and even immediacy. Every use of
force, in order to be lawful, has to be adequate to the situation that calls for
the use of force. Or to put it slightly differently: the modalities of the use of
force have to correspond to the purposes of its use. This requirement belongs
both to jus ad helium and jus in hello.
Analyzing self-defense, Yoram Dinstein distinguishes between "on the
spot reaction," "defensive armed reprisals," responses to an "accumulation
of events" and "war of self-defence" as different modalities of the use of force
that can be resorted to depending on the character of the armed attack that
has triggered the right to use force in self-defense. 13 The legality of these mo-
dalities of self-defense is dependent on the character of the armed attack. Ju-
dith Gardam writes that "in the Gulf conflict the massive aerial bombardment
11. See Rein Miillerson & David Scheffer, The Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, in BEYOND
CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (Lori
Damrosch, Gennady Danilenko & Rein Mullerson eds., 1995).
12. John Basset Moore, The Caroline, in 2 Digest of International Law 412 (1906). See
also, R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (J 938).
13. See DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 192-221.
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of the infrastructure of Iraq had to be balanced against its contribution to the
removal of Iraq from Kuwait." 14
A good example of the adequacy of measures undertaken may be opera-
tions to rescue one's nationals abroad, which is often considered to be a spe-
cial case of self-defense. Whether one regards it as a separate ground for the
lawful use of force or as being within the parameters of the right to self-de-
fense, practically all authors agree that the purpose of the use of force (rescu-
ing nationals) conditions the modalities that may be used. As C.H.M.
Waldock wrote, measures of protection must be "strictly confined to the ob-
ject of protecting them [nationals] against injury." 15
In the light of these distinctions between modalities of self-defense depend-
ing on the character ofan armed attack, it seems natural that the modalities of
the use of force for humanitarian purposes must also correspond to the objec-
tives of the use of force. They have to be adequate to these objectives.
Fernando Teson writing of humanitarian intervention observes that "the gen-
eral rule is that the coercion in the operation and the consequent harm done
by it have to be proportionate to the importance of the interest that is being
served, both in terms of the intrinsic moral weight of the goal and in terms of
the extent to which that goal is served." 16
The objectives of Operation Allied Force, as declared by NATO and the
G-8 and confirmed by the Security Council, where: (1) immediate and verifi-
able end of violence and repression in Kosovo; (2) withdrawal from Kosovo of
military and paramilitary forces; (3) deployment in Kosovo of effective inter-
national civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United
Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives; (4)
establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the
Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful
and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; (5) the safe and free return of all
refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitar-
ian organizations; (6) a political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
14. Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, in
International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons
281 (Lawrence Boisson de Chazournes &. Philipe Sands eds., 1999).
15. C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law,
81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 467 (1952).
16. Fernando Teson, A Philosophy of International Law 64 (1998).
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the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; and
(7) a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization
of the crisis region. 17
The question is: do these objectives that are different from objectives of
other types of use of force (e.g., in self-defense or as a measure of collective se-
curity) determine also what kind of force can be used? Although neither the
Hague or Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocols to the latter nor cus-
tomary international law contain any references to wars of self-defense, col-
lective security operations or humanitarian interventions, distinguishing only
between international armed conflicts and armed conflicts of non-interna-
tional character, that does not mean that requirements of necessity, propor-
tionality or even immediacy may not lead to distinctions between applicable
law depending on the purpose of the use of force.
It seems that the NATO response was not, using the Naulilaa formula, "ex-
cessively disproportionate" 18 to the achievement of the objectives of this hu-
manitarian intervention. There was not simply a potential and imminent
threat to human lives in Kosovo leaving little time for deliberation; human
lives were actually being lost and crimes against humanity were actually being
committed before NATO intervened. The world community, represented
inter alia by the UN Security Council, had already given peaceful diplomacy a
chance but the ethnic cleansing continued unabated.
The primary or general objective of any humanitarian intervention is to
stop massive human rights violations. In the case of Kosovo it was to stop eth-
nic cleansing and, foremost, the murder and torture through which the ethnic
cleansing was being carried out. All other objectives are to be subordinated to
this primary objective. They are aimed at reversing, if possible, the results of
human rights violations, at ensuring that violations will not recur in the future
and at punishing those who have committed acts of genocide, war crimes or
crimes against humanity. But the primary objective is to stop violations (i.e.,
to protect victims) that have engendered the intervention.
The NATO intervention, in the end, stopped such human rights viola-
tions. But the fact that it achieved this objective only in the end seems to be
the major shortcoming of Operation Allied Force. I completely agree with
Professor Roberts when he believes that "in the 1999 war it was
17. See general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis in Annex 1 of Security
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
18. The Naulilaa Case (Port. V. Germ. 1928), 2 REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL
AWARDS 1028 (1928).
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disadvantageous to NATO, and to the inhabitants of Kosovo, that Milosevic
was not confronted with a more convincing threat of land operations in the
province." The openly declared refusal to use ground troops and the exclusive
use of air power allowed the ethnic cleansing not only to continue unabated,
but also even to intensify for a while. Earlier Roberts had emphasized that "the
initial exclusion of the option of a land invasion was the most extraordinary
aspect ofNATO's resort to force." 19
One has to bear in mind that the Hutu extremists in their genocidal attack
against the Tutsis in 1994 killed an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 people
within approximately one month. 20 Ethnic cleansing, even without massive
killing of the Rwandan scale, can also be carried out with extreme speed. The
Croats, for example, drove out more than 200
y000 Serbs from Krajina within
just three days. 21 Thus, Milosevic could have expelled or killed most of the Al-
banian population of Kosovo while NATO was bombing targets in Serbia
proper to protect the Kosovars. In humanitarian interventions, the exclusive
use of aerial bombardment without even a plausible threat to use ground
troops may be a terrible gamble. Therefore, an intervention seems to be inade-
quate to the objectives of the use of force when it is carried out by means of
bombing military and dual-purpose objectives outside the area where human
rights violations are being committed in order to persuade the authorities to
stop violations, without at least being ready to use force to protect immedi-
ately and directly the victims of massive human rights violations. Here the re-
mark of Professor Wedgwood that "a gradual war of attrition that might defeat
Belgrade in slow motion was unacceptable in light ofhuman values at stake in
the conflict" is rather pertinent.
What may be adequate in a war of self-defense or in a war against terrorism
(also a specific form of self-defense) may be inadequate in the case of humani-
tarian intervention. We see that just as modalities of use of force as a counter-
measure depend on the characteristics of the initial wrong, so too does jus in
hello (the law of armed conflict) depend on jus ad helium (the law on lawful
causes of use of force) . Here the bridge between the two branches of interna-
tional law is the requirement of adequacy (including, as it was said earlier, ne-
cessity, proportionality and even immediacy)—the requirement that is central
to both of them. Daniel Webster, speaking of self-defense in the Caroline case
wrote that "the act justified by that necessity of self-defense, must be limited
19. Roberts, supra note 10, at 112.
20. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1994/640 (May 31, 1994).
21. Tim Judah, Kosovo's Road to War, 41 SURVIVAL, Summer 1999, at 12.
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by that necessity and kept clearly within it."22 We may paraphrase it by saying
that an act justified by the necessity of humanitarian intervention must be
limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.
It seems that the bridge of adequacy between purposes of the use of force
and its modalities is especially important today when threats to peace and se-
curity stem not so much from the clash of interests of superpowers or
cross-border attacks by one State against another, but from internal con-
flicts, massive human rights violations and terrorism. Here Roberts's remark
about the restrictive character of the oft-quoted expression in the 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration that "the only legitimate object which States should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the en-
emy" is rather pertinent. As he writes, the laws of war "by no means exclude
the application of military force against the adversary's war-making capacity
and system of government." I support Roberts's call to NATO members "to
address the question of how their conception of war relates to the laws of
war, and whether any modifications of either are indicated by this experi-
ence. The question of what is a military objective, addressed most exten-
sively in Protocol I, is central." 23
The Kosovo experience shows that what is and what is not a military ob-
jective is, to an extent at least, dependent on the purpose of war. In that re-
spect Roberts rightly draws our attention to the East Timor crisis writing
that "it appears that a systematic campaign of bombing was not a serious op-
tion" in that crisis. Depending on the purposes of the use of force (e.g., to
rescue one's nationals abroad) the adversary's armed forces (even the con-
cept of adversary or enemy becomes uncertain in the case of many new
threats) may not be the main target at all.
Adam Roberts wrote earlier that:
[T]he main problem in Kosovo was that, because it proved relatively easy to
conceal military units and movable equipment from attacks from the air, there
was especially strong pressure on the Nato alliance to attack fixed targets,
which in many cases (bridges, power stations, buildings of various types, the
broadcasting station in Belgrade) had civilian as well as military functions. 24
22. MOORE, supra note 12, at 919.
23. See Professor Roberts's paper in this volume, supra, at 418.
24. Id.
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In the light of what I have said above, I believe that targets such as bridges,
power stations and other similar dual-purpose objects, which may be legiti-
mate targets in the case ofmore conventional military operations (e.g., when
force is used in self-defense), should not be military objectives (save maybe
exceptional circumstances) in humanitarian operations.
All interventions that have so far been analyzed as humanitarian (not-
withstanding whether accepted or rejected as such) have been carried out by
ground troops and not by air strikes only. 25 The point is that though massive
human rights violations may be stopped at the end of the day by hitting op-
pressive regimes' military and dual-purpose objects in order to persuade
them to stop violations, the effects of such violations (which well may con-
tinue or even exacerbate while such military force is used) can be reversed
only to an extent. Those who are killed remain dead. Those who are raped
remain raped. Even those who are "only" expelled remain traumatized for
the rest of their life and many of them, as historical experience shows, never
return.
Ruth Wedgwood raises a delicate issue of "the difficulties controlling sur-
rogate ground forces" or local insurgents who "share many of the illiberal
qualities" of their opponents. In Kosovo such a force was the so-called
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) whom President Clinton had earlier
branded (and not without serious ground) terrorists. It is a dilemma of
whether or not to support bad guys against the worst guys. Cooperation with
such groups may be dictated by considerations of military necessity, but one
should not forget that very often those who fight against oppressors fight
only for their own freedom to oppress others.
One can only hope that after the Kosovo experience and other develop-
ments pointing in the same direction26 at least some would-be human rights
violators will not rely on State sovereignty and will think twice before embark-
ing on their murderous paths. At the same time, this experience teaches us
that it is difficult to protect other peoples' lives without being ready to sacrifice
lives of one's own soldiers. In our so imperfect world those who care about hu-
man rights and want to make the world safer vis-a-vis terrorist attacks cannot
afford to become soft. Unfortunately, dictators and terrorists (often these no-
tions overlap since dictators use terror to stay in power, while terrorists are
25. See, e.g., ANTHONY AREND & ROBERT BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 112-137 (1993).
26. For example, the functioning of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals in The
Hague, the arrest of General Pinochet in London, the adoption of the Statute of the permanent
International Criminal Court.
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aspiring dictators who want to impose their beliefs and aims on others) under-
stand and respect only force. Mutual hatred and respect between Stalin and
Hitler was not accidental.
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Horace B. Robertson, Jr.
I shall confine my comments to the papers presented by Professors Robertsand Wedgwood. First, as to Adam Roberts's paper. Professor Roberts has
laid out eight issues that arose during the Kosovo air campaign, which he as-
serts are likely to affect the way in which the law is viewed, influences events,
and develops further in the future. I will single out three of these for my com-
ments.
First, is there now a stronger link between jus in hello and jus ad belluml
Roberts asserts that the 1990s saw a strengthening of the idea that a system-
atic pattern of basic humanitarian norms may justify acts of military interven-
tion. "Quite simply," he states, "massive violations oijus in hello can help to
legitimize certain uses of force." 1 While I do not quarrel with Roberts's con-
clusion, it seems to me that while justification for intervention by another
State or international entity may rest in part on a systematic pattern of viola-
tions of jus in hello in a civil war, that is solely an issue of jus ad helium. The
conduct of the intervening party once involved in the conflict is completely
independent of whether or not the intervention meets the test of jus ad
helium. The intervening party is obligated, both by treaty and customary inter-
national law, to abide by the principles and rules of/us in hello. With respect to
the obligations of the almost universally binding 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Common Article 2 provides unequivocally: "the present Convention shall ap-
ply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war
1. See Professor Roberts's paper in this volume, supra, at 410.
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is not recognized by one of them." 2
This principle is reiterated in Articles 1(1) and 3(a) of Protocol I, which
state that the Protocol shall apply "from the beginning" of any armed conflict
referred to in Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions. 3 Although not ail parties to
the Kosovo intervention were parties to Protocol I, the principle it states
seems to have been generally accepted as a part of the customary law of war.
The United States CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement provide, for example:
"US forces will comply with the Law ofWar during military operations involv-
ing armed conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized under in-
ternational law, and will comply with its principles and spirit during all other
operations."4 The US Navy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Op-
erations, likewise provides as follows: "Regardless of whether the use of armed
force in a particular circumstance is prohibited by the United Nations Charter
(and therefore unlawful) , the manner in which the resulting armed conflict is con-
ducted continues to be regulated by the law of armed conflict"5 This principle is
valid today and should be applied in any future conflict.
Now to the second question that Professor Roberts asks that I would like to
address. Is there tension between the NATO/US strategic doctrine which
aims at putting pressure on the adversary's government and the implicit as-
sumption of the laws of war that the adversary's armed forces are the main le-
gitimate object of attack? If so, how can this tension be addressed?
My answer is that I do not believe there is a tension between the strategic
objective of putting pressure on the enemy's leadership and the tactical con-
duct of the military campaign. After all, the ultimate object of any military
campaign is some political objective; the campaign itself can be fully
2. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, authentic text in Final Record of the
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 1, Federal Political Department, Berne, 205-224,
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman eds., 1988). The
provisions of Convention II (Wounded, sick and shipwrecked), Convention III (Prisoners of
War) and Convention IV (Civilians) are identical.
3. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS-
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3 12 1.01A, Standing Rules of
Engagement for US Forces, Enclosure A, 11 lg (Jan. 15, 2000).
5. The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP
M4M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1, at 1 5.1 (1997) (emphasis added).
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compliant with law of war in reaching this strategic objective. As Clausewitz
wrote in his much-quoted statement, "War is not merely a political act, but
also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out
the same by other means."6 This statement is neutral with respect to the legiti-
macy of the military means and methods of carrying out the campaigns. The
legitimacy of the resort to armed force does not excuse the violation of the
laws of war (jus in hello) nor does it render unlawful the compliant actions of a
soldier, airman or sailor engaged in a conflict, the entry into which by his na-
tion may be regarded as unlawful under the principles ofjus ad bellum.
It should be noted in this connection that the Committee established by
the Prosecutor of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) was asked to address the linkage between the jus in hello and the jus ad
helium. 1 The Committee was specifically asked to address the allegations that
since the resort to force by NATO had not been authorized by the Security
Council, the resort to force was illegal and consequently "all forceful measures
taken by NATO were unlawful."8 The Committee declined to address this is-
sue as a matter of practice, "which we consider to be in accord with the most
widely accepted and reputable legal opinion."9
The third question raised by Professor Roberts that I would like to address
is what, if anything, might need to be done about the paradox that the United
States is simultaneously a principal upholder of the obligation of States to ob-
serve the laws of war, and a non-party to several important agreements.
Professor Roberts lists a number of agreements to which the United States
is not a party, the most significant being Protocol I. While the other agree-
ments listed are important, Protocol I is the most significant because it gives
concrete definition to a number of principles that traditionally formed a part
of the customary laws of war governing the methods and means of warfare but
which have not been codified in a single document. As Professor Roberts ac-
knowledges, although it is not a party, "the United States takes at least some
of these accords more seriously than some States that are parties." 10 As Colo-
nel Graham has stated, the fact that the United States was not a party to
6. Karl von Clausewitz, On War (1832).
7. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1111 30-4, 39 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1265-6 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to
the Prosecutor].
8. Id., U 30.
9. Id., U 34.
10. See Professor Roberts's paper in this volume, supra, at 428.
459
Commentary
Protocol I had no effect on the conduct of the war in Kosovo. 11 What the
United States loses by not being a party, in my view, is the legal (and moral)
authority, in taking to task non-complying States which are parties, of reliance
on the implementation and enforcement provisions of these agreements. As
Roberts points out, a principal feature of these latter-day agreements is their
provision for implementation and enforcement measures. Adherence would
enable the United States to rely on and cite specific binding agreements in-
stead of relying on the sometimes vague and ambiguous principles of the cus-
tomary international law of war.
A greater paradox in this field, and perhaps a more fruitful field for future
action, is pointed out by Professor Murphy in the final paragraph of his paper
submitted to this colloquium. He states:
To this observer, it is ironic that so much attention has been devoted to the
issue of whether NATO complied with the jus in bello in its Kosovo campaign.
For when one looks at practices in other conflicts around the
world—Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Sudan, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, to
name just a few—one sees not only no effort to comply with the jus in bello but
barbaric practices that flout even the most elementary dictates of humanity.
Accordingly, the most strenuous efforts should be made to induce States and
other combatants to adhere to at least the ethical and moral dimensions of
international humanitarian law, regardless of the presence or absence of a
formal legal obligation to do so. 12
Now let me turn briefly to Professor Wedgwood's paper. I can be brief here
because what I have said earlier applies to some extent to the issues she raises.
She states that the "asserted independence of the two regimes [jus ad bellum
and jus in bello] may be no more than a fiction." 13 She argues that the Kosovo
campaign was not a war to settle a commercial or boundary dispute but one to
protect basic human rights and therefore that, "[w]hether one's framework is
utilitarian or pure principle, it is possible to admit that the merits of a war
make a difference in our tolerance for methods of warfighting." 14
I submit such a principle places one on a very slippery slope. Any linkage
between the two principles has been universally rejected by the relevant inter-
national agreements and (in the words of the Report to the Prosecutor) "the
11. See Colonel Graham's comments in this volume, supra, at 378.
12. See Professor Murphy's paper in this volume, supra, at 255.
13. See Professor Wedgwood's paper in this volume, supra, at 434-5.
14. Id.
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most widely accepted and reputable legal opinion." 15 In my comments on Pro-
fessor Roberts's paper I made the point that both international agreements
and customary international law have firmly settled that the rules ofwar apply
to the conduct of hostilities regardless ofwhether we are assessing the conduct
of those on the "good" side of the conflict or those on the "bad" (or aggressor)
side. I repeat it here because I firmly believe it is well established in all of the
international agreements that deal with the subject and in customary interna-
tional law. I also believe it is morally justified and the only workable way of
judging compliance with the law ofwar by subordinate participants in the con-
flict. Judging which is the "good" or the "bad" side of any conflict is essentially
subjective. I have never heard of a national leader who did not assert that his
cause was "just." Are we to judge the conduct of subordinate military officers
on the ground that they find themselves fighting on the wrong side of a war? I
submit that the question answers itself.
I agree, however, with Professor Wedgwood in her expressions of concern
about the contentious role of civilian tribunals in the post-war trial of those
accused of violations of the law of war. This problem is aggravated by the de-
velopment of precision-guided munitions and the increasing transparency of
targeting decisions made by military authorities resulting from almost instan-
taneous on-scene television reporting and analysis as well as cockpit-monitor-
ing of strike weapons from launch to detonation. What may appear to be a
reasonable and lawful targeting decision to a commander enveloped in the fog
of war may take on an entirely different appearance with the advantage of
hindsight. Judging whether that decision is lawful or not is certainly difficult
for any tribunal but particularly so for one which may not have a full apprecia-
tion that, as Professor Wedgwood states, "implementation of many aspects of
the law of war depends on battlefield judgments and knowledge of campaign
strategy." 16 While it would be desirable in my view (and apparently also in Pro-
fessor Wedgwood's) that such judgments should be made by a military tribu-
nal with membership familiar with these factors, I am afraid that we have gone
too far down the road toward civilian tribunals to make possible a reversal of
that policy. The tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions for
universal jurisdiction of "grave breaches" have set us off on a course that may
be irreversible. We can, I think, however, take some temporary comfort at
least from the Report to the Prosecutor, which appeared to take a
15. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 34.
16. See Professor Wedgwood's paper in this volume, supra, at 435.
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knowledgeable and sophisticated approach to its analysis of allegations of war
crimes by NATO forces in the air campaign.
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Harvey Dalton
I think there are three verities that we need to be aware of throughout ourdiscussions in this area. Professor Robertson has already mentioned
one—that the use of force is a continuation of political relations by other
means. I think another verity is embodied in Article 2(7) of the UN Char-
ter, which provides that domestic matters are the sole responsibility of sov-
ereign States. I think another verity is also embodied in the UN Charter,
that is the inviolability of the territorial integrity and political independence
of sovereign States.
We've heard from time to time that Operation Allied Force was a humani-
tarian intervention and that there might be a right of humanitarian interven-
tion. I agree with Professors Roberts and Walker that, at least in my view,
there is no right of humanitarian intervention and that the situation in
Kosovo was an extraordinary situation dominated by necessity. It was neces-
sary for the NATO alliance to use force. There were no alternative means. All
alternative means had been exhausted.
But assuming that Kosovo was a humanitarian intervention, there have been
some comments that maybe the rules should be different when we talk about
the use of force as a part of humanitarian intervention. My question is why?
What makes this so different from an ordinary armed conflict that the rules
should be different? If we're going to apply the jus in hello, it should apply on all
instances of armed hostilities. In this case, the weapons were no less deadly,
the systems were just as effective and just as destructive, the clash of the
armed forces was just as deadly, and the effects on civilians were no different.
There seems to be some implicit criticism of NATO's decision to keep its
planes above fifteen thousand feet as ifNATO was not being quite correct in
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playing by these rules. I would like to simply point out that the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had one of the most sophisticated integrated air de-
fense systems in Europe. FRY forces did put our pilots and aircraft in harm's
way. They shot down two of our aircraft. There's no evidence that I'm aware
of that NATO's decision to stay above fifteen thousand feet affected the accu-
racy of our weapons. We did have outliers (missiles or bombs that drop outside
the area they were targeted at). We did have mistakes. But there's no evi-
dence that the fifteen thousand foot restriction or ceiling affected the accu-
racy. The fifteen thousand foot altitude protected our aircraft against the FRY
anti-aircraft artillery, but it did not protect those aircraft against surface-to-air
missiles. You might contemplate that fact on your way home from this collo-
quium when you're flying at thirty-seven thousand feet, because an SA-2 can
reach out and touch you at thirty-seven thousand feet.
As Colonel Sorenson mentioned yesterday, fifteen thousand feet is not very
high. Mistakes have been made at far less than fifteen thousand feet. I would
refer you to the US/UK blue-on-blue clash that occurred during Operation
Desert Storm. That incident occurred at much less than fifteen thousand feet.
Finally, I would like to turn very briefly to the reference by Professor Wedg-
wood to the international institutions and international tribunals. I would
agree with Professor Roberts that there has not been a critical review of the
Committee's Report to the Prosecutor on the Kosovo operation. I'd like to
give you two examples from this report. The Committee uncritically accepted
the definition ofenvironmental crime contained in the International Criminal
Court statute:
Operational reality is recognized in the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, an authoritative indicator of evolving customary international law on
this point, where Article 8(b)(iv) makes the infliction of incidental
environmental damage an offence only if the attack is launched intentionally in
the knowledge that it will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 1
Now that was an uncritical acceptance of a crime that was defined in the ICC
Statute, and there are a few people here that can tell you—Charles Garaway in
particular—that this was a definition that was cobbled together as a
1. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 21, 39 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1263 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A.
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compromise by various lawyers from likeminded States in a restaurant at the
top of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn in October 1995 or 1996. It's a
compromise. Yet here's an uncritical acceptance of this definition in a statute
that is not in force. We need a critical review of this Committee's Report.
Another example is the Committee's rather tight control on the attacks on
propaganda and a rather critical statement concerning the attack on the RTS
(Serbian TV and radio station) transmission facility. It must be known that
the RTS system was critical to sustaining the war effort and the ethnic cleans-
ing effort by the FRY. It also directed virulent propaganda against NATO
with the view to breaking up the alliance or shattering our unanimity. It was
part of a determined effort to conceal what was actually happening in Kosovo.
I think it's very important to recognize that in an authoritative regime such as
in Yugoslavia, propaganda is essential. Control of the populous is essential and
propaganda is the means by doing it. Let me give you a quote from Julius
Stone:
Quite apart from the dependence of totalitarian governments on unquestioning
and undeviating acceptance of their respective ideologies, preparation for
modern war and the waging of it demand a high degree of solidarity of outlook
and effort throughout the community. In these circumstances, the undermining
of the internal social and political order of the enemy and his psychological
assurance become a Military target as important as his physical industrial plant
and second in importance only to his armed forces. 2
So propaganda is a legitimate military objective—at least in this commenta-
tor's view.
One final point with respect to the International Criminal Court. Professor
Dinstein in his book notes that there are certain principles that are jus cogens.
These are fundamental principles that trump other aspects of international
law. His example of a jus cogens principle is the territorial inviolability and the
political independence of sovereign States. A final comment. I would suggest
to you that there may be another principle ofjus cogens and that is a principle
that no obligation can be conferred on a sovereign State without their express
written consent. That is also contained in the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. It is also a fundamental principle of international law. If you take
that as a principle ofjus cogens, then those aspects of the ICC statute that pur-
port to extend the ICC's jurisdiction over a non-party State and nationals of a
non-party State are a legal nullity.
2. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 322 (1954).
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Does the US Have a Unilateralist Approach to International Law?
John Norton Moore:
This question is addressed to Adam Roberts who I intend to gently take to
task. I do so, however, after saying that I'm an admirer of your paper in gen-
eral. I say gently because actually I suspect that in terms of the purpose of your
statement, you and I would have exactly the same underlying purpose to be
served. We would both agree on the great importance of the United States
and our European allies working together. I particularly enjoyed the entire
intellectual sweep of what you were dealing with. I thought it was quite
extraordinary.
My comment relates to the specifics of your statement that somehow we
need to be concerned that the United States currently is set out on a course to
ensure that laws apply to others, but they do not apply to the United States. I
believe it's quite dangerous to be making these generalizations. I'm just back
from the country of some of my good European colleagues and I know that
one is hearing quite a few generalizations about American isolationism and
nonparticipation in various treaties. I think that we have to actually proceed
treaty-by-treaty in looking at these. There are very different reasons for US
nonparticipation in a number of these treaties and the kinds of generalizations
that we're hearing are not helping us move forward.
With respect to the Law of the Sea Convention, US leadership actually re-
sulted in an effective renegotiation of Part XI. Our President then submitted
the treaty to the Senate. There is no opposition of any significant kind in the
United States to it. There is a peculiarity in the US Constitution over require-
ments in relation to how it goes through the US Senate, and I fully expect that
the United States will be a party to that treaty at some point.
The landmines convention is eminently reasonable in seeking to bring
under control the reckless scattering of landmines by aggressive leaders.
(Saddam Hussein, for example, threw landmines around Kuwait with no
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records kept.) That is an entirely understandable and reasonable thing to do.
On the other hand, the United States believes strongly that we need to differ-
entiate between the uses of a variety of weapons systems. For example, our
forces in South Korea maintain a well-marked mined area between North and
South Korea. The laws of war and arms control ought to differentiate appro-
priately between those two examples. The United States did not reject the
landmine convention because we want to have different laws for everyone,
but because we don't think the right thing is being done.
Adam Roberts:
For the sake of brevity, I made my remarks in a way that was perhaps tact-
less. I agree with you that there are different reasons for nonparticipation in
many of these treaty regimes and sometimes there is sound, sensible, pruden-
tial reasoning on the part of the United States in thinking seriously about the
consequences of becoming party to a particular agreement. I wouldn't deny
any of that for one second. And of course, the United States is not alone on
the landmines treaty. Finland has similar concerns to those of the United
States about the possible defensive value of landmines. So there's no sugges-
tion that it is not a serious position.
My concern is not that the United States in fact views itself as above the
law, but that there may be a perception of that because of the range and num-
ber of treaties that we're talking about and because the United States has such
a peculiar—as you yourself have indicated—and slow system of ratification of
treaties, which has been a nightmare for successive presidents of the United
States. In respect of some of the treaties in this area, a good deal can be
achieved by reservation. Not of course with the landmines treaty and not of
course with the ICC statute, because, in my opinion unwisely, reservations
have been excluded from those treaties. There really is a structural problem
there. It is not clever of the majority of the like-minded States to exclude the
possibility of reservations, because reservations, although they have had a bad
name among some progressive international lawyers, are actually a very
important means of bringing treaties into a relationship with the needs, inter-
ests, plans and intentions of States. So I agree with you in a large part of what
you say. But I think, for example in relation to Protocol I or a number of the
other treaties I listed, a good deal could be achieved by participating with res-
ervations rather than staying formally outside the regime. I hasten to add I'm
well aware that the United States, even while formally outside certain re-
gimes, in fact has contributed very powerfully to them.
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Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?
Adam Roberts:
While it is impossible to establish a general right of humanitarian interven-
tion, in individual cases one can argue that there are powerful factors support-
ing intervention. I'm not sure whether they are all containable within the
category of necessity. I don't think they are. But there are very powerful fac-
tors, including legal factors, which may point to a justification for the use of
force in a particular case. It is the concentration on the specificities of a partic-
ular and urgent situation that seems to me to be the right legal as well as politi-
cal approach.
The German Bundestag, for example, when it debated the issue of Kosovo
in October, 1998, essentially said that whereas it was not asserting any general
right of humanitarian intervention, in the extraordinary circumstances of
Kosovo, it would support an operation and would permit the use of German
forces to take part in that operation. I personally think that is a more powerful
and a clearer position than the very fragile one of asserting a general right of
states to engage in humanitarian intervention.
One can of course buttress such an approach by making certain general
propositions about particular cases, be it Bangladesh in 1971 or northern Iraq
in 1991, when a use of force without the consent of the receiving sovereign
State was tolerated by the international community even though it didn't
have explicit UN Security Council blessing. There is also the relevant legal
consideration that an intervention may be in support ofUN Security Council
objectives even if it is not with the specific consent of the Security Council.
There's also the relevant legal consideration that some of these actions have
not been condemned. All of that falls short of a general right. But it's a consid-
erable advance over the position that you have attributed to me, which is not
the position I hold—that one simply has to throw up one's hands in despair
and say these questions cannot be answered. On the contrary, in specific
cases, they can be answered, and they need to be answered.
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethically Right, Although Legally Wrong?
Christopher Greenwood:
There is one lesson offered to us that seems to be a pit of vipers that we
need to avoid like the plague. That is the suggestion that it may be better to
proceed on the basis that something is ethically right and not worry too much
if it's legally wrong. Now I can see that there are times when you have a
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situation where something is ethically justified, and the law has not yet caught
up with that. But when that's the case, surely as lawyers we ought to be trying
to ensure the law is changed in order to accommodate what we recognize as
the ethical need. The suggestion that we can simply fall back on an ethical jus-
tification and think that is the end of the matter is frankly wet. It's no good at
all if you've got to defend what we have done in Kosovo in front of an inter-
national court. It doesn't give the kind of steer that we ought to be giving to
the people who go out and do the fighting and it's frankly an abdication of our
responsibility as lawyers. It comes pretty much to saying this: "It's too difficult
to formulate a rule that isn't capable of abuse, therefore it would be better if
we don't formulate a rule at all." That's something which I as a lawyer simply
cannot accept. We're paid to deal with difficult situations and we should face
up to our responsibility in that regard.
Adam Roberts:
It's not my position that one can summarize the state of affairs and justifica-
tion for the Kosovo operation as ethically right but legally dubious or legally
wrong. That's a position that was advanced in a number of articles by lawyers,
including the articles by Bruno Simma and Antonio Cassese in the European
Journal of International Law, 1 and I think it's a very extraordinary position to
take. It's perhaps a comment on the puzzling state of the law to say that some-
thing may be legally dubious, even legally wrong, but ethically right.
The position I would take is different. It is impossible to establish a general
right of humanitarian intervention. There is virtually no chance of getting any
significant group of states to assert a general right of humanitarian interven-
tion and no serious effort has been made since the Kosovo war to do that. Ad-
mittedly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly passed a resolution urging there
should be such a right, but they got absolutely nowhere. 2 The reason they're
getting nowhere is: first, States that fear they might be the subject of interven-
tion, have recent memories of colonialism, or are governed by seedy dictators
are never going to agree; secondly, the States that might do the intervening
turn out—and especially the United States—to be not very interested in
1. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving
towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World
Community?, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1999).
2. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is completely independent ofNATO but constitutes a
link between national parliaments and the Alliance. It encourages governments to take Alliance
concerns into account when framing national legislation. For more information, see the NATO
Handbook at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hbl601.htm.
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propounding a general doctrine that might obligate them to act in situations
where for one reason or another they may be unable or unwilling to. So there is
simply no chance of getting an international agreement of the kind that lawyers
might recognize as law asserting a general right.
However, one can say—and here I think we agree—that there may be a tol-
erated occasional practice of intervention. Here the fact that there has been
no General Assembly resolution condemning the Kosovo action and the fact
that the Security Council draft resolution of March 26, 1999 put forward by
Russia and others condemning the Kosovo action failed, is evidence that
while there is no established general right, certain cases of humanitarian inter-
vention may be tolerated. Another example is the Indian intervention over
East Bengal in 197 1, which was defended partly on grounds similar to those on
which the NATQ action over Kosovo was defended. I think that is as far as
one can go. It is riot saying that there is a distinction between ethics and law,
but rather that there is an odd legal situation where a practice is occasionally
tolerated that cannot be asserted as a general right. One actually weakens the
argument for humanitarian intervention if one makes the legitimacy of a par-
ticular intervention seem to be dependent upon the existence of the general
right. I think it is a very occasional practice.
Rein Mullerson:
During my comments I supported the view now expressed by Chris Green-
wood. I also think that there cannot be and there shouldn't be such difference
between what is ethically or morally right and legally wrong. Adam spoke
about toleration of certain interventions. The toleration of them leads to
change in the law or at least it undermines, it destabilizes the existing prohibi-
tion on the use of force. I think that perhaps the least we can say today about
the use of force for humanitarian purposes is that it is not unquestionably un-
lawful in a certain set of circumstances. Every right is general
—
you can't say
non-general or otherwise. In international law, and I am not going into theory,
there are treaties that create legal obligations. These are not general rights or
obligations, but customary international law certainly is general. Therefore,
every right under customary international law has to be general. There was
considerable toleration of Operation Allied Force on the part of many States
for very different reasons. I think that this, if it hasn't led towards the emer-
gence of a new rule, has undermined the existence of the rule (if there was
such a rule) prohibiting the use of force for humanitarian purposes.
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Leslie Green:
There probably is not at present a general or a non-general right of inter-
vention, but when I look back, I often feel that in the humanitarian field, our
classical writers were far more advanced than we are. I'm thinking now of the
writings of Grotius, Vattel, Hall, Westlake, and the greatest of them all on the
subject of intervention, Stowell. They would argue that if the situation is so
unique and so outrageous, then while there may not be a right, perhaps we are
moving into a stage where there is a duty to intervene. If we develop the law
with regard to humanitarian principles we may find that in the light of Ban-
gladesh, in the light of Kosovo, perhaps in the light of Rwanda where we
should have taken stronger action, we are now in a position where the situa-
tion has become so outrageous that we go back to Hall and Westlake and say
that there is a duty upon those who believe in the personality of the human
being and those who believe in the rule of law; there is a duty upon us even if
there are written documents that suggest we may be going outside the ambit
of the law.
Michael Bothe:
If law and ethics seem to clash, then something must be wrong either with
the law or with ethics. The problem we are facing here is that most of us are
lawyers. We know how to make nice arguments of what the law is. My impres-
sion is that many people who speak about ethics just feel in their hearts what
it is. I sometimes question whether this is the correct source for ethical
principles.
Ruth Wedgwood:
Actually it's a great pity that international law doesn't really have a vocab-
ulary with which to recapture the brilliant British distinction between law and
equity that is also found in American nineteenth century jurisprudence. It is
the skeptical doubt that any rule could ever capture all of the necessary
instances of exception—the role of equity contra legem and intra legem. Instead
we seem to lapse into almost a sociological or psychological vocabulary of
acquiescence or tolerance or diplomatic signal. My own suspicion is that the
flat rule against humanitarian intervention is in some ways a historical period
piece. It's part of anti-colonialism.
One of the curious books in my library is a 1940 monograph by the "Ger-
man Library of Information" on so-called "Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the
German Minority in Poland," published in New York in 1940. The fact that
humanitarian intervention was proffered by Germany as an excuse for the
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invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland in World War II gave it a very bad
name for a very long time. So even in Europe the feeling of Turkey or other
States was that mistreatment of coreligionists would be used as an excuse for
intervention. The reflex against humanitarian intervention may become less
automatic as the majority of members of the United Nations system become
more democratic and mature. I wouldn't go so far as to coin a duty to inter-
vene because it's going to be breached so often.
Adam Roberts:
I was pleased that Leslie Green put this in its proper context along centu-
ries of historical debate about the issue. Maybe in a sense we can all blame
Grotius for the way in which the debate has been phrased because he was the
one who actually used the term "right" in respect of intervention for what we
now regard as humanitarian causes. He raised the issue in terms of whether
States had a right to do it. For reasons I've indicated that may be a problematic
way of looking at a very difficult issue. I do think that there is bound to be
skepticism in the post-colonial era about any general assertion of such a right
and for pretty good reasons. One of the most notorious episodes of European
colonialism—the Belgian role in the Congo—began as a humanitarian enter-
prise with a congress held in Brussels on Central Africa during which the
word humanitarian was uttered countless times. It can very easily happen
that a cause embarked upon for humanitarian or mercy purposes can end up
very nasty as we have seen in Somalia. So the nervousness about a general
right seems to me to be justifiable and not just to be a fad of the present
post-colonial era.
Where I think there may be scope for developing a new principle is in the
direction of thinking about a duty, not to intervene, but a duty to take appro-
priate action (whatever that may be) in case of extreme violations of humani-
tarian norms. In many cases, the appropriate action will not be intervention.
There may be numerous other forms of action that are better for whatever
reasons
—
prudential reasons, tactical reasons and so on. I think it would be
very unwise to promote the idea of a duty to intervene as such, but a duty to
take action may make more sense.
Michael Glennon: 3
I am a bit surprised by both Adam Roberts's and Chris Greenwood's dis-
comfort with the notion that ethical or moral considerations may, or could
3. Professor of Law, University of California at Davis
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under certain circumstances, provide a justification for law violation. That
tradition of civil disobedience is of course one with a long-standing and rather
time-honored pedigree and not simply in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Why
should international law not be subject to the same considerations? Is it not
possible that the law has come over in the fullness of time and the course of re-
cent events to reflect evolving social mores or whatever it is that the law seeks
to correspond to? Isn't that perhaps precisely what occurred with respect to
Article 2(4) when it confronted the moral justifications or the felt ethical
needs of NATO leaders? I myself initially conceptualized this as kind of a
problem of civil disobedience in international law. I must say on further reflec-
tion, I've come to think that the real issue is not whether there is an exception
for humanitarian intervention, but whether there is a rule for which an excep-
tion could or should exist. My current conclusion I suppose would be that in-
ternational law simply provides no satisfactory answer to the question of
lawfulness of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.
Wolff H. von Heinegg:
If you read Wilhelm Grewe's book Epochs of International Law, which has
now been translated into English by Michael Byers, you will find a chapter on
humanitarian intervention. The discussion that was held in the nineteenth
century and much of what has been discussed since Kosovo is identical. Even
though I'm a professor of international law, I have to admit that it's not us
lawyers that make international law. I have always understood international
law to be made by States who are the main subjects of public international
law. Necessity—I just want to remind you that the Latin phrase opinio juris is
shortened because it is opinio juris sive necessitates-—has to be articulated by
the subject of international law, which means by States. So when it comes to
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, there were a couple of States who obvi-
ously felt the necessity to do something. Whether this will develop into a rule
of international law, customary or whatever, depends on the States and not
on us.
Is There a Link Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?
Wolff H. von Heinegg:
We are not only stepping on a slippery slope (as Admiral Robertson put it)
when it comes to the question of whether those who are fighting for the just
cause are less bound by jus in bello than the one who is fighting for the unjust
cause. Let me remind you once again that jus in bello according to the
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consensus of States is the utmost the international community is willing to tol-
erate, so everything which goes beyond these limits is clearly illegal. The les-
son I have learned from this colloquium, maybe not from the Kosovo conflict,
is that we should leave jus in hello as it is. I have problems putting stronger limits
on belligerents by referring to jus ad bellum. I certainly do have severe problems
with lightening the limits or by brushing them away and thus jeopardizing the
achievements of the law of armed conflict.
Henry Shue:
I admire Professor Wedgwood's courage in saying the unconventional dur-
ing her presentation. I think it's very helpful, but I'm sure she'll agree that if
we're going to speak the unspeakable, we should do it very precisely. I just
want to emphasize how narrow a point I think there is here. That is, I didn't
take her suggestion to be that the more just one's cause, the more discretion
one has about the in bello rules. I took it to be that there are exceptional cases
in which one's moral responsibility is to win because one's adversary is so evil
that one is justified in doing what one would otherwise not be justified in
doing. I'm willing to concede that there is such a category in the abstract,
which I think puts me a couple of inches away from Professor Greenwood. I
would also suggest that so far there's only been one case—the Nazi's. The
danger here of course is that since all nations tend to demonize their enemies
anyway (it's sort of notorious that George Bush first referred to Saddam
Hussein as another Hitler; while Saddam Hussein is a nasty piece of work,
he's not a Hitler) we really have to be very careful. It seems to me that honor-
able defeat without atrocity is still preferable to victory with atrocity except in
these very rare cases. So although I think you're right in principle, I'm not
sure that the point shouldn't stay unspoken.
Ruth Wedgwood:
I take and agree with the point. Indeed one of the problems with codifica-
tion always is that (a) it is looking for simplicity and (b) both lawyers and
courts take litigating positions. They choose to enunciate bright line rules that
they think will lead to the best result in the majority of cases. But most States
also take the relationship between jus in bello and jus ad bellum to be broader
than we ordinarily admit—because very few States (at least in the age of total
war) would choose to be conquered honorably and many States would use any
justifiable means if, in the last analysis, they thought there was a magic bullet
that would preserve them from brutal occupation. This is grounded on
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strategic anticipation of an adversary's expected breach of the laws of honor-
able occupation.
One of the purposes of the law ofwar (e.g., Geneva IV's provisions protect-
ing occupied territories) is to say to States that the alternative of being con-
quered isn't all that bad because civil life will go on. There will be a regime
change, but your private life and private property will be preserved and your
families can conduct themselves as always. This is simply a quarrel among
princes. But in the age of total war, if one is skeptical about the efficacy of en-
forcement of Geneva IV or its first-cousin principles, then I think you would
see lots of deviation from jus in hello for the sake of avoiding a devastating oc-
cupation and social destruction. In a way, jus in hello is a very, very stringent
rule of exhaustion, but in the last analysis, for total war (not limited war), most
countries would ultimately deviate from it, at least in detail, and within the
bounds of humane standards.
Yves Sandoz:
It is a fact that the law of war is fundamentally separated between the ad
helium and in hello. I share your view that humanitarian law cannot force a
country to lose a war. That's why it's so important to examine the rules for the
conduct of hostilities. That's also why I cannot share your suggestion that in
some cases you could violate humanitarian law because if you accept that, it's
the end of humanitarian law. Every State that goes to war believes it is defend-
ing a good cause.
Ruth Wedgwood:
We've been talking about lots of different senses in which jus in hello and jus
ad helium could be linked. One was Professor Roberts' point that if there are so
many systematic in hello violations, that itself is the casus helli for humanitarian
intervention. There's the other argument offered at Nuremberg by the prose-
cution, but rejected by the judges, that in an illegal war all acts of force are ille-
gal. Harvard Professor Sheldon Glueck makes this point in his little volume on
war crimes, introduced by Justice Robert Jackson. 4 My third type of linkage
was to argue that there may be cases in which the urgency of concluding the
war should influence the interpretation of military necessity or the unclear
borderline between civilian objects and military objects. If indeed Milosevic
had continued killing people at a rapid pace and we knew or could infer that,
then a rapid conclusion of the war would have been all the more urgent.
4. See SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR (1946).
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That in turn would have arguably justified designations of military targets
that were realistic in light of the problems of persuading Milosevic to cease
and desist. It's a sliding scale. It's at the edges, but it doesn't mean to reject
what is crucial. I agree with Yves Sandoz and the others that from the point of
view of educating ground-level military operators and ordinary politicians,
one wants to preserve the formal distinction of in hello and ad helium.
Critiquing the Report to the Prosecutor
Natalino Ronzitti:
Adam Roberts said that the Report of the Committee established by the
ICTY Prosecutor has not been properly critiqued. I am one of those who have
heavily criticized the Report to the Prosecutor in an article published in the
European Journal of International Law. My main critique is that it said the
facts were not well established, that is, that it is the Committee's assertion that
it is very difficult to establish the facts. This is very strange because the prose-
cutor has the full power of the ICTY to summon people. The second critique is
that the Report has said that the law is not very clear. You cannot say within a
court that the law is not very clear. That, together with the anonymity of the
Committee because we don't know officially who they are, is not, I'm afraid, in
keeping with the prestige of this Tribunal.
Adam Roberts:
What I intended to say about the ICTY Report is that there hasn't been a
full-blooded criticism of its conclusion that there were no violations justifying
reference to the ICTY by those who asserted that NATO did commit war
crimes. On the whole, the Report has remained inviolate against that kind of
criticism and it remains a valuable comment on Operation Allied Force. I am
in fact aware of the article that you have contributed on the subject, which
does not set out to be the kind of full-blooded critique that I had in mind. I will
certainly be referring to it.
Applying the Law of Armed Conflict in the Future
Ruth Wedgwood:
A few responses to what I thought were some very thoughtful comments.
The distinction that academics face between the interior view of law and the
exterior view is always there. There's a language you speak as a citizen, advo-
cate or judge that has a crisp vocabulary, rejects alternative readings, and
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stabilizes the legal text for the sake of clear communication and workable
guidelines for behavior. But when you step back and ask how satisfactory that
framework is or what meta-principles will influence interpretation, then you
can dare to be a little more dangerous. Most of my scruples about not losing
wars and avoiding utterly catastrophic humanitarian harm can be accommo-
dated by interpretation within the existing rules ofjus in hello. The worry I sup-
pose is the milieu of the decision maker. If you have someone as a war crimes
judge who is deeply skeptical about the right to use force in any circumstance,
who fundamentally at heart is a type of a pacifist, then you're going to get a
very different reading of these rules than you will from somebody who survived
World War II or the Korean War or any number of other conflicts. So my con-
cern is how you explain the appropriate balancing to somebody who's ap-
proaching these rules as an ingenue, which I hasten to say the war crimes
tribunal judges are not. Europe has lived through its wars. Don't mistake my
exceptional chancellor's foot for an antinomianism wanting to overthrow the
rules as such.
It would be helpful to make some clear distinctions for participants who ap-
ply the law of armed conflict. Number one, some textual statements are rules
and others are principles. Some norms are bright-line rules, sharp-edged and
self-executing, and others are circumstance and fact specific and will garner
lots of variation in lawyers' interpretation of what they mean in a particular
circumstance. Professor Dolzer's invocation of margin of appreciation indeed
might be one very good way of putting it into accepted vernacular. But we
have too easily given the impression that all laws ofwar are created equal, that
they all are equally easily applied, and that all are amenable to application
without experience. In general, I have to agree, we're very far down the road
indeed. ICTY, ICTR, ICC, European Court—the cow is out of the barn and
the only cure for the movement to "juridicalize" war may be the attempt by
the military community and by extraordinary judges like Judge Pocar of really
coming to learn each other's trade craft.
My advice to friends in Washington has been that of forced familiarity—to
smother the ICC with seminars. Have lots ofNATO gatherings in which you
begin to educate the judges and persuade them that they do need military law
clerks. They do need a roster of expert witnesses. They do need to go to what-
ever the European equivalent is of CINC conferences to come to understand
some of the practical operations of the law of war. I see this as an incredibly
difficult field because it requires people who are versed in history, versed in
criminal law, versed in international law, versed in humanitarian law, versed
in military operations and versed in military law. It requires a kind of
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omnicompetent synthesis. Perhaps the die has been cast. But the purpose of
my observation was to try to invoke a sense of modesty in civilian judges and
NGO's (as well as in myself) in approaching the application of rules to battle-
field operations.
If I may give a parallel New Haven anecdote: Yale used to pride itselfon be-
ing the vanguard for law and psychiatry. Judge David Bazelon, and some of the
other judges on the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
thought that if only they could get the right kind of psychiatrists testifying
about the nature of legal insanity and moral choice, they could reform the law
of criminal responsibility. Ultimately the judges decided, after much gnashing
of teeth, that to do so would be an abdication from their own responsibility
under the law to decide about the nature of moral choice. You couldn't call a
randomly-selected expert witness. This wasn't an objective question of fact. In
the context of battlefield law, my worry is that if there is a great distance
between the two communities of judges and military operators—if all you
have is an amateur criminal lawyer, acting as prosecutor, calling random
experts to say what they think should happen on the Kosovo battlefield—then
that's going to inhibit necessary military planning.
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AppendixA
I Background and Mandate
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted a bombing
campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 24 March
1999 to 9 June 1999. During and since that period, the Prosecutor has re-
ceived numerous requests that she investigate allegations that senior political
and military figures from NATO countries committed serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law during the campaign, and that she prepares in-
dictments pursuant to Article 18(1) & (4) of the Statute.
2. Criticism of the NATO bombing campaign has included allegations of
varying weight: a) that, as the resort to force was illegal, all NATO actions
were illegal, and b) that the NATO forces deliberately attacked civilian infra-
structure targets (and that such attacks were unlawful), deliberately or reck-
lessly attacked the civilian population, and deliberately or recklessly caused
excessive civilian casualties in disregard of the rule of proportionality by trying
to fight a "zero casualty" war for their own side. Allegations concerning the
"zero casualty" war involve suggestions that, for example, NATO aircraft op-
erated at heights which enabled them to avoid attack by Yugoslav defences
and, consequently, made it impossible for them to properly distinguish be-
tween military or civilian objects on the ground. Certain allegations went so
far as to accuse NATO of crimes against humanity and genocide.
3. Article 18 of the Tribunal's Statute provides:
"The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of
information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments,
United Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or
obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed".
On 14 May 99 the then Prosecutor established a committee to assess the allega-
tions and material accompanying them, and advise the Prosecutor and Deputy
Prosecutor whether or not there is a sufficient basis to proceed with an investi-
gation into some or all the allegations or into other incidents related to the
NATO bombing.
4. In the course of its work, the committee has not addressed in detail the is-
sue of the fundamental legality of the use of force by NATO members against
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the FRY as, if such activity was unlawful, it could constitute a crime against
peace and the ICTY has no jurisdiction over this offence. (See, however, paras
30 - 34 below). It is noted that the legitimacy of the recourse to force by
NATO is a subject before the International Court of Justice in a case brought
by the FRY against various NATO countries.
II Review Criteria
5. In the course of its review, the committee has applied the same criteria to
NATO activities that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has applied to the
activities of other actors in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The com-
mittee paid particular heed to the following questions:
a. Are the prohibitions alleged sufficiently well-established as viola-
tions of international humanitarian law to form the basis of a prose-
cution, and does the application of the law to the particular facts
reasonably suggest that a violation of these prohibitions may have
occurred?
and
b. upon the reasoned evaluation of the information by the committee,
is the information credible and does it tend to show that crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may have been committed by
individuals during the NATO bombing campaign?
This latter question reflects the earlier approach in relation to Article 18(1) of
the Statute taken by the Prosecutor when asserting her right to investigate alle-
gations ofcrimes committed by Serb forces in Kosovo (Request by the Prosecutor,
Pursuant to Rule 7 bis) (B) that the President Notify the Security Council That the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Has Failed to Comply With Its Obligations Under
Article 29, dated I February 1999). The threshold test expressed therein by the
Prosecutor was that of "credible evidence tending to show that crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may have been committed in Kosovo". That
test was advanced to explain in what situation the Prosecutor would consider,
for jurisdiction purposes, that she had a legal entitlement to investigate. (As a
corollary, any investigation failing to meet that test could be said to be arbitrary
and capricious, and to fall outside the Prosecutor's mandate). Thus formulated,
the test represents a negative cut-off point for investigations. The Prosecutor
may, in her discretion require that a higher threshold be met before making a
positive decision that there is sufficient basis to proceed under Article 18(1).
(In fact, in relation to the situation on the ground in Kosovo, the Prosecutor
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was in possession of a considerable body of evidence pointing to the commis-
sion of widespread atrocities by Serb forces.) In practice, before deciding to
open an investigation in any case, the Prosecutor will also take into account a
number of other factors concerning the prospects for obtaining evidence suffi-
cient to prove that the crime has been committed by an individual who merits
prosecution in the international forum.
Ill Work Program
6. The committee has reviewed:
a. documents sent to the OTP by persons or groups wishing the OTP
to commence investigations of leading persons from NATO coun-
tries,
b. public documents made available byNATO, the US Department of
Defense and the British Ministry of Defence,
c. documents hied by the FRY before the ICJ, a large number of other
FRY documents, and also the two volume compilation of the FRY
Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia
(White Book),
d. various documents submitted by Human Rights Watch including a
letter sent to the Secretary General ofNATO during the bombing
campaign, a paper on NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions, and a report
on Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,
e. a UNEP study: The Kosovo Conflict: Consequence for the Environment
and Human Settlements,
f. documents submitted by a Russian Parliamentary Commission,
g. two studies by a German national, Mr. Ekkehard Wenz, one con-
cerning the bombing of a train at the Grdelica Gorge and the other
concerning the bombing of the Djakovica Refugee Convoy,
h. various newspaper reports and legal articles as they have come to
the attention of committee members,
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i. the response to a letter containing a number of questions sent to
NATO by the OTP, and
j. an Amnesty International Report entitled "Collateral Damage* or
Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws ofWar by NATO during Op-
eration Allied Force.
7. It should be noted that the committee did not travel to the FRY and it did
not solicit information from the FRY through official channels as no such
channels existed during the period when the review was conducted. Most of
the material reviewed by the committee was in the public domain. The com-
mittee has relied exclusively on documents. The FRY submitted to the Prose-
cutor a substantial amount of material concerning particular incidents. In
attempting to assess what happened on the ground, the committee relied
upon the Human Rights Watch Report entitled Civilian Deaths in the NATO
Air Campaign and upon the documented accounts in the FRY Ministry of For-
eign Affairs volumes entitled NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia. The committee
also relied heavily on NATO press statements and on the studies done by Mr.
Ekkehard Wenz. The information available was adequate for making a prelim-
inary assessment of incidents in which civilians were killed or injured. Infor-
mation related to attacks on objects where civilians were not killed or injured
was difficult to obtain and very little usable information was obtained.
8. To assist in the preparation of an Interim Report, a member of the Military
Analysis Team reviewed the documents available in the OTP at the time, that is,
all those referred to in paragraph 6 above except the FRY volumes entitled
NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, the HRW report on Civilian Deaths in the NATO
Air Campaign, the studies by Mr. Wenz, NATO's response to the letter sent by
the OTP to NATO, and the Amnesty International Report. The analyst pre-
pared: a) a list of key incidents, b) a list of civilian residential targets, c) a list of ci-
vilian facility targets, d) a list of cultural property targets, e) a list of power facility
targets, f) a list of targets the destruction of which might significantly affect the
environment, and g) a list ofcommunications targets. Very little information was
available concerning the targets in lists (b) through (g).
9. The committee reviewed the above lists and requested the preparation of
a file containing all available information on certain particular incidents, and
on certain target categories. (It should be noted that the use of the terms
"target" or "attack" in this report does not mean that in every case the site in
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question was deliberately struck by NATO. The terms are convenient short-
hand for incidents in which it is alleged that particular locations were dam-
aged in the course of the bombing campaign)
.
The key incidents and target categories were:
a. the attack on a civilian passenger train at the Grdelica Gorge -
12/4/99 - 10 or more civilians killed, 15 or more injured,
b. the attack on the Djakovica Convoy - 14/4/99 - 70-75 civilians
killed, 100 or more injured,
c. the attack on Surdulica, - 27/4/99 - 1 1 civilians killed, 100 or more
injured,
d. the attack on Cuprija - 8/4/99 - 1 civilian killed, 5 injured,
e. the attack on the Cigota Medical Institute - 8/4/99 - 3 civilians
killed,
f. the attack on Hotels Baciste and Putnik - 13/4/99 - 1 civilian killed,
g. the attacks on the Pancevo Petrochemical Complex and Fertilizer
Company - 15/4/99 and 18/4/99 - no reported civilian casualties,
h. the attack on the Nis Tobbaco Factory - 18/4/99 - no reported ci-
vilian casualties,
i. the attack on the Djakovica Refugee Camp - 21/4/99 - 5 civilians
killed, 16-19 injured,
j. -the attack on a bus at Lu
v
ane - 1/5/99 39 civilians killed,
k. the attack on a bus at Pec - 3/5/99 - 1 7 civilians killed, 44 injured,
1. the attack at Korisa village - 13/5/99 - 48-87 civilians killed,
m. the attack on the Belgrade TV and Radio Station - 23/4/99 - 16 ci-
vilians killed,
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n. the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade - 7/5/99 - 3 civilians
killed, 15 injured,
o. attack on Nis City Centre and Hospital - 7/5/99 - 13 civilians
killed, 60 injured,
p. attack on Istok Prison - 21/5/99 - at least 19 civilians killed,
q. attack on Belgrade Hospital - 20/5/99 - 3 civilians killed, several in-
jured,
r. attack on Surdulica Sanatorium - 30/5/99 - 23 killed, many injured,
s. attack on journalists convoy Prizren-Brezovica Road - 31/5/99 - 1
civilian killed - 3 injured
t. attack on Belgrade Heating Plant - 4/4/99, - 1 killed,
u. attacks on Trade and Industry Targets.
10. On 23 July 1999, each committee member was provided with a binder in-
cluding all available material. The committee members reviewed material in
the binders.
1 1
.
In addition to reviewing factual information, the committee has also gath-
ered legal materials and reviewed relevant legal issues, including the legality of
the use of depleted uranium projectiles, the legality of the use of cluster muni-
tions, whether or not the bombing campaign had an unlawfully adverse im-
pact on the environment, and legal issues related to target selection.
12. The committee prepared an interim report on the basis of its analysis of
the legal and factual material available and this was presented to the Prosecu-
tor on 6 December 1999. At the direction of the Prosecutor, the committee
then further updated the incident list and prepared a list of general questions
and questions related to specific incidents. A letter enclosing the question-
naire and incident list was sent to NATO on 8 February 2000. A general reply
was received on 10 May 2000.
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13. It has not been possible for the committee to look at the NATO bombing
campaign on a bomb by bomb basis and that was not its task. The committee
has, however, reviewed public information concerning several incidents, in-
cluding all the more well known incidents, with considerable care. It has also
endeavored to examine, and has posed questions to NATO, concerning all
other incidents in which it appears three or more civilians were killed.
In conducting its review, the committee has focused primarily on incidents in
which civilian deaths were alleged and/or confirmed. The committee reviewed
certain key incidents in depth for its interim report. These key incidents in-
cluded 10 incidents in which 10 or more civilians were killed. The review by
Human Rights Watch revealed 12 incidents in which 10 or more civilians were
killed, all of the incidents identified by the committee plus two additional inci-
dents: a) the attack on the Aleksinak "Deligrad" military barracks on 5/5/99 in
which 10 civilians were killed and 30 wounded (a bomb aimed at the barracks
fell short) , and b) the attack on a military barracks in Novi Pazar on 3 1/5/99 in
which 1 1 civilians were killed and 23 wounded (5 out of 6 munitions hit the
target but one went astray). The committee's review of incidents in which it is
alleged fewer than three civilians were killed has been hampered by a lack of re-
liable information.
IV Assessment
A. General Issues
i. Damage to the Environment
14. The NATO bombing campaign did cause some damage to the environ-
ment. For instance, attacks on industrial facilities such as chemical plants and
oil installations were reported to have caused the release of pollutants, al-
though the exact extent of this is presently unknown. The basic legal provi-
sions applicable to protection of the environment in armed conflict are Article
35(3) of Additional Protocol I, which states that '[i]t is prohibited to employ
methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment'
and Article 55 which states:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection
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includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival
of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are pro-
hibited
15. Neither the USA nor France has ratified Additional Protocol I. Article 55
may, nevertheless, reflect current customary law (see however the 1996 Advi-
sory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, where the International
Court of Justice appeared to suggest that it does not (ICJ Rep. (1996), 242,
para. 31)). In any case, Articles 35(3) and 55 have a very high threshold of ap-
plication. Their conditions for application are extremely stringent and their
scope and contents imprecise. For instance, it is generally assumed that Arti-
cles 35(3) and 55 only cover very significant damage. The adjectives 'wide-
spread, long-term, and severe' used in Additional Protocol I are joined by the
word 'and', meaning that it is a triple, cumulative standard that needs to be
fulfilled.
Consequently, it would appear extremely difficult to develop a prima facie case
upon the basis of these provisions, even assuming they were applicable. For in-
stance, it is thought that the notion of 'long-term' damage in Additional Proto-
col I would need to be measured in years rather than months, and that as such,
ordinary battlefield damage of the kind caused to France in World War I would
not be covered.
The great difficulty of assessing whether environmental damage exceeded the
threshold of Additional Protocol I has also led to criticism by ecologists. This
may partly explain the disagreement as to whether any of the damage caused by
the oil spills and fires in the 1990/91 GulfWar technically crossed the thresh-
old of Additional Protocol I.
It is the committee's view that similar difficulties would exist in applying Addi-
tional Protocol I to the present facts, even if reliable environmental assess-
ments were to give rise to legitimate concern concerning the impact of the
NATO bombing campaign. Accordingly, these effects are best considered from
the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict such as necessity and
proportionality.
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16. The conclusions of the Balkan Task Force (BTF) established by UNEP to
look into the Kosovo situation are:
"Our findings indicate that the Kosovo conflict has not caused an
environmental catastrophe affecting the Balkans region as a whole.
Nevertheless, pollution detected at some sites is serious and poses a
threat to human health.
BTF was able to identify environmental 'hot spots', namely in Pancevo,
Kragujevac, Novi Sad and Bor, where immediate action and also further
monitoring and analyses will be necessary. At all of these sites,
environmental contamination due to the consequences of the Kosovo
conflict was identified.
Part of the contamination identified at some sites clearly pre-dates the
Kosovo conflict, and there is evidence of long-term deficiencies in the
treatment and storage of hazardous waste.
The problems identified require immediate attention, irrespective of
their cause, if further damage to human health and the environment is
to be avoided."
17. The OTP has been hampered in its assessment of the extent of environ-
mental damage in Kosovo by a lack of alternative and corroborated sources re-
garding the extent of environmental contamination caused by the NATO
bombing campaign. Moreover, it is quite possible that, as this campaign oc-
curred only a year ago, the UNEP study may not be a reliable indicator of the
long term environmental consequences of the NATO bombing, as accurate
assessments regarding the long-term effects of this contamination may not yet
be practicable.
It is the opinion of the committee, on the basis of information currently in
its possession, that the environmental damage caused during the NATO
bombing campaign does not reach the Additional Protocol I threshold. In ad-
dition, the UNEP Report also suggests that much of the environmental con-
tamination which is discernible cannot unambiguously be attributed to the
NATO bombing.
18. The alleged environmental effects of the NATO bombing campaign flow
in many cases from NATO's striking of legitimate military targets compatible
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with Article 52 of Additional Protocol I such as stores of fuel, industries of
fundamental importance for the conduct of war and for the manufacture of
supplies and material of a military character, factories or plant and manufac-
turing centres of fundamental importance for the conduct of war. Even when
targeting admittedly legitimate military objectives, there is a need to avoid ex-
cessive long-term damage to the economic infrastructure and natural environ-
ment with a consequential adverse effect on the civilian population. Indeed,
military objectives should not be targeted if the attack is likely to cause collat-
eral environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct
military advantage which the attack is expected to produce (A.P.V. Rogers,
"Zero Casualty Warfare," IRRC, March 2000, Vol. 82, pp. 177-8).
19. It is difficult to assess the relative values to be assigned to the military ad-
vantage gained and harm to the natural environment, and the application of
the principle of proportionality is more easily stated than applied in practice.
In applying this principle, it is necessary to assess the importance of the target
in relation to the incidental damage expected: if the target is sufficiently im-
portant, a greater degree of risk to the environment may be justified.
20. The adverse effect of the coalition air campaign in the Gulf war upon the
civilian infrastructure prompted concern on the part of some experts regard-
ing the notion of "military objective." This has prompted some experts to ar-
gue that where the presumptive effect of hostilities upon the civilian
infrastructure (and consequently the civilian population) is grave, the military
advantage conferred by the destruction of the military objective would need
to be decisive (see below, paras. 40-41). Similar considerations would, in the
committee's view, be warranted where the grave threat to the civilian infra-
structure emanated instead from excessive environmental harm resulting
from the hostilities. The critical question is what kind of environmental dam-
age can be considered to be excessive. Unfortunately, the customary rule of
proportionality does not include any concrete guidelines to this effect.
21. The military worth of the target would need to be considered in relation
to the circumstances prevailing at the time. If there is a choice ofweapons or
methods of attack available, a commander should select those which are
most likely to avoid, or at least minimize, incidental damage. In doing so, how-
ever, he is entitled to take account of factors such as stocks of different weap-
ons and likely future demands, the timeliness of attack and risks to his own
forces (A.P.V. Rogers, ibid, at p. 178). Operational reality is recognized in the
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Statute of the International Criminal Court, an authoritative indicator of
evolving customary international law on this point, where Article 8(b)(iv)
makes the infliction of incidental environmental damage an offence only if the
attack is launched intentionally in the knowledge that it will cause wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall mili-
tary advantage anticipated. The use of the word "clearly' ensures that criminal
responsibility would be entailed only in cases where the excessiveness of the
incidental damage was obvious.
22. Taken together, this suggests that in order to satisfy the requirement of
proportionality, attacks against military targets which are known or can rea-
sonably be assumed to cause grave environmental harm may need to confer a
very substantial military advantage in order to be considered legitimate. At a
minimum, actions resulting in massive environmental destruction, especially
where they do not serve a clear and important military purpose, would be
questionable. The targeting by NATO of Serbian petro-chemical industries
may well have served a clear and important military purpose.
23. The above considerations also suggest that the requisite mens rea on the
part of a commander would be actual or constructive knowledge as to the
grave environmental effects of a military attack; a standard which would be
difficult to establish for the purposes of prosecution and which may provide an
insufficient basis to prosecute military commanders inflicting environmental
harm in the (mistaken) belief that such conduct was warranted by military ne-
cessity. (In the Hostages case before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, for in-
stance, the German General Rendulic was acquitted of the charge of wanton
devastation on the grounds that although Rendulic may have erred in believ-
ing that there was military necessity for the widespread environmental de-
struction entailed by his use of a Scorched earth' policy in the Norwegian
province of Finnmark, he was not guilty of a criminal act (11 Trials of War
Criminals, (1950), 1296)). In addition, the notion of 'excessive' environmen-
tal destruction is imprecise and the actual environmental impact, both pres-
ent and long term, of the NATO bombing campaign is at present unknown
and difficult to measure.
24. In order to fully evaluate such matters, it would be necessary to know the
extent of the knowledge possessed by NATO as to the nature of Serbian mili-
tary-industrial targets (and thus, the likelihood of environmental damage
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flowing from their destruction) , the extent to which NATO could reasonably
have anticipated such environmental damage (for instance, could NATO
have reasonably expected that toxic chemicals of the sort allegedly released
into the environment by the bombing campaign would be stored alongside
that military target?) and whether NATO could reasonably have resorted to
other (and less environmentally damaging) methods for achieving its military
objective of disabling the Serbian military-industrial infrastructure.
25. It is therefore the opinion of the committee, based on information cur-
rently available to it, that the OTP should not commence an investigation
into the collateral environmental damage caused by the NATO bombing
campaign.
ii. Use of Depleted Uranium Projectiles
26. There is evidence of use of depleted uranium (DU) projectiles by NATO
aircraft during the bombing campaign. There is no specific treaty ban on the
use ofDU projectiles. There is a developing scientific debate and concern ex-
pressed regarding the impact of the use of such projectiles and it is possible
that, in future, there will be a consensus view in international legal circles that
use of such projectiles violate general principles of the law applicable to use of
weapons in armed conflict. No such consensus exists at present. Indeed, even
in the case of nuclear warheads and other weapons of mass-destruction -
those which are universally acknowledged to have the most deleterious envi-
ronmental consequences - it is difficult to argue that the prohibition of their
use is in all cases absolute. (Legality of Nuclear Weapons, IC] Rep. (1996), 242).
In view of the uncertain state of development of the legal standards governing
this area, it should be emphasised that the use of depleted uranium or other
potentially hazardous substance by any adversary to conflicts within the for-
mer Yugoslavia since 1991 has not formed the basis of any charge laid by the
Prosecutor. It is acknowledged that the underlying principles of the law of
armed conflict such as proportionality are applicable also in this context; how-
ever, it is the committee's view that analysis undertaken above (paras. 14-25)
with regard to environmental damage would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the
use of depleted uranium projectiles by NATO. It is therefore the opinion of
the committee, based on information available at present, that the OTP
should not commence an investigation into use of depleted uranium projec-
tiles by NATO.
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Hi. Use of Cluster Bombs
27. Cluster bombs were used by NATO forces during the bombing campaign.
There is no specific treaty provision which prohibits or restricts the use of clus-
ter bombs although, of course, cluster bombs must be used in compliance with
the general principles applicable to the use of all weapons. Human Rights
Watch has condemned the use of cluster bombs alleging that the high "dud"
or failure rate of the submunitions (bomblets) contained inside cluster bombs
converts these submunitions into antipersonnel landmines which, it asserts,
are now prohibited under customary international law. Whether
antipersonnel landmines are prohibited under current customary law is debat-
able, although there is a strong trend in that direction. There is, however, no
general legal consensus that cluster bombs are, in legal terms, equivalent to
antipersonnel landmines. It should be noted that the use of cluster bombs was
an issue of sorts in the Martic Rule 61 Hearing Decision of Trial Chamber I on
8 March 1996. In that decision the Chamber stated there was no formal provi-
sion forbidding the use of cluster bombs as such (para. 18 of judgment) but it
regarded the use of the Orkan rocket with a cluster bomb warhead in that par-
ticular case as evidence of the intent of the accused to deliberately attack the
civilian population because the rocket was inaccurate, it landed in an area
with no military objectives nearby, it was used as an antipersonnel weapon
launched against the city of Zagreb and the accused indicated he intended to
attack the city as such (paras. 23-31 of judgment). The Chamber concluded
that "the use of the Orkan rocket in this case was not designed to hit military
targets but to terrorise the civilians of Zagreb" (para. 31 ofjudgment). There is
no indication cluster bombs were used in such a fashion by NATO. It is the
opinion of the committee, based on information presently available, that the
OTP should not commence an investigation into use of cluster bombs as such
by NATO.
iv. Legal Issues Related to Target Selection
a. Overview of Applicable Law
28. In brief, in combat military commanders are required: a) to direct their
operations against military objectives, and b) when directing their operations
against military objectives, to ensure that the losses to the civilian population
and the damage to civilian property are not disproportionate to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. Attacks which are not directed
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against military objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian
population) and attacks which cause disproportionate civilian casualties or ci-
vilian property damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence of unlaw-
ful attack under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The mens rea for the offence is
intention or recklessness, not simple negligence. In determining whether or
not the mens rea requirement has been met, it should be borne in mind that
commanders deciding on an attack have duties:
a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be at-
tacked are military objectives,
b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and
means of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event to mini-
mizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage,
and
c) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause
disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
29. One of the principles underlying international humanitarian law is the
principle of distinction, which obligates military commanders to distinguish
between military objectives and civilian persons or objects. The practical ap-
plication of this principle is effectively encapsulated in Article 57 of Addi-
tional Protocol which, in part, obligates those who plan or decide upon an
attack to "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are neither civilians nor civilian objects". The obligation to do everything fea-
sible is high but not absolute. A military commander must set up an effective
intelligence gathering system to collect and evaluate information concerning
potential targets. The commander must also direct his forces to use available
technical means to properly identify targets during operations. Both the com-
mander and the aircrew actually engaged in operations must have some range
of discretion to determine which available resources shall be used and how
they shall be used. Further, a determination that inadequate efforts have been
made to distinguish between military objectives and civilians or civilian ob-
jects should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident. If precau-
tionary measures have worked adequately in a very high percentage of cases
then the fact they have not worked well in a small number of cases does not
necessarily mean they are generally inadequate.
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b. Linkage Between Law Concerning Recourse to Force and Law Concern-
ing How Force May Be Used
30. Allegations have been made that, as NATO's resort to force was not au-
thorized by the Security Council or in self-defence, that the resort to force was
illegal and, consequently, all forceful measures taken by NATO were unlaw-
ful. These allegations justify a brief discussion of the jus ad bellum. In brief, the
jus ad bellum regulates when states may use force and is, for the most part, en-
shrined in the UN Charter. In general, states may use force in self defence (in-
dividual or collective) and for very few other purposes. In particular, the
legitimacy of the presumed basis for the NATO bombing campaign, humani-
tarian intervention without prior Security Council authorization, is hotly de-
bated. That being said, as noted in paragraph 4 above, the crime related to an
unlawful decision to use force is the crime against peace or aggression. While a
person convicted of a crime against peace may, potentially, be held criminally
responsible for all of the activities causing death, injury or destruction during a
conflict, the ICTY does not have jurisdiction over crimes against peace.
31. The jus in hello regulates how states may use force. The ICTY has jurisdic-
tion over serious violations of international humanitarian law as specified in
Articles 2-5 of the Statute. These are jus in hello offences.
32. The precise linkage between jus ad helium and jus in hello is not completely re-
solved. There were suggestions by the prosecution before the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg and in some other post World War II war crimes
cases that all of the killing and destruction caused by German forces were war
crimes because the Germans were conducting an aggressive war. The courts were
unreceptive to these arguments. Similarly, in the 1950's there was a debate con-
cerning whether UN authorized forces were required to comply with the jus in
hello as they represented the good side in a battle between good an evil. This de-
bate died out as the participants realized that a certain crude reciprocity was es-
sential if the law was to have any positive impact. An argument that the "bad"
side had to comply with the law while the "good" side could violate it at will
would be most unlikely to reduce human suffering in conflict.
33. More recently, a refined approach to the linkage issue has been advocated
by certain law of war scholars. Using their approach, assuming that the only
lawful basis for recourse to force is self defence, each use of force during a con-
flict must be measured by whether or not it complies with the jus in hello and
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by whether or not it complies with the necessity and proportionality require-
ments of self defence. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not ade-
quately address what should be done when it is unclear who is acting in self
defence and it does not clarify the obligations of the "bad" side.
34. As a matter of practice, which we consider to be in accord with the most
widely accepted and reputable legal opinion, we in the OTP have deliberately
refrained from assessing jus ad bellum issues in our work and focused exclu-
sively on whether or not individuals have committed serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law as assessed within the confines of the jus in hello.
c. The military objective
35. The most widely accepted definition of "military objective" is that in Arti-
cle 52 of Additional Protocol I which states in part:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage.
36. Where objects are concerned, the definition has two elements: (a) their
nature, location, purpose or use must make an effective contribution to mili-
tary action, and (b) their total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization
must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the
time. Although this definition does not refer to persons, in general, members
of the armed forces are considered combatants, who have the right to partici-
pate directly in hostilities, and as a corollary, may also be attacked.
37. The definition is supposed to provide a means whereby informed objective
observers (and decision makers in a conflict) can determine whether or not a
particular object constitutes a military objective. It accomplishes this purpose
in simple cases. Everyone will agree that a munitions factory is a military ob-
jective and an unoccupied church is a civilian object. When the definition is
applied to dual-use objects which have some civilian uses and some actual or
potential military use (communications systems, transportation systems, pet-
rochemical complexes, manufacturing plants ofsome types), opinions may dif-
fer. The application of the definition to particular objects may also differ
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depending on the scope and objectives of the conflict. Further, the scope and
objectives of the conflict may change during the conflict.
38. Using the Protocol I definition and his own review of state practice, Major
General A.P.V. Rogers, a former Director of British Army Legal Services has
advanced a tentative list of military objectives:
military personnel and persons who take part in the fighting without
being members of the armed forces, military facilities, military
equipment, including military vehicles, weapons, munitions and stores
of fuel, military works, including defensive works and fortifications,
military depots and establishments, including War and Supply
Ministries, works producing or developing military supplies and other
supplies of military value, including metallurgical, engineering and
chemical industries supporting the war effort; areas of land of military
significance such as hills, defiles and bridgeheads; railways, ports,
airfields, bridges, main roads as well as tunnels and canals; oil and other
power installations; communications installations, including
broadcasting and television stations and telephone and telegraph
stations used for military communications. (Rogers, Law on the
Battlefield (1996) 37)
The list was not intended to be exhaustive. It remains a requirement that both
elements of the definition must be met before a target can be properly consid-
ered an appropriate military objective.
39. In 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drew up
the following proposed list of categories of military objectives:
I. The objectives belonging to the following categories are those con-
sidered to be of generally recognized military importance:
(1) Armed forces, including auxiliary or complementary
organisations, and persons who, though not belonging to the
above-mentioned formations, nevertheless take part in the
fighting.
(2) Positions, installations or constructions occupied by the forces
indicated in sub-paragraph 1 above, as well as combat
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objectives (that is to say, those objectives which are directly
contested in battle between land or sea forces including
airborne forces).
(3) Installations, constructions and other works of a military
nature, such as barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g.
Ministries of Army, Navy, Air Force, National Defence,
Supply) and other organs for the direction and administration
of military operations.
(4) Stores of army or military supplies, such as munition dumps,
stores of equipment or fuel, vehicles parks.
(5) Airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations.
(6) Those of the lines and means ofcommunications (railway lines,
roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental
military importance.
(7) The installations of broadcasting and television stations;
telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military
importance.
(8) Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the
war:
(a) industries for the manufacture of armaments such as weap-
ons, munitions, rockets, armoured vehicles, military air-
craft, fighting ships, including the manufacture of
accessories and all other war material;
(b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a
military character, such as transport and communications
material, equipment of the armed forces;
(c) factories or plant constituting other production and manu-
facturing centres of fundamental importance for the con-
duct of war, such as the metallurgical, engineering and
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chemical industries, whose nature or purpose is essentially
military;
(d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is
to serve the industries referred to in (a) -(c);
(e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence,
e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants produc-
ing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption.
(9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for
experiments on and the development of weapons and war
material.
II. The following however, are excepted from the foregoing list:
(1) Persons, constructions, installations or transports which are
protected under the Geneva Conventions I, II, III, of August
12, 1949;
(2) Non-combatants in the armed forces who obviously take no
active or direct part in hostilities.
III. The above list will be reviewed at intervals of not more than ten
years by a group of Experts composed of persons with a sound grasp
of military strategy and of others concerned with the protection of
the civilian population.
(Y. Sandoz, C. Swiniarski, B. Zimmerman, eds., Commentary on the Addi-
tional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
(1987) at 632-633.
40. The Protocol I definition of military objective has been criticized by W.
Hays Parks, the Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to the U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General as being focused too narrowly on definite military ad-
vantage and paying too little heed to war sustaining capability, including eco-
nomic targets such as export industries. (W. Hays Parks, "Air War and the
Law of War," 32 A.RL. Rev. 1, 135-45 (1990)). On the other hand, some crit-
ics of Coalition conduct in the GulfWar have suggested that the Coalition air
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campaign, directed admittedly against legitimate military objectives within
the scope of the Protocol I definition, caused excessive long-term damage to
the Iraqi economic infrastructure with a consequential adverse effect on the
civilian population. (Middle East Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Ci-
vilian Casualties during the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War
(1991); Judith G. Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law,"
87 Am. J. MIL. 391,404-10 (1993)).
41. This criticism has not gone unexplored. Franchise Hampson, a British
scholar, has suggested a possible refinement of the definition:
In order to determine whether there is a real subject of concern here, it
would be necessary to establish exactly what the effect has been of the
damage to the civilian infrastructure brought about by the hostilities. If
that points to a need further to refine the law, it is submitted that what is
needed is a qualification to the definition of military objectives. Either it
should require the likely cumulative effect on the civilian population of
attacks against such targets to be taken into account, or the same result
might be achieved by requiring that the destruction of the object offer a
definite military advantage in the context of the war aim. Frangoise
Hampson, "Means and Methods ofWarfare in the Conflict in the Gulf,"
in P. Rowe, ed., The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law
89 (1983) 100.
42. Although the Protocol I definition of military objective is not beyond criti-
cism, it provides the contemporary standard which must be used when attempt-
ing to determine the lawfulness of particular attacks. That being said, it must be
noted once again neither the USA nor France is a party to Additional Protocol I.
The definition is, however, generally accepted as part of customary law.
43. To put the NATO campaign in context, it is instructive to look briefly at the
approach to the military objective concept in history of air warfare. The Protocol I
standard was not applicable during World War II. The bomber offensives con-
ducted during that war were conducted with technological means which ren-
dered attacks on targets occupying small areas almost impossible. In general,
depending upon the period in the conflict, bomber attacks could be relied upon,
at best, to strike within 5 miles, 2 miles or 1 mile of the designated target. The
mission for the US/UK Combined Bomber Offensive from the UK was:
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"To conduct a joint United States-British air offensive to accomplish
the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military,
industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of
the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance
is fatally weakened. This is construed as meaning so weakened as to
permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent."
(A. Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (1968) 330).
The principal specific objectives of the offensive were designated as:
"Submarine construction yards and bases.
German aircraft industry.
Ball bearings.
Oil.
Synthetic rubber and tires.
Military transport vehicles."
(A. Verrier, ibid, at 330).
Notwithstanding the designation of specific targets and the attempt, at least by
US Army Air Force commanders on occasion, to conduct a precision bombing
campaign, for the most part World War II bombing campaigns were aimed at
area targets and intended, directly or indirectly, to affect the morale of the en-
emy civilian population. It is difficult to describe the fire bombing of Hamburg,
Dresden and Tokyo as anything other than attacks intended to kill, terrorize or
demoralize civilians. Whether or not these attacks could be justified legally in
the total war context of the time, they would be unlawful if they were required
to comply with Protocol I.
44. Technology, law, and the public consensus of what was acceptable, at
least in demonstrably limited conflicts, had evolved by the time of the 1990-91
Gulf Conflict. Technological developments, such as precision guided muni-
tions, and the rapid acquisition of control of the aerospace by coalition air
forces significantly enhanced the precision with which targets could be
attacked.
Target sets used during the Gulf Conflict were:
"Leadership; Command, Control, and Communications; Strategic Air
Defenses; Airfields; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Research and
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Production; Naval Forces and Port Facilities; Military Storage and
Production; Railroads and Bridges, Electrical Power; and Oil Refining
and Distribution Facilities. Schwarzkopf added the Republican Guard
as a category and Scuds soon emerged as a separate target set. After the
beginning of Desert Storm, two more categories appeared: fixed
surface-to-air missile sites in the KTO and breaching sites for the
ground offensive."
(W. Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (1995) 32)
45. In the words of the Cohen, Shelton Joint Statement on Kosovo given to
the US Senate:
"At the outset of the air campaign, NATO set specific strategic
objectives for its use of force in Kosovo that later served as the basis for
its stated conditions to Milosevic for stopping the bombing. These
objectives were to:
— Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to Belgrade's
aggression in the Balkans;
— Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on
helpless civilians and create conditions to reverse his ethnic
cleansing; and
— Damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the
future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its
ability to wage military operations...
Phases of the Campaign. Operation Allied Force was originally planned to be
prosecuted in five phases under NATO's operational plan, the development of
which began in the summer of 1998. Phase was the deployment of air assets
into the European theater. Phase 1 would establish air superiority over Kosovo
and degrade command and control over the whole of the FRY. Phase 2 would
attack military targets in Kosovo and those FRY forces south of 44 degrees
north latitude, which were providing reinforcement to Serbian forces into
Kosovo. This was to allow targeting of forces not only in Kosovo, but also in the
FRY south of Belgrade. Phase 3 would expand air operations against a wide
range of high-value military and security force targets throughout the FRY.
Phase 4 would redeploy forces as required. A limited air response relying pre-
dominantly on cruise missiles to strike selected targets throughout the Phase 1.
Within a few days of the start of NATO's campaign, alliance aircraft were
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striking both strategic and tactical targets throughout Serbia, as well as work-
ing to suppress and disrupt the FRY's integrated air defence system.
At the NATO Summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, alliance leaders de-
cided to further intensify the air campaign by expanding the target set to in-
clude military-industrial infrastructure, media, and other strategic targets ...."
46. The NATO Internet Report Kosovo One Year On (http://www.nato.int/
kosovo/repo 2000, 21 Mar 00) described the targets as:
"The air campaign set out to weaken Serb military capabilities, both
strategically and tactically. Strikes on tactical targets, such as artillery
and field headquarters, had a more immediate effect in disrupting the
ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. Strikes against strategic targets, such as
government ministries and refineries, had long term and broader impact
on the Serb military machine.
The bulk ofNATO's effort against tactical targets was aimed at military
facilities, fielded forces, heavy weapons, and military vehicles and
formations in Kosovo and southern Serbia...
Strategic targets included Serb air defences, command and control
facilities, Yugoslav military (VJ) and police (MUP) forces headquarters,
and supply routes".
47. Most of the targets referred to in the quotations above are clearly military
objectives. The precise scope of "military-industrial infrastructure, media and
other strategic targets" as referred to in the US statement and "government
ministries and refineries" as referred to in the NATO statement is unclear.
Whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a debatable issue. If
the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target.
If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort,
it is not a legitimate target.
d. The Principle of Proportionality
48. The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or
not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple
to state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate de-
structive effect and undesirable collateral effects. For example, bombing a
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refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that
people in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike on
an ammunition dump should not be prohibited merely because a farmer is
plowing a field in the area. Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of
proportionality are not quite so clear cut. It is much easier to formulate the
principle of proportionality in general terms than it is to apply it to a particular
set of circumstances because the comparison is often between unlike quanti-
ties and values. One cannot easily assess the value of innocent human lives as
opposed to capturing a particular military objective.
49. The questions which remain unresolved once one decides to apply the
principle of proportionality include the following:
a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advan-
tage gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to
civilian objects?
b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums?
c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own
forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to ci-
vilian objects?
50. The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to re-
solve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on
the background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human
rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same
relative values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further,
it is unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds
and differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories
would always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the determination of rel-
ative values must be that of the "reasonable military commander". Although
there will be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where
reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants
or the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military
advantage gained.
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51. Much of the material submitted to the OTP consisted of reports that civil-
ians had been killed, often inviting the conclusion to be drawn that crimes had
therefore been committed. Collateral casualties to civilians and collateral
damage to civilian objects can occur for a variety of reasons. Despite an obli-
gation to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas, to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives, and to pro-
tect their civilians from the dangers of military operations, very little preven-
tion may be feasible in many cases. Today's technological society has given
rise to many dual use facilities and resources. City planners rarely pay heed to
the possibility of future warfare. Military objectives are often located in
densely populated areas and fighting occasionally occurs in such areas. Civil-
ians present within or near military objectives must, however, be taken into
account in the proportionality equation even if a party to the conflict has
failed to exercise its obligation to remove them.
52. In the Kupreskic Judgment (Case No: IT-95-16-T 14 Jan 2000) the Trial
Chamber addressed the issue of proportionality as follows:
"526. As an example of the way in which the Martens clause may be
utilised, regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative
effect of attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to
civilians. In other words, it may happen that single attacks on military
objectives causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may
raise doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their
face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (or
of the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated
attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between
indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to
conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may
not be in keeping with international law. Indeed, this pattern of military
conduct may turn out to jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of
civilians, contrary to the demands of humanity."
This formulation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive statement of the
applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians. Its practical im-
port, however, is somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is
the committee's view that where individual (and legitimate) attacks on mili-
tary objectives are concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all of
which are deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a
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crime. The committee understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to
an overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the
military campaign.
v. Casualty Figures
53. In its report, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Human Rights
Watch documented some 500 civilian deaths in 90 separate incidents. It con-
eluded: "on the basis available on these ninety incidents that as few as 488 and
as many as 527 Yugoslav civilians were killed as a result ofNATO bombing.
Between 62 and 66 percent of the total registered civilian deaths occurred in
just twelve incidents. These twelve incidents accounted for 303 to 352 civil-
ian deaths. These were the only incidents among the ninety documented in
which ten or more civilian deaths were confirmed." Ten of these twelve inci-
dents were included among the incidents which were reviewed with consider-
able care by the committee (see para. 9 above) and our estimate was that
between 273 and 317 civilians were killed in these ten incidents. Human
Rights Watch also found the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication
NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia to be largely credible on the basis of its own filed
research and correlation with other sources. A review of this publication indi-
cates it provides an estimated total of approximately 495 civilians killed and
820 civilians wounded in specific documented instances. For the purposes of
this report, the committee operates on the basis of the number of persons al-
legedly killed as found in both publications. It appears that a figure similar to
both publications would be in the range of 500 civilians killed.
vi. General Assesment of the Bombing Campaign
54. During the bombing campaign, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties, in-
cluding 10,484 strike sorties. During these sorties, 23,614 air munitions were
released (figures from NATO). As indicated in the preceding paragraph, it ap-
pears that approximately 500 civilians were killed during the campaign. These
figures do not indicate that NATO may have conducted a campaign aimed at
causing substantial civilian casualties either directly or incidentally.
55. The choice of targets by NATO (see paras. 38 and 39 above) includes
some loosely defined categories such as military-industrial infrastructure and
government ministries and some potential problem categories such as media
and refineries. All targets must meet the criteria for military objectives (see
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para. 28-30 above). If they do not do so, they are unlawful. A general label is
insufficient. The targeted components of the military-industrial infrastructure
and of government ministries must make an effective contribution to military
action and their total or partial destruction must offer a definite military ad-
vantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Refineries are certainly tradi-
tional military objectives but tradition is not enough and due regard must be
paid to environmental damage if they are attacked (see paras. 14-25 above).
The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent particular
media components are part of the C3 (command, control and communica-
tions) network they are military objectives. If media components are not part
of the C3 network then they may become military objectives depending upon
their use. As a bottom line, civilians, civilian objects and civilian morale as
such are not legitimate military objectives. The media does have an effect on
civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster support for the war effort, the
media is not a legitimate military objective. If the media is used to incite
crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. If the me-
dia is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates
the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objec-
tive. As a general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed by the com-
mittee, it is the view of the committee that NATO was attempting to attack
objects it perceived to be legitimate military objectives.
56. The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying
above the height which can be reached by enemy air defences. However,
NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distin-
guish military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives. The 15,000 feet
minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have meant the tar-
get could not be verified with the naked eye. However, it appears that with the
use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried
out in the vast majority of cases during the bombing campaign.
B. Specific Incidents
57. In the course of its review, the committee did not come across any inci-
dent which, in its opinion, required investigation by the OTP. The five spe-
cific incidents discussed below are those which, in the opinion of the
committee, were the most problematic. The facts cited in the discussion of
each specific incident are those indicated in the information within the pos-
session of the OTP at the time of its review.
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i. The Attack on a Civilian Passenger Train at the Grdelica Gorge on 12/4/99
58. On 12 April 1999, a NATO aircraft launched two laser guided bombs at
the Leskovac railway bridge over the Grdelica gorge and Juzna Morava river,
in eastern Serbia. A 5 -carriage passenger train, travelling from Belgrade to
Ristovac on the Macedonian border, was crossing the bridge at the time, and
was struck by both missiles. The various reports made of this incident concur
that the incident occurred at about 1 1.40 a.m. At least ten people were killed
in this incident and at least 15 individuals were injured. The designated target
was the railway bridge, which was claimed to be part of a re-supply route being
used for Serb forces in Kosovo. After launching the first bomb, the person
controlling the weapon, at the last instant before impact, sighted movement
on the bridge. The controller was unable to dump the bomb at that stage and
it hit the train, the impact of the bomb cutting the second of the passenger
coaches in half. Realising the bridge was still intact, the controller picked a
second aim point on the bridge at the opposite end from where the train had
come and launched the second bomb. In the meantime the train had slid for-
ward as a result of the original impact and parts of the train were also hit by the
second bomb.
59. It does not appear that the train was targeted deliberately. US Deputy De-
fense Secretary John Hamre stated that "one of our electro-optically guided
bombs homed in on a railroad bridge just when a passenger train raced to the
aim point. We never wanted to destroy that train or kill its occupants. We did
want to destroy the bridge and we regret this accident." The substantive part
of the explanation, both for the failure to detect the approach of the passenger
train and for firing a second missile once it had been hit by the first, was given
by General Wesley Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe
and is here reprinted in full:
" [T] his was a case where a pilot was assigned to strike a railroad bridge
that is part of the integrated communications supply network in Serbia.
He launched his missile from his aircraft that was many miles away, he
was not able to put his eyes on the bridge, it was a remotely directed
attack. And as he stared intently at the desired target point on the
bridge, and I talked to the team at Aviano who was directly engaged in
this operation, as the pilot stared intently at the desired aim point on
the bridge and worked it, and worked it and worked it, and all of a
sudden at the very last instant with less than a second to go he caught
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a flash of movement that came into the screen and it was the train
coming in.
Unfortunately he couldn't dump the bomb at that point, it was locked, it
was going into the target and it was an unfortunate incident which he,
and the crew, and all of us very much regret. We certainly don't want to
do collateral damage.
The mission was to take out the bridge. He realised when it had
happened that he had not hit the bridge, but what he had hit was the
train. He had another aim point on the bridge, it was a relatively long
bridge and he believed he still had to accomplish his mission, the pilot
circled back around. He put his aim point on the other end of the bridge
from where the train had come, by the time the bomb got close to the
bridge it was covered with smoke and clouds and at the last minute
again in an uncanny accident, the train had slid forward from the
original impact and parts of the train had moved across the bridge, and
so that by striking the other end of the bridge he actually caused
additional damage to the train." (Press Conference, NATO HQ,
Brussels, 13 April).
General Clark then showed the cockpit video of the plane which fired on the
bridge:
"The pilot in the aircraft is looking at about a 5-inch screen, he is seeing
about this much and in here you can see this is the railroad bridge which
is a much better view than he actually had, you can see the tracks
running this way.
Look very intently at the aim point, concentrate right there and you can
see how, if you were focused right on your job as a pilot, suddenly that
train appeared. It was really unfortunate.
Here, he came back around to try to strike a different point on the
bridge because he was trying to do a job to take the bridge down. Look at
this aim point - you can see smoke and other obscuration there - he
couldn't tell what this was exactly.
Focus intently right at the centre of the cross. He is bringing these two
crosses together and suddenly he recognises at the very last instant that
the train that was struck here has moved on across the bridge and so the
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engine apparently was struck by the second bomb." (Press Conference,
NATO HQ, Brussels, 13 April).
60. Some doubt has since been cast on this version of events by a comprehen-
sive technical report submitted by a German national, Mr Ekkehard Wenz,
which queries the actual speed at which the events took place in relation to
that suggested by the video footage of the incident released by NATO. The ef-
fect of this report is to suggest that the reaction time available to the person
controlling the bombs was in fact considerably greater than that alleged by
NATO. Mr. Wenz also suggests the aircraft involved was an F15E Strike Ea-
gle with a crew of two and with the weapons being controlled by a Weapons
Systems Officer (WSO) not the pilot.
61. The committee has reviewed both the material provided by NATO and
the report of Mr. Wenz with considerable care. It is the opinion of the com-
mittee that it is irrelevant whether the person controlling the bomb was the
pilot or the WSO. Either person would have been travelling in a high speed
aircraft and likely performing several tasks simultaneously, including
endeavouring to keep the aircraft in the air and safe from surrounding threats
in a combat environment. If the committee accepts Mr. Wenz's estimate of
the reaction time available, the person controlling the bombs still had a very
short period of time, less than 7 or 8 seconds in all probability, to react. Al-
though Mr Wenz is of the view that the WSO intentionally targeted the train,
the committee's review of the frames used in the report indicates another in-
terpretation is equally available. The cross hairs remain fixed on the bridge
throughout, and it is clear from this footage that the train can be seen moving
toward the bridge only as the bomb is in flight: it is only in the course of the
bomb's trajectory that the image of the train becomes visible. At a point where
the bomb is within a few seconds of impact, a very slight change to the bomb
aiming point can be observed, in that it drops a couple of feet. This sequence
regarding the bomb sights indicates that it is unlikely that the WSO was tar-
geting the train, but instead suggests that the target was a point on the span of
the bridge before the train appeared.
62. It is the opinion of the committee that the bridge was a legitimate military
objective. The passenger train was not deliberately targeted. The person con-
trolling the bombs, pilot or WSO, targeted the bridge and, over a very short
period of time, failed to recognize the arrival of the train while the first bomb
was in flight. The train was on the bridge when the bridge was targeted a
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second time and the bridge length has been estimated at 50 meters (Wenz
study para 6 g above at p. 25). It is the opinion of the committee that the infor-
mation in relation to the attack with the first bomb does not provide a suffi-
cient basis to initiate an investigation. The committee has divided views
concerning the attack with the second bomb in relation to whether there was
an element of recklessness in the conduct of the pilot or WSO. Despite this,
the committee is in agreement that, based on the criteria for initiating an in-
vestigation (see para. 5 above) , this incident should not be investigated. In re-
lation to whether there is information warranting consideration of command
responsibility, the committee is of the view that there is no information from
which to conclude that an investigation is necessary into the criminal respon-
sibility of persons higher in the chain of command. Based on the information
available to it, it is the opinion of the committee that the attack on the train at
Grdelica Gorge should not be investigated by the OTP.
ii. The Attack on the Djakovica Convoy on 14/4/99
63. The precise facts concerning this incident are difficult to determine. In
particular, there is some confusion about the number of aircraft involved, the
number of bombs dropped, and whether one or two convoys were attacked.
The FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report (White Book) describes the inci-
dent as follows:
"On April 14, 1999 [...] on the Djakovica-Prizren road, near the
villages of Madanaj and Meja, a convoy of Albanian refugees was
targeted three times. Mostly women, children and old people were in
the convoy, returning to their homes in cars, on tractors and carts. The
first assault on the column of over 1000 people took place while they
were moving through Meja village. Twelve persons were killed on that
occasion. The people from the convoy scattered around and tried to
find shelter in the nearby houses. But NATO warplanes launched
missiles on those houses as well, killing another 7 persons in the
process. The attack continued along the road beween [the] villages
[of] Meja and Bistrazin. One tractor with trailer was completely
destroyed. Twenty people out of several of them on the tractor were
killed. In the repeated attack on the refugee vehicles, one more person
was killed." (Vol 1, p. 1)
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Total casualty figures seem to converge around 70-75 killed with approxi-
mately 100 injured. The FRY publication NATO War Crimes in Yugoslavia
states 73 were killed and 36 were wounded.
64. NATO initially denied, but later acknowledged, responsibility for this at-
tack. Assuming the facts most appropriate to a successful prosecution, NATO
aircraft flying at 15000 feet or higher to avoid Yugoslav air defences attacked
two vehicle convoys, both of which contained civilian vehicles. On 15 April,
NATO confirmed that the aircraft had been flying at an altitude of 15,000
feet (approximately 5 km) and that, in this attack, the pilots had viewed the
target with the naked eye rather than remotely. The aim of the attack was to
destroy Serb military forces, in the area of Djakovica, who had been seen by
NATO aircraft setting fire to civilian houses. At a Press Conference of 15
April 1999, NATO claimed that this was an area where the Yugoslav Special
Police Forces, the MUP, were conducting ethnic cleansing operations over
the preceding days. The road between Prizren and Djakovica served as an im-
portant resupply and reinforcement route for the Yugoslav Army and the Spe-
cial Police.
65. A reconstruction of what is known about the attack reveals that in the
hours immediately prior to the attack, at around 1030, NATO forces claimed
to have seen a progression of burning villages, and that a series of fires could
be seen progressing to the south east. They formed the view that MUP and VJ
forces were thus methodically working from the north to the south through
villages, setting them ablaze and forcing all the Kosovar Albanians out of
those villages. At around 1030, the pilot spotted a three-vehicle convoy near
to the freshest burning house, and saw uniformly shaped dark green vehicles
which appeared to be troop carrying vehicles. He thus formed the view that
the convoy comprised VJ and MUP forces working their way down towards
Djakovica and that they were preparing to set the next house on fire. In re-
sponse, an F-16 bombed the convoy's lead vehicle at approximately 1110; the
pilot relayed a threat update and the coordinates of the attack and departed
the area to refuel. A second F-16 aircraft appears to have arrived on the scene
around 1 135, and visually assessed the target area as containing large vehicles
which were located near a complex of buildings. A single GBU-12 bomb was
dropped at 1 148. Contemporaneously, a third aircraft identified a large con-
voy on a major road south east out of Djakovica and sought to identify the tar-
get. The target was verified as a VJ convoy at 1216 and an unspecified number
of bombs were dropped at 1219. In the next 15 or so minutes (exact time
516
___^_
AppendixA
unspecified) , the same aircraft appears to have destroyed one further vehicle
in the convoy. Simultaneously, two Jaguar aircraft each dropped 1 GBU-12
bomb each, but both missed their targets. Between 1235 and 1245, the first
F-16 aircraft appears to have dropped three further bombs, at least one of
which appears to have missed its target.
66. It is claimed by one source (report on file with the OTP) that the Yugoslav
TV broadcast of the attack on the Djakovica convoy on 15 April 1999 re-
corded a conversation between one F-16 pilot involved in the attack and the
AWACs. This conversation is alleged to establish both that the attack on the
convoy was deliberate and that a UK Harrier pilot had advised the F-16 pilot
that the convoy was comprised solely of tractors and civilians. The F-16 pilot
was then allegedly told that the convoy was nevertheless a legitimate military
target and was instructed to fire on it. This same report also suggests that the
convoy was attacked with cluster bombs, indicated by bomb remnants and
craters left at the site. However, these claims - both with regard to the fore-
knowledge of the pilot as to the civilian nature of the convoy and of the weap-
ons used - are not confirmed by any other source.
67. NATO itself claimed that although the cockpit video showed the vehicles
to look like tractors, when viewed with the naked eye from the attack altitude
they appeared to be military vehicles. They alleged that several characteristics
indicated it to be a military convoy including movement, size, shape, colour,
spacing and high speed prior to the attack. There had also been reports of Serb
forces using civilian vehicles. An analysis of the Serb TV footage of the attack
on Djakovica by the OTP indicates that at approximately 1240, some point
during the attack, doubt was conveyed that Serb convoys do not usually travel
in convoys of that size. However, the on-scene analysis of the convoy ap-
peared to convey the impression that the convoy comprised a mix of military
and civilian vehicles. At around 1300, an order appears to have been issued,
suspending attacks until the target could be verified.
68. NATO has consistently claimed that it believed the Djakovica convoy to
be escorted by Serb military vehicles at the time of the attack. Human Rights
Watch has commented on the incident as follows:
"General Clark stated in September that NATO consistently observed
Yugoslav military vehicles moving on roads 'intermixed with civilian
convoys.' After the Djakovica-Decane incident, General Clark says, 'we
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got to be very, very cautious about striking objects moving on the roads.'
Another NATO officer, Col. Ed Boyle, says: 'Because we were so
concerned with collateral damage, the CFAC [Combined Forces Air
Component Commander] at the time, General [Michael] Short, put out
the guidance that if military vehicles were intermingled with civilian
vehicles, they were not to be attacked, due to the collateral damage.'
When this directive was actually issued remains an important question.
Nevertheless, the change in NATO rules of engagement indicates that
the alliance recognized that it had taken insufficient precautions in
mounting this attack, in not identifying civilians present, and in
assuming that the intended targets were legitimate military objectives
rather than in positively identifying them."
69. It is the opinion of the committee that civilians were not deliberately at-
tacked in this incident. While there is nothing unlawful about operating at a
height above Yugoslav air defences, it is difficult for any aircrew operating an
aircraft flying at several hundred miles an hour and at a substantial height to
distinguish between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy. In this case,
most of the attacking aircraft were F16s with a crew of one person to fly the
aircraft and identify the target. As soon as the crews of the attacking aircraft
became aware of the presence of civilians, the attack ceased.
70. While this incident is one where it appears the aircrews could have bene-
fitted from lower altitude scrutiny of the target at an early stage, the commit-
tee is of the opinion that neither the aircrew nor their commanders displayed
the degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which
would sustain criminal charges. The committee also notes that the attack was
suspended as soon as the presence of civilians in the convoy was suspected.
Based on the information assessed, the committee recommends that the OTP
not commence an investigation related to the Djakovica Convoy bombing.
Hi. The Bombing of the RTS (Serbian TV and Radio Station) in Belgrade on
23/4/99
71. On 23 April 1999, at 0220, NATO intentionally bombed the central stu-
dio of the RTS (state-owned) broadcasting corporation at 1 Aberdareva
Street in the centre of Belgrade. The missiles hit the entrance area, which
caved in at the place where the Aberdareva Street building was connected to
518
AppendixA
__
the Takovska Street building. While there is some doubt over exact casualty
figures, between 10 and 17 people are estimated to have been killed.
72. The bombing of the TV studio was part of a planned attack aimed at dis-
rupting and degrading the C3 (Command, Control and Communications)
network. In co-ordinated attacks, on the same night, radio relay buildings and
towers were hit along with electrical power transformer stations. At a press
conference on 27 April 1999, NATO officials justified this attack in terms of
the dual military and civilian use to which the FRY communication system
was routinely put, describing this as a
"very hardened and redundant command and control communications
system [which ...] uses commercial telephone, [...] military cable, [...]
fibre optic cable, [...] high frequency radio communication, [...]
microwave communication and everything can be interconnected.
There are literally dozens, more than 100 radio relay sites around the
country, and [...] everything is wired in through dual use. Most of the
commercial system serves the military and the military system can be
put to use for the commercial system [...]."
Accordingly, NATO stressed the dual-use to which such communications sys-
tems were put, describing civilian television as "heavily dependent on the mili-
tary command and control system and military traffic is also routed through the
civilian system" (press conference of 27 April, ibid).
73. At an earlier press conference on 23 April 1999, NATO officials reported
that the TV building also housed a large multi-purpose communications satel-
lite antenna dish, and that "radio relay control buildings and towers were tar-
geted in the ongoing campaign to degrade the FRY's command, control and
communications network". In a communication of 17 April 1999 to Amnesty
International, NATO claimed that the RTS facilities were being used "as ra-
dio relay stations and transmitters to support the activities of the FRY military
and special police forces, and therefore they represent legitimate military tar-
gets" (Amnesty International Report, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, June
2000, p. 42).
74. Of the electrical power transformer stations targeted, one transformer sta-
tion supplied power to the air defence co-ordination network while the other
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supplied power to the northern-sector operations centre. Both these facilities
were key control elements in the FRY integrated air-defence system. In this
regard, NATO indicated that
"we are not targeting the Serb people as we repeatedly have stated nor
do we target President Milosevic personally, we are attacking the
control system that is used to manipulate the military and security
forces."
More controversially, however, the bombing was also justified on the basis of
the propaganda purpose to which it was employed:
"[We need to] directly strike at the very central nerve system of
Milosovic's regime. This of course are those assets which are used to
plan and direct and to create the political environment of tolerance in
Yugoslavia in which these brutalities can not only be accepted but even
condoned. [....] Strikes against TV transmitters and broadcast facilities
are part of our campaign to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery
which is a vital part of President Milosevic's control mechanism."
In a similar statement, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was reported as saying
in The Times that the media "is the apparatus that keeps him [Milosevic] in
power and we are entirely justified as NATO allies in damaging and taking on
those targets" (24 April, 1999). In a statement of 8 April 1999, NATO also in-
dicated that the TV studios would be targeted unless they broadcast 6 hours
per day of Western media reports: "If President Milosevic would provide equal
time for Western news broadcasts in its programmes without censorship 3
hours a day between noon and 1800 and 3 hours a day between 1800 and mid-
night, then his TV could be an acceptable instrument of public information."
75. NATO intentionally bombed the Radio and TV station and the persons
killed or injured were civilians. The questions are: was the station a legitimate
military objective and; if it was, were the civilian casualties disproportionate
to the military advantage gained by the attack? For the station to be a military
objective within the definition in Article 52 of Protocol I: a) its nature, pur-
pose or use must make an effective contribution to military action and b) its
total or partial destruction must offer a definite military advantage in the cir-
cumstances ruling at the time. The 1956 ICRC list of military objectives,
drafted before the Additional Protocols, included the installations of
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broadcasting and television stations of fundamental military importance as
military objectives (para. 39 above). The list prepared by Major General Rog-
ers included broadcasting and television stations if they meet the military ob-
jective criteria (para. 38 above). As indicated in paras. 72 and 73 above, the
attack appears to have been justified by NATO as part of a more general at-
tack aimed at disrupting the FRY Command, Control and Communications
network, the nerve centre and apparatus that keeps Miloseviae in power, and
also as an attempt to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery. Insofar as the
attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network, it was
legally acceptable.
76. If, however, the attack was made because equal time was not provided for
Western news broadcasts, that is, because the station was part of the propa-
ganda machinery, the legal basis was more debatable. Disrupting government
propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the population and the
armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds
alone may not meet the "effective contribution to military action" and "defi-
nite military advantage" criteria required by the Additional Protocols (see
paras. 35-36, above). The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols in-
terprets the expression "definite military advantage anticipated" to exclude
"an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages" and in-
terprets the expression "concrete and direct" as intended to show that the ad-
vantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close rather than
hardly perceptible and likely to appear only in the long term (ICRC Commen-
tary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, para. 2209). While stopping
such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and under-
mine the government's political support, it is unlikely that either of these pur-
poses would offer the "concrete and direct" military advantage necessary to
make them a legitimate military objective. NATO believed that Yugoslav
broadcast facilities were "used entirely to incite hatred and propaganda" and
alleged that the Yugoslav government had put all private TV and radio sta-
tions in Serbia under military control (NATO press conferences of 28 and 30
April 1999). However, it was not claimed that they were being used to incite
violence akin to Radio Milks Collines during the Rwandan genocide, which
might have justified their destruction (see para. 47 above). At worst, the Yu-
goslav government was using the broadcasting networks to issue propaganda
supportive of its war effort: a circumstance which does not, in and of itself,
amount to a war crime (see in this regard the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1946 in the case of Hans Fritzsche, who
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served as a senior official in the Propaganda ministry alleged to have incited
and encouraged the commission of crimes. The IMT held that although
Fritzsche clearly made strong statements of a propagandistic nature, it was
nevertheless not prepared to find that they were intended to incite the com-
mission of atrocities, but rather, were aimed at arousing popular sentiment in
support of Hitler and the German war effort (American journal of International
Law, vol. 41 (1947) 328)). The committee finds that if the attack on the RTS
was justified by reference to its propaganda purpose alone, its legality might
well be questioned by some experts in the field of international humanitarian
law. It appears, however, that NATO's targeting of the RTS building for pro-
paganda purposes was an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its primary
goal of disabling the Serbian military command and control system and to de-
stroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power. In a press
conference of 9 April 1999, NATO declared that TV transmitters were not
targeted directly but that "in Yugoslavia military radio relay stations are often
combined with TV transmitters [so] we attack the military target. If there is
damage to the TV transmitters, it is a secondary effect but it is not [our] pri-
mary intention to do that." A NATO spokesperson, Jamie Shea, also wrote to
the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists on 12 April claim-
ing that Operation Allied Force "target [ed] military targets only and televi-
sion and radio towers are only struck if they [were] integrated into military
facilities ... There is no policy to strike television and radio transmitters as
such" (cited in Amnesty International Report, ibid, June 2000).
77. Assuming the station was a legitimate objective, the civilian casualties
were unfortunately high but do not appear to be clearly disproportionate.
Although NATO alleged that it made "every possible effort to avoid civilian
casualties and collateral damage" (Amnesty International Report, ibid, June
2000, p. 42), some doubts have been expressed as to the specificity of the warn-
ing given to civilians by NATO of its intended strike, and whether the notice
would have constituted "effective warning ... of attacks which may affect the
civililan population, unless circumstances do not permit" as required by Article
57(2) of Additional Protocol I.
Evidence on this point is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, NATO
officials in Brussels are alleged to have told Amnesty International that they
did not give a specific warning as it would have endangered the pilots (Am-
nesty International Report, ibid, June 2000, at p. 47; see also para. 49 above re:
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proportionality and the extent to which a military commander is obligated to
expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage)
.
On this view, it is possible that casualties among civilians working at the RTS
may have been heightened because of NATO's apparent failure to provide
clear advance warning of the attack, as required by Article 57(2).
On the other hand, foreign media representatives were apparently forewarned
of the attack (Amnesty International Report, ibid). As Western journalists
were reportedly warned by their employers to stay away from the television sta-
tion before the attack, it would also appear that some Yugoslav officials may
have expected that the building was about to be struck. Consequently, UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair blamed Yugoslav officials for not evacuating the
building, claiming that "[t]hey could have moved those people out ofthe build-
ing. They knew it was a target and they didn't ... [I]t was probably for . . . very
clear propaganda reasons." (ibid, citing Moral combat - NATO at war, broad-
cast on BBC2 on 12 March 2000). Although knowledge on the part of Yugo-
slav officials of the impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation
to forewarn civilians under Article 57(2), it may nevertheless imply that the
Yugoslav authorities may be partially responsible for the civilian casualties re-
sulting from the attack and may suggest that the advance notice given by
NATO may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances.
78. Assuming the RTS building to be a legitimate military target, it appeared
that NATO realised that attacking the RTS building would only interrupt
broadcasting for a brief period. Indeed, broadcasting allegedly recommenced
within hours of the strike, thus raising the issue of the importance of the mili-
tary advantage gained by the attack vis-a-vis the civilian casualties incurred.
The FRY command and control network was alleged by NATO to comprise a
complex web and that could thus not be disabled in one strike. As noted by
General Wesley Clark, NATO "knew when we struck that there would be al-
ternate means of getting the Serb Television. There's no single switch to turn
off everything but we thought it was a good move to strike it and the political
leadership agreed with us" (ibid, citing "Moral combat, NATO at War,"
broadcast on BBC2 on 12 March 2000). At a press conference on 27 April
1999, another NATO spokesperson similarly described the dual-use Yugoslav
command and control network as "incapable of being dealt with in "a single
knock-out blow (ibid)" The proportionality or otherwise of an attack should
not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident. (See in this regard
para. 52, above, referring to the need for an overall assessment of the totality
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of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign). With regard
to these goals, the strategic target of these attacks was the Yugoslav command
and control network. The attack on the RTS building must therefore be seen
as forming part of an integrated attack against numerous objects, including
transmission towers and control buildings of the Yugoslav radio relay network
which were "essential to Milosevic's ability to direct and control the repressive
activities of his army and special police forces in Kosovo" (NATO press re-
lease, 1 May 1999) and which comprised "a key element in theYugoslav
air-defence network" (ibid, 1 May 1999). Attacks were also aimed at electric-
ity grids that fed the command and control structures of the Yugoslav Army
(ibid, 3 May 1999). Other strategic targets included additional command and
control assets such as the radio and TV relay sites at Novi Pazar, Kosovaka
and Krusevac (ibid) and command posts (ibid, 30 April). Oi the electrical
power transformer stations targeted, one transformer station supplied power
to the air-defence coordination network while the other supplied power to the
northern sector operations centre. Both these facilities were key control ele-
ments in the FRY integrated air-defence system (ibid, 23 April 1999). The ra-
dio relay and TV transmitting station near Novi Sad was also an important
link in the air defence command and control communications network. Not
only were these targets central to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's govern-
ing apparatus, but formed, from a military point of view, an integral part of the
strategic communications network which enabled both the military and na-
tional command authorities to direct the repression and atrocities taking
place in Kosovo (ibid, 21 April 1999).
79. On the basis of the above analysis and on the information currently avail-
able to it, the committee recommends that the OTP not commence an inves-
tigation related to the bombing of the Serbian TV and Radio Station.
iv. The Attack on the Chinese Embassy on 7/5/99
80. On 7/5/99, at 2350, NATO aircraft fired several missiles which hit the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing 3 Chinese citizens, injuring an estimated
15 others, and causing extensive damage to the embassy building and other
buildings in the immediate surrounds. At the moment of the attack, fifty peo-
ple were reported to have been in the embassy buildings. By the admission of
US Government sources, the Chinese Embassy compound was mistakenly hit.
The bombing occurred because at no stage in the process was it realised that
the bombs were aimed at the Chinese Embassy. The Embassy had been
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wrongly identified as the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Pro-
curement (Yugoimport FDSP) at 2 Umetnosti Boulevard in New Belgrade.
The FDSP was deemed by the CIA to be a legitimate target due to its role in
military procurement: it was selected for its role in support of the Yugoslav
military effort.
81. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering offered the following explana-
tion for what occurred:
"The bombing resulted from three basic failures. First, the technique
used to locate the intended target - the headquarters of the Yugoslav
Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP) - was severely
flawed. Second, none of the military or intelligence databases used to
verify target information contained the correct location of the Chinese
Embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the
first two mistakes detected. No one who might have known that the
targeted building was not the FDSP headquarters - but was in fact the
Chinese Embassy - was ever consulted."
According to US Government sources, the street address of the intended tar-
get, the FDSP headquarters was known as Bulevar Umetnosti 2 in New Bel-
grade. During a mid-April "work-up" of the target to prepare a mission folder
for the B-2 bomber crew, three maps were used in an attempt to physically lo-
cate this address within the neighborhood: two local commercial maps from
1989 and 1996, and one US government (National Imagery and Mapping
Agency or NIMA) map produced in 1997. None of these maps had any refer-
ence to the FDSP building and none accurately identified the current location
of the Chinese Embassy.
82. The root of the failures in target location appears to stem from the land
navigation techniques employed by an intelligence officer in an effort to pin-
point the location of the FDSP building at Bulevar Umetnosti 2. The officer
used techniques known as "intersection" and "resection" which, while appro-
priate to locate distant or inaccessible points or objects, are inappropriate for
use in aerial targeting as they provide only an approximate location. Using
this process, the individual mistakenly determined that the building which we
now know to be the Chinese Embassy was the FDSP headquarters. This
method of identification was not questioned or reviewed and hence this flaw
in the address location process went undetected by all the others who
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evaluated the FDSP headquarters as a military target. It also appears that
very late in the process, an intelligence officer serendipitously came to sus-
pect that the target had been wrongly identified and sought to raise the con-
cern that the building had been mislocated. However, throughout a series of
missed opportunities, the problem of identification was not brought to the at-
tention of the senior managers who may have been able to intervene in time
to prevent the strike.
83. Finally, reviewing elements in, inter alia, the Joint Staff did not uncover ei-
ther the inaccurate location of the FDSP headquarters or the correct location
of the Chinese Embassy. The data base reviews were limited to validating the
target data sheet geographic coordinates and the information put into the
data base by the NIMA analyst. Such a circular process did not serve to un-
cover the original error and highlighted the system's susceptibility to a single
point of data base failure. The critical linchpin for both the error in identifica-
tion of the building and the failure of the review mechanisms was thus the in-
adequacy of the supporting data bases and the mistaken assumption the
information they contained would necessarily be accurate.
84. The building hit was clearly a civilian object and not a legitimate military
objective. NATO, and subsequently various organs of the US Government,
including the CIA, issued a formal apology, accepted full responsibility for the
incident and asserted that the intended target, the Federal Directorate for
Supply and Procurement, would have been a legitimate military objective.
The USA has formally apologized to the Chinese Government and agreed to
pay $28 million in compensation to the Chinese Government and $4.5 million
to the families of those killed or injured. The CIA has also dismissed one intel-
ligence officer and reprimanded six senior managers. The US Government
also claims to have taken corrective actions in order to assign individual re-
sponsibility and to prevent mistakes such as this from occurring in the future.
85. It is the opinion of the committee that the aircrew involved in the attack
should not be assigned any responsibility for the fact they were given the
wrong target and that it is inappropriate to attempt to assign criminal respon-
sibility for the incident to senior leaders because they were provided with
wrong information by officials of another agency. Based on the information
available to it, the committee is of the opinion that the OTP should not un-
dertake an investigation concerning the bombing of the Chinese Embassy.
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v. The Attack on Korisa Village on J 3/5/99
86. On 14 May 1999, NATO aircraft dropped 10 bombs on the village of
Korisa, on the highway between Prizren and Pristina. Much confusion seems
to exist about this incident, and factual accounts do not seem to easily tally
with each other. As many as 87 civilians, mainly refugees, were killed in this
attack and approximately 60 appear to have been wounded. The primary tar-
get in this attack was asserted by NATO to be a Serbian military camp and
Command Post which were located near the village of Korisa. It appears that
the refugees were near the attacked object. However, unlike previous cases
where NATO subsequently claimed that an error had occurred in its targeting
or its military intelligence sources, NATO spokespersons continued to affirm
the legitimacy of this particular attack. They maintained that this was a legiti-
mate military target and that NATO intelligence had identified a military
camp and Command Post near to the village of Korisa.
87. According to NATO officials, immediately prior to the attack, the target
was identified as having military revetments. The pilot was able to see silhou-
ettes of vehicles on the ground as the attack took place at 2330, when two la-
ser guided bombs were dropped. Ten minutes later, another two laser guided
bombs and six gravity bombs were dropped. In a press conference on 15 May,
NATO stated that the attack went ahead because the target was confirmed by
prior intelligence as being valid and the pilot identified vehicles present.
There were never any doubts, from NATO spokespersons, as to the validity of
this target.
88. Information about NATO's position on the bombardment of Korisa was
released at the press conference on the following day, 15 May. At this confer-
ence, General Jertz twice affirmed that the target was, in NATO's opinion, le-
gitimate since military facilities were present at the site:
"As already has been mentioned, it was a legitimate military target.
NATO reconnaissance and intelligence orders identified just outside
Korisa a military camp and command post, including an armoured
personnel carrier and 10 pieces of artillery. Follow-up intelligence
confirmed this information as being a valid military target. Immediately
prior to the attack at 23.30-11.30 pm - local time Thursday night an
airborne forward air controller identified the target, so the identification
and attack system of his aircraft, having positively identified the target
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as what looked like dug-in military reveted positions, he dropped two
laser guided bombs. Approximately 10 minutes later, the third aircraft
engaged the target with gravity bombs, with six gravity bombs. A total of
10 bombs were dropped on the target."
When questioned about the presence of civilians on the ground, General Jertz
indicated:
"What I can say so far is when the pilot attacked the target he had to
visually identify it through the attack systems which are in the aircraft,
and you know it was by night, so he did see silhouettes of vehicles on the
ground and as it was by prior intelligence a valid target, he did do the
attack [...] it was a legitimate target. Since late April we knew there
were command posts, military pieces in that area and they have been
continuously used. So for the pilot flying the attack, it was a legitimate target.
But when he is in the target area for attacking, it is his responsibility to
make sure that all the cues he sees are the ones which he needs to really
attack. And at night he saw the silhouettes of vehicles and that is why
he was allowed to attack. Of course, and we have to be very fair, we are
talking at night. If there is anybody sleeping somewhere in a house, you
would not be able to see it from the perspective of a pilot. But once
again, don't misinterpret it. It was a military target which had been used
since the beginning of conflict over there and we have all sources used
to identify this target in order to make sure that this target was still a
valid target when it was attacked." (Emphasis added).
TheNATO position thus appears to be that it bombed a legitimate military target,
that it knew nothing of the presence of civilians and that none were observed im-
mediately prior to the attack. Indeed, NATO stated that they believed this area to
have been completely cleared of civilians. There is some information indicating
that displaced Kosovar civilians were forcibly concentrated within a military camp
in the village of Korisa as human shields and that Yugoslav military forces may
thus be at least partially responsible for the deaths there.
89. The available information concerning this incident is in conflict. The at-
tack occurred in the middle of the night at about 2330. The stated object of
the attack was a legitimate military objective. According to NATO, all practi-
cable precautions were taken and it was determined civilians were not
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present. It appears that a relatively large number of civilians were killed. It also
appears these civilians were either returning refugees or persons gathered as
human shields by FRY authorities or both. The committee is of the view that
the credible information available is not sufficient to tend to show that a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been committed by the aircrew or
by superiors in the NATO chain ofcommand. Based on the information avail-
able to it, the committee is of the opinion that OTP should not undertake an
investigation concerning the bombing at Korisa.
V Recommendations
90. The committee has conducted its review relying essentially upon public
documents, including statements made by NATO and NATO countries at
press conferences and public documents produced by the FRY. It has tended
to assume that the NATO and NATO countries' press statements are gener-
ally reliable and that explanations have been honestly given. The committee
must note, however, that when the OTP requested NATO to answer specific
questions about specific incidents, the NATO reply was couched in general
terms and failed to address the specific incidents. The committee has not spo-
ken to those involved in directing or carrying out the bombing campaign. The
committee has also assigned substantial weight to the factual assertions made
by Human Rights Watch as its investigators did spend a limited amount of
time on the ground in the FRY. Further, the committee has noted that Hu-
man Rights Watch found the two volume compilation of the FRY Ministry of
Foreign Affairs entitled NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia generally reliable and the
committee has tended to rely on the casualty figures for specific incidents in
this compilation. If one accepts the figures in this compilation of approxi-
mately 495 civilians killed and 820 civilians wounded in documented in-
stances, there is simply no evidence of the necessary crime base for charges of
genocide or crimes against humanity. Further, in the particular incidents re-
viewed by the committee with particular care (see paras. 9, and 48-76) the
committee has not assessed any particular incidents as justifying the com-
mencement of an investigation by the OTP. NATO has admitted that mis-
takes did occur during the bombing campaign; errors of judgment may also
have occurred. Selection of certain objectives for attack may be subject to le-
gal debate. On the basis of the information reviewed, however, the committee
is of the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing
campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justi-
fied. In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are
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unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate
charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly
heinous offences.
91. On the basis of information available, the committee recommends that no
investigation be commenced by the OTP in relation to the NATO bombing
campaign or incidents occurring during the campaign.
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served as a Visiting Professor at the University of Montreal, the University of
Florida, and the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, and was a Visiting Scholar at the
University of Michigan. He is currently serving as Chairman of the Advisory
Commission on Humanitarian Law of the German Red Cross; on the Scien-
tific Advisory Board, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg, Germany; and as the President of the German
Society of International Law. He was a member of the German delegation to
the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law (1974-77).
Professor Bothe is the author and/or editor of numerous books and articles on
international humanitarian law as well as international law questions relating
to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Professor Ove Bring is Professor of International Law at Stockholm Uni-
versity and at the Swedish National Defense College. He is Chairman of the
Swedish Branch of the International Law Association and has served as Spe-
cial Legal Adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He participated in the
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Thomson/Blackwell humanitarian mission to the former Yugoslavia, reporting
to the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) (1992-1993). In 1994 he headed a Swedish human
rights mission to China and Tibet, reporting to the Swedish Ministry for For-
eign Affairs. In February 1995 he was appointed Swedish Conciliator under
the European Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE,
now The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) . Pro-
fessor Bring was on the Central Board of Directors for the Swedish Red Cross
from 1996 to 1999, and is currently a member of the Governing Council of the
San Remo Institute of International Humanitarian Law and a Swedish Mem-
ber of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, US Navy (Ret.), commanded
Fighter Squadron 41 and Carrier Air Wing 8, both embarked in USS NIMITZ
(CVN 68). He later commanded the assault ship USS GUAM (LPH 9) and,
during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the aircraft car-
rier USS MIDWAY (CV 41). Following promotion to flag rank, he became
Commander, Carrier Group 6 and Commander, USS America Battle Group.
In addition to combat deployments to Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, he de-
ployed in support ofUnited Nations operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. He
served with the US Air Force; the staff ofCommander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet;
the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, on four occasions; with the Joint
Staff (as J6) ; and as Director, Navy Space, Information Warfare, and Command
and Control (N6). Vice Admiral Cebrowski became the forty-seventh Presi-
dent of the Naval War College in July 1998. Following retirement, in Novem-
ber 2001 Vice Admiral Cebrowski was appointed as Director of the Office of
Force Transformation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Captain William H. Dalton, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), is currently as-
signed to the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, as Associate
Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence). From 1965 to 1995 he served as a
judge advocate in the United States Navy. His assignments included service
as the Executive Officer, Naval Legal Service Office, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;
the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (International Law) within the
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy; the Staff
Judge Advocate, United States Pacific Command in Hawaii; and as the In-
spector General, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. Captain
Dalton also served on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College as the first
Deputy Director, Oceans Law and Policy Department.
Professor Yoram Dinstein is currently the Charles H. Stockton Professor
of International Law at the US Naval War College, an appointment he also
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filled from 1999-2000. Previously, he served as a Humbolt Fellow at the Max
Planck Institute of Foreign, Comparative and International Law in Heidel-
berg, Germany (2000-01) and as Professor of International Law, Yanowicz
Professor of Human Rights, President (1991-98), Rector (1980-85), and
Dean of the Faculty of Law (1978-80) at Tel Aviv University. Professor
Dinstein started his career in Israel's Foreign Service and served as Consul of
Israel in New York and a member of Israel's Permanent Mission to the United
Nations (1966-70). He is a member of the Institute of International Law and
the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo.
He was among the group of international lawyers and naval experts that pro-
duced the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea. Formerly, he served as Chairman of the Israel national
branch of Amnesty International and was also a member of the Executive
Council of the American Society of International Law. Professor Dinstein is
the editor of the Israel Yearbook ofHuman Rights and has written extensively
on subjects relating to international law, human rights, and the law of armed
conflict.
Professor Rudolf Dolzer is a Professor and the Director, Institute for Inter-
national Law at the University of Bonn, Germany. He attended Gonzaga Uni-
versity on a Fulbright Scholarship and has been a Visiting Professor at the
University of Michigan School of Law, Cornell Law School and the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Dolzer has been a Research Fel-
low, Max-Planck-Institute of Comparative Public Law and International Law.
From 1992 to 1996 he served as Director General in the Office of the German
Federal Chancellor. He is currently a member of the Directorate, German
Society for Foreign Policy; the Advisory Board, Drager-Foundation, Liibeck;
the International Board, Instituto de Empresa, Madrid; the Board of Direc-
tors, International Development Law Institute, Rome; and the German Par-
liament's Commission of Enquiry on Globalization.
Colonel David E. Graham, US Army, is the Chief, International and Op-
erational Law Division within the Office ofThe Judge Advocate General, De-
partment of the Army and the Director, Center for Law and Military
Operations, The Judge Advocate General's School of the Army, Charlottes-
ville, Virginia. During his career in the US Army, which began in 1971, Colo-
nel Graham's other assignments have included Chief, Strategic Planning,
Office of The Judge Advocate General; Staff Judge Advocate, United States
Southern Command; Legal Advisor, Multinational Force and Observers:
Peacekeeping Force, Sinai; and Attorney-Advisor, International Law, Office
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of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, United States Army Europe and
Seventh Army.
Professor Leslie C. Green is a former Charles H. Stockton Professor of In-
ternational Law at the Naval War College (1996-98). After serving in the
British Army during World War II, he held university appointments at the
University of London; University of Singapore; University of Alberta, where
he is University Professor Emeritus; Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea; Uni-
versity of Colorado; and University of Denver. Professor Green's many gov-
ernment appointments include Member and Legal Advisor to the Canadian
delegation to the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Con-
flict (1975-77) and special consultant to the Judge Advocate General, Na-
tional Defence Headquarters. In the latter capacity, he wrote the Canadian
Manual on Armed Conflict Law. Professor Green is the author of numerous
books, including The Contemporary Law Of Armed Conflict, and over 320
papers and articles.
Professor Christopher Greenwood is Professor of International Law at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. He is a Barrister, practic-
ing from Essex Court Chambers in London, and has represented the United
Kingdom before the International Court ofJustice in the Nuclear Weapons and
Lockerbie cases, as well as appearing regularly in the English courts, where his
cases have included Pinochet and the Guantanamo Bay detainees case. Pro-
fessor Greenwood was formerly a Fellow and Lecturer at Magdalene College,
Cambridge, has been a Visiting Professor at the Universities ofMarburg, West
Virginia, and Mississippi, and Director of Studies and Lecturer at the Acad-
emy of International Law in The Hague. He is a regular lecturer at military
colleges, has published a number of articles on international law, and is the
author of a forthcoming book, The Modern Law of Armed Conflict.
Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg is Professor of Public Interna-
tional Law at the University of Frankfurt-Oder and former Professor of Law at
the University of Augsburg, Germany. He was the Rapporteur of the Interna-
tional Law Association Committee on Maritime Neutrality and is currently
the Vice-President of the German Society of Military Law and the Law of
War. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg was among a group of international
lawyers and naval experts who produced the San Remo Manual on Interna-
tional Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. He is a widely published au-
thor of articles and books on the law of the sea and naval warfare.
Ms. Judith A. Miller is a partner at the Williams & Connolly law firm in
Washington, D.C., advising on a wide range of business and governmental is-
sues. She returned to the firm in January 2000, after serving as the General
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Counsel for the Department of Defense. As the General Counsel from 1994 to
1999, she was responsible for advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and
their senior leadership team on the host of legal and policy issues that came
before the Department of Defense, including international affairs and intelli-
gence matters, and operations law. Ms. Miller is the Co-Chair of the Federal
Practice Task Force of the American Bar Association, and a member of the
Defense Science Board, the Standing Committee on Law and National Secu-
rity, and the American Law Institute. She was appointed to the Civil Justice
Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and its follow-on implementation committee, and is on the
Executive Committee of the American Society of International Law.
Lieutenant Colonel Tony E. Montgomery, US Air Force, is the Deputy
Staff Judge Advocate, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida. During his career, which began in 1983, his assign-
ments have included service as the Area Defense Counsel for Florennes Air
Base, Belgium; Chief of Military Justice at Hill Air Force Base, Utah; Staff
Judge Advocate for Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas; Chief, Operations
and International Law for Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia; and from 1998 to 2001, he served as the Deputy
Judge Advocate and Chief, Operations Law, for the United States European
Command. During the summer of 1996, Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery
served as the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commander, Joint Task Force
Southwest Asia.
Professor John Norton Moore is the Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at
the University of Virginia School of Law, and Director of the University's
Center for National Security Law and the Center for Oceans Law & Policy.
Professor Moore chaired the American Bar Association's Standing Commit-
tee on Law and National Security for four terms and has been a member of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)'s Historical Review Board from 1998
to the present. He is the author or editor of 20 books and over 140 scholarly
articles and served for two decades on the editorial board of the American
Journal of International Law. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, the American Law Institute, and the American Society of International
Law. Professor Moore's public service includes two terms as the Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace, as the Coun-
selor on International Law to the Department of State, as Ambassador and
Deputy Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, and Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force
on the Law of the Sea. He has served as a Consultant to both the President's
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Intelligence Oversight Board and the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
Professor Rein Mullerson is Professor and Chair of International Law at
King's College of London University where he is also the Director of the Mas-
ter of Arts Program on International Peace & Security. From 1992-94 he was
Visiting Centennial Professor of the London School of Economics and Politi-
cal Science. He served as the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Estonia during
1991-92 and from 1988-92 Professor Mullerson was a Member of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. He is a member of the Institut de Droit
International. Professor Mullerson is the author of six books on international
law and politics and more than 150 articles and reviews. His latest books are
Human Rights Diplomacy (1997) and Ordering Anarchy: International Law
in International Society (2000).
Professor John F. Murphy is Professor of Law at Villanova University. In
addition to teaching, his career has included a year in India on a Ford Founda-
tion Fellowship, private practice in New York and Washington, D.C., and ser-
vice in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
US Department of State. He was previously on the law faculty at the Univer-
sity of Kansas, and has been a visiting professor at Cornell University and
Georgetown University. From 1980-1981 he was the Charles H. Stockton
Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College. Professor
Murphy is the author or editor of several books and monographs, and is also
the author of numerous articles, comments, and reviews on international law
and relations. Professor Murphy has served as consultant to the US Depart-
ments of State and Justice, the ABA Standing Committee on Law and Na-
tional Security, and the United Nations Crime Bureau, and has testified
before Congress on several occasions. He is currently the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Alternate Observer at the US Mission to the United Nations.
Mr. W. Hays Parks, Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Re-
tired), is Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate General of the United
States Army for Law of War Matters. He has also occupied the Naval War
College's Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law and is Adjunct Pro-
fessor at both George Washington University School of Law and American
University School of Law. A legal adviser for the 1986 air strike against terrorist-
related targets in Libya, Mr. Parks also had primary responsibility for the in-
vestigation of Iraqi war crimes during its 1990-1991 occupation of Kuwait. He
has served as a United States representative for law of war negotiations in
New York, Geneva, The Hague, and Vienna. A frequent lecturer on the law
of military operations at the National, Army, Air Force and Naval War
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Colleges, the service staff colleges, and other service schools such as the Navy
Fighter Weapons School ("Top Gun"), Mr. Parks is widely published in mili-
tary and legal journals. In 2001 he became the fifth person in the history of the
United States Special Operations Command to receive that command's top
civilian award, the U.S. Special Operations Command Outstanding Civilian
Service Medal.
Judge Fausto Pocar is currently serving as a Judge at the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
for Rwanda (ICTR) . He is on leave from the University of Milan where he is
Professor of International Law and where he also served as the Dean of the
Faculty of Political Sciences and as the Vice-President. Judge Pocar has been
constantly involved in United Nations activities. Elected in 1984 as a member
of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, its Chairman in 1991
and 1992. He also conducted various missions for the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (among others in Chechnya in 1995 and in Russia in 1996). He
served several times as a member of the Italian delegation to the General As-
sembly in New York and to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.
Judge Pocar was also a member of the United Nations Committee on the
peaceful uses of outer space. Judge Pocar taught at The Hague Academy of In-
ternational Law and participated, during the past twenty years, in The Hague
Conference on Private International Law. Author of numerous legal publica-
tions, Judge Pocar is a member of various associations, such as the Institut de
droit international and the International Law Association.
Professor Adam Roberts is the Montague Burton Professor of Interna-
tional Relations at Oxford University and a Fellow of Balliol College. He has
been a lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and was the Alastair Buchan Reader in International
Relations and Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford from 1981-86. He has a
three-year Leverhulme Major research Fellowship for 2000-03. He is the au-
thor of numerous articles and books including Nations in Arms: The Theory
and Practice of Territorial Defence and he co-edited Documents on the Law
of War.
Rear Admiral Horace B. Robertson, Jr., JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), served
31 years on active duty with the US Navy, first as a general line officer (surface
warfare) and later as a law specialist and judge advocate. Included among his
assignments were tours as Commanding Officer of an amphibious landing
ship, Special Counsel to the Secretary of the Navy, Special Counsel to the
Chief of Naval Operations, and Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Follow-
ing retirement, Rear Admiral Robertson was appointed Professor of Law at
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Duke University School of Law, where he assumed Emeritus status in 1990.
He is the editor ofThe Law ofNaval Operations, volume 64 of the Naval War
College's International Law Studies (the "Blue Book") series. He was among a
group of academics and naval experts that worked together to produce the
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at
Sea. During 1991-92, he served as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of Inter-
national Law at the US Naval War College.
Professor Natalino Ronzitti is Professor of International Law at the Luiss
University, Rome, Italy. He has been a Visiting Scholar, Wolfson College,
Cambridge; a Fulbright Scholar and Scholar in residence, University of Vir-
ginia School of Law, and twice been a NATO Fellow. Professor Ronzitti has
been a member of numerous Italian delegations at international conferences,
including the 1975 Session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirma-
tion and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflict; International Conference for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); CSCE Meetings on
the Human Dimension: (Paris, 1989; Copenhagen, 1990; Moscow, 1991);
Legal Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference of
Disarmament (Geneva), 1991-95; the XLVIIth Session of the First Commit-
tee of the United Nations General Assembly; Non-Proliferation Treaty Re-
view and Extension Conference (New York, 1995); and the Review
Conference of the Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively In-
jurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Vienna, 1995). He was also a mem-
ber for the Italian Government of the Preparatory Commission for the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use ofChemical Weapons and their Destruction (The Hague) (1993-97)
and has been a consultant for various departments of the Italian Government
on European Union affairs and international humanitarian law. Professor
Ronzitti is a member of the Editorial board of the Italian Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law, of the International Spectator (Rome) and of the Journal of Con-
flict & Security Law.
Professor Joel H. Rosenthal is President of the Carnegie Council on Eth-
ics and International Affairs. Founded in 1914 by Andrew Carnegie, the Car-
negie Council is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
dedicated to research and education in the field of ethics and international af-
fairs. The Carnegie Council's purpose is to promote understanding of the val-
ues and conditions that ensure peaceful relations among nations. Professor
Rosenthal is editor of the journal Ethics & International Affairs and author of
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the book, Righteous Realists (1991). He is also editor of Ethics and Interna-
tional Affairs: A Reader (2nd edition, 1999). Among his current professional
activities, Professor Rosenthal serves as co-director of the Carnegie Coun-
cil/National War College working group on "Ethics and the Future of Interna-
tional Conflict," and coordinates the Council's programs on "Ethics and U.S.
Foreign Policy." He also serves as Adjunct Professor in the Department of Pol-
itics at New York University.
Professor Nicholas Rostow is the General Counsel, United States Mission
to the United Nations. Prior to that appointment he was the Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. Pro-
fessor Rostow has served in senior positions in both the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the United States Government. These include Staff Director
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; Deputy Staff Director and
Counsel of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Mili-
tary/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (more famil-
iarly known as the Cox Committee); Special Assistant to the State
Department's Legal Adviser; as a Special Assistant to Presidents Reagan and
Bush; and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council. In addition to gov-
ernment service, Professor Rostow has taught law and history at the Univer-
sity of Tulsa and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His publications
are in the fields of international law and diplomatic history.
Professor Yves Sandoz is the former Director for International Law and
Communication of the International Law of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) . Professor Sandoz is the author or editor of numerous
publications in the field of international humanitarian law and international
criminal law, including the Commentary on the Additional Protocols to of 8
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which he authored
in part and for which he served as co-editor. He has taught at the Interna-
tional Institute ofHuman Rights in Strasbourg, France and The Hague Acad-
emy of International Law. He actively participated in the creation of the
University Center for International Humanitarian Law, in Geneva, where he
is currently teaching. As of November 2002, he is a member of the ICRC.
Professor Ivan Shearer is the Challis Professor of International Law at the
University of Sydney. He was formerly Professor of Law and Dean of the Fac-
ulty of Law at the University of New South Wales, where he was awarded
Emeritus status in 1993. He has been a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College,
Oxford, and held visiting appointments at universities in Germany and
Greece. Professor Shearer is the Vice President of the International Law Asso-
ciation (Australian branch), and on the editorial board of three professional
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journals. He is a member of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law,
San Remo, and was among a group of international lawyers and naval experts
that produced the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea. He holds the rank of Captain in the Royal Australian
Naval Reserve, and in that capacity gives advice within the Department of
Defence and frequent lectures on the law of the sea and international law to
various service bodies. During 2000-01, he served as the Charles H. Stockton
Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College.
Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, US Air Force (Ret.) served as
Commander Allied Forces Southern Europe, Stabilization Forces Air Compo-
nent, Naples Italy and Commander, 16th Air Force and 16 th Air and Space Ex-
peditionary Task Force, US Air Forces in Europe from 1998 until his
retirement on July 1, 2000. As such he was responsible for the planning and
employment of NATO's air forces in the Mediterranean area of operations
from Gibraltar to Eastern Turkey, including the command of operations dur-
ing NATO's Kosovo air campaign. Earlier assignments as a flag officer in-
cluded service as the Assistant Director of Operations, Headquarters Air
Combat Command; Director of Joint Training and Exercises, US Atlantic
Command; Chief of Staff, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe; and Director
O^ Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe. Lieutenant General
Short was a command pilot with more than 4,600 flying hours in fighter air-
craft, including 276 combat missions in Southeast Asia.
Professor Henry Shue is Senior Research Fellow in the Department of
Politics and International Relations, as well as Senior Research Fellow at Mer-
ton College, University of Oxford. He has written on dual-purpose facilities as
military objectives, the morality of war and of nuclear deterrence, and the
strength of obligations across national boundaries. After teaching at the Uni-
versity ofNorth Carolina and Wellesley College, he was a founding member of
the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, and
then the first Director of the Program on Ethics and Public Life, Cornell Uni-
versity. His publications include Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and
U.S. Foreign Policy (1980; 2nd edition, 1996), Nuclear Deterrence and Moral
Restraint (editor, 1989), and "Bombing to Rescue? NATO's 1999 Bombing of
Serbia" in Ethics and Foreign Intervention (2003).
Professor Scott L. Silliman is a professor of the practice of law at the Duke
University School of Law, as well as Executive Director of the Law School's
Center on Law, Ethics and National Security. He also holds appointments as
an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill and at North Carolina Central University, and as an Adjunct Lecturer in
542
Appendix B
_======___
Law at Wake Forest University School of Law. Professor Silliman served as a
United States Air Force judge advocate from 1968 until his retirement in the
grade of colonel in 1993. During his career as a military attorney, he held a
variety of leadership positions, including staff judge advocate at two large in-
stallations and three major Air Force commands. In his last assignment, as
the senior attorney for Air Combat Command, he was general counsel to the
commander of the largest principal organization within the Air Force. Profes-
sor Silliman is a frequent commentator on national radio and television news
programs on issues involving military law and national security. He is a mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee to the ABA's Standing Committee on Law
and National Security and of the Board of Directors of the Triangle World
Affairs Council.
Colonel Richard B. Sorenson, US Air Force, is the StaffJudge Advocate,
19th Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force
Base, Texas. Colonel Sorenson entered active duty with the United States Air
Force in May 1976. He served as an Air Force aviator for five years before at-
tending the University of Minnesota School of Law from which he graduated
in 1984. His assignments as an Air Force judge advocate have included ser-
vice as Chief, Aviation Tort Claims and Litigation, Headquarters Air Force
and as Chief, Operations Law Division, Headquarters, United States Air
Forces in Europe at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Colonel Sorenson served as
the lead Air Force attorney for litigation arising from the terrorist bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
Professor Torsten Stein holds the Chair for European Law and European
Comparative Law and is the Director of the Europe Institute at the University
of Saarland, Saarbrucken, Germany. He has been a Senior Research Fellow at
the Max-Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and Public Interna-
tional Law in Heidelberg and has often served as rapporteur for committees of
the International Law Association (ILA). He is currently the Honorary Secre-
tary and Executive Director of the ILA's German branch and a member of the
ILA's Executive Council, and a member of the Advisory Boards of the Acad-
emy of European Law Trier and the European Academy Otzenhausen. Profes-
sor Stein is also a Colonel in the German Air Force Reserve.
Professor Barry S. Strauss is Professor of History and Classics at Cornell
University where he was also Director of the Peace Studies Program,
1995-2002. Professor Strauss has held fellowships from the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities and the University Center for Human Values at
Princeton University, as well as research grants from the Littauer Memorial
Foundation, the Korea Foundation, and the U.S. Department of Education.
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He has published several books including The Anatomy of Error: The Lessons
of Ancient Military Disasters for Modern Strategists (1990) and War and De-
mocracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian
War (2001), which he co-edited. Professor Strauss is currently writing a book
on the battle of Salamis (480 B.C.) and the ancient clash of civilizations.
Professor Robert F. Turner holds both professional and academic doctor-
ates from the University of Virginia School of Law, where in 1981 he co-
founded the Center for National Security Law. He continues to serve as the
Center's Associate Director. A former three-term chairman of the ABA
Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and Editor of the ABA
National Security Law Report for many years, he previously served as a Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and as the first President of the congres-
sionally-established U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. The author
or editor of more than a dozen books and numerous articles, Professor Turner
has testified before more than a dozen congressional committees. During
1994-1995, he held the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at
the Naval War College.
Professor George K. Walker is Professor of Law, Wake Forest University
School of Law. He was the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International
Law at the US Naval War College from 1992-93. Professor Walker retired as
a Captain in the US Naval Reserve after serving aboard destroyers, qualifying
as a Surface Warfare Officer, and duty as Commanding Officer of six Naval
Reserve units. He was a Woodrow Wilson fellow at Duke University and re-
ceived a Sterling Fellowship while holding a research position at Yale Law
School. Professor Walker has edited or written ten books and over forty book
chapters, law journals, and continuing education publications, as well as sev-
eral state statutes. He is the author of The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and
Policy, volume 76 of the Naval War College's International Law Studies (the
"Blue Book") series. Professor Walker was among the group of international
lawyers and naval experts that produced the San Remo Manual on Interna-
tional Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. He has served as a vice pres-
ident of the North Carolina Bar Association and on the Executive Council of
the American Society of International Law. Professor Walker is also a member
of the American Law Institute.
Lieutenant Andru E. Wall, JAGC, US Navy, is on the faculty of the US
Naval War College as a member of the International Law Department. Lieu-
tenant Wall was commissioned in 1997 and after graduating from the Naval
Justice School he reported to the Naval Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic. In
1999 he was assigned as Staff Judge Advocate for Commander, Amphibious
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Squadron Six where he served during a Mediterranean and Red Sea deploy-
ment. Lieutenant Wall has taught international law at the US Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island since June 2000. In addition, he serves as
adjunct faculty at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San
Remo, Italy and the Roger Williams University School of Law in Bristol,
Rhode Island.
Professor Ruth G. Wedgwood is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School,
and is also Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on International Organi-
zations and Law at the Council in Foreign Relations in New York City. Cur-
rently on a leave of absence from Yale Law School, she is serving as the
Edward B. Burling Professor of International Law at the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Professor Wedgwood is a member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Com-
mittee on International Law, and is Vice President of the International Law
Association (American branch). During 1998-99, she served as the Charles
H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College.
She has written and lectured widely on Security Council politics, United
Nations peacekeeping, war crimes, and UN reform. She is a former law clerk
to Judge Henry Friendly of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and Justice Harry Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Executive Editor
of the Yale Law Journal. Professor Wedgwood served as amicus curiae in the
case of Prosecutor v. Blaskic at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.
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